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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation explores the role of cognition—the elements, structures and processes of indi-
vidual and collective thought—in finding effective, cooperative solutions to climate change. It 
makes three contributions—theoretical, empirical, and methodological—to international rela-
tions scholarship. First, it explores cognition as a significant variable in international political 
life, developing an analytical framework that not only links a cognitive framework of analysis to 
major IR theories but bridges current theoretical divides between rationalism and constructivism. 
Second, by identifying and visualizing current belief systems of participants in global climate 
negotiations, the thesis offers insights regarding cognitive obstacles to multilateral cooperation. 
The most important obstacle is a clash of substantively and emotionally different belief systems. 
Depending on the specific constellation of a person’s beliefs about collective identity, percep-
tions of climate-change threat, and associated emotions, some belief systems contain normative 
beliefs about justice (i.e., a dominant logic of appropriateness), while others do not. The latter 
belief systems reflect the national-interest logic of consequences. Focusing in particular on the 
“wicked” characteristics of climate change, the analysis further reveals a neglect of scientific 
knowledge (in particular knowledge of the possibility of climate tipping points), a serious under-
valuation of the distant future, and perceptions of a number of constraints on agency, some of 
which cannot be resolved within the negotiations. The study also identifies six distinct belief sys-
tems among climate negotiators, which I label The International Community, A Minilateral Club, 
The Market, Individuals, The Developed World, and The Irresponsible West. The key element 
distinguishing these belief systems is actor type, which affects problem definitions, proposed so-
lutions, political strategies, and more generally an actor’s role in global climate governance. 
Third, this dissertation expands the methodological toolbox available to IR scholars by demon-
strating the value and synergistic power of cognitive-affective mapping and Q Method. These are 
powerful tools to reveal individual and collective belief systems respectively. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
"Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results." 
(Rita Mae Brown, 1983) 
 
After more than 20 years of failed diplomatic efforts under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) one might conclude that international cooperation 
on climate change is a hopeless endeavor—another Conference of the Parties (COP) would be 
a waste of time, money and greenhouse gases (GHG). Is it insane to keep negotiating climate 
change, expecting different results from the same diplomatic tools? Or are there yet undiscov-
ered levers for changing the political dynamics? And is it insane to keep studying the issue, 
expecting different insights from the same theoretical approaches? Or are there yet unex-
plored, more productive lenses? 
The continuing disputes over climate policies at all levels of governance are slowly dimin-
ishing not only existing optimism that an effective global deal can be struck, but also the col-
lective ability of the international community to contain climate change within ‘non-
dangerous’ limits. Given the nature of the climate problem this collective ability is a moving 
target (Stocker 2013). With more time passing without effective climate policies, both the po-
tential impacts of climate change, and humanity’s abilities to address this problem—through 
mitigation, adaptation or geoengineering—are changing, most likely declining (Rogelj et al. 
2013). 
This situation raises a fundamental question for a student of international politics: What 
are the conditions for multilateral cooperation on climate change? Much scholarship has been 
devoted to this issue, offering competing explanations for the absence of cooperation without 
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providing much guidance for overcoming the obstacles identified. Defining climate change as 
a collective action problem subject to Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968) non-
cooperation is explained by reference to a rationally unwilling hegemon (Falkner 2006; 
Sunstein 2007), hegemonic rivalry (Paterson 2009), or the lack of a hegemon (Hampson 
1989), a regime complex (Keohane and Victor 2011), regime fragmentation (Zelli 2011), re-
gime ossification (Depledge 2006), or different perceptions of justice across the North-South 
divide (Roberts and Parks 2006). The key problem from a neorealist and neoliberal institu-
tionalist perspective is structural—power differences and economic interests favor inaction. 
From a social constructivist perspective climate change is an issue of justice, based on ideas 
of North-South relations, exploitation and responsibility. Since the structural conditions ap-
pear unchangeable on a policy-relevant time scale and it remains unclear how to untie the 
Gordian equity knot, scholars of international relations (IR) are shifting their attention from 
the problem of elusive state cooperation to a more descriptive analysis of non-state actors 
(Schroeder and Lovell 2012) and bottom-up solutions (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Pattberg 
and Stripple 2008; Betsill and Corell 2011; Hoffmann 2011). 
While such theoretical pluralism is desirable when exploring a new problem, its inconclu-
siveness and inadequate provision of policy guidance is frustrating from a practical perspec-
tive. Relying on existing explanations of failure rather than devising strategies for success is 
also passive and pessimistic, and does not realize the full potential of IR scholarship, which 
should aspire to improve international politics and its outcomes. Finally, while the theories 
seem to explain the observed reality of non-cooperation, most of the existing research relies 
on assumptions about the interests and beliefs of actors that have not been empirically vali-
dated.  
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IR Seems to have reached a theoretical and empirical boundary this dissertation seeks to 
push out a little further. Moving beyond static-descriptive work I am interested in an emanci-
patory approach—developing a type of knowledge that can facilitate change. The necessary 
starting point for this endeavor is the place where I believe all change starts: in the mind. 
 
I. A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Human behavior is often purposeful. People act to achieve certain goals, such as protec-
tion from harm, generation of wealth, or relief of human suffering. Goal-directedness can give 
actions meaning (Schelling 1978, 17–19). IR theory attributes the ability to act purposefully to 
collective actors, including states, terrorist networks, transnational NGOs or epistemic com-
munities. Collective behavior requires shared beliefs about the things that exist and about cau-
sality, as well as ways and means to change these shared beliefs over time. However, IR the-
ory has remained uninterested in the mental processes—individual or collective—that create 
these shared beliefs, and instead has focused on what people do. Even social constructivists, 
who emphasize the importance of inter-subjectivity, shy away from the analysis of cognitive 
processes in favor of analyzing the causal role of ideas.   
Taking constructivism seriously, there should be multiple possibilities to interpret and re-
spond to the current material structure, which is believed to be the key obstacle to cooperation 
by most theorists and practitioners dealing with climate change politics and governance. The 
material structure refers to the current distribution of tangible sources of power among all 
units of the system—states, including their military might, economic power, and geographic 
features like territory and natural resources. From a constructivist perspective agents should 
be able to choose responses rather than being structurally forced into their current perceptions 
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of interests and identities (Wendt 1992). However, it remains unclear what alternative inter-
pretations of the given system structure are possible, and how a change in identities, beliefs or 
norms that could sustain such alternatives could be brought about. So far there is no detailed 
analysis of how individuals (persons rather than states) think about their interests—individual 
or collective - in the context of the climate change problem, what they believe to be the appli-
cable norms, and what they perceive to be requirements for cooperation. It is unclear whether 
state representatives in fact have rational thoughts about costs and benefits or structural 
threats and opportunities, normative considerations of historical responsibility and justice, or a 
combination of these. If different individuals hold fundamentally different beliefs, how do 
they differ and why?  
This is a lacuna—both empirical and theoretical—that this study begins to fill. Identifying 
what political actors believe today, this study offers unique views into the cognitive reasons 
for non-cooperation on climate policy that extend beyond the theoretical explanations offered 
by IR scholarship so far. This research explores the role of cognition—the elements, struc-
tures and processes of individual and collective thought—for finding effective, cooperative 
solutions to climate change. The central research question is: 
What cognitive elements and processes promote or inhibit cooperation to 
achieve effective responses to climate change?  
The subjects of inquiry are thoughts and beliefs of individuals and groups, not their 
sources (e.g., system structure) or their consequences (e.g., decisions, behavior). This focus 
on the mental mechanisms connecting decision-relevant factors and the observed political be-
havior differentiates my research from previous work on climate politics but also IR scholar-
ship more generally.  
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Given the interest of cognitive analysis in ideas, in other words, the conceptual content of 
beliefs, it is important to understand how it differs in particular from social constructivism. 
Social constructivist theories have sought to counter structural theories with the argument that 
ideas matter, and have accorded causal power to various kinds of ideas. Ideas themselves are 
believed to produce or at least influence political outcomes. The distinct causal assumption of 
a cognitive approach is that agents rather than ideas produce political outcomes. An agent is 
motivated by a specific belief system that provides both the foundation and constraints for 
political decision-making. Further, ideas and beliefs can be understood as the results of brain 
processes rooted in the biological functions of the human body. Cognition is therefore best 
understood as a set of observable actor-level processes that bridge the material-social world 
and its given ideational structure (cognitive input) on the one side and political decisions and 
behavior (cognitive output) on the other. A gate might serve as a useful metaphor: cognition 
can be conceptualized as the gate through which information about and perceptions of the ma-
terial and social environment passes in order to lead to a decision or behavior. 
Given this bridging or gate-keeping function cognition is not independent of system struc-
ture and ideas. Rather it uses available informational resources to enable purposeful and 
meaningful action. Sometimes cognition creates systemic novelty: the cognitive processes of 
different individuals can produce different and sometimes unexpected results. Small differ-
ences in the set up of the ‘mental machinery’ within the individual brain at a certain point in 
time can lead to different interpretations of the material or ideational reality and consequently 
different decisions. Based on this focus on the mind, a cognitive approach is naturally con-
cerned with issues of agency, intention formation, identity, and the links between thoughts, 
actions and political outcomes.   
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The cognitive approach is not a rival theory to IR’s ‘big three’—neorealism, neoliberal in-
stitutionalism, and social constructivism—but a complementary perspective that is able to 
speak to existing work and even integrate past insights across different theoretical schools. 
Identifying parts of the cognitive status quo in global climate politics—the cognitive system 
structure if you will—this research also provides the foundation for change—change that be-
gins in the mind.  
Three conceptions of cognition that are not without contention heavily shape my work. 
All of these issues will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2. First, adopting the dominant 
view among cognitive scientists, I reject mind-brain duality and conceive of mental processes 
as brain processes, rooted in neural activity, chemistry and more generally biological func-
tions of the human body. Second, I argue that there is an intimate connection between cogni-
tion and emotion and reject the separation of the cognitive and affective systems. While the 
emphasis on emotions for human thought and choice has a long history (e.g., Hume’s senti-
mentalism), the subject has so far had very little relevance in IR scholarship. One of the rea-
sons for this neglect might have been the lack of tools and methods to analyze emotional phe-
nomena. With this research project I make some progress on both fronts, acknowledging emo-
tions in my theoretical framework and experimenting with new methods to make emotions 
empirically tractable. Third, I suggest that cognition is best understood in complex system 
terms. Rather than looking at individual cognitive elements such as distinct beliefs, theories of 
cognition need to address the relationship between individual cognitive elements and larger 
system dynamics. One can describe sets of cognitive elements and their links as networks of 
meaning, such as political ideologies (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008) and frames (Nelson; 
Benford and Snow 2000), problem-specific or conflict narratives (Smith 2007), or social dis-
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courses (Maguire 2004). This project is concerned with specific networks of meaning that are 
a subset of the beliefs of a specific group of individuals: the belief systems of participants in 
the global climate negotiations about climate change and multilateral cooperation.  
The rationale for focusing on cognition is supported and contextualized by four distinct 
scholarly developments outside the field of IR. 
(1) A growing number of scholars in other social science disciplines (e.g., social psychol-
ogy, communication and decision sciences) are turning their attention to the analysis of cogni-
tive barriers to engagement with climate change at the level of citizens, ideological groups, or 
local communities. Key questions of this research include the role of emotions (Lorenzoni et 
al. 2006; Wolf and Moser 2011; Roeser 2012), cultural elements (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and 
Braman 2011; Leiserowitz in Moser and Dilling 2007, chap. 2), ideologies (Weber 2010; 
Antilla 2005; McCright and Dunlap 2000), communicative strategies including the use of im-
agery (O’Neill et al. 2013), and physical experience of climatic events (Dessai et al. 2004; 
Spence et al. 2011) as factors in shaping individual responses to and public opinion on climate 
change (Norgaard 2006b; Norgaard 2011). Shifting from ‘lack of information’- and ‘lack of 
concern’-explanations to more complex processes in the human mind, this body of work is 
creating important insights regarding the cognitive barriers to bottom-up, political mobiliza-
tion for climate change action. It has important implications for domestic political processes 
and can be used to improve national and sub-national policy-making. However, its relevance 
for understanding the UN negotiation process is limited to indirect effects, for instance, the 
impact of climate skepticism in the US on the international climate science community and 
the functioning of the IPCC, or the role of cognitive barriers to climate action in the emer-
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gence, strategies and effectiveness of transnational NGOs that participate in the UNFCCC 
proceedings. 
(2) There is an increasing academic interest in the history of ideas (Heymann 2010; Jaeger 
and Jaeger 2010; Weart 2010), the role of different forms of knowledge (Lahsen 2010), and 
imagination (Yusoff and Gabrys 2011) in the context of climate change. The underlying as-
sumption of these studies is that ideas—rather than structures or economic power—can shape 
governance institutions, social structures and individual lives. More importantly, when ideas 
change, they change the institutions built around them. Key issues when exploring the role of 
ideas for climate governance have included the formulation in Article 2 of the UNFCCC, 
which states that the goal of the Convention is to “… prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system” (Lowe and Lorenzoni 2007; Lenton 2011a), and the political 
agreement formalized at the Copenhagen summit of keeping the global average temperature 
increase below 2°C (Randalls 2010; Jaeger and Jaeger 2010; Bellamy and Hulme 2011). This 
work raises important questions regarding political actors’ tendencies and abilities to use dif-
ferent ideas in their efforts to create a climate governance regime.  
(3) Over the last two decades there have been notable advances in the cognitive sciences, 
including the neurosciences, in understanding human thinking and the inextricable link be-
tween cognition and emotion (Damasio 1995; Thagard 2006; Moser in Moser and Dilling 
2007, chap. 3). This has been accompanied by the development of computational tools for the 
study of cognition, including agent-based models (Lustick and Miodownik 2009), neural net-
work models (Thagard 2006), automated text analysis, and cognitive-affective mapping 
(Findlay and Thagard 2012). So far, with a few notable exceptions (Mercer 2005a; Mercer 
2010; Moisi 2009; Sasley 2011; McDoom 2012) these advances have hardly been utilized in 
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the analysis of global politics. Despite the availability of novel tools and research strategies 
there are no studies that explore the role of cognition and emotion in multilateral climate 
change negotiations. 
(4) Climate change has given rise to a small body of research on wicked problems and the 
associated questions of how to address problems in this special category, that presumably are 
not open to standard political responses (Verweij et al. 2006; Levin et al. 2009; Prins et al. 
2010; Levin et al. 2012). The different characteristics of wickedness and many issues regard-
ing the appropriate social responses to these characteristics remain contested. Do political ac-
tors recognize these special problem characteristics? How do they acquire relevant knowledge 
and how does this knowledge affect their beliefs about governance and cooperation?  
Taken together, these findings suggest that focusing on the role of cognition in the analy-
sis of international climate politics can generate significant new insights. Investigating cogni-
tive processes of individuals and groups that take part in international political processes—
diplomats, NGO and private sector representatives—raises important questions regarding the 
nature, content and specific characteristics of their thought patterns in contrast to the cognitive 
responses of citizens and domestic political actors.  
Critics might argue that a cognitive approach is too reductionist because it claims that all 
political phenomena can be traced back to individual psychology. The previous paragraphs 
have already begun to counter the reductionist challenge, outlining a definition of cognition 
that integrates individual brain processes with a range of material and social factors (cognitive 
input variables) as well as political decisions and behavior (cognitive output variables). In-
stead of being reductionist, this cognitive approach is systemic, viewing cognitive processes 
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as elements in larger social-material systems with important transmitter functions between 
system conditions and political behavior.  
Second, rather than seeking to explain political phenomena with individual thought proc-
esses, this cognitive approach places emphasis on the relationship between individual and col-
lective cognitive processes, what I call the person-group problem (PGP). The ontological 
status of collective cognitions is a major problem with importance across several social sci-
ence disciplines. IR not only treats the state as a unitary actor but also often implicitly as-
sumes the thinking state. In contrast a cognitive approach distinguishes between the individual 
and group-level of analysis, offering tools to explore this relationship between multiple levels. 
Nevertheless, one could still fundamentally question the value of a focus on individual 
minds because such an approach fails to acknowledge the relevance of all social processes, 
conditions and institutions that might have created these beliefs. If one assumes, like Mary 
Douglas does (Douglas 1986), that ‘the social’ is prior to individual cognitive processes, and 
in fact shapes and determines individual thought, then a focus on individual minds would 
seem futile – it would confuse the independent and dependent variables.   
However, neither the individual mind nor the social mind should be prioritized. Rather 
than focusing on one or the other, the interaction and mutual interdependence between the in-
dividual mind and the social environment are key for understanding existing beliefs and belief 
dynamics. It is unclear how much cognitive “freedom” or self-determination rests with the 
individual, and to what extent a person’s belief have been received from the social environ-
ment or even imposed by it. But even when acknowledging the crucial interactions between 
the individual and the social, I argue that much can be gained from using the individual mind 
as an entry point to the analysis. Most importantly, the rules that apply to the individual brain 
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condition what types of belief systems are possible, and those constraints also apply to shared 
or collective beliefs. Further, understanding individual cognitive processes allows the re-
searcher to understand how social processes affect individual beliefs – which ideas are 
adopted or rejected and why. Finally, a focus on social factors cannot explain how these social 
phenomena came into existence in the first place – every institution, practice or ideology had 
to start in an individual mind. Individual minds are also relevant for triggering processes that 
can change existing social structures. Consequently a focus on cognition, defined as individ-
ual brain processes, offers potentially valuable insights that cannot be gained with a focus on 
‘the social’. 
 
II. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
This is an explorative study that aims to gather initial empirical insights to support theory-
building efforts. The project investigates current cognitive patterns among political actors en-
gaged in multilateral negotiations to create a global climate change governance regime. Below 
I outline the conceptual framework for answering the main research question: 
What cognitive elements and processes promote or inhibit cooperation to 
achieve effective responses to climate change?  
This question raises two distinct two sub-issues. First, how can one describe the current 
cognitive reality, in other words, what are the most important and maybe most common cog-
nitive elements and processes in the minds of climate change negotiators? Second, how do 
these cognitive patterns impact ongoing political efforts to create a cooperative multilateral 
agreement on climate change? 
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1. Cognitive Elements and Processes  
Is it possible to identify types of cognitive elements (e.g., concepts, beliefs) or processes 
(e.g., risk assessments) that are recurrent in the belief systems of different individuals with 
different views on global climate governance? I distinguish two types of cognitive elements 
and processes: (a) general elements that are essential for an actor’s thinking about any issue in 
a multilateral political setting, for example, an actor’s self-representation, concepts regarding 
other actors or regarding the relevant structural and normative context, and (b) elements and 
processes that are specific to climate change and are not expected to play a major role in other 
political contexts, for instance, an actor’s mental representations of special problem character-
istics such as climate tipping points. Concerning general elements (a) I focus on mental repre-
sentations concerning structural constraint and agency, identity and justice, reflecting well-
known theoretical categories in IR scholarship. Assuming that these three broad categories are 
essential cognitive elements across various political situations – individuals cannot make 
sense of reality without using these categories – I call these meta-concepts.  
 
2. Influence on International Cooperation  
Do these two groups of cognitive elements and processes—especially the interaction be-
tween meta-concepts and the special characteristics of climate change—have any discernible 
effect on actors’ ability to develop cooperative responses to climate change? In other words, 
what types of concepts and thought processes are relevant for (non-)cooperative decisions of 
climate change negotiators? 
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3. Initial Hypothesis 
I approached the research question in three steps, each guided by an initial hypothesis: (1) 
identification of relevant concepts and concept categories for individual and collective deci-
sion-making, (2) qualitative exploration of the cognitive effects of a set of special characteris-
tics of climate change, (3) analysis of the interactive effect of (1) and (2) on the ability of in-
ternational policy-makers to agree on effective, cooperative solutions to climate change. 
Hypothesis 1: There are at least three types of (meta-)concepts in the belief systems 
of climate negotiators that are relevant for the emergence and sustainability of coop-
eration within the UNFCCC: those related to structural constraints of agency, collec-
tive identity, and norms of justice. Combinations of these concepts form coherent 
cognitive clusters (i.e., belief systems) that provide the foundation for shared beliefs, 
official negotiation positions, and collective decision-making. 
Hypothesis 2: Some characteristics of climate change pose major cognitive obstacles 
to international cooperation. These include (i) the overwhelming complexity of the 
problem leading to a sense of hopelessness, (ii) uncertainty and the particular time 
scales of climate change, requiring long-term thinking in the face of short-term ori-
ented political and ethical decision-making, and (iii) the imperceptibility of climate 
change for the average person on a daily basis leading to a lack of urgency. 
Hypothesis 3: Some special problem characteristics inhibit international cooperation, 
because they limit both rational decision-making and the role of emotion to create a 
strong motivation for climate action (beliefs about agency). These characteristics in-
clude the long problem time scales of climate change, which require the cognitive 
ability to imagine qualitatively different distant futures (i.e., non-linear change and 
tipping points) in order to assess the potential costs of non-cooperation or benefits of 
cooperation. 
Step one is about cognition in international decision-making generally—what are the rele-
vant concepts? Step two is issue-specific, asking whether the general cognitive features are 
influenced by the nature of the problem at hand. Step three explores the relevance of these 
basic insights for the chances of international cooperation.  
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III. METHODOLOGY: NEW AND ESTABLISHED TOOLS TO EXPLORE          
SUBJECTIVITY 
In contrast to more conventional research designs this project seeks to identify, visualize, 
and analyze subjectivity rather than material variables or behavior. To this end I deploy two 
complementary methodological tools: cognitive-affective mapping and Q method. These two 
instruments served to identify the content and structure of participants’ belief system at the 
time of the interview or Q sort in the spring and summer of 2012. First, I developed 55 cogni-
tive-affective maps (CAMs) based on semi-structured interviews to generate insights into the 
views of specific individuals at particular point in time (‘cognitive snapshots’). The CAM re-
flect the substance of the interview transcripts, using exclusively the language and terminol-
ogy offered by study participants. Second, I conducted a Q study with a self-selected subset of 
this participant group to identify different ideal-type belief systems (factors) that are shared by 
a number of individuals. The Q study took place several months after the initial interview 
with the study participants. All 55 study participants who had been interviewed were invited 
to the Q study; 28 decided to participate. The Q sort ran on an online platform and did not in-
volve any face-to-face interaction or follow-up interview between the participants and myself. 
Cognitive-affective mapping and Q method are independent research instruments, but as I will 
describe in more detail in chapter 5, the results complement each other. Before highlighting 
some of the key features that made these two methodological approaches very well suited to 
pursue my research questions, I provide a rationale for working with participants in the global 
climate negotiations, especially diplomats representing states in the UNFCCC. 
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1. Working with Diplomats 
Investigating the private beliefs of diplomats (international negotiators) rather than those 
of their political masters within national governments has major advantages, but also some 
serious drawbacks that place important limitations on the conclusions that can be drawn from 
this research. A central issue for this discussion is the fundamental distinction between private 
beliefs and public preferences or negotiation positions (Feldman 1988; Hamm, Miller, and 
Ling 1992; Niemeyer 2011). The key question is whether there is any utility in exploring the 
beliefs of negotiators, who could be considered as mere messengers of their domestic political 
masters and therefore powerless executors of mandates in the creation of a cooperative 
agreement between states. Below I present three arguments why working with diplomats is 
both useful and necessary for the purpose of this project and offered unique advantages over 
other possible participant groups and methodological possibilities. 
(1) I assume that the beliefs of individual negotiators contain the most detailed and rich 
points of view regarding the global aspects of the climate challenge, and they can differ from 
the beliefs of domestic actors due to negotiators’ unique experience of climate change as a 
governance challenge. Diplomats have a deep comprehension of the issue because it is their 
job and professional responsibility to address climate change in a multilateral setting. They 
have maximum access to the evolving scientific information, they are frequently exposed to 
the views of other global actors, and they have to present and justify their national position in 
a coherent manner continuously. This constant exposure to other actors’ views is a unique 
element that expands the perspectives of diplomats—the range of ideas and arguments they 
have to consider and respond to. At the same time these unique features can also lead to nar-
row understandings of the climate problem, perceived purely in multilateral treaty terms and 
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divorced from on-the-ground realities. Diplomats are also the links between domestic and the 
international political processes, making their cognitive reality crucial for the cross-scale in-
teractions. They are a two-way communication channel, relaying a domestic message to the 
international community and carrying decisions, questions and tasks from the multilateral fo-
rum into the domestic political sphere. Because of these specific circumstances the beliefs of 
negotiators should be more comprehensive and sensitive to global complexities than those of 
domestic political actors, who are not required to take all those elements into account. Further, 
diplomats focus on the multilateral context, which is subject of this study, rather than the do-
mestic politics of climate change. This global political debate is different than the domestic 
one; it has not only different participants, but also different conceptual elements, processes 
and technicalities. Finally, the ‘lifeworld’ (Habermas 1985) of negotiators is shaped by their 
continuous interaction in varying negotiation settings—massive conferences attended by sev-
eral thousand people, moving between plenary sessions, contact groups, drafts of bracketed 
texts, interactions with civil society observers, and lots of travel time—and the rhythm of 
moving between this multilateral setting and the domestic politics. In short, the set of global-
level discourses on climate change and cooperation differs from domestic discourses, al-
though naturally there will be major overlap between the different system scales.   
(2) Importantly, the belief systems of climate negotiators contain what one could call the 
current possibility space of problem definitions and solutions that human beings are capable 
of conceiving. This study reveals belief systems that are possible, whether or not they are pub-
licly revealed in the form of negotiation positions. Private beliefs of diplomats can differ sig-
nificantly from the official negotiation position the individual presents in the UNFCCC con-
text, but his or her point of view is a valid point of view for a person with that nationality. 
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These private views have been shaped by the same multiplicity of social, political and cultural 
factors that influence domestic decision-makers, but are also subject to an additional global 
set of influences. Therefore investigating the private beliefs of climate change negotiators 
leads to a more complete understanding of the landscape of possible ways of thinking about 
and responding to climate change. This very basic insight contributes to our understanding of 
the nature of belief systems, their content and structure. It also allows us to stipulate features 
of the belief systems that could be successful in domestic contexts.  
(3) Another useful argument for working with negotiators is the fact that they are compa-
rable. The similarity of their roles as representatives of governments in the UNFCCC process 
ensures the comparability of the viewpoints gathered. A study involving domestic decision-
makers would have faced major difficulties in this regard. A multitude of different actors 
(e.g., various ministries, departments, agencies, industry players, parliamentarians) is in-
volved in the process of determining negotiation positions or national climate policies. The 
relevant set of actors would have differed across countries, making a useful comparison diffi-
cult, if not impossible. In addition, the domestic landscape of discourses is likely to be so dif-
ferent that it would have been very difficult to implement a Q study (see chapter 5). 
But aren’t the subjective views of diplomats irrelevant? Diplomats are constrained by ne-
gotiation mandates that provide clear and insurmountable constraints on their positions; it 
simply does not matter what these individuals think. Yet, as I have already argued, we can 
learn a lot from the private beliefs of diplomats regarding the nature (i.e., content and struc-
ture) and the existing possibility space of belief systems on this topic. Further, in the case of 
small and developing states, delegation heads (often the state’s Ambassador to the United Na-
tions in New York) often have significant freedom to determine their country’s negotiation 
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position and climate change response strategy more generally. Their personal beliefs tend to 
overlap strongly, if not completely, with what they state in the formal negotiation process.  
Finally, it is not the goal of this study to improve the clearly limited power of negotiators 
to create a cooperative agreement. Rather, my goal is to understand the nature of existing be-
liefs and their relevance for multilateral cooperation, assuming that these would be valid 
viewpoints in political debates and that there is a possibility of engaging domestic political 
audiences based on these viewpoints.  
In summary, studying the private beliefs of diplomats is valuable for three reasons. First, 
these beliefs are the most relevant but also the most specific and detailed with respect to the 
subject of this study: the global aspects of climate change governance. Second, the beliefs of 
negotiators contain the current possibility space of solutions to climate change that humans 
are capable of perceiving, which contains potential lessons about the nature of cognition. 
Third, working with diplomats enables a rigorous cross-national comparison of viewpoints 
that would not be possible when working with domestic political actors. 
 
2. Gathering Data—Identifying Cognitive Reality 
Cognitive-Affective Mapping is a tool to identify, visualize and analyze individuals’ belief 
content and structure. A cognitive-affective map (CAM) is a network diagram or concept 
graph that “displays not only the conceptual structure of people’s views, but also their emo-
tional nature, showing the positive and negative values attached to concepts and goals” 
(Thagard 2012).1  The participant CAMs were analyzed to answer the following questions: 
• What are the most relevant concepts? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The process for generating and analyzing CAMs is described in detail in Chapter 3, pp. 74 ff. 
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• Are there any regularities regarding the type of existing concepts/beliefs across CAMs 
of individuals with very different views?  
• How do these concepts reflect the cognitive expectations of IR theory, for instance, are 
there concepts regarding national interests, cost-benefit calculations and structural 
analysis more generally, actor identities, or norms, especially norms regarding interna-
tional justice? If multiple types of concepts exist, how do they relate to each other? Is 
there are hierarchy among them? 
• What role do the special characteristics of climate change play in the belief systems of 
individual negotiators? 
Q method (Brown 1980) is a well-established tool to identify different viewpoints (‘fac-
tors’) on a certain subject matter in a group of individuals. In a Q sort participants attribute 
their own, personal meaning to a set of statements they are asked to rank-order, thereby re-
vealing their individual belief structure. By correlating individuals (rather than objective 
traits), a Q sort provides information about similarities and differences in the structured be-
liefs of groups of people. Conventional Q methodology only assesses belief structures without 
paying attention to the associated emotional content. Through small adjustments I added an 
emphasis on emotional information. 
Complementarity of CAM and Q Method: Each of the methods applied here has obvious 
limitations, but their joint application alleviates many of their individual shortcomings. CAM 
zooms in on the individual’s cognitive state and allows study participants to present their be-
liefs using their own language, concepts and arguments. The method maximizes idiosyncratic 
participant input at the cost of limiting comparability of findings across participants. Q’s fo-
cus is on cognitive features that are shared by several individuals. The method sacrifices de-
tailed information about the individual in order to detect collective or shared points of view. 
The primary advantage of combining the two methods is the generation of complementary 
insights, comparable to a micro and macro perspective of subjectivity.  
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Using both tools in conjunction also allows the researchers to synthesize their respective 
insights. This can advance knowledge in two ways. Observing the reduction of conceptual 
diversity contained in the CAMs during the scale transition from the individual to the group 
level, the combination of methods helps to separate ‘popular’ cognitive elements from those 
that are primarily expressions of individual preferences and personality. Second, uncovering 
the diversity of beliefs in the form of participant CAMs associated with a shared belief system 
identified with the help of Q method helps understand the level of ideational plasticity or 
permissibility of a shared perspective.   
Finally, each method works with different constellations of groups of participants, a joint 
property that can help the researcher understand the demographic features that might be asso-
ciated with certain belief systems. The CAM analysis required the establishment of groups by 
the researcher prior to the analysis, even prior to participant recruitment. Q on the other hand 
allows groups to emerge based on their shared beliefs about the subject matter. The compari-
son of these groups enabled a set of early insights regarding the nature of existing belief sys-
tems, the possibility that parts of belief systems were shared with a number of different 
groups, and the possibilities for cognitive change.  
 
IV. THE CENTRAL ARGUMENTS 
This dissertation develops a spectrum of insights regarding global climate change govern-
ance, but at its root is a very basic argument about the power of a cognitive approach to ad-
vance the study of international politics. Showing the relevance of basic theories and meth-
odological tools from the cognitive sciences to IR enables researchers to deepen and possibly 
integrate existing knowledge and to bridge theoretical perspectives often seen as opposing 
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each other or being mutually exclusive. The following paragraphs briefly summarize some of 
the most important findings of this study. Most of these have benefitted from and would not 
have been possible without the bridge-building ability of the cognitive approach. 
Applying a cognitive analysis to global climate politics this research bridges structural-
rational and constructivist theories, offering initial insights into the utility of these theories for 
developing a better understanding of the deliberation and decision-making processes of cli-
mate negotiators. The most important link between these strands of theory is the interdepend-
ence of group identity concepts and risk perceptions, for example, expected cost calculations 
regarding climate change. Jointly these cognitive entities condition the definition of group in-
terests and determine whether or not these interests are linked to normative justice concerns. 
The central elements of all belief systems identified in this study are actor identities and 
actor groups. All other elements of the belief system, including the nature of the problem at 
hand, are defined and understood in relation to a specific in-group the individual identifies 
with. Climate change, the type of risks it poses, the actions necessary to address it, and the 
moral norms associated with efforts to solve the problem all depend on an actor’s vantage 
point. Put differently, identity conditions an actor’s rationality by shaping—enabling and con-
straining—perceptions of costs and benefits in a given system structure. This insight validates 
both structural and constructivist theories, but it also emphasizes that a full understanding of 
political behavior is not possible without reference to both theoretical schools. 
One could use the image of sunlight on a landscape to understand this limitation. From the 
perspective of the sun only parts of the landscape are illuminated or visible at any point in 
time—the hills, mountainsides and building walls facing the sun receive most light while flat 
areas that are not in the shadow of a mountain or a house receive some. But many places re-
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main invisible. Different belief systems can be understood as different ‘views’ of the land-
scape in the course of the day as the sun moves across the sky and illuminates different parts.  
In addition to identity concepts and risk perceptions (i.e., cost expectations) a third cate-
gory of mental representations—normative considerations—appears in some belief systems 
but not others, depending on the constellation of identity group, risk perception and associated 
emotions. Two major types of belief system can be distinguished. In the first the actor’s in-
group is perceived to face existential threats, identity loss, death or grave human suffering. 
These concerns trigger strong negative emotions and are associated with a normative frame-
work of reasoning that infuses the actor’s negotiation position. IR scholars would call this a 
belief system with a dominant logic of appropriateness. Given the nature of climate change 
and its skewed global impacts, the likelihood of having a norm-based belief system increases 
with the actor’s identification with groups larger than the state, for example, the group of de-
veloping countries, the poor, or even humanity. While that might surprise IR scholars, many 
state representatives do in fact identify with such large groups in addition to their individual 
and national identity. 
The second type of belief system perceives risks of economic costs and other material 
losses like infrastructure damage, but no threat to human life and wellbeing. In this mental 
framework the logic of consequences is dominant. 
They key to understanding these differences in beliefs are specific identity concepts and 
risk perceptions of individuals who see themselves as members of different groups, ranging 
from local communities to the human community. Urgency and support for climate action ex-
ists if an actor perceives a certain type of threat to his or her in-group within a relevant tempo-
ral timeframe. If any of these three conditions is missing—the person perceives a less severe 
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type of threat for the in-group today, or an existential threat to another group—the link is bro-
ken. When applied to the climate change negotiations in 2012 with the current distribution of 
impacts and the current belief distribution about future impacts, this observation suggests that 
that small-island state representatives merely need to have a strong sense of national identity 
to feel urgency and desire cooperative action (but they tend to have more comprehensive 
identities), but representatives of wealthy Western democracies need a cosmopolitan iden-
tity—humans connected to all humans—for the same cognitive experience.  
These insights confirm the first hypothesis stated above: there are in fact certain categories 
of concepts that structure every belief system. These meta-concepts include collective identi-
ties, structural constraints of agency and in a specific subset of belief systems normative ele-
ments about justice. 
Special characteristics of climate change do not play the role one would expect in shaping 
the belief systems about climate change governance at the global level. Few special character-
istics (e.g., pervasiveness) are acknowledged, but most (e.g., climate tipping points, long time 
scales) receive too little attention. They are generally not used to motivate arguments about 
the needed solutions, governance instruments, or goals.    
Given the long time scales of climate change and major uncertainties regarding the timing 
and scale of future change or systemic responses to climate policies, concepts about time are 
very important for climate change governance. However, the cognitive systems of participants 
in climate negotiations indicate significant shortcomings or even lack of attention to issues of 
inter-temporal choice. Individuals interviewed for this study experienced severe cognitive 
limitations when they were asked to imagine or even seek to influence the distant future. The 
cognitive mechanisms for dealing with the long-term challenge include avoidance, lack of de-
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tail and imagination, and reluctance to acknowledge possibility of failure. Emotions play an 
important role in these mechanisms, because individuals are not able to feel and anticipate an 
imagined future with the same intensity that accompanies their memories of the past or their 
experience of the present. Consequently the distant future is generally undervalued and under-
defined in the negotiations and does not have the weight it should have given the unprece-
dented causal reach of the present generation into the future. 
The absence of clear timelines (for impacts, actions, or expected system response to ac-
tions) has important implications for the discussion about governance goals and climate re-
gime targets. The 2°C temperature target adopted at the Copenhagen summit in 2009 is not 
associated with a clear time line, specific actions or milestones. Not able to imagine how the 
target could be reached and observing the continuous political stalemate within the UNFCCC, 
many negotiators are already pessimistic regarding their collective ability to reach it. They are 
in the process of mentally abandoning the temperature target, and replacing it with something 
that is more certain, under their control and within their collective skill set: a political agree-
ment sometime in the coming years. I argue that the temperature target diminishes beliefs 
about agency and does not have the motivating force a good goal is supposed to unleash. Its 
replacement with a political target that is not environmentally effective is an undesirable cog-
nitive response and should give rise to a new discussion about appropriate and effective cli-
mate regime targets. 
In the scholarship and among practitioners the temperature target is often associated with 
the goal of the Convention to prevent “dangerous” climate change, specifying this vague goal 
and enabling practical, measurable steps towards it. This link between 2°C and the term “dan-
gerous” raises interesting questions about possibly fatalist tendencies among climate negotia-
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tors—if they no longer believe that that temperature target can be reached, have they given up 
and accepted that we are failing to prevent dangerous climate change? This study shows that 
negotiators do not consider the 2°C target as a threshold between a non-dangerous and a dan-
gerous world. Instead they employ linear thinking in the sense that “three degrees is better 
than five,” and later is better than never. They are able to remain hopeful without any reasons 
for such optimism. 
These insights offer mixed evidence for the second hypothesis guiding this project but 
clearly confirm the third: some special problem characteristics inhibit international coopera-
tion because they limit rational decision-making and the role of emotion to create a strong 
motivation for climate action. The special problem characteristics pose cognitive obstacles, 
but not in the way I hypothesized at the outset of the project. First, climate change is per-
ceived as a complex and uniquely pervasive problem, but this understanding does not lead to 
a sense of being overwhelmed or paralyzed in the face of this challenge. Instead of experienc-
ing hopelessness, negotiators’ cognitive response to the unsuccessful negotiation dynamics—
for example, the replacement of the temperature target with a political goal—allows them to 
remain optimistic. Second, long-term thinking is indeed challenging for negotiators; yet, they 
are not actually aware of this being a challenge or cognitive shortcoming. Third, climate 
change is increasingly observable and already part of the lived experience of many negotia-
tors. Therefore imperceptibility is only a cognitive challenge for a shrinking number of nego-
tiators from developed countries.    
In addition to these specific cognitive issues, this study identifies six private belief sys-
tems that are prevalent among negotiators in the Umbrella Group, the European Union (EU), 
some G77 and China members, and a broad range of NGO representatives. I label these The 
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International Community, A Minilateral Club, The Market, Individuals, The Developed 
World, and The Irresponsible West. These six belief systems share a number of fundamental 
ideas, but differ in their views on climate change governance. Each perspective focuses on the 
responsibilities of a different actor group, ranging from individual states, to groups of states to 
individual human beings. Again, one can distinguish belief systems that are strongly shaped 
by norms (e.g., international solidarity, the rich help the poor) and those shaped by a logic of 
costs or consequences. 
 
V. SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTION AND POLICY RELEVANCE 
This project makes a range of contributions to the field of IR and offers policy-relevant in-
sights about the existing belief systems driving contentious political dynamics.  
 
1. Scholarly Contributions  
I distinguish three types of scholarly contributions: theoretical, empirical and methodo-
logical. Overall the project offers preliminary evidence for the value of a cognitive approach 
to IR and the utility of existing methods for empirical work in this field. The insights gener-
ated with this conceptual and methodological approach cannot be placed in one of the avail-
able theoretical boxes of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalisms or constructivism. Neither do 
they easily fit with previous approaches to political psychology or past cognitive work like 
George’s operational code (George 1969) or image theory (Herrmann et al. 1997), because 
they are more specific than the former and more general than the latter. However, this re-
search is not disconnected from these existing scholarly traditions, but builds on and speaks to 
them. In this sense it advances existing knowledge on global climate change governance, the 
	   27	  
drivers of political contention, and the constraints of meaningful multilateral cooperation on 
climate change in the UNFCCC setting. 
By identifying the relevance and utility of concepts and theories from the cognitive sci-
ences to the field of international relations, this study makes a genuinely interdisciplinary con-
tribution. Recent advances in one discipline contribute to knowledge generation in another, 
pushing out some theoretical, empirical and methodological boundaries.  
The cognitive approach applied to the case of global climate change governance presents a 
theoretical-conceptual alternative to the ‘big three’ theoretical traditions within IR. But rather 
than negating the insights generated by the traditional schools of thought, the cognitive lens is 
able to use them. What is more, the cognitive analysis has been able to connect structural and 
ideational theories that have traditionally offered contrasting and opposing arguments. While 
not the objective of this research, this theoretical bridge building has been productive in the 
case of climate change politics and might prove similarly useful in other areas of IR scholar-
ship.  
In exploring the nature of cognition – the content and structure of belief systems – this re-
search project also deepens scholarly understanding of the causes of non-cooperation in the 
case of climate change, pointing in particular to a clash of different belief systems, an under-
valuation of the distant future, and perceptions of a number of constraints on agency, some of 
which cannot be resolved within the negotiations. These explanations differ from but com-
plement existing explanations of global climate change politics that concern material power 
structures and perceptions of justice across the North-South divide. More importantly, by 
mapping parts of the current cognitive landscape in global climate change negotiations the 
empirical insights of this work are beginning to reveal potential levers for changing the politi-
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cal dynamics surrounding the climate change problem. This emancipatory element—
leveraging work on cognition as a tool for political change—will require further research, for 
example efforts to understand cognitive change processes and the implications of moving up 
and down the scales of the governance system. 
In terms of empirical novelty, this project has investigated mental realities—existing be-
lief systems about multilateral cooperation and climate change—with a special emphasis on 
the role of wicked problem characteristics. The data have revealed key concepts and mental 
processes that dominate people’s beliefs about global climate change governance, and to what 
extent these reflect the assumptions of major IR theories. The results also indicate that al-
though the nature of climate change is increasingly well understood in the natural and social 
scientific communities, these insights are not yet adequately integrated into the beliefs of ne-
gotiators. This mismatch between scientific and policy-maker knowledge concerns in particu-
lar the importance of climate tipping points for beliefs on governance goals and tools, poten-
tial costs of climate change, and the timelines for action and expected social and environ-
mental change.  
Finally this project expands the methodological toolbox available to IR scholars by dem-
onstrating the potential value and synergistic power of two methodologies. This is one of the 
first studies to apply cognitive-affective mapping (CAM), a new tool developed by cognitive 
researchers at the University of Waterloo, in a sustained empirical effort. CAM is very effec-
tive in revealing cognitive content and structures of study participants. The tool has clear lim-
its regarding the visualization of large, highly complex, and strongly connected belief sys-
tems, but it has been very well suited for the exploratory stage of this research program. Sec-
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ond, this project has demonstrated the power of Q Method for the study of inter-subjectively 
shared belief systems. The method is not new but hardly used in IR and political science.  
 
2. Policy Relevance 
Although this work is far from comprehensive, it elucidates some motivations and view-
points that make the climate change negotiation difficult. Showing that belief systems about 
climate change and multilateral cooperation are only partly determined by material structures, 
the cognitive analysis reveals how perceptions of the given material realities interact with dif-
ferent forms of identity, risk assessments, associated emotions, and normative beliefs. These 
different cognitive realities appear hard to reconcile at first glance, but a closer inspection of 
the data offers reasons for optimism and helps identify room for compromise. Most impor-
tantly, gaining a deeper and more detailed understanding of the different perspectives underly-
ing parties’ negotiation positions can increase negotiators’ general understanding and respect 
for each other, building trust that is often claimed to be lacking in the UNFCCC community. 
This knowledge might also help parties and stakeholders develop negotiation strategies that 
are able to take some of these concerns into account. 
 
VI. LIMITS OF ANALYSIS 
This project has two important limitations. First, I am only interested in the international 
politics of climate change, not global affairs in general or domestic climate politics in specific 
countries. Owing to the focus of this research on special problem characteristics of climate 
change, the theoretical framework I develop has only limited applicability to other global 
governance challenges or international relations more generally.  
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The focus on global climate politics further implies that this projects investigates the cog-
nitive processes of a particular group—participants in global climate change negotiations—
rather than human beings in general, citizens of a particular country or other social groups. 
This group consists of several sub-groups, including state representatives (diplo-
mats/negotiators), representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and represen-
tatives of corporate actors (firms, business associations). Second, I am not interested in the 
general political psychology of international climate decision-making, which concerns various 
cognitive mechanisms that bound rationality. Psychology and behavioral sciences explore 
these mechanisms extensively, for example prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
anchoring, or the availability heuristic (Slovic 2000). Instead I focus on cognitive content—
the concepts and conceptual clusters that are specific to climate change (e.g., climate sensitiv-
ity, climate security) and their associated cognitive processes (e.g., long-term cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 
VII. A GUIDE TO THE DISSERTATION 
The following chapter, chapter 2, will offer a brief survey of different literatures in IR and 
the cognitive sciences relevant to this research project. Drawing out key themes from these 
diverse areas of research, the chapter sets up the foundations and key components of a cogni-
tive analysis. At the center of this literature synthesis is the question how cognition can be de-
fined for the purpose of analyzing international climate politics. Given that cognition as a 
process has not received a lot of attention in mainstream IR scholarship, the review probes 
cognitive assumptions of major IR theories and integrates them into a preliminary conceptual 
framework.  
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Chapters 3 and 4 present the empirical and analytical results of the interview-based cogni-
tive-affective mapping process. Chapter 3 provides a detailed introduction to the method and 
participant selection. The main body of the chapter summarizes the key findings of the map-
ping exercise, describing existing beliefs patterns in six different participant groups. Chapter 4 
builds on this empirical foundation to answer the central research question about the role of 
cognition in global climate politics. My main insights concern the existence and interaction of 
cognitive elements that confirm both rationalist and constructivist expectations, the presence 
of cognitive elements in phenomena that fall outside the ambit of these theoretical lenses, 
cognitive responses to special problem characteristics that appear unsatisfying and call atten-
tion to challenges at the science-policy interface in global climate governance, and finally the 
effects of all of these factors on agency in the climate change negotiations. 
I summarize the methods and results of the Q study in Chapter 5. I identify and compare 
six different belief systems of participants in the UNFCCC negotiations. Again, both rational-
ist and constructivist processes are present and interact with other cognitive elements to form 
emotionally coherent networks of meaning. I also highlight a set of beliefs that is shared 
among all study participants and forms the current minimum consensus and motivation for 
continuing negotiations. At the same time the Q study identified a number of highly conten-
tious ideas.  
The conclusion ties together these findings and emphasizes their relevance for the schol-
arly and policy-maker communities. Offering thoughts on future directions of this research 
program I make the case for an ambitious effort to build a cognitive theory of IR that could 
bridge major strands of existing theory without abandoning their rich insights.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Building A Theoretical Framework for Cognitive Analysis  
– A Review of Relevant Political and Cognitive Science Literature 
 
This chapter has two aims. First, it offers a summary of the existing literature on issues re-
lated to cognition, cooperation and climate change in political and cognitive science and adja-
cent disciplines. Second, through this literature review the chapter outlines the conceptual ap-
proach to answering the central research question of this study: 
What cognitive elements and processes promote or inhibit cooperation to achieve ef-
fective responses to climate change?  
I start with a brief definition of the term cognition for the purpose of this research project 
(I). Section II reviews major IR theories of cooperation with the goal to identify their implicit 
cognitive assumptions. Section III reviews recent developments outside IR regarding the rele-
vance of cognition for human responses to climate change. Collectively, sections II and III 
indicate the limits of current research regarding the first sub-question outlined in Chapter 1 (p. 
10)—what are the cognitive elements and processes relevant for decision-making on multilat-
eral cooperation and climate change. In section IV I turn to the second sub-question (pp.10-
11) whether climate change displays special problem characteristics that influence efforts to 
find cooperative solutions at the international level. Based on these findings section V sum-
marizes the necessary elements for a theoretical framework for the cognitive analysis of 
global climate politics. 
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I. WHAT IS COGNITION? 
Cognition is generally defined as the mental process of knowing and acquiring knowl-
edge, including aspects such as awareness, perception, reasoning, intuition, judgment and de-
cision-making. Many disciplines study cognition, but the usage and definition of the term dif-
fer between them. Cognitive science takes an information-processing view of mental proc-
esses (see section I.1.). Within political science and IR cognition is the subject of two differ-
ent research programs. One concerns the identification of beliefs and belief structures of indi-
vidual decision makers (see section II.). The other is the field of political psychology that 
draws heavily on cognitive psychology to understand general mental processes that shape po-
litical decision-making, often countering the assumption of rational choice theory that human 
beings are purely expected utility maximizers. According to Stein and Welch “Cognitive psy-
chology explains deviations from rational actor assumptions about judgment, estimation and 
choice by looking at the simple rules people use to make timely responses to complex and ill 
structured problems.” (Gross Stein and Welch 1997, 53). Defining cognition somewhat more 
narrowly than the cognitive sciences, political psychologists study the simple decision-rules 
or ‘short cuts’ of the brain when dealing with complex decision processes. These simple rules 
refer to issues like heuristics (Finucane et al. 2000), prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Berejekian 1997; Fanis 2004; Mercer 2005b), schemata and cognitive biases.  
This study is not interested in general cognitive mechanisms that impair or distort rational 
decision-making. Rather I seek to understand the issue-specific substance and structure of de-
cision-makers’ belief-systems, in other words the concepts and emotions that structure a per-
son’s point of view regardless of the operation of heuristics or biases. Therefore my definition 
of cognition is closely aligned with the information processing approach of the cognitive sci-
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ences. It is distinct from but does not oppose the political psychology approach. I define cog-
nition as the elements, structures and processes of individual and collective thought and feel-
ing. Consequently cognitive analysis is concerned with ‘what is going on in a person’s head’ 
and the inter-subjectively shared ideas, meaning systems and emotions in a group. Since inte-
grating thought and emotion rather than treating them as separate or interacting systems is still 
controversial in the cognitive sciences I address this debate in more detail below (section I.3.). 
 
1. Theories of Mental Representation 
In the cognitive sciences there are two major approaches to (individual) cognition. Both 
were inspired by the emergence of computer sciences and artificial intelligence in the 1950s, 
and countered the previously dominant behaviorism (Thagard 2005, 6). Both theories agree 
on the main entities of cognition—elements, structures, and processes—but they differ regard-
ing the nature of the relationship between them. Some cognitive scientists conceptualize cog-
nition as verbal processing based on the application IF-THEN rules to a certain problem 
(Thagard 2005, chap. 3). Only one rule operates at a time, and series of rules result in deci-
sions. This early approach is associated with the theory of propositional attitudes, which con-
ceptualizes individual knowledge as a list of statements (propositions).  
On the other end of the spectrum is the neural network approach (connectionism), which 
perceives of cognition as processes of a complex network, in which individual cognitive ele-
ments are nodes that can be activated by links between them. Knowledge is coded in the neu-
ral network structures by simultaneous activation of several nodes. Consequently learning and 
cognitive change requires a structural reconfiguration of the network (Antal and Hukkinen 
2010, 938). In neural networks parallel processing is possible, and information spreads in 
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non-linear ways (Thagard 2005, chap. 7). The central process for making decisions or solving 
problems in a neural network is (emotional) coherence (Thagard 2000). Recently these two 
approaches—verbal processing and connectionism—have been converging, suggesting that 
the mind uses both rule-based and connectionist operations (Eliasmith and Anderson 2004). 
 
2. Cognitive Entities 
The basic ontological entities of cognition are mental representations, structures and proc-
esses. There are several basic kinds of mental representations, including concepts (Thagard 
2005, chap. 4), beliefs (including causal beliefs), goals or motivations (Thagard 2010b, chap. 
6), images and representations of events. Concepts usually correspond to single words or 
terms that stand for something in the world, for example, chair, parents or climate change. 
Concepts are relational in the sense that they are linked to entities in the material world and to 
numerous other concepts, and only make sense in the context of those relationships. Beliefs 
are propositions or convictions—they are statements about the world, such as ‘climate change 
is a hoax’ or ‘fast food is bad for your health’. The most important type of beliefs is causal 
beliefs. They are the foundation of goal-oriented human behavior. In order to achieve a cer-
tain goal, one needs to be able to identify the actions or processes that can lead to the desired 
outcome. Goals are desirable states of the world that orient and drive human behavior. 
Structures are the linkages and relationships between mental representations. Based on a 
connectionist ontology, these structures are best conceptualized as networks in which the 
nodes are individual mental representations with various connections (links) between them. 
Clusters or sets of concepts form beliefs, images, or other cognitive structures. Each of these 
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structural elements is part of a larger cognitive network and becomes activated in particular 
contexts.  
Process – Cognitive processes include making decisions, solving algebra problems, and 
assessing risks. A particularly interesting set of processes concerns the acquisition, change 
and abandonment of mental representations, including the adding of concepts (new knowl-
edge), the changing of beliefs or world views (changing existing structures), and replacing or 
‘deleting’ existing mental representations. 
While these elements answer the question “What is there?” they do not yet account for the 
semantic content of cognition (“Where does meaning come from?”). Meaning emerges from 
the connections between multiple cognitive elements, structures and processes as much as 
from their relationship to entities in the material and social worlds (Markus and Hamedani 
2007). For example, my mental representation of climate change consists of a large number of 
concepts (e.g., the greenhouse effect, temperature change, Arctic summer sea ice melt, food 
scarcity, tipping points, international negotiations or solar power), images related to individ-
ual concepts or clusters of concepts (e.g., glacier retreat in a time series of photographs or is-
lands submerging under rising sea levels) and goals (e.g., preparing for security implications 
of climate change). Each element is linked to many others and each relates to physical reali-
ties and events (e.g., the experience of a heat wave in Ontario, or news reports about a drought 
in the Southern USA in July 2011), information regarding scientific findings in academic 
journals, or conversations with my colleagues about climate change governance. When mak-
ing a decision (e.g., what kind of course I am going to teach next term), all these elements and 
their linkages play a role. 
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3. Cognition and Emotion  
Cognition and emotion are inextricably linked—feeling is integral to knowing. Building 
on advances in the cognitive sciences over the last two decades (Damasio 1995; G. F. 
Loewenstein et al. 2001; Vohs, Baumeister, and Loewenstein 2007; Duncan and Barrett 2007; 
Scholl 2013), Thagard argues that previous views of cognition as computational processes of 
deliberative coherence are incomplete and puts forward a theory of cognition as a process of 
emotional coherence (Thagard 2006, chap. 2; Thagard 2008). He suggests that emotions are 
mental states, which cannot be separated from the cognitive elements described above: con-
cepts can have emotional valences (e.g., positive emotions related to the idea of a long vaca-
tion, or negative emotions related to the concept of death), as can beliefs (e.g., ‘climate 
change is real’ can evoke fear and guilt) and goals (thinking about getting your driver’s li-
cense makes you happy). Emotions are also involved in cognitive processes, such as rejecting 
or revising beliefs. Accepting a new belief based on coherence feels good; if a new belief is 
incoherent with one’s existing beliefs, it is irritating. Thagard further assumes that decisions 
are based on a process of multiple constraint satisfaction, taking into consideration both the 
cognitive acceptability of a mental representation and its emotional valence. Based on this 
view, emotions are intrinsically linked to all cognitive elements, structures and processes, and 
any cognitive theory has to account for the emotional content of cognition. 
Psychologists and communication scientists broadly support this integrated cognitive-
affective perspective (Moser in Moser and Dilling 2007, chap. 3; Finucane et al Slovic 2000, 
chap. 26). Political scientists Crawford (Crawford 2000), McDermott (McDermott 2004) and 
Mercer have made first attempts to introduce the idea of affective rationality into the field of 
IR. Mercer argues that emotional cognition is an “assimilation mechanism” for new informa-
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tion into existing belief structures and plays a major role in risk assessments (Mercer 2005a; 
Mercer 2010). 
However, this integrative view of cognition as inseparable processes of thought and feel-
ing is still contested in many disciplines, including the cognitive sciences. The prevalent view 
defines cognition and emotion as separate but interacting systems, each with functionally spe-
cialized areas in the brain. While this perspective has already evolved from Zajonc’s argu-
ment that emotion is primary and independent of cognition (Zajonc 1980) or Lazarus’ position 
that emotion is secondary and dependent on cognition (Lazarus 1982), recent work increas-
ingly emphasizes that “there are no truly separate systems for emotion and cognition because 
complex emotional-cognitive behavior emerges from the rich, dynamic interactions between 
the brain networks. … the neural basis of cognition and emotion should be viewed as strongly 
non-modular.” (Pessoa 2008, 148).  
 
4. Linking Individual and Collective Cognition  
Cognition takes place in the brain of an individual, but all social behavior depends on the 
ability of social groups to attribute shared meaning to objects, behaviors, and words (lan-
guage). Collective-meaning making is a fundamental process for human societies, and it is at 
the heart of political decision-making. But can we actually attribute beliefs to social groups—
is there such a thing as collective cognition? If not—because groups do not have brains—how 
can we conceptualize the processes and results of collective sense-making? Below I briefly 
outline the challenges of distinguishing between individual and collective processes of 
thought and meaning-making, identifying the interactions between the individual and social 
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processes involved in collective cognition. However, these issues ultimately deserve more 
space and theoretical attention than I can offer here.  
There are at least three approaches to the question how to link individual and collective 
cognition: working with averages (Antal and Hukkinen 2010), making assumptions about the 
beliefs shared by the majority (aggregation), or relying on the belief structures of key indi-
viduals (representatives, leaders) of a group. 
Thagard argues that cognition is a process that consists of interacting mechanisms at the 
the neural, molecular, psychological, and social levels (Thagard 2010c). Using this multilevel-
ism approach, “social systems are best understood by depicting their operations at all relevant 
levels” (Thagard 2010c, 273). Given that groups do not have brains, and collective mental 
representations are therefore not real entities, he suggests that person-group problem can also 
be conceptualized in terms of multilevel interacting mechanisms: the interaction between in-
dividual-level mechanisms (i.e., molecular, neural and psychological processes) and group-
level mechanisms (i.e., communication and sensory interaction) create the bonds that hold a 
group together. The key to collective cognition is the individual who thinks about himself as a 
member of the group (Thagard 2010c, 274). Writing about conflict Ellemers supports this 
view by exploring the conditions under which “the group self”—thinking about oneself as a 
member of a group—becomes more important than the individual self (Ellemers 2012). Fur-
ther, Thagard’s multilevelism and Hacking’s theory of the looping effect of human kinds 
(Hacking 2001) capture the same phenomena. Hacking suggests that the creation of new cate-
gories for social groups changes the way (members of) these groups behave and interact with 
other groups. In Thagard’s terms the creation of new group categories involves new ways of 
thinking about oneself as a group member (in comparison to other groups). These mental rep-
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resentations include identity-related concepts about the self, concepts about other group 
members and concepts about the group as an entity in itself. Individuals acquire and change 
group-related beliefs through interactions with other people and with other aspects of group-
related experiences, including the use of collective resources and property, for instance certain 
spaces and office buildings, or the collective experience of events. This process of social 
communication and physical-sensory interaction synchronizes the mental representations re-
lated to the group in the minds of group members and non-members. The process works both 
ways: an individual not only receives information about the group and develops an under-
standing of the group as a collective entity, she also contributes to other people’s mental rep-
resentations and experiences of the group. The nature of the group depends on this recursive 
process between individual cognition and social interaction between group members.  
Understanding collective beliefs therefore requires first of all an understanding of how in-
dividuals “envision” themselves as group members and the emotions, values and meanings 
they attach to this membership (Thagard 2010b, 274; see also Tajfel, Introduction in Tajfel 
1982, 2–3). Second, in order to create shared understandings in a group, communication and 
physical interactions with each other and the group’s social-material environment are impor-
tant processes, allowing individuals to share ideas and emotions, and enabling individual and 
collective cognitive change (e.g., acquiring or revising shared beliefs). At the same time, the 
social communication processes that lead to shared beliefs operate in both directions. Much of 
an individual’s belief system has been received from the outside, severely limiting the ways 
he can envision himself as a group member. Political processes and structures are also rele-
vant social dynamics, for example, legislative deliberation and decision-making procedures, 
bureaucratic hierarchies, or the composition of committees. 
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To summarize, the link between individual and collective cognition manifests itself in 
each individual’s cognitive structure and processes, which contain concepts and emotional 
valences related to the group and to the individual’s membership in the group (social identity). 
These mental representations are shaped by the information received when interacting with 
the group. That in turn is shared with the group and can impact how other group members 
perceive of themselves and the group. 
This conception of the link between the individual and the group as mutual constitution is 
reminiscent of Gidden’s structuration theory, which suggests that there is a mutual relation-
ship between social structures and agents (Giddens 1992), While structures constrain and en-
able meaningful behavior, agents can use existing structures to create social change and to 
change their conceptions of themselves and their group. The structural conditions at any point 
in time serve as a stable reality against which ideas for alternative, desirable conditions can be 
presented. These ideas can destabilize existing institutions and norms, but only because these 
structures have been perceived as stable before.  
 
5. Linking Cognition and Social-Material Realities  
Cognitive processes are not only influenced by interactions with other people, but also by 
interactions with the material world of objects—natural and artificial entities, including 
plants, ecosystems, buildings or books—and events, including storms or species extinctions. 
When talking about climate change, objects and events in the natural environment are of par-
ticular interest: how do we categorize natural kinds (e.g., climatic zones), (how) can change 
be observed (e.g., the melting of the Arctic summer sea ice), and how do we make sense of 
extreme weather events?  
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A special problem in this context is the role of scientific information. Science seeks to ex-
plain the entities that exist, the causes of change in the natural world, the likelihood of future 
change and the explanation of unobservable entities or developments. Does abstract informa-
tion in scientific journals have the same cognitive influence like the personal experience of 
flooding? And to what extent is scientific information simply a reflection of the physical, 
chemical or biological reality, or a social construct? Does it matter that categories like average 
global temperature and climate sensitivity are artificial kinds with strong relations to natural 
kinds, but depend on human cognition?  
A full theory of cognition will have to take all three processes outlined above into consid-
eration: the relational process of sense-making or meaning creation; the interaction between 
individual cognition and social groups and with the physical environment. This includes 
mechanisms of communication, physical interaction, observation with the human senses and 
interpretation, all of which contribute to the creation of inter-subjective agreement on the 
meaning of objects, events, and social facts. 
Figure 2-1: Relational Cognition 
 
 
6. Rational Choice 
Cognition goes beyond, but includes, the current definition of rational choice. Rational 
decision-making is a cognitive process that includes risk and value assessments and cost-
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benefit calculations, which in turn require the existence of cognitive elements such as con-
cepts about values, costs, benefits and beliefs about causality. This research project will ex-
plore to what extent rational choice plays a role in decision-making regarding climate change, 
and to what extent it may be affected by emotions or complemented by other cognitive proc-
esses. 
 
II. COGNITION IN IR THEORY 
A cognitive theory of IR is not a competitor to the existing “big three”—neorealism, neo-
liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism—because it works at a different level of ex-
planation. The existing theories relate human behavior in international affairs, for example, 
engaging in military conflict, either to observable variables with material, measurable mani-
festations, such as power structures and imbalances, or to ideas and norms, such as humanitar-
ian intervention. Using the rationality assumption, analysts believe they can understand the 
relevance of these material circumstances or ideas for the decisions and behavior of actors in 
the international system.  
Rather than assuming that the rational analyst can replicate the rational decisions of a pol-
icy-maker, cognitive analysis seeks to describe the actual cognitive processes underlying the 
observed decisions and behavior. Cognitive analysis reveals whether and to what extent a 
specific decision was based on a rational cost-benefit analysis as assumed by realists, or on 
assessments of morally appropriate behavior and the relationship between identity and norms 
as suggested by constructivists. Did US President George W. Bush calculate the economic 
cost of a carbon tax when refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol? Do European policy-makers 
push ahead with cap-and-trade because they see themselves as climate and technology cham-
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pions, and simply disregard calculated economic costs? Or do these two actors simply have 
different definitions of economic costs in the context of climate change? Providing answers to 
these questions, cognitive analysis can verify the cognitive assumptions of major IR theories 
and maybe point to theoretical lacunae if those assumptions do not fully capture the thought 
processes revealed.  
A cognitive approach focuses on mental processes that provide the link between material 
and social factors (i.e., the material system structure or the normative-ideational structure) and 
the decisions and behaviors of individuals and group. Therefore cognitive processes as a vari-
able are best understood as a set of causally intermediate processes exhibiting reciprocal rela-
tions with structural-material factors and social behavior.  
 
1. Cognitive Assumptions of Major IR Theories 
As suggested above, most IR theories rely on important implicit assumptions about 
thought processes of decision-makers that lead to observed behavior, but do not consider 
these thought processes as causal. Theorists of all denominations work with the assumption 
that individuals and groups have similar or stable cognitive patterns across different situa-
tions. The theories might differ regarding the cognitive elements and processes they consider 
to be important drivers for human behavior, but all take the existence of cognitive processes 
for granted.  
This section explores these basic cognitive assumptions of major IR theories. It is not un-
reasonable to expect that each theory simply captures one particular type of cognitive process, 
and that all of these types can co-exist.  
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I briefly review three sets of literature: major theories on international cooperation, theo-
ries on conflict (i.e., the failure to cooperate), and a set of theories on political mobilization 
and revolution, which are forms of cooperative political behavior at different social scales. 
 
a. Theories of Cooperation 
Much of IR scholarship is concerned with the question why and under what conditions 
states cooperate. The standard answer has become “When it is in their interest.” How actors 
define this national interest has been the subject of an ongoing debate for decades. However, 
all theories agree that state cooperation usually takes the form of (international) regimes 
(Krasner 1983), such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Climate change belongs in the 
category of collective action problems that Hardin described as prone to the “tragedy of the 
commons”—the rational overexploitation of the atmosphere by individuals (i.e., states) results 
in the undersupply of a global public good (climate stability), or worse, in the collapse of the 
shared resource (Hardin 1968). Conventional collective-action theory predicts that coopera-
tive solutions cannot be found unless an external authority or a hegemon establishes a rule-
based system and penalizes rule-infringement (Ostrom 2010). 
The two dominant strands of thinking in IR—neorealism and neoliberal institutional-
ism—share the basic cognitive assumption that human beings are rational decision-makers, 
who perform mental cost-benefit calculations when considering their response to a certain 
situation. Because actors’ choices are supposedly driven by the goal of utility or gain maximi-
zation (based on whatever the relevant actor considers to be a gain), Ruggie labels these two 
major theories neo-utilitarianism (Ruggie 1998). Since the 1970s the rational-choice explana-
tions for international cooperation have slowly shifted from a neo-realist focus on coercion 
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(hegemonic stability theory) to neo-liberal institutionalist focus on shared gains and learning, 
including cooperation against the hegemon. The strategic nature of this approach has lead to a 
wide application of game theory, and the attempt to analyze international affairs through the 
lens of highly simplified game analogies of real-world situations. 
According to hegemonic stability theory the existence of a hegemon is necessary and suf-
ficient for international regime formation in an anarchical international system, because the 
hegemon has a rational interest and the coercive capacity to both exploit and institutionalize 
its temporary structural dominance in order to maximize benefits from cooperation. Coopera-
tive benefits for other states or the supply global public goods are welcome side effects. The 
most successful attack on hegemonic stability theory came from an unexpected corner—
global environmental governance. Falkner argues that many international environmental 
agreements have been created without the contribution or even against the will of the existing 
hegemon (Falkner 2006). In these cases the rational calculations of the cooperators suppos-
edly suggest that the benefits of an environmental regime would outweigh its costs regardless 
of the participation of the hegemon.  
Other scholars have applied utilitarian thinking to cases of cooperation without the state 
(Ostrom 1990) and the question whether different types of collective action problems require 
different forms of cooperation (Barrett 2007).  
Neo-Gramscian theory provides a more holistic, critical system perspective, according to 
which sets of ideas matter for the stability and functioning of a society by providing the idea-
tional glue that holds the various elements together in a stable structure. A “hegemonic ideol-
ogy” provides the justification or rationale for the given set of social structures and power re-
lations. Taking a neo-Gramscian view, some authors argue that business actors in today’s 
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global economy defend the hegemonic neo-liberal-capitalist ideology and actively seek to 
prevent its destabilization by competing climate change-driven narratives (Levy and Newell 
2004, chap. 4).  
Social constructivism assumes a very different cognitive reality, suggesting that the most 
relevant cognitive entities are concepts related to actor identity, norms, and assessments of 
(in)justice in any given context. According to constructivists it is not the objective system 
structure that matters for state decision-making, but how different actors interpret this struc-
tural environment and what ideas they apply to it—the existing ideational structure (Wendt 
1992). Rather than giving ontological primacy to material or ideational reality, constructivists 
seek to understand how material realities gain meaning through social interaction. Such idea-
tional flexibility emphasizes the differences in actors’ identities and cultures—their percep-
tions of themselves and others—and the generally accepted norms of behavior. Going even 
further than allowing ideas to have causal power in international affairs, constructivists argue 
that ideas can have constitutive power—they can bring entities into existence (for the con-
struction of social kinds, Wendt 1999, 77 ff., 171 ff.; for the social construction power of 
international organizations, Barnett and Finnemore 2004; for the causal power of norms, 
Thomas 2001). 
However, with few exceptions (Albin 2001; Roberts and Parks 2006) constructivist theo-
ries do not provide general insights regarding the types or components of identities and norms 
that are needed to produce cooperation on climate change, or those that prevent cooperative 
agreements. Constructivism is issue-specific, relying on process-tracing and discourse analy-
sis to uncover the causal role of ideas in a particular situation. Cognitive analysis differs from 
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constructivism in attributing causality not to ideas, but to motivated individuals and social 
groups, who have cognitive responses to the environment they interact with.  
Foreign policy analysis has developed its own strand of research on the role of ideas and 
identities in international politics. The influence of identity in foreign policy became one of 
the major themes in this field in the early 2000s (Kaarbo 2003). Goldstein (Goldstein 1988) 
and Katzenstein (Katzenstein 1996) are two important examples of attempts to address the 
question of norms and identities as cognitive bases for policy-making. But most of this re-
search does not focus on cognitive or psychological processes, but rather “on the impact of 
particular beliefs, shared by large numbers of people, about the nature of their worlds that 
have implications for human action” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 7). Kaarbo therefore ar-
gues that integrating research on the beliefs of individual leaders about their environment, and 
how individual information processing can affect foreign policy choices, would be a valuable 
research avenue to pursue (Kaarbo 2003). 
b. Theories of Conflict 
If one understands conflict as the failure to cooperate, then one can reasonably expect the 
same cognitive processes to be involved in the decision-making processes of conflict parties.  
Structural theories and the rationality paradigm dominate the conflict literature as much 
as theories of cooperation (Waltz 1979; Nicholson 1992). A number of scholars have explored 
constraints on rationality to explain conflict-related decisions that deviate from the expecta-
tions of rational choice theory (Jervis 1976; Stein and Welch in Geva and Mintz 1997, chap. 
4), but few have suggested that the rationality ideal lacks explanatory utility. 
The conflict literature has borrowed heavily and fruitfully from a sociological theory of 
social identity and intergroup conflict (Tajfel 1982). Tajfel’s insights regarding the human 
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tendency to develop in-group preferences and out-group competition or even hostility has be-
come the foundation for theories of ethnocentrism (LeVine and Campbell 1972; Hammond 
and Axelrod 2006), ethnic conflict (1985, chap. 4; Ignatieff 1998, 34–71) and racism 
(Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001). Exaggerating intergroup differences as a tool for 
identify formation and confirmation is associated with the generation and use of stereotypes. 
Brown describes stereotyping as a natural cognitive process of social categorization, which by 
itself it does not cause hostilities, but can influence how we behave towards individuals of 
other groups (e.g., discrimination) (R. Brown 1986, chap. 16). Brown further argues that the 
outbreak of ethnic conflict requires the identification of (comparable) in- and out-groups 
combined with perception of injustice, in other words, the individual assessment of the un-
fairness of the in-group’s disadvantage in comparison with the out-group becomes the central 
motivation for conflict. An aggressive group blames an out-group for the current injustice, 
and considers (violent) conflict as the best strategy to remedy this situation (R. Brown 1986, 
chap. 15, 17). 
Recent scholarship that increasingly focuses on cognition as a factor in violent and non-
violent conflict also investigates group identity beliefs as sources of conflict, for example, sa-
cred values and religion (Atran and Ginges 2012), cultural diversity and prejudice (Crisp and 
Meleady 2012), and the need for an “overarching” or inclusive social identity for stable 
“peace systems” (Fry 2012). All of these examples are part of a larger trend towards exploring 
the biological and evolutionary causes of conflict by studying beliefs or cognitive processes as 
drivers of behavior. This includes a research program on the biology of cultural conflict, 
which starts from the assumption that brain processes are the foundation of any kind of 
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thought and belief, and therefore the roots of conflict lie in the differences between the brain 
processes of members of different cultural groups (Berns and Atran 2012).   
Related theories of conflict focus on the role of perceived injustice as a cause of conflict. 
The most important is relative deprivation theory (Berkowitz in Davies 1971; Davies in 
Davies 1971), which suggests that increasing deprivation on its own is not sufficient to cause 
violent conflict. Rather, the necessary conditions for a revolution include a shift of a group’s 
perceptions of its current situation from “the way things are” to being unjust. Such a shift can 
occur when a phase of improving conditions (e.g., economic growth) creates hopes and rising 
expectations of social progress, but is followed by a sharp decline that frustrates these expec-
tations. In these circumstances a previously tolerated level of deprivation becomes unaccept-
able. Other circumstances causing such a shift in perceptions can include social-economic 
status comparisons to other groups or the identification of circumstances that advantage other 
groups over the revolutionary group. More generally, Welch has developed a theory about the 
role of justice in “the genesis of war” and its importance as a motive for the behavior of states 
(Welch 1995). 
c. Political Mobilization 
Sociology offers important insights regarding political mobilization in social movements. 
Political scientists have utilized these insights to study the causes and dynamics of revolution. 
Since political mobilization requires cooperation in a group of people, this literature presents 
a third opportunity to identify the cognitive assumptions of theories of political cooperation. 
Social movement scholars emphasize the importance of cognitive processes as mediating 
factors between political opportunity structures and the creation of social movement organiza-
tions (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996)—certain ideas provide the motivation for coordi-
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nated action in response to a given socio-political environment. The literature explores the 
role of cognition in the context of so-called collective action frames (CAFs), defined as “ac-
tion-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and cam-
paigns of social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 2000). CAFs are the result of 
“meaning work”—the active and often strategic effort to produce and maintain shared under-
standings of events and conditions, including convictions regarding what (if anything) should 
be done about them. The literature treats CAFs as problem or situation-specific, although 
some suggest the existence of master-frames. CAFs contain at least three elements: diagnosis 
(problem definition and attribution), prognosis (proposed solutions) and action motivation. 
Gamson stands out with his suggestion of more distinct elements: injustice, identity or adver-
sarial elements, and agency—a strong parallel to the findings of the cooperation and conflict 
literatures (Gamson 1992).  
d. Theories of Cooperation and the Climate Change Regime  
Scholars have used many of the theories mentioned above to analyze the past absence of 
effective cooperation within the UNFCCC. Since climate change emerged on the global po-
litical agenda, rational-choice approaches have been dominant, seeking rational explanations 
for the failure to supply a global public good (Ward 1996; Grundig 2006; Keohane and Victor 
2011). Sunstein concludes that for the US “the monetized benefits of the Kyoto Protocol 
would be dwarfed by the monetized costs” and consequently the US is rationally opposed to 
support the climate regime (Sunstein 2007, 5). Based on hegemonic stability theory, Falkner 
argues that it depends on national interests and domestic factors whether or not the US uses its 
hegemonic position to exercise leadership or veto power in international environmental 
agreements. Since domestic support for an effective international climate treaty is lacking, but 
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the costs for the economic hegemon would be very high, US leadership will not be forthcom-
ing (Falkner 2005). The American negotiation position has confirmed this view, consistently 
refusing to accept a treaty that does not establish mitigation obligations for the emerging 
powers and allows them to free ride on the costly efforts of the US. The neorealist pessimism 
about international cooperation on climate change has lead many scholars to advocate for 
multilevel or polycentric governance (Rayner 1991; Ostrom 2010), shifting attention away 
from states to sub-state and non-state actors (Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Betsill and Bulkeley 
2006; Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley 2011). Others have begun to focus on changes in the 
process and structure of the multilateral negotiation setting (Eckersley 2012) or advocate to 
simply wait for the emerging powers to accept a greater role (Leal-Arcas 2011). 
However, some scholars have doubts about the utility of rational choice models of burden 
sharing. Bodansky points out that the collective action rationale—everybody is interested in 
everyone else making binding commitments—does not seem to apply in the case of climate 
change. The BASIC countries should have a strong interest in binding, numerical emission 
reduction targets of the developed countries, but they strongly resisted the inclusion of any 
numbers in an international agreement debated at COP 15 in Copenhagen (Bodansky 2011). 
At the same time the EU is pushing ahead with costly GHG reductions, knowing that few oth-
ers are doing the same. If these actors are not making rational decisions, what are the cogni-
tive processes underlying their negotiation positions? Hochstetler and Viola also point to this 
puzzling behavior with a special focus on Brazil (Hochstetler and Viola 2012). They argue 
that the global commons logic does not apply to very large emitters since their action can di-
rectly affect governance outcomes without cooperative efforts among multiple actors. Domes-
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tic factors explain their willingness to take domestic action without international commit-
ments that also bind other states.  
Constructivist approaches tend to focus on various processes of social meaning-making in 
the context of climate change governance (Miller and Edwards 2001; Miller 2001; Pettenger 
2007; Liverman 2009) rather than explanations of (non)cooperative negotiation outcomes. 
Among the exceptions are Roberts and Parks, who offer a detailed account of the role of op-
posing perceptions of climate justice as barriers to a multilateral agreement, and Eckersley 
(Eckersly in Reus-Smit 2004, chap. 4), who provides constructivist arguments for the failure 
of international climate treaty-making (e.g., differences in EU and US regulatory ideals, moral 
norms and identities). More generally, the literature on climate ethics offers multiple accounts 
of the importance of norms that should guide the distribution of responsibilities in the climate 
change regime (Ringius, Torvanger, and Underdal 2002; Caney 2005; Okereke and Dooley 
2010; Gardiner 2010; Pickering, Vanderheiden, and Miller 2012). Analyzing domestic trends 
that oppose climate policies in the US, Jamison connects climate change and social movement 
theory, suggesting that climate skepticism is a conservative counter-movement to the envi-
ronmental movement of the 1970s (Jamison 2010). Similar views are expressed by Jacques et 
al., in an analysis of the role of conservative think tanks in the climate skeptic debate 
(Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008). 
Taken together, these findings leave a rather bleak and inconclusive picture of the state of 
international climate politics (Leal-Arcas 2011). Rationalist approaches conclude that past 
failures to create an effective climate regime are unlikely to be overcome, while ideational 
approaches similarly point to obstacles to cooperation, such as climate skepticism, perceptions 
of global injustice and diverging climate discourses. 
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2. Existing Approaches to Cognition and IR 
IR scholarship has developed four distinct theoretical approaches to cognition: (a) the op-
erational code, (b) concept maps, (c) discourse analysis, and (d) image theory.  
The earliest cognitive theory in IR is the Operational Code, which was developed by 
Robert Merton (1940), “made more prominent by Leite’s (1953) study of Bolshevism” (M. D. 
Young and Schafer 1998, 69), and reformulated with more conceptual rigor by Alexander 
George (George 1969). George developed ten questions that captured political leaders’ beliefs 
about the principles of political life and argued that a person’s responses form a belief system, 
in which individual beliefs are “bound together by some form of constraint or functional in-
terdependence” (Cited by M. D. Young and Schafer 1998, 70). Operational codes are issue-
specific and subject to change over time (Renshon 2008).  
After Axelrod published “The Structure of Decision” in 1976, the idea of cognitive or 
conceptual maps became prominent, and researchers developed sophisticated approaches to 
mapping the beliefs of individual policy-makers and decision-making bodies (e.g., commit-
tees). While most work was based on text analysis, some studies used simulations with pol-
icy-makers to gather data and verify their models (Bonham 1988). The core strength of these 
early maps is the reflection of causal beliefs, assumed to be the basis of decision-making 
(Astorino-Courtois 1995). Bonham seeks to connect cognitive mapping and international ne-
gotiations, arguing that the tool can reveal the assumptions of negotiators, map the effect of 
individual proposals, and identify common ground (Bonham 1993). 
Shapiro et al. proposed an alternative approach to cognition, arguing that discursive prac-
tices are historically determined constraints for individual cognitive processes (Shapiro, 
Bonham, and Heradstveit 1988). A discursive practice (frame) is conceived as external to the 
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individual mind and treated as the agent in the causal model. More generally, discourse 
analysis has become a prominent constructivist approach to the study of global environmental 
politics (Hajer 1996). A discourse is “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categoriza-
tions that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and 
through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1996, 44). Discourse 
analysis seeks to understand the dynamics that lead to the dominance of one discourse over 
others or to change of social institutions, for example, the strategic use of story-lines or the 
formation of discourse coalitions (Maguire and Hardy 2009; Maguire 2004). There are strong 
parallels between discourses and discursive practices in the study of IR, and collective action 
frames and frame-related activities in the social movement literature. The major weakness of 
the discursive approach is its inability to explain the origins of discursive practices and the 
lack of generalizeability across cases. Further, it seems awkward to attribute causal power to 
an abstract entity that seems to be suspended in mid-air between individuals, intangible and 
separate from individual minds.  
Another body of research studies images as relatively stable mental structures that influ-
ence decision-making (Cottam 1986; Herrmann et al. 1997). This work is based on the notion 
of schemata as organized clusters of concepts. Herrmann connects image theory to gestalt 
theory, arguing that an image forms an integrated whole rather than a collection of separate 
and independent parts. The IR-relevant work only deals with images of other countries in the 
minds of individual decision-makers based on three sources: goal (in)compatibility, power 
differences (i.e., the potential for agency) and cultural status (identity). Alexander et al. 
(2005) link image theory to social identity and social dominance, based on ideas very similar 
to the grid-group typology based on Douglas’ cultural theory (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). 
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So far none of these theoretical advances has taken the role of emotion into consideration. 
Mercer and a number of political psychologists have argued for the integration of emotional 
factors into political analysis, but so far a coherent theory has remains elusive (Mercer 2005a; 
Mercer 2010). 
 
3. Summary: Building Blocks for a Theoretical Cognitive Framework 1 
These distinct bodies of literature on cooperation, conflict and political mobilization all 
suggest that there are three sets of basic cognitive entities that are relevant for decision-
making on international cooperation:  
a. Mental representations concerning structural opportunities for and constraints of 
agency, often identified through cost-benefit calculations regarding different action 
options in a given situation,  
b. Mental representations related to different actor identities (in- and out-groups),  
c. Mental representations related to notions of justice. 
Past insights regarding cognitive structures suggests that different elements tend to be 
grouped together in a coherent manner to form images, (collective action) frames or dis-
courses. These structures provide the foundation for individual and collective decision-
making, for instance, as an operational code or as prescriptive elements of a collective action 
frame. However, it remains unclear to what extent one can make general statements about 
these cognitive structures across issues and cases. A theory about the process of decision-
making using these structures is lacking entirely. Concept maps, based on causal beliefs, so 
far provide the most detailed insights into the thought-processes of decision-makers.  
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Building on these insights I approach the research project with the assumption that each of 
the major theories mentioned above has equal validity—it is possible that all of the cognitive 
assumptions they make are relevant for political decisions regarding cooperation on climate 
change, and that they may even take place simultaneously (parallel processing). Depending on 
the context and the decision-maker, some elements might be more important than others. 
These assumptions raise the question how these distinct processes and consequently theories 
could be reconciled. Is there a mechanism that facilitates decision-making based on both ra-
tional choice, identity and normative considerations simultaneously?  
 
III.  COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
This section ventures outside the field of IR to scan the growing cognitive science litera-
ture including social psychology, communication and decision sciences, for relevant insights 
regarding the cognitive processes influencing global climate politics. Three distinct bodies of 
literature in various sub-disciplines of the cognitive sciences seek to explain how people re-
spond to climate change information, in particular to what extent they are willing to support 
costly collective action (e.g., supporting GHG emission policies, reducing their personal en-
ergy consumption patterns). Many studies are motivated by the puzzle that popular concern 
about climate change has been wavering while scientific consensus on the reasons for concern 
has been solidifying over the last two decades. Finally I briefly review the literature on mental 
models. 
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1. Explaining Public Complacency 
Beyond the quantitative analysis of public concern about climate change (Leiserowitz 
2006; N. Smith and Leiserowitz 2012; Kvaløy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012) numerous re-
search programs explore the various cognitive-affective coping mechanisms people use to pro-
tect themselves from difficult or threatening information, such as climate change science. 
Norgaard argues that accurate and complete understanding of the science is not a prerequisite 
for concern. However, many people stop paying attention to the issue when they realize there 
is no easily available solution; concern is maintained only if action options are available and 
known. Norgaard lays out a theory of socially organized denial, arguing that people work to 
avoid disturbing information in order to (i) avoid negative emotions, such as fear, guilt, help-
lessness, (ii) follow cultural norms, such as not raising difficult subjects in conversation that 
could humiliate interlocutors, or (iii) maintain positive conceptions of individual and national 
identity. Societies develop a repertoire of techniques to ignore disturbing problems and create 
a narrative in which “everything is fine.” They do not want to know (Norgaard 2011; 
Norgaard in Dryzek, Norgaard, and Schlosberg 2011, chap. 27).  
Similar views are expressed by other authors, who point to contradictions between climate 
change information and the human need to believe in a just and stable world (M. Feinberg and 
Willer 2010), or to various beliefs that might be cognitive preconditions for supporting cli-
mate action, including beliefs about one’s ability to remedy the problem (Krosnick et al. 
2006; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006).  
The central argument of a set of theories around cultural cognition (Kahan, Jen-
kins-Smith, and Braman 2011) and ideology is that people make decisions in line with pre-
existing cognitive structures and deeply held cultural values. They point out that climate 
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change information does not have a “blank slate” to start from, but encounters cognitive struc-
tures and meaning systems that have developed over a long period of time and are difficult to 
change. Depending on the fit between the new information and the existing belief structures, 
the individual is more or less likely to reject the information rather than to adjust the given 
belief and value system to integrate climate change (confirmation bias). The same argument is 
made for risk perceptions and the social amplification/attenuation of risk (Dessai et al. 2004; 
Weber 2010; Leiserowitz in Moser and Dilling 2007). Swim et al. provide an overview of the 
psychological literature on dealing with climate change (Swim et al. 2011). 
Both of these literatures converge in a body of research exploring the link between climate 
skepticism and political conservatism (Jacques 2012), especially in the United States. This 
work suggests that climate skepticism is dominant among conservatives, because the implica-
tions of climate change are threatening to deeply held conservative values, such as individual-
ism, private property and free enterprise, small government, and anti-multilateralism 
(McCright and Dunlap 2000; Jamison 2010). Conservative cognitive structures resist the 
change required to integrate climate change policies. The cognitive dissonance is resolved 
with climate skepticism, which becomes a cognitive-affective coping mechanism, or even a 
political tactic (Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008) to protect a coherent conservative ideol-
ogy. Connected research explores the role of (biased) media reporting on climate change and 
its relevance for the public communication process in a democracy (Carvalho 2007; Antilla 
2005). More generally, there is a growing field of research integrating morality, environ-
mental attitudes, ideology and politics (M. Feinberg and Willer 2010; Hatemi and McDermott 
2012; Matthew Feinberg and Willer 2013). 
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Based on these insights communication research seeks to develop strategies for improving 
public climate change communication (Pidgeon 2012) and for increasing political mobiliza-
tion for climate action through framing (Bain et al. 2012), careful selection of the messenger 
and message content, for instance, a focus on solutions rather than dire warnings of a gloomy 
future (Stern 2012). Johnson critically compares three communication strategies discussed in 
the literature, including persuasion, political movement mobilization, and deliberation 
(Johnson 2012). A recent focus on the role of emotions strengthens the link between commu-
nication and risk research and cognitive science (Meijnders, Midden, and Wilke 2001; Weber 
2006; Myers et al. 2012; Roeser 2012). 
All of these research streams are concerned with the responses of individual voters, public 
opinion or social-political movements. Lowe and Lorenzoni’s work on expert views is an ex-
ception (Lowe and Lorenzoni 2007). So far there have been no studies connecting these in-
sights to the cognitive processes of diplomats, policy-makers, representatives of climate 
NGOs or business actors engaged in the international negotiation process. Given the profes-
sional-cultural context of individuals engaged in the negotiations, one can expect that for this 
particular group cognitive-affective coping mechanisms are less important than the constraints 
of cultural cognition and ideology. A diplomat assigned to the climate desk is unlikely to re-
spond to this task with climate change denial. It is more likely that the Habermasian “life-
world” of negotiation participants (Depledge 2006, 10) reifies certain ideas regarding the pur-
pose and justification of UNFCCC negotiations. Further, the minds of negotiators might con-
tain some cognitive elements and processes that do not feature in the thought processes of pri-
vate individuals, such as concepts related to the national interest, the role of the state, and 
power in a multilateral context. 
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2. Mental Models 
The concept of mental models originates in psychology (Craik 1943) and has become in-
creasingly popular in multiple disciplines since the growth of cognitive science in the 1990s. 
“Mental models are personal, internal representations of external reality that people use to in-
teract with the world around them … used to reason and make decisions and can be the basis 
for individual behaviors.” (Denzau and North 1994, 4–5; Jones et al. 2011, 45). Mental mod-
els are cognitive structures that contain assumptions about how the world works; they affect 
how people filter, process and store information, in other words what knowledge an actor de-
rives from its interactions with other people and the physical environment (Kolkman, Kok, 
and van der Veen 2005, 320). They “guide understanding, reasoning, prediction and ulti-
mately action” (Biggs et al. 2011, 170). 
Mental models can be shared inter-subjectively. Through communication and culture peo-
ple can develop similar models, which become the source for group ideologies or societal in-
stitutions. Mental models are essential to the way societies structure their environment and 
interact with it (Denzau and North 1994). 
A number of scholars have argued that a mental model approach could be very valuable in 
multi-stakeholder policy processes, especially in natural resources management (Kolkman, 
Kok, and van der Veen 2005; Jones et al. 2011; Mathevet et al. 2011; Du Toit, Biggs, and 
Pollard 2011) and conservation planning (Biggs et al. 2011). Lowe and Lorenzoni have ap-
plied the approach to elicit expert views on the concept of danger as it relates to climate 
change (Lowe and Lorenzoni 2007). They identified three distinct mental models of danger: 
(i) human influence on the climate system, (ii) climate-related impacts on natural and human 
communities, and (iii) threat to status quo. Although I am not using a mental model terminol-
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ogy, the cognitive analysis conducted for this research project with the aim to uncover exist-
ing belief systems among participants in the global climate negotiations is an exercise in iden-
tifying mental models broadly defined.  
 
3. Summary: Building Blocks for a Cognitive Theoretical Framework 2 
This review of some general and some climate change-specific literature in the cognitive 
sciences has pointed to a number of cognitive entities that should be part of a cognitive 
framework for the analysis of climate politics: 
a. Emotions as important factors in risk perceptions and moral judgment, 
b. The distinction and link between individual and collective cognition, 
c. The link between cognition and material-social realities (relationalism), 
d. Decision-making mechanisms (e.g., emotional coherence, constrained by existing 
cognitive structures). 
 
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE—A COGNITIVE CHALLENGE SUI GENERIS? 
Is it possible that climate change displays special characteristics that influence the cogni-
tive and consequently political response to it? Some authors have suggested that climate 
change is a ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber 1973; Prins et al. 2010) or even ‘super-wicked’ prob-
lem (Levin et al. 2009; Levin et al. 2012). This line of argument goes beyond the notion that 
the institutional design of international treaties should respond to the specific problem struc-
ture (Mitchell 2006), and points to the possibility that collaborative solutions to climate 
change might require a different type of political or governance approach than the interna-
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tional community has used in the past (Prins et al. 2010), and maybe even a different kind of 
science (Verweij et al. 2006). 
While the concepts and criteria for (super-) wickedness remain contested and are not di-
rectly relevant for this project, the notion that there might be something special—something 
particularly difficult—about climate change, is intriguing. This section briefly outlines possi-
bly unique problem characteristics that might render climate change a problem sui generis. 
Further, the section provisionally selects and combines some of these characteristics, whose 
potential cognitive effects as promoters of or obstacles to cooperation will be explored in 
more depth with this research. 
 
1. Special Problem Characteristics 
a. Pervasiveness and Complexity 
In contrast with other global governance problems climate change is characterized by an 
unprecedented level of complexity due to the problem’s pervasiveness. This term implies that 
beyond its global, transboundary character, which it shares with other problems, including 
trade, ozone depletion or biodiversity, climate change has causes and effects at almost all 
imaginable natural and social system scales with multiple linkages and cross-scale dynamics. 
Sources of GHG emissions and land-use change are not limited to a few countries or industry 
players like in the ozone case, but include individuals, households, firms, industries, transna-
tional networks, and governments around the world. Consequently addressing climate change 
requires almost universal changes of behavioral patterns, especially with regard to energy use. 
Climate impacts can be experienced by organisms, plants and species with limited tempera-
ture ranges, by ecosystems and climatic systems with tipping points, by all life on the planet 
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from the depth of the acidifying oceans to the heights of the warming atmosphere. Climate 
change affects all natural systems that provide vital services for human societies, including 
food, clean air and water, natural resource harvest, temperature, or flood control. The problem 
fundamentally challenges all current economic structures and social organizations. 
Another contrast between climate change and other global governance challenges is the 
fundamental importance of implicated structures for human civilization, progress and produc-
tivity. Energy production and supply systems are the backbone and lifeblood of any society, 
which makes efforts to change or abandon the existing constellation of actors, resources and 
infrastructure extraordinarily difficult (T. Homer-Dixon 2006, chap. 2; Foreword to T. 
Homer-Dixon 2010) and qualitatively different than, for example, replacing ozone-depleting 
substances with non-harmful ones in a handful of industries. Transforming the global fossil 
fuel industry will be disruptive not only for the industry itself but for entire societies. The 
economic, political and social changes required are staggering.  
These two features—pervasiveness and the need to transform global energy systems—
might also render climate change a special collective action problem. Global challenges that 
require several actors to collaborate are not uncommon. Climate change falls into this stan-
dard category, since somewhere between ten and twenty states are needed to significantly re-
duce global GHG emissions and manage land-use change (Victor 2006, 95). However, one 
could argue that beyond this minimum requirement of multilateralism, more actors—and not 
only state-actors have to collaborate to set the world on a path to carbon-neutrality. Develop-
ing countries might be required to use some energy technologies, but not others; companies 
might have to change their business models and surrender to certain types of regulation and 
taxation; individuals might have to accept limits to their personal freedom, such as flying or 
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meat-eating. All of this takes place in a global environment where power and vulnerability 
with respect to climate change are very unevenly distributed and the collective interest is con-
tested, where inequality within and across countries is high, the global population keeps grow-
ing, urbanization is increasing, and many global governance institutions are showing signs of 
stress. Taking these circumstances into consideration, the collective action problem in re-
sponse to climate change appears to be qualitatively different than the coordination of twenty 
states to reduce GHG. 
b. Uncertainties 
Climate change governance needs to deal with comparatively high levels of uncertainty 
regarding numerous important questions about both natural and social systems (Pachauri and 
Reisinger 2007, 27, 73). This includes the specific climate response to increased levels of at-
mospheric GHG concentrations, the effects of different levels of warming on major physical 
systems (Shackley and Wynne 1996; Latif 2011), the impact of environmental changes on 
human well-being, and finally the effects over time of potential policy options (Dessai, 
O’Brien, and Hulme 2007). Again, uncertainty is not unique to climate change—Levin et al. 
suggest that complexity and uncertainty are two out of five problems generally associated 
with global environmental problems (Levin et al. 2009)—but the scale and dimensions of un-
certainty related to climate governance might be unprecedented.2 
c. Long Time Scales 
Some of these uncertainties are linked to the circumstance that the climate systems works 
on long time scales and displays significant time lags between an initial change and the sys-
tem’s response, e.g. the increase of average atmospheric GHG concentration and the associ-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 For details regarding the treatment of uncertainty in the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC, see the “Uncer-
tainty Guidance Note”: http://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/ar4-workshops-express-meetings/uncertainty-guidance-
note.pdf 
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ated increase of global average surface temperature. Climatic changes take place over multi-
ple decades, centuries and millennia, rather than years or election cycles (Pachauri and Reis-
inger 2007, 46–47). Similarly, there is potentially a large time window between the imple-
mentation of a climate policy and the policy’s impact on the climate system. Given the nu-
merous uncertainties one cannot know how big the effect of a particular policy would be or 
how one would measure it. The time-delay also makes it difficult to predict with precision 
when or over what time period that effect would manifest.  
Under these conditions a standard cost-benefit analysis combined with discounting be-
comes increasingly difficult, if not impossible. The combined challenge of long time scales 
and major uncertainties have given rise to a debate among distinguished economists about the 
general utility of these analytic tools in the case of climate change. The arguments center on 
the possibility of “fat-tail” events—low probability but high impact occurrences with cata-
strophic implications for a society (Weitzman 2009). Lemoine and Traeger are among the first 
authors who attempt to model the economic impact of tipping points and their interactions 
with climate policy (Lemoine and Traeger 2012). Yet, time-discounting is not only standard 
practice among policy-makers but also among the public (Jacobs and Matthews 2012).  
Further, the long time-scales raise a number of important questions regarding intergenera-
tional ethics for which there are few and unsatisfying analytical tools (Gardiner 2011).  
d. Limited Observability  
Since climate change is a very slow-moving problem from a human and especially politi-
cal perspective, humans have severely limited abilities to directly observe or experience the 
threat and full consequences of climate change with the human senses. Some impacts like the 
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events might be easier to detect than 
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others like ocean acidification and species extinction. The problem of limited observability 
includes constraints on people’s cognitive ability to link cause and effect. One simply cannot 
see, feel or otherwise experience how much warming is caused by the emission of one ton of 
carbon dioxide, or one commute to work in the family’s SUV. An individual might be able to 
observe gradual sea-level rise in a particular place in the course of her 80-year lifespan, but 
sea-level rise takes place over several centuries and has different effects along the various 
coastlines of the world. Similar arguments can be made about ice sheet loss and ocean acidifi-
cation. Any individual might get a glimpse, but nobody can get the full picture. Accepting that 
our senses are of little use for understanding what is causing climate change, and what types 
of threats societies are facing, all climate-related decision-making has to rely to a large extent 
on abstract and synthesized information provided by scientists and technical experts and on 
imagination. This might have implications for the relevance of affect, but more importantly it 
elevates the importance of scientific experts and public communication processes for climate 
politics.  
These observations need to be qualified in two respects. First, many individuals especially 
in the developing world are already experiencing diverse effects of climate change in their 
daily lives, for instance, less reliable weather patterns, more frequent and more intense ex-
treme weather events, or coastal erosion and sea-level rise. Individuals engaged in the politi-
cal process are likely to associate these personal observations or indirect observations by fel-
low citizens with climate change. The same phenomenon of observation and experience-based 
beliefs about climate change has recently begun in the developed world, with increasing 
floods in the UK, wild fires in Australia and sustained drought and intense east coast storms in 
the US. 
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e. Tipping Points 
Over the last few years, climate scientists have pointed out that the global climate and 
various climate subsystems could exhibit tipping points—“a critical threshold at which a tiny 
perturbation can qualitatively alter the state or development of a system” (Lenton et al. 2008, 
1786). Examples for tipping elements include various ice sheets (large ice volume vs. none), 
the Atlantic thermohaline circulation (on vs. off), and the Indian Summer Monsoon (strong 
vs. weak). Recently researchers have become more cautious concerning the possibility of 
global-scale tipping points (Lenton and Williams 2013), and continue to emphasize a number 
of major uncertainties concerning the conditions and timing of such events (Lenton 2012). 
Broecker was among the first to express concern about the possibility of climatic tipping 
points in 1987 (Broecker 1987). However, the concept tipping point is not new or specific to 
the climate system. It is often used interchangeably with the terms threshold, regime shift or 
critical transition. And it does not only apply to natural systems like the climate, but can also 
frame one’s understanding of social system change. Malcolm Gladwell’s book The Tipping 
Point (Gladwell 2002) popularized the concept, although Gladwell’s tipping points refer to 
very different phenomena (e.g., the spread of a fashion fad) than those that concern Lenton 
and others who seek to understand possible characteristics of the climate system. I adopt Bro-
ecker’s and Lenton’s definition that emphasizes the nonlinear or rapid character of systemic 
change (“sudden rather than gradual”), which is driven by internal system processes such as 
feedback effects.  
Tipping as a specific system behavior could have very serious implications for the well-
being of human societies, which have evolved in and adapted to the stable climate system 
over the last 10,000 years. The possibility of climate tipping points therefore poses major 
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challenges for the design of climate governance institutions. Gardiner suggests that the grow-
ing awareness of the possibility of tipping points should be welcomed because it could un-
dermine the current political inertia and therefore “help us to act” (Gardiner 2009, 140). Nut-
tal also argues that the idea of tipping points has major discursive power and prompts “discus-
sion characterized by a nervous anticipation of the future.” (Nuttall 2012, 97). Similarly inter-
ested in the effect of sudden or abrupt climatic changes on individual risk perceptions, Hulme 
and Bellamy come to a more differentiated conclusion, arguing that different value systems 
determine the effect of tipping point concerns on individual beliefs about climate change risk 
and action (Bellamy and Hulme 2011). However, to my knowledge there have been no studies 
on the effect of the tipping point concept on the beliefs of climate change decision-makers. 
f. Multiple Simultaneous Stresses 
An often underestimated feature of climate change is its likelihood to produce multiple 
simultaneous stresses for social systems, rather than one-off and bounded emergency events.  
Droughts, fires, pests, floods and coastal storm surges in different regions of the world can 
place multiple simultaneous stresses on global food systems that can trigger crisis cascades in 
social and economic systems. One such case has already occurred, although it remains unclear 
whether all individual stresses can indeed be linked to climate change: in 2010 a heat wave 
and fires in Russia, floods in Pakistan and China, and a drought in China all converged to 
produce major stress in the global food system, which might have contributed to the uprisinsg 
in North Africa and the Middle East (Werrell, Femia, and Slaughter 2012).3 Similarly multi-
ple stresses on water availability due to shifting hydrological conditions are not unlikely. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/02/04/207460/contribution-of-high-food-prices-to-mideast-unrest/, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/18/133852810/the-impact-of-rising-food-prices-on-arab-unrest,   	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These systemic stresses could have knock-on effects for health systems, international trade, 
poverty alleviation, disaster risk management and international security provision.   
g. Lack of Intentionality and Moral Rules 
Finally, two characteristics of climate change are particularly interesting in a conflict and 
security context. The lack of intentionality or hostility on behalf of those who cause the poten-
tial harm (indirectly with GHG emissions and land-use change), and the vast geographic dis-
tribution of the major contributors, makes it very difficult to attribute blame to a certain 
group. In other words it is almost impossible to identify an enemy. This characteristic also 
renders strategic thinking in the conventional sense of IR—game theoretic responses to ene-
mies in an anarchic world—useless. Further, the absence of moral rules for atmos-
pheric/environmental changes means there might be an absence of moral and emotional 
arousal (Grasso 2012), which is often a key ingredient for political action against a looming 
threat.  
 
2. Cognitive Responses to Special Problem Characteristics 
Some or all of these characteristics of climate change might affect the cognitive ability of 
individuals and the international community to respond to the challenge cooperatively. Below 
I outline arguments for exploring the cognitive effects of pervasiveness, long time scales and 
limited observability on actors’ preparedness to cooperate.  
a. Pervasiveness and the Loss of Hope 
Preparedness to act on climate change requires first of all the cognitive possibility of suc-
cess, which includes mental representations of a goal (e.g., limiting global warming to 2°C) 
and pathways towards that goal (e.g., mitigation timetables, energy system transition plan-
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ning). Goal selection and pursuit is a form of agency. If success is dependent on the actions of 
others, an individual’s assessment of the chances to come to a cooperative agreement (e.g., 
perceptions of other actors’ willingness to mitigate, or beliefs about one’s ability to influence 
others’ willingness to act) can strongly affect his or her sense of agency. The psychological 
theory of hope suggests that goal pursuit, pathway thinking and agency are linked by hope 
(Snyder 2002), and consequently the loss of hope diminishes an individual’s sense of agency 
(McGeer 2004). 
Success, as it is currently defined in the global policy process, necessitates the cooperation 
of many actors in the form of an effective agreement under the UNFCCC umbrella.4  Given 
the unprecedented problem scale and complexity, and past negotiation failures, one would 
expect that some actors experience hopelessness at certain points in the negotiation process. 
Loss of hope along with a sense of agency, especially the dynamics of spreading hopeless-
ness, could play an important role for the collective ability to find a cooperative agreement. 
Apart from its treatment in psychology, hope has been a theme in a diverse set of literatures, 
from which I draw some brief examples below. 
Towards the end of the Cold War Beardslee describes the nuclear threat in terms that also 
apply to climate change: “unknown and uncertain territory,” “threat is abstract, outside peo-
ple’s experience, yet overwhelming in its horror and scale,” “… it engenders a sense of pow-
erlessness and hopelessness,” “… and yet the great majority of adults take no action whatso-
ever.” Along these lines Kefford compares the psychological effect of the threat of nuclear 
war with that of climate change (Kefford 2006). He suggests that the overwhelming threat of 
nuclear war lead to widespread apathy and despair, rendering thinking about the future use-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 For some actors that assessment might change with the development of geoengineering technologies and a 
growing understanding of their costs and effects. 
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less. Expecting the same public response to climate change, Kefford argues that denial and 
apathy should be turned into political mobilization for climate change mitigation, similar to 
the nuclear disarmament movement. Expending on these ideas, Courville and Piper argue that 
NGOs can use hope for political mobilization towards social change (Courville and Piper 
2004). 
Several authors have used hope rather intuitively as an explanation for the inaction of so-
cieties in the face of an overwhelming problem in historical and political essays (Tuchman 
1987; Hamilton 2010) as well as in literary works (Hamilton cites, “The Plague” by Albert 
Camus, 1947).  
Treating the loss of hope as a potential cognitive response to the pervasiveness of climate 
change, combined with past negotiation failures, this research explores whether and to what 
extent actors experience hope and hopelessness during the UNFCCC negotiations.  
b. Time Scales, Limited Observability and Myopia  
The majority of personal, ethical and political decisions in modern societies have a limited 
time-horizon. For individual choices, the relevant time line can range from days to a few 
years, in rare cases a few decades, for instance, when buying life insurance or having children. 
Most political choices in democracies are driven by election cycles (about five years) and 
economic dynamics, fewer by the lifetime of infrastructure projects (several decades) or major 
social security systems (a generation). Decision-making with a time-horizon of more than 50 
years is practically unknown in the public sector. This implies that there is a fundamental 
mismatch between the decision timelines modern societies and political actors are used to 
(years to decades), and those of climate change (centuries and millennia). It also means that 
humans have no experience to build on when making choices regarding climate change. 
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The standard rationalist approach to decision-making is cost-benefit analysis (CBA)—
comparing different available paths of action, one always chooses the option that maximizes 
the difference between expected gains and losses (net benefits) over a distinct time period. 
Economists have long debated the role of time in the process of cost-benefit analysis: how 
does one value costs and benefits occurring in the present vs. those one expects to occur in the 
distant future? Two distinct responses to this question have been developed (Loewenstein, and 
Elster 1992, Introduction). One side suggests that it is “natural” for individuals to discount the 
future, pointing to a number of reasons why humans are prone to valuing the “many tempta-
tions of the present” higher than the less certain promises of the future. A second camp argues 
that the value of present and future assets is and should be treated equal. The prevailing prac-
tice of discounting in economic and political decision-making in modern societies is indica-
tive of the power of myopia. A recent study by Jacobs and Matthews offers empirical evi-
dence that citizens also discount the future (Jacobs and Matthews 2012). This is of particular 
relevance for climate-related decision-making, because effective climate policies would have 
considerable and well understood short-term costs, but mainly long-term and more uncertain 
benefits. In other words, the current generation is required to pay a relatively certain price for 
preventing future generations’ less certain harm. Under these conditions a CBA results in in-
action—the (perceived) costs simply outweigh the (perceived) benefits, as long as the current 
generation of decision-makers sufficiently discounts the future. 
However, in the global climate debate one can observe not only those actors who seem to 
succumb to shortsighted decision-making in the face of a long-term problem (e.g., the US, 
India, Saudi Arabia), but also those who are able to take long-term consequences and time 
lags into consideration, and strongly argue for fast political action despite the short-term costs. 
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(e.g., AOSIS, LDCs, climate justice movement). What causes the difference between these 
perspectives? Are their thoughts based on different time-lines? A rationalist scholar would 
answer that the long-term thinkers have probably more to loose, or that their losses are ex-
pected earlier and therefore not as heavily discounted. They might also add that the long-term 
thinkers would not incur any costs of action since they are poor and do not have any signifi-
cant mitigation potential.  
Other explanations for the different attitudes observed among climate negotiators could 
include differences in their social value systems and definitions of intergenerational justice, 
and differences in attitudes towards nature and ‘environmental stability’. Both of these factors 
are elements of a society’s social identity and its dominant ideologies. Finally, some individu-
als might simply have a higher capacity for abstract thinking and imagination than others.  
Using this mismatch of decision- and problem timescales as a point of departure, this re-
search project will explore the different cognitive-affective processes for dealing with the 
long time scales of climate change and the question of discounting in CBA, in particular the 
different emotions associated with sensory experience vs. abstract, scientific information. Fur-
ther it will explore the issue of imagination: (how) do individuals imagine the long-term fu-
ture, in particular tipping point events and their social consequences (Wagner and Zeckhauser 
2012).  
 
V. THE PILLARS OF A FRAMEWORK FOR COGNITIVE ANALYSIS 
Integrating the insights gained from the literature review above, a provisional theoretical 
framework for the cognitive analysis of global climate politics should consists of the follow-
ing analytic dimensions: 
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(1) Cognitive Elements: Each actor has specific mental representations concerning (a) the 
structural opportunities and constraints of agency, (b) the identity of the self and others (in- 
and out-groups), and (c) the actor’s understanding of justice. Actors also have mental repre-
sentations of climate change and its characteristics, for example, its pervasiveness, associated 
uncertainties, and the possibility of tipping points. All of these representations have emotional 
valences of differing intensity. 
(2) Cognitive Structures: These and other mental representations and the links among 
them form stable and emotionally coherent cognitive structures, which can be visualized as 
cognitive-affective networks.  
(3) Cognitive Processes: Processes such as decision-making and cognitive change are 
constrained by emotional coherence.  The theory of cognition as a process of emotional co-
herence (Thagard 2006, chap. 2) assumes that cognitive elements have emotional valences, 
and that decisions are based on a process of multiple constraint satisfaction, taking into con-
sideration both the cognitive acceptability of a mental representation and its emotional va-
lence.  
An actor’s interactions within a social group or with other material realities provides input 
for cognitive processes. Based on these interactions the unique problem characteristics of cli-
mate change can affect the ability of individuals and groups identify cooperative solutions to 
this particular collective action problem. Rational decision-making might be an important 
cognitive process, but is likely to be severely constrained in the case of climate change due to 
high levels of uncertainty, difficulties of quantifying certain costs and benefits, and systemic 
time lags. Consequently I expect myopia and the absence of imagined futures to be relevant 
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cognitive features in some belief systems about climate change and cooperation. Another im-
portant cognitive process is likely the effect of the loss of hope on agency-related beliefs. 
The link between individual and collective cognition is best understood as one of multi-
level interacting mechanisms, involving cognitive mechanisms at the individual level and so-
cial mechanisms at the group level.  
The mental processes that generate thoughts and beliefs have a neural basis—thinking is a 
brain function. More importantly, all mental representations refer to things in the world, either 
physical ones like trees or cars, or socially constructed ones, like states or war, which depend 
on a shared belief about the existence and meaning of those entities.  
The framework offers opportunities for empirical testing and is able to integrate neo-
realist and constructivist theories.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Cognitive-Affective Mapping—Method, Findings and Limitations 
 
This chapter presents the results of my empirical efforts to identify existing belief systems 
among participants in the global climate negotiations using cognitive-effective mapping 
(CAM). Section I introduces the method and section II outlines how I selected participants for 
this project. Since this is one of the first sustained research efforts using the CAM method 
(Findlay and Thagard 2012) and the first using interview data, I offer a number of observa-
tions in section III about the practical experience of generating CAMs in interaction with 
study participants, the potential value of cognitive-affective mapping for social scientific re-
search, and some limitations that affected this dissertation project in particular. Section IV 
summarizes the CAM content, structure and narratives. This data form the foundation for the 
theoretical findings I present in chapter 4.  
 
I. COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE MAPPING 
Cognitive-affective mapping is a qualitative research tool to identify, visually represent 
and analyze existing belief structures (Findlay and Thagard 2012; T. F. Homer-Dixon et al. 
under review). A cognitive-affective map is a network diagram or concept graph that “dis-
plays not only the conceptual structure of people’s views, but also their emotional nature, 
showing the positive and negative values attached to concepts and goals.” (Thagard 2012). 
The networked representation of sets of connected concepts is based on neural network re-
search in the cognitive sciences that conceptualizes and simulates brain processes in terms of 
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connections between populations of neurons that can be modeled computationally (Galushkin 
2007).  
Cognitive maps have been used in the past (Axelrod 1976; Bonham 1993; Novak 1998), 
but there are a number of features that distinguish CAMs from previous approaches and make 
it particularly suited to this study. The most obvious and theoretically relevant novelty intro-
duced by CAMs is the ability to include affective information, adding an important layer of 
data about mental states and processes (Mercer 2010). Affect is the combination of emotion, 
mood, and motivation. Recent literature in multiple disciplines including psychology, political 
science and decision studies, has emphasized both the need to integrate affect in the analysis 
of human behavior (Damasio 1995; G. F. Loewenstein et al. 2001; Lebow 2005; Vohs, 
Baumeister, and Loewenstein 2007; Sasley 2011), but also the methodological difficulties of 
doing so (Crawford 2000; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008).  
In contrast to Axelrod’s mental maps (Axelrod 1976), CAMs do not focus exclusively on 
causal beliefs, but on the network of all relevant concepts for a given subject matter. In the 
context of global climate change politics, this can include concepts related to climate science 
that explain the nature of climate change as a phenomenon in nature, the definition of equity, 
or the values a person considers threatened by climate change impacts. This approach results 
in a fuller or more comprehensive picture of the different mental representations that create a 
person’s belief system and serve as motivations or inputs into decision-making processes.   
In addition to being more comprehensive, CAMs have the unique ability to reveal not only 
belief content but also cognitive structure—the unique constellation of connections between 
different mental representations that ultimately create meaning. This topological feature adds 
value to the qualitative inquiry into belief systems. Going beyond more conventional text-
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based analysis, which has to build on a linear ordering of statements or sentences, CAMs 
“provide an immediate gestalt of the whole system and of the simultaneous interactions be-
tween, and relationships among, its parts.” (T. F. Homer-Dixon et al. forthcoming, 3–4).  
CAMs are special—affective—versions of mental models and the CAM generation proc-
ess (see below) is a method for the elicitation of mental models (Carley and Palmquist 1992; 
Jones et al. 2011). 
 
1. The Nature and Limitations of CAM 
The main elements of a CAM are (i) network nodes, which represent discreet cognitive 
elements (mainly single concepts or propositions), (ii) emotional valences of these nodes 
(positive, neutral, negative, ambivalent), and (iii) links/connectors that represent relationships 
(or their absence) between two nodes.  
(i) (ii) There are four different types of nodes, depicted with different shapes and colors. 
Positive nodes are shown as green ovals, neutral ones as yellow rectangles and negative ones 
as red hexagons. Ambivalent concepts are concepts that a person perceives as positive in 
some contexts and negative in others, for example, a sports car as a status symbol and source 
of joy vs. its role in a fatal accident. Hence, ambivalent concepts are depicted as a combina-
tion of an oval and a hexagon (purple). The thickness of a shape’s edges represent the emo-
tional intensity associated with the node on a scale from one to three (both positive and nega-
tive).  
(iii) Links are lines connecting two nodes, indicating both the emotional and logical rela-
tionship between the two concepts (see Annex Ch3-1 for details). CAM links are symmetric 
(i.e., undirected), allowing the emotional loadings of each node to influence the other. Which 
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direction dominates in any given moment depends on a number of factors, including priming 
effects. This feature creates the potential risk of making a CAM unreadable. A reader might 
not be able to clearly identify the beliefs that the CAM seeks to represent given the multiple 
possible interpretations of the relationship between two or more nodes. 
There are two different types of links. Solid lines indicate emotional coherence or com-
patibility between concepts. Emotional coherence exists between two concepts with the same 
emotional loading—(not) liking one concepts implies (not) liking the other. Emotional inco-
herence exists if there is a relationship between two concepts with different emotional va-
lences. Related to but different from the emotional association between concepts is their logi-
cal connection, which can be based on constitution, causality, co-occurrence, or any other 
type of relationship that implies a connection (good or bad). The absence of a link indicates 
the lack of a relationship between the nodes.  
Links can have varying strengths on a scale from -3 to 3, indicating that the strength or 
importance of a connection between two nodes can differ. The factors that influence the 
strength of a link have so far not been explored, but they could include availability and quality 
of evidence, whether the linked beliefs rest on personal experience or abstract information, 
uncertainty, newness of concept, or the source of information about a concept, for instance, a 
trusted person with shared values, an expert, a stranger (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 
2011). 
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Figure 3-1: CAM Elements and Link Types 
 
This way of representing the cognitive reality of an individual is strongly influenced by 
recent cognitive theory, most imporatntly, the theory of emotional rather than just cognitive 
coherence (Thagard 2006). Consequently CAMs are highly simplified representations of one 
aspect of cognition—the emotional structure of belief and value systems—that necessarily 
ignore other elements of the mind and mental processes. This simplification is useful for some 
analytic purposes, but comes with a number of limitations regarding what the method can and 
cannot deliver. These and other issues regarding the nature and limitations of CAMs are dis-
cussed in more detail in Appendix Ch3-1, which contains the standard protocol for addressing 
these in the context of this research.  
 
2. Data Source: Semi-Structured Qualitative Interviews 
One can generate CAMs in a number of different ways, including the use of software tools 
such as Empathica (Thagard 2010a).5 One can ask research subjects to develop their own 
CAM of a specific issue after an introduction to the CAM technique and the formulation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Empathica, which is available for free, was created in 2011 by fourth-year software engineering students at the 
University of Waterloo. Learn more at http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/empathica.html. 
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the topic to be mapped. Alternatively the researcher can generate the CAM based on data 
gathered with qualitative interviews or based on primary and secondary text sources, includ-
ing published statements, speeches, journal articles, statutes, and observations. One can verify 
the validity of a researcher-generated CAM in a (second) interview with the research subject, 
providing the opportunity to correct the map by adding, deleting or changing concepts, emo-
tional valences or links. Another way to verify an initial CAM that is based on text sources is 
to have other researchers generate a CAM based on the same source material, and then com-
pare the results. The next section outlines the approach I adopted for this study. 
I conducted 55 semi-structured interviews with study participants to generate the input 
data (transcripts) for CAMs. 52 of the interviews were recorded, maximizing data quality and 
ensuring that the CAMs used the language and terminology chosen by participants. The inter-
view instructions emphasized the confidential nature of the conversation and asked the par-
ticipants to talk about their personal opinions rather than the official (negotiation) position of 
the organization they represent. The questions covered eight different themes: the science of 
climate change, expected climate change impacts, the (political) nature of the problem, solva-
bility, ideal solution and obstacles; interest definition and cost-benefit analysis, assessment of 
COP 17 in Durban, concern about climate tipping points and imagining a 2080 worst-case 
scenario of climate change. Appendix Ch3-2 contains the list of interview questions.  
The questions were open-ended and designed with an important trade-off in mind. On the 
one hand it was important to allow to participants to steer the conversation in a direction that 
was most meaningful to them and to insert as much of their subjective views as possible. It 
was a key purpose of the interviews to reveal differences in the ways individuals think about 
the issue of climate change and multilateral cooperation, and therefore the interview structure 
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had to leave room for such participant-driven differences. On the other hand, the goal of the 
interviews was to generate CAMs that would be comparable to some degree. The interview 
questions provided thematic anchors that generated conceptual clusters open to a comparative 
analysis. To strengthen comparability across interview responses, I sought to clarify the views 
of participants in later interviews on concepts that had frequently been used in earlier inter-
views. 
There are a number of insurmountable challenges associated with the attempt to study in-
dividual cognition using an interview approach. First, it is impossible to know or verify 
whether participants are honest and speak about their personal beliefs. The possibility that 
participants present positions of the organizations they represent as their own, or present opin-
ions they believe are appropriate or expected (e.g., from a moral standpoint) rather than their 
own beliefs, can simply not be excluded. This is a general problem for social scientific re-
search and not unique to this study. For this particular research design dishonesty is not a ma-
jor setback. If the opinions provided differ from the private beliefs of the participant, the per-
son apparently preferred to be seen as holding the stated beliefs. The answers provided must 
be at least coherent (make sense) in the participant’s mind, and are therefore possible beliefs 
one can hold. In this sense even dishonest answers provide useful data. 
A connected problem concerns diplomats who have a dominant civil servant persona, and 
identify strongly with their role as a representative of the state. This can result in the devel-
opment of two parallel belief systems—a private one, and one that that is shaped and con-
strained by the values and responsibilities of a civil servant. It is possible that a diplomat 
tasked with climate change negotiations develops a rich subset of beliefs about the climate 
issue within the belief system as a civil servant, while ignoring the topic as a private individ-
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ual. Such a separation existed in at least one of the 36 interviews I conducted with diplomats. 
Taking my invitation to speak about private beliefs seriously, the participant attempted to 
think on the spot and provide honest answers as a private individual. However, this private 
belief system seemed to be weaker than the civil servant beliefs, which may therefore have 
strongly influenced the views expressed during the interview. 
Finally, the stability of participants’ beliefs over time is unclear, raising the question 
whether their responses would have been different on any other day or under different cir-
cumstances. Various factors influence the interview situation (e.g., mood, stress, an earlier 
meeting), and can make certain concepts more or less important than they would have been at 
a different point in time (priming effect). Since the interviews were conducted under very dif-
ferent conditions—some in participant’s offices, some during the UNFCCC negotiation ses-
sion Bonn in May 2012, some in person, and some via Skype or phone—these influences are 
not comparable and not even knowable. Again, this is not a unique problem for this study. 
However, some elements of the research design alleviate this problem by giving participants 
the opportunity to present and correct their opinions outside the interview situation and on 
their own time (see CAM follow-up below). Neither the CAM nor the Q Study can address 
the possibility that a study participant changed his or her mind in the study period (e.g., be-
tween the interview and the Q Sort). 
 
3. Process: Generating CAMs 
I generated 55 CAMs based on interview transcripts, using the following protocol for each 
map. After carefully reading the complete transcript, I selected and marked key concepts in 
the text—single words or short phrases—while assessing their emotional valences based on 
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the context and meaning provided by the participant. I generated the CAM with the software 
Empathica, using the concepts marked in the transcript, adding emotional valences and plac-
ing links between concepts based on my interpretation of the text. Words contained in the 
same sentence or the same paragraph tend to be linked to each other and located spatially 
close to each other in the map. When the participant used the same concept in very different 
sections of the interview, I placed the relevant links between more distant CAM areas. More 
generally I used seven conceptual anchors based on the interview questions to create a spatial 
pattern that is somewhat similar across all CAMs. The concept ‘Climate Change’ is placed in 
the center of the map. Different issues that relate to climate change are placed in a circle 
around the center node, starting in the upper left corner: ‘Me’, ‘Science’, ‘Impacts’, ‘Problem 
Nature’, ‘Solution’, ‘UNFCCC’. Below I include an example that demonstrates this structural 
pattern. 
Figure 3-2: Sample CAM 
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In order to verify that the CAMs generated this way reflect the thoughts of the research 
participants, I sent each participant their CAM draft (.png file), and provided instructions for 
reading a CAM. I included a short interpretation of some aspects of the CAM and included a 
number of clarifying questions. The email invited the participants to provide feedback regard-
ing the nodes and their emotional valences, but also the placement and strength of links. The 
standard email text is provided in Appendix Ch3-3. If such feedback was provided, I revised 
the CAM and sent the corrected image to the participant. The quality of the feedback sug-
gested that participants understood the technique and were generally satisfied with the depic-
tion of their views. In most cases they suggested adding concepts or links, or changing the 
emotional valence of a certain concept.  
In addition I sought to validate that the CAM generation process is not completely idio-
syncratic in the sense that multiple researchers would generate similar results when using the 
same text source and instructions. Two colleagues familiar with the method volunteered to 
generate a CAM based on one (the same) interview transcript. I compared the two CAMs 
produced by my colleagues with my own CAM measuring the percentage of substantial over-
lap, that is, the share of identical concepts and their emotional valences used by more than one 
researcher. Given that the interview transcript contained about 6,000 words, the number of 
possible concepts to choose from was likely larger than 1,000, and a CAM rarely exceeds 150 
concepts, a match of more than 50% can be considered a satisfactory validation of the 
method. 
The CAMs produced by my colleagues were significantly less detailed than my own—
with 68 and 62 concepts they were about half the size of the original CAM I had produced. I 
limited the comparison to the concepts contained in these two CAMs, a total of 95. My CAM 
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contained 74 of these 95 concepts (78%). 18 concepts (19%) were contained in only one of 
the three CAMs (ten in the CAM produced by one colleague; eight in the other). While 19% 
is a significant failure rate concerning the identification of relevant concepts, it is impressive 
that each researcher would pick at most ten such concepts out of more than a 1,000 possibili-
ties. In addition my two colleagues have significantly less contextual knowledge about multi-
lateral climate change negotiations, which makes the limited selection of non-agreement con-
cepts a fairly strong validation of the method. Among the remaining 77 concepts 35 (45%) 
were full matches (i.e., identified by all three researchers), and 42 (55%) were partial matches 
(i.e., identified by two researchers). 
A similar comparison was made for the emotional valences of the 77 concepts that were 
identified by more than one researcher. The emotional valences assigned by all three re-
searchers matched in 46 cases (60%). For 18 concepts (23%) there was a partial match (two 
researchers), and there was disagreement regarding the remaining 13 concepts (17%). 
Overall this effort confirmed that the method is able to produce fairly consistent results al-
though the CAMs generated by different researchers will inevitably contain differences in 
terms of the number of concepts included, the relevance of concepts and the emotional va-
lences assigned to the concepts.  
While this process added two layers of data verification it also suffered from a number of 
weaknesses with respect to the data required for a CAM with high empirical validity. The 
most important shortcoming is a lack of data about the strengths of links. Since no informa-
tion is available that allows the researcher to quantify the strength of the links, the initial set-
ting of weights is strongly driven by the intuition and background knowledge of the re-
searcher. Although I requested feedback from participants particularly related to the weight of 
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links, no such feedback was ever given. Providing this information for the high number of 
links in each CAM would be very time-consuming and probably challenging for an individ-
ual. Given the research context and the difficulties of recruiting participants, it was practically 
impossible to gather the data required to create links with a satisfying empirical foundation. 
The only indication for the validity of the link weights assigned by the researcher in this study 
is the fact that participants did not request any changes in response to my email eliciting feed-
back. Since some participants might not even have looked at their CAM, or read the instruc-
tions for reading a CAM carefully, this is not a very reliable indicator.  
Similar challenges apply to the strength of emotional valences of nodes. In some cases 
emotive language (‘horrible’, ‘extremely frustrating’, ‘fear’) helped distinguish stronger affec-
tive loadings from weaker ones. But due to time constraints and the type of study participants 
it was not possible to gather sufficient information to assign all emotional valences based on 
satisfying empirical evidence. 
All 55 CAMs have been anonymized for the purpose of publication, and are included in 
Appendix Ch3-4. 
 
4. CAM Analysis 
CAMs are open to at least two different analytical approaches. The first approach uses a 
coding scheme to explore the content of CAMs—the existing concepts, ideas and meanings as 
well as emotional information related to the concepts. The second approach seeks to identify 
relevant network structures such as concept and meaning clusters and the relationships be-
tween them. Each analytic lens was applied to the individual CAMs and to six groups of 
CAMs (see the participant matrix below).  
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The content analysis was driven by a coding effort that reflected the overarching research 
question of this study:  
What cognitive elements and processes promote or inhibit cooperation to achieve 
effective responses to climate change? 
Its aim was: (1) to identify the most relevant concepts in existing belief systems, (2) to as-
sess to what extent cognitive assumptions of major IR theories match the cognitive reality in 
the case of global climate change politics, (3) to understand the role (if any) of the unique 
characteristics of climate change in the belief systems of individuals involved in the global 
political process.   
The coding scheme (see Appendix Ch3-5) was divided into three parts. The first sought to 
identify concepts related to theoretical expectations of the decision-making models of major 
IR theories (e.g., costs, benefits, identity, norms). The second part of the coding framework 
focused on the special characteristics of climate change and their reflection in the beliefs of 
the study participants. This included the identification of beliefs about complexity, the exis-
tence of tipping points, long-term climate impacts, and responsibilities to future generations. 
Finally, the coding effort sought to identity other concepts that might be relevant but do not fit 
the two categories above (e.g., hope).  
Second, the structural analysis consisted of a purely qualitative visual analytic effort to 
identify belief clusters, and connections between them, more and less central or well con-
nected concepts, and tangential beliefs in the CAMs. This approach had a much less defined 
starting point, because with a few exceptions (Rosenberg 1988) there are no theories about the 
structure of belief systems. I attempted a visual analysis of the CAM images to identify net-
work substructures (clusters) and links between these. However, the complexity of the subject 
matter and consequently highly interconnected CAMs made it impossible to derive useful 
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comparative insights using this qualitative approach. I summarize a small number of observa-
tions at the end of this chapter, but these do not match the quality and extent of the observa-
tions made about the conceptual content of the CAMs.  
Nevertheless, a structural analysis would be valuable and possible when using a quantita-
tive rather than qualitative approach. It would require a specific software program to perform 
network analyses that can account for the different types of nodes and links in a CAM. The 
program could compute values like network centrality (i.e., the level of connectedness), iden-
tifying important conceptual hubs in a CAM. It could identify existing clusters of concepts 
and their boundaries, and potentially address questions related to emotional valences, for in-
stance, which CAMs or clusters are predominantly positive or negative, which ones have a 
comparatively high amount of ambivalent or neutral concepts, and so on. Ideally such a quan-
titative network analysis would be merged with qualitative information. For example, not all 
highly connected nodes might be important in terms of meaning, but a quantitative analysis 
would not be able to detect the difference.   
Third, I complemented the content and structural analysis with a comparison of the narra-
tives reflected in the interviews and CAMs. I use the term narrative to describe the essence of 
a person’s belief system—its emotional logic—that is necessary to make sense of the climate 
governance challenge. A narrative has to answer basic questions regarding governance pro-
tagonists (i.e., relevant actors), the nature of the climate problem, and the challenges and solu-
tions associated with it. I derive these narratives from the interview transcripts and the CAMs, 
seeking to distill a story-line that connects the most important conceptual elements and the 
their relationships. My approach is closely linked to Bruner’s functional account of narratives 
(Bruner 1991), which seeks to identify the roles or purposes of narratives for an individual. 
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The narrative analysis sought to reduce each CAM to 25-30 key concepts and their link struc-
ture. This set of essential or core concepts had to be able to tell the same story as the larger 
CAM and formed the basis of the verbal narrative I developed using the concepts provided by 
research participants. Individual points of view were not included as narratives if they were 
not part of a larger belief pattern in a group.  
The analysis proceeded in clusters, using the six participant groups (see below) as cluster-
ing device that enabled in-group as well as cross-group comparisons. Non-state actor groups 
were paired with the group that reflected their interests most closely.  
 
II.  SELECTION OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS  
The participant selection criteria and process for this project had to satisfy the require-
ments for both cognitive-affective mapping and the Q study. The key goal was to identify dif-
ferent points of view held by participants in the global climate change negotiations. Therefore 
participant selection had to ensure a minimum diversity among the perspectives of study par-
ticipants without the need to be globally representative or comprehensive.  
With respect to diversity of views, the CAM and Q method requirements for participant 
selection align very well. Q method is somewhat more demanding regarding the strategic 
sampling of participants, often emphasizing that the selection of participants needs to ensure 
that the most important viewpoints on the topic are included (see chapter 5). However, the 
aim of this research project was to explore the nature of existing belief systems and to theo-
rize about their content and structure. The aim is not to assess their political relevance, or the 
possibilities for reconciling existing differences in the negotiation process. Therefore the im-
portance of a view is not a key concern for this study. Further, the question whose views are 
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most important in the context of global climate politics does not have a straightforward an-
swer.  
All study participants are participants in the international negotiation process under the 
umbrella of the UNFCCC. This group includes diplomats (i.e., representatives of govern-
ments) and representatives from a variety of observer organizations, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) from civil society and the private sector (e.g., industry 
associations and companies). From here on I refer to all three types of observer organizations 
as NGOs.  
The introduction to this dissertation already offered a justification for working with dip-
lomats rather than decision-makers at the national level. The following sections provide (1) a 
detailed description of the design of the participant selection process, and (2) a summary of 
the results of the selection process, including the conventions I use to refer to groups of par-
ticipants, ensuring the confidentiality of individual responses. 
 
1. Selection Process Design 
Given the multiplicity of variables that can influence a person’s view on multilateral co-
operation and climate change, participant selection with the aim of capturing a diversity of 
views had to simplify the existing complexity, keeping in mind the practical challenges of re-
cruiting participants of an ongoing, contentious and time-demanding political process. 
a. Diplomats 
For diplomats this could have been achieved in various ways, for example, selecting two 
countries from each of the major negotiation blocks. I rejected this approach for three reasons. 
First, the alliances are changing over time, their number has been steadily increasing, and 
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there is significant overlap between them. Second, the reasons for being in a negotiation alli-
ance can be political or historical rather than a shared set of interests and views regarding 
global climate governance. The best example is the G77 and China, a diverse group of 133 
countries with often contradicting views on climate change, but held together by a historical 
context of colonialism and late development (Najam 2005). Third, this study seeks to under-
stand the privately held beliefs of participants in the climate negotiations, and these might dif-
fer from the positions presented by the negotiation alliances they are part of.  
Instead of mirroring existing organizational patterns, I identified two variables that can 
reasonably be expected to influence the perspective of individuals representing a certain coun-
try. First, the home country’s relative contribution to the problem in terms of relative level of 
emissions is relevant because it determines the power to contribute to the solution through 
mitigation and also the potential costs of addressing the problem. People who live in high-
emission countries are expected to have more concerns about the costs of action, and therefore 
be more reluctant to support a cooperative multilateral framework than people from low-
emission countries. Second, the expected severity of impacts of climate change within the 
home country—vulnerability—is likely to influence perspectives. Individuals from highly 
vulnerable countries are expected to focus on the costs of non-action or delayed action, and to 
favor a cooperative multilateral approach to avoid expected harm and damage. 
I distinguished between three categories of emitters—high, medium and low—and two 
categories of vulnerability—high and low (for measures and cut-offs see below). The combi-
nation of these two variables resulted in a 3x2 matrix displayed in Table 3-1, and conse-
quently six different groups of countries or country profiles, for example, High Emitters and 
High Vulnerability (HEHV).  
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Table 3-1: Participant Groups - Diplomats 
 
 
This group matrix provided the starting point for participant selection. Each group con-
tains a different number of countries and most likely a variety of viewpoints. Among all the 
countries that fit the criteria of a group, I selected a minimum of three, and reached out to in-
dividual members of the national delegations to invite participants. I identified individual 
names using the UNFCCC participant list at COP-17 in Durban in 2011. I included one or 
two individuals from each country, regardless of their role in the delegation (e.g., heads of 
delegation, area experts). Personal networks and interactions in the course of the fieldwork 
helped identify some individuals. 
There are a number of problems associated with this process of identifying participants; I 
will address the three most important ones in turn. 
(i) The variables I use to create six groups of participants (emissions and vulnerability) 
have to be based on objectively measurable qualities of the home countries of these individu-
als (see below for measuring challenges). However, the participants identified or individuals 
from the respective countries more generally might have very different subjective assessments 
regarding these variables and might place their own country in a different group accordingly. 
For example, the measures I applied place Canada in the high emissions & low vulnerability 
categories (Group 4-HELV). Some Canadians might object and point out that the fast chang-
            High Medium Low 
High Group 1 – HEHV  Group 2 – MEHV Group 3 – LEHV VULNERABILITY	  
Low Group 4 – HELV Group 5 – MELV Group 6 – LELV 
LEVEL	  OF	  NATIONAL	  CO2	  EMISSIONS	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ing Arctic and long coastlines makes Canada highly vulnerable to climate change, and that 
therefore Canada belongs in Group 1-HEHV. 
This discrepancy between objective and subjective assessment could weaken the goal of 
including a diversity of views because some groups might end up being underrepresented or 
not included at all. This is an insurmountable challenge, since it is impossible to elicit partici-
pants’ views before selecting them. However, this problem applies to individuals in all groups 
and the effects of an inappropriate group assignment should cancel out. 
(ii) The creation of three categories along the emission dimension and two categories 
along the vulnerability dimension is a major simplification of the complex reality of the proc-
esses and system characteristics involved (e.g., different emission sources or different kinds of 
vulnerability).  
Determining numerical cut-offs between high, medium and low emissions is not straight-
forward given the massive differences among country’s emission profiles. I decided to create 
three rather than two categories to reflect the following features of current emission profiles. 
There is a small set of countries whose emissions are one or several orders of magnitude 
larger than the emissions of everybody else. This group has major overlap with the G20. Even 
within this group there are major differences. The annual emissions of the top five emitters 
(China, US, India, Russia, Japan) range between 1.0 and 8.3 billion tons of CO2, while the 
emissions of other group members is still far below the one billion mark. A significant num-
ber of countries have very small, almost insignificant annual CO2 emissions (e.g., small-island 
and developing states). There is a large group of countries with neither extremely high nor 
negligibly low emissions. This group deserved its own category rather than being split in the 
middle and placed with the high or low emitters. Again, the countries captured here represent 
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a large range of different emission levels. Based on these features of the global CO2 emission 
distribution, I placed the cut-offs for high emitters at 200 million tons/year, and for medium 
emitters at ten million tons/year. These cut-offs are based on the latest available data from the 
US Energy Information Administration, published in June 2012, for year 2010. The distribu-
tion of countries among the three groups is 25 (high)—74 (medium)—118 (low). A complete 
list with cut-offs is included in Appendix Ch3-6.  
Determining a cut-off between high and low vulnerability is equally challenging. Espe-
cially in middle of the distribution it seems arbitrary to place countries in different categories. 
However, given the number of dimensions along which countries’ vulnerability profiles dif-
fer, a more differentiated approach would have added very little value while imposing major 
complexity to the group matrix. The disadvantages of adding weakly defined vulnerability 
categories leading to more than six country groups outweighed the potential benefits of a 
more sophisticated reflection of complex realities.   
(iii) The variables used for the group matrix rely on existing measures of national emis-
sion levels and vulnerability, which face a number of challenges. 
Data on national GHG emissions worldwide is scarce and incomplete. There is no single 
data source that contains information for all GHG gases and all countries. The UNFCCC 
gathers data primarily on GHG emissions for the 42 countries that are listed in Annex-I of the 
Kyoto Protocol, including Land Use and Land-Use Change (LULUCF) numbers with the lat-
est data point in 2009. The International Energy Agency provides data on global carbon emis-
sions up to 2009 without a ranking. I used data provided by the US Energy Information Ad-
ministration, which covers only CO2 emissions from energy consumption up to 2010 and does 
not include LULUCF.  
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There are some fundamental definitional and measurement problems regarding countries’ 
vulnerability to climate change (Adger 2006). I provide a short summary of some of the key 
issues below, and outline the approach used for categorizing countries for the purpose of this 
study.  
Starting point for the different attempts to measure vulnerability is the definition provided 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its 3rd Assessment Report in 
2001: “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects 
of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of 
the character, magnitude and rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensi-
tivity and its adaptive capacity.” (IPCC 2001, 995 (Annex B)) One could summarize this 
definition in a formula: Vulnerability = Exposure + Sensitivity - Adaptive Capacity. A more 
recent IPCC definition speaks of “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.” 
From here a variety of approaches takes off in very different directions.  
Exposure measures tend to be most advanced. They are based on geological, physical, 
biological or chemical variables for which quantifiable data is available. But even within this 
sub-field there are major differences between the types of climate impacts social systems can 
be exposed to, for example, coastal erosion vs. droughts vs. floods, making a comparison dif-
ficult. Further, the forecasting methods employed have significant limitations.  
Measuring sensitivity requires the assessment of the resilience of the system (e.g., the age 
and health of a person exposed to heat wave). This can involve multiple, system-specific, dy-
namic variables, posing major challenges of quantification and cross-case comparison.  
Finally, measures of adaptive capacity, defined as the ability to anticipate, cope with and 
adapting to certain impacts, has to consider multiple factors, including knowledge access, re-
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source availability, technological advance, or social capital. Adaptive capacity is often 
equated with level of development, in other words the Least Developed Countries tend to 
have the least adaptive capacity. However, this might be a misleading simplification. For ex-
ample, highly developed communities in the US are assumed to have high adaptive capacity, 
but might be incapable of addressing the problem for various reasons, for example, ideologi-
cal forces like the Tea Party that block adaptation initiatives, or even encourage behavior that 
increases risk exposure. An example for the latter is North Carolina’s legislative effort to rule 
out considerations of non-linear sea level rise by state planners in order to encourage contin-
ued development along the coastline (Phillips 2012). Less developed communities in poorer 
countries on the other hand might have strong social capital, and be smart in leveraging inter-
national support for adaptation, greatly reducing their vulnerability to climate change.  
Since vulnerability is a dynamic phenomenon shaped by the interplay between constantly 
changing biophysical and social processes in often very complex multi-scale systems, it is 
“not easily reduced to a single metric and is not easily quantifiable” (Adger 2006, 274). As-
sessing vulnerability involves a combination of social and environmental data as well as pro-
jections of future changes. Generalized measures of vulnerability therefore are often compos-
ites of different components, for instance, community type, time period, climate stimulus, that 
seek to capture certain dimensions of the difficult concept, and often have a certain purpose in 
mind, such as disaster risk reduction. This aggregation of measures is often intransparent and 
the source for sometimes significant differences across indices and rankings. In addition nor-
mative considerations are often interlaced with the analysis. One of the most basic issues is 
the fact a vulnerability measure at the country level cannot capture the various levels and 
types of vulnerabilities experienced by communities, organizations and individuals within that 
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country. Further, most existing studies focus on developing countries, and do not allow for a 
consistent global comparison. To my knowledge only one of the existing vulnerability meas-
ures takes indirect effects of climate change into account, such as trade effects, import de-
pendencies, disruptions of int. supply-chains, (Vincent 2004), or is able to assess a commu-
nity’s future adaptive capacity, rather than its present one. 
To sum up, the available indices and rankings need to be approached carefully, distin-
guishing the indicators and aggregation methods, as well as motivating normative perspec-
tives. Since the use of the a vulnerability index for this study had a very limited purpose—
identifying study participants with different points of view—I canvassed a range of existing 
vulnerability indices (Global Adaptation Index [GAIN] by the Global Adaptation Institute; 
Global Climate Risk Index by Germanwatch; Climate and Regional Economics of Develop-
ment’s Vulnerability Index [VI-CRED] by the Stockholm Environment Institute; Climate 
Vulnerability Monitor [CVM] by DARA; Environment Vulnerability Index [EVI] by 
UNEP/SOPAC; Structural Vulnerability Assessment [SVA] by FERDI; Geographic Distribu-
tion of Climate Vulnerability by SEDAC, Columbia University), and chose to work with a 
combination of two indices that combine a general emphasis of adaptive capacity (Global Ad-
aptation Index) with data for 2010, and exposure to extreme weather events and natural disas-
ters (Global Climate Risk Index) with data up to 2011. Some of the indices mentioned do not 
have global coverage (EVI, SVA), do not provide rankings (CVM), or do not offer country-
level assessments (VI-CRED).  
The GAIN index provides a ranking of 161 countries (cut-off between low and high vul-
nerability at 80) according to an aggregate measure that combines vulnerability to climate-
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related hazards and readiness to adapt to the challenges posed by climate change; higher rank-
ings indicate lower vulnerability. The ranking is included in Appendix Ch3-7. 
The Global Climate Risk Index (CRI) is focused on the impacts of extreme weather 
events, using data gathered by the global re-insurance company MunichRe. Rather than fore-
casting into the future, the index is an assessment of past and current damages caused by 
floods, droughts, hurricanes and other extreme events. It offers two rankings for 183 countries 
(cut-off at 91): one for average numbers over the last 20 years (1991-2010), and a current one 
for 2010; higher rankings indicate higher vulnerability. 
The two indices place only two countries that are part of this study in different vulnerabil-
ity categories: Brazil and Colombia. Colombia has experienced major La Niña impacts re-
cently and has shot up from rank 47 (already high) in CRI’s 20-year average to rank two in 
the 2010 index. This merited Colombia’s placement in the high-vulnerability category despite 
its GAIN ranking of 67. The case of Brazil is less clear with a GAIN ranking of 63 and a CRI 
ranking of 23 in 2010, but only 96 for the 20-year average. Additional considerations like the 
possibility of an Amazon tipping point (Lenton 2011b), and the diversity of environmental 
and economic conditions due to the size of the country lead me to include Brazil in the high-
vulnerability category, although most indices would consider it to be only moderately vulner-
able to climate change.  
The results of the selection process for diplomats are presented in Table 3-2. Individual 
participants are shown by the countries they represent. The 36 participating diplomats, among 
them twelve delegation heads, represent 30 different countries. The share of women (11) was 
31%. For confidentiality reasons the remainder of the study will refer only to the groups these 
individuals belong to (Group 1-HEHV, Group 2-MEHV, Group 3-LEHV, Group 4-HELV, 
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Group 5-MELV, Group 6-LELV); not to their country of origin, or position within the delega-
tion.  
Table 3-2: States Represented by Participating Diplomats 
 
The participants include members of the Umbrella Group, the European Union, the G77 & 
China, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)/Small Island Developing States (SIDS), 
the Least Developing Countries (LDCs), the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), the BASIC group 
(Brazil, South Africa, India, China), the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), the Coalition 
of Rainforest Nations (CRN), and the recently formed Alliance of Independent Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean States (AILAC). AILAC was formed at the Bonn negotiations in 2012 and 
since it did not exist when this study was designed it is not part of Appendix Ch3-8 or Figure 
3-2 below. Some relevant groups and countries are not included, in particular India, China and 
oil-producing Middle Eastern countries. Many of these players have recently formed the Like-
Minded Group. The main reason for these gaps is the lack of response from the multiple indi-
Emissions High Medium Low Total 
Vulnerability 
(>200mill t 
CO2) (>10mill t CO2) (<10mill t CO2)   
South Africa Bangladesh Botswana   
Brazil  Guatemala Grenada   
Indonesia Pakistan Mozambique   
  Philippines Namibia   
  Colombia  Uganda   
  Bolivia Dominica   
    Samoa   
High 
3 6 7 16 
US (3) Argentina Iceland   
Canada (2) Singapore Barbados   
Germany Denmark Cape Verde   
Japan Sweden (2)     
South Korea (2) Finland (2)     
Australia       
Low 
10 7 3 20 
TOTAL 13 12 11 36 !
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viduals contacted. A table detailing the membership of participants in current UNFCCC nego-
tiation groups is detailed in a table in Appendix Ch3-8. Figure 3-2 below shows the match be-
tween these negotiation groups and the six participant groups in this study. 
Figure 3-3: Participating Diplomats and Current Negotiation Groups in the UNFCCC 
 
b. Non-state Actors  
Since non-state actors do not represent countries, but usually speak on behalf of a certain 
interest group, I could not apply the selection criteria for diplomats. Instead I developed a ty-
pology of NGOs based on the type of interest they seek to protect using the list of participat-
ing observer organization at the UNFCCC COP-17 in Durban. I identified eight types of ob-
server organizations: youth, faith, development, environment, environment & market, busi-
ness & technology, fossil fuels, local government. This list is not comprehensive, and there is 
some significant overlap between the different types (e.g., faith and development or business 
and fossil fuels). I identified at least one organization in each category and invited an individ-
ual representative to participate. Table 3-3 summarizes the results of this process.  
Umbrella Group
1 2 3
4 5 6
BASIC
EU
1 2 3
4 5 6
CRN
1 2 3
4 5 6
EIG
1 2 3
4 5 6
LDCs
ALBA
1 2 3
4 5 6
5 6
1 2 3
4 5 6
1 2 3
1 22 3
4 5 6
G77 & China
3
4 5 6
1
4
AOSIS/SIDS
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Table 3-3: NGOs and Private Sector Actors represented by Participants 
 
The 19 participating individuals include eight different nationalities. Most are from the US 
and Canada, but the group also includes Indian, Brazilian and South African nationals. The 
share of women is 42%. Throughout the study, reference to the beliefs of one of these 19 in-
dividuals will be made by reference to the non-state actor type, for example, Youth NGOs. 
Based on the alignment of the interests of state representatives and non-state actors, one 
could expect some overlap between the six-group matrix for diplomats and the eight NGO 
types identified above. For the purpose of the CAM analysis I created the following groups of 
diplomats and non-state representatives: 
• Group 1-HEHV  –  Youth NGOs, 
• Group 2-MEHV  –  Development and Faith NGOs, 
• Group 3-LEHV  –  Environment NGOs, 
• Group 4-HELV  –  Fossil Fuel Industry, Business and Technology Actors, 
• Group 5-MELV  –  Environment & Market NGOs, Local Government. 
• Group 6-LELV 
Type Observer Organization 
Earth In Brackets (EIB) 
SustainUs Youth 
Climate Action Network (CAN) 
World Vision Faith 
Christian Aid 
ActionAid International Development 
Germanwatch 
World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) Business & 
Technology Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute (Global CCS Institute) 
World Coal Association (WCA) 
World Steel Association (WSA) 
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) 
Fossil Fuels 
Shell 
National Round Table on The Environment and the Economy (NRTEE) Environment & 
Market Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
Amazon Conservation Team (ACT) Environment 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (2) 
Cities Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) 
Total 19 !
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Figure 3-4: Potential Interest and Viewpoint Alignment between State and Non-state Participants 
 
2. Results 
The resulting group of 55 participants includes individuals from 32 countries, representing 
30 states and 18 different civil society and private sector organizations. The share of women 
is 35%. 
 
III. PROCESS OBSERVATIONS 
The eight-month process of recruiting participants, conducting interviews, and generating 
CAMs based on transcripts has provided a number of lessons about the value of cognitive-
affective mapping as a method for social-scientific research, but also about the challenges of 
using it in an empirically driven project.  
The interview-based use of the method is very time-consuming. Apart from the normal 
requirements of recruiting participants, scheduling meetings, conducting interviews, following 
up with emails, and transcribing interviews, the real work for a CAM analysis begins after 
these tasks. Working with roughly 15-20 pages (6,000-10,000 words) of transcribed interview 
Emissions
Vulnerability
1 2 3
4 5 6
Development*&*Faith*
Environment*
Local**
Government*
Youth*
Fossil*Fuels*
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text for each participant, it took six to eight hours to create the initial CAM for each partici-
pants and additional time to request feedback from participants and to make the necessary 
changes to the CAM if such feedback was provided.  
It is challenging for the researcher to determine which concepts are important enough to 
be included in the CAM and which ones can be ignored. This observation raises the question 
of what level of detail is needed and useful. The CAMs I generated generally contain 120-150 
concepts. The validation process demonstrated that ‘thinner’ versions would have been possi-
ble. It resulted in CAMs containing roughly 60 concepts. In addition, the effort to generate 
core CAMs containing only 30 concepts showed that such simplification is possible and use-
ful, but that it comes at a significant cost—the loss of meaning and detail. Ultimately the use-
ful level of detail will depend on the purpose of the research and the questions it seeks to an-
swer. Studies that seek to isolate a small number of key concepts will prefer a minimalist ap-
proach that can reduce large amounts of text data to a few essential concepts. Studies that ex-
plore existing systems of meaning without prior knowledge might prefer to start with very 
detailed CAMs. In my case, the combination of a detailed CAM and a strongly reduced core 
CAM offered the richest insights and in-depth learning about the existing cognitive patterns.  
Below I include an illustration of different levels of CAM detail. I generated the first and 
third CAMs; a colleague produced the second based on the same interview transcript. The 
three CAMs present the same data about the same belief system, but with three different lev-
els of detail.  
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Figure 3-5(a): Three Levels of CAM Detail—Highly Detailed CAM Produced By Myself 
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Figure 3-5(b): Three Levels of CAM Detail—Moderately Detailed CAM Produced By Another 
Researcher 
	  	  
Figure 3-5(c): Three Levels of CAM Detail—CAM with Little Detail Produced By Myself 	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The empirical effort also raised the question whether a single CAM is able to capture the 
various beliefs of an individual on a complex issue such as climate change governance. At a 
certain level of detail or abstraction, it might simply not be possible to represent conceptual 
relationships appropriately. The verbal material generated in the interview process—if taken 
seriously—places strong constraints on the concepts that can be used to create a CAM. While 
it might often be desirable or even necessary to unpack certain concepts in order to represent 
coherent conceptual relationships, this was not possible in this study due to the lack of an em-
pirical base for such unpacking. Other projects might experience this less as a constraint if 
they are able to contact study participants multiple times to gather more data and to ask clari-
fying questions that can help produce a more coherent map. In my case the interview tran-
scripts contain the universe of possible concepts, and respecting those limits I encountered 
numerous consistency challenges that I was not able to resolve with the available data. 
Further, it might be valuable to create not one but several CAMs that deal with the various 
sub-issues raised in the interview. This might be the best approach for dealing with the use of 
time—thoughts about the present state of the world vs. the imagined future state of the 
world—and with the problem of presenting indirect beliefs, in other words beliefs about the 
beliefs of others. These issues are addressed in more detail in Appendix Ch3-1.  
Despite these challenges cognitive-affective mapping offers a number of advantages that 
make it a valuable instrument in the toolbox of social scientists, even in fields unrelated to the 
cognitive sciences. A key strength of this approach is its ability to generate in-depth under-
standing of another person’s beliefs and ways of thinking that is more powerful and more rig-
orous than interview-only techniques. My understanding of the beliefs of interview partners 
differed significantly pre- and post-CAM generation. One reason for this qualitative differ-
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ence might be the necessity to grapple with questions about the importance of concepts and 
the links between concepts, even if those concepts were mentioned in very different parts of 
the interview.  
Second, the opportunity for data verification through interaction with the participant using 
a visual representation is a major advantage of this tool compared with other interview tech-
niques. The follow-up conversations can sometimes be even more important than the initial 
interview, revealing a number of misunderstandings and faulty assumptions about what was 
meant rather than said. This leads to a significant improvement in the quality of the interview 
data. And finally the reduction of a body of text to discrete concepts and its transformation 
into an image that distinguishes between substance and structure allows for an easier compari-
son of beliefs across individuals. While this might not be a useful contribution to process-
tracing studies, it can greatly enhance discourse and text analysis, studies on political delib-
eration and argumentative strategies, foreign policy analysis, conflict resolution, interpretive 
approaches and case studies that focus on individual leaders and their decision-making, for 
example, operational code studies.  
 
IV. SUMMARY OF CAM CONTENT, STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE 
This section reports the results of the comparative analysis of the belief systems of the 55 
study participants using the CAMs generated in collaboration with them. I treated content and 
emotions jointly, and consequently analyzed each CAM in three iterations, focusing on con-
tent, structure, and narrative respectively.  
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1. Group 1 – High Emitters With High Vulnerability (6) 
This group includes diplomats from South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia and three members of 
youth NGOs.  
a. Content Analysis 
All three diplomats in this group use concepts that largely fit a rational cost-benefit 
framework of decision-making. For NGO representatives the picture is less clear. All six indi-
viduals distinguish two different types of costs associated with climate change. The first type 
are costs imposed by climate impacts, which diplomats usually detail with reference to their 
own country, for example, “People trapped in poverty,” “Stranded assets,” “Water scarcity,” 
“Land loss.” The second type are cost concerns related to a loss of competitiveness as a con-
sequence of climate policies. This second type applies in particular to the emerging econo-
mies in the BASIC group, but also for the US. The diplomats also connected observed (not 
merely expected) economic and development costs to climate change, which provided the mo-
tivation for engaging in climate negotiations with the goal to avoid or manage future costs. 
They linked the competitiveness issue to what one might call global power management—the 
US’ concern about relative economic decline is considered an obstacle to multilateral coop-
eration. Interestingly one diplomat and all three youth activists did not associate major cli-
mate-related costs with their respective home countries but with others, for instance, “The 
most affected” and “The most vulnerable” people in Africa and parts of Asia, or the poor in 
developing countries. In this case the motivational power of these costs was still sufficient, 
although it was disconnected to the person’s national community. All six group members ex-
pressed strong concern about different forms of human suffering: threatened livelihoods, pov-
erty, food shortage, or extreme weather events. 
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The Youth NGO representatives were all concerned about costs to people elsewhere, es-
pecially the impact of food shortages and extreme weather events. Two mentioned the possi-
bility of death due to natural disasters. All three emphasize identity-related losses as costs: 
"Loss of homes, identities and cultures,” or "Loss of the world as it always was." Only one 
diplomat raised similar concerns. Two NGO representatives experienced such ideational costs 
personally: the loss of seasons in places where the person grew up, and sadness about changes 
in local forest expressions. These examples point to the importance of place-based identity 
and subtle connections to the environment. Two individuals stated that national interests and 
political self-interest, such as making profits or trade group interests, are obstacles to solving 
the climate problem. 
Only one individual explicitly identified the “avoidance” of “long-term costs of inaction” 
as a benefit; otherwise benefits of action remained implicit and unspecified. 
Concepts related to identity and norms and justice formed a major part of all of these 
CAMs, but were particularly prominent in the belief systems of the NGO representatives. 
Each individual had a slightly different definition of collective identity, pointing to various 
groups inside or outside the negotiations they identify with. Unsurprisingly all three diplomats 
have a well-developed national identity and used a number of concepts, often place-related or 
environmentally relevant in the climate context, for example, “A dry country,” “A tropical 
country,” “Low-lying coastal areas,” to describe this in-group. Two diplomats also recognized 
that their home country is a significant future contributor to climate change, which burdens 
their national identity with a ‘moral dilemma.’ The use of these concepts suggests that identity 
modifications are currently incorporating this attribute (“contributor to climate change”) into 
the self-image of these countries, and also affect the norms of justice these individuals con-
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sider applicable to themselves and their home countries. Diplomats identified other groups 
that they attributed with different kinds of agency and obligations, including “The most vul-
nerable” (in-group), “The West” (out-group), and the community of states (in-group). All 
three diplomats clearly distinguished between developed countries (out-group), developing 
countries (in-group), and a third category called emerging economies, major emitters or big 
developing countries.  
This distinction between categories of countries was much less prominent in the CAMs of 
the youth activists. The North-South divide featured strongly in only one CAM, and there is 
not a single mention of the emerging powers. Instead these individuals identify with "every 
human being under 25,” "The Youth Climate Movement" or "The Future,” trying to give this 
nebulous actor voice in the present UN process. 
All six CAMs contain normative elements that indicate a preference for multilateral coop-
eration. Three individuals believe that those who cause a problem or harm someone are re-
sponsible for addressing the problem proportionally to their share of causal responsibility, re-
gardless of intentionality. The shared norms include cooperation that is pro-poor, pro-
vulnerable, and is based on inclusive decision-making in the UNFCCC.  
One NGO representative argued that the nature of the climate problem is an ideological 
and moral conflict between the global North and South. Climate justice is the primary goal, 
which means that addressing climate change is not enough, but that a "grand equalization of 
the world" has to be achieved through North-South resource flows, poverty eradication and 
economic development in the global South. 
In addition to the global-level equity discussion the Youth NGO CAMs reveal a second 
normative trend that draws attention to local and community values. Two individuals believe 
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that focusing on sustainable, low-carbon life-styles as a source of happiness and meaning, and 
on a value system that builds on the idea of taking care of each other to create a better future, 
are important elements of a multilevel solution to climate change. 
All six individuals consider state governments to be key actors, acknowledging that do-
mestic action, and possibly bilateral initiatives should complement multilateral cooperation. 
The diplomats argue that state agency is constrained in the sense that some goals cannot be 
achieved by a certain subset of states (e.g., “Major Emitters,” “The Developed Countries 
alone”). One diplomat argued that climate change is a two-level game, in which national cir-
cumstances in the US are holding the international negotiations hostage. Two NGO represen-
tatives confirm this view when they express concern about the role of the domestic electorates 
in North America and campaign finance rules in the US. 
Only two individuals have a good appreciation of the scientific complexity involved. They 
use a systems view that links goals, time-horizons and systemic lags, arguing that ambition 
will have to increase the longer action is not taken or that the available pathways to the 2°C 
target are increasingly limited. Further, two NGO representatives address the problem of cli-
matic tipping points and see a certain novelty in the scale or complexity of the problem. 
b. Narrative 
I identified four different narratives in this group: A New Development Model, Addressing 
Historical Grievances, Multilateral Solidarity, and The Global-Local Link. 
A New Development Model: This narrative has two variations. At its core is the argument 
that climate change is a serious challenge for humanity, but especially for poor communities, 
threatening economic development, identities and security. Addressing this problem is pri-
marily the responsibility of those who caused the problem with past emissions—the devel-
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oped countries—but increasingly that of the emerging economies, who will be responsible for 
a large part of future emissions. The solution for this challenge is a new development path that 
does not copy the fossil fuel-powered development of the industrialized world. One variation 
of the narrative points to the low-carbon nature of this new development model and the need 
to constrain consumption. The second variation goes further, arguing that we need a new aspi-
rational model of the poor that will motivate the necessary changes in the development model. 
Only the developed countries can create this new aspirational model, because their model and 
success orients the developing countries. 
Addressing Historical Grievances: Climate change has been caused by developed coun-
tries, but will affect the developing countries severely. The historical emissions of the devel-
oped countries are the source for their moral obligation to both mitigate the problem and pro-
vide resources to the South for mitigation and adaptation (climate justice). But addressing 
climate change is not enough. Rather the moral responsibility of the developed countries in-
cludes the obligation to address development and poverty eradication in the developing world. 
The purpose of the negotiations cannot be to save future generations by abandoning people 
living today. There must be trade-offs between the two goals. Climate change is an opportu-
nity to equalize global conditions of a currently unfair distribution of prosperity in the world. 
Multilateral Solidarity: Climate change is a truly global problem, and within the global 
community all countries must help each other deal with it.  Everybody—the major emitters 
and the developing countries—should act boldly now. The US is the biggest obstacle to such 
multilateral cooperation. Due to their domestic situation their positions are holding the inter-
national negotiation process hostage.  
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The Global-Local Link: Both climate change impacts and the solution to climate change 
have a global and a local dimension. The problem severely affects the global poor, but there 
are also local losses in the developed world, mainly related to environmental changes in the 
communities where we grew up or where we live. The global solution needs to combine sci-
entific effectiveness (i.e., staying within the 2°C target) and global equity (i.e., allowing de-
veloping countries to grow). There are strong links between this global goal and the domestic 
and even local dynamics. First, domestic politics and electorates can present major obstacles 
to the global process because their values and positions shape governments’ negotiation posi-
tions. Second, value change at the individual and community level can make important con-
tributions to solving the climate problem. Third, the young generation can give voice to the 
future in the UN process. 
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c. Example 
Figure 3-6: CAM of Group 1 Member
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2. Group 2 – Medium Emitters With High Vulnerability (10) 
This group includes representatives from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Pakistan and the Philippines. Non-state actor groups associated with this cluster are two faith-
based and two development NGOs. 
a. Content Analysis 
The individuals in this group address various issues associated with a rational choice 
framework, including the costs of action (mainly mitigation) and inaction (climate impacts), 
national interests, and the global distribution of power. All group members are concerned 
about the costs of climate-related extreme weather events, which have affected either their 
home countries or regions of the world they have worked in. They all agree that climate 
change will affect everyone around the world, but that only certain countries and communities 
in the developing world will suffer because they have limited coping capacity. This dispropor-
tionate effect of climate change is the key driver of the equity concerns raised by all but one 
individual in this group. Notably, all of these individuals refer to damages and suffering to-
day—often based on personal experience—rather than future impacts of climate change.  
Two diplomats and one NGO participant mention costs to humanity or the international 
system as a consequence of climate change, for example, “Threat to Humanity’s Survival” or 
the “Loss of Countries.” Further, they all share an interest in development and economic 
growth, although two individuals consider it fundamentally problematic that the dominant 
economic discourse equates development with growth. Almost all group members talk about 
the need to change current consumption patterns of the rich to enable growth in the develop-
ing world. Two diplomats recognize the importance of power differences, and the link be-
tween the costs of climate action and the desire of various actors to maintain (US, EU) or to 
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change (China) the current global balance of power. Two NGO representatives make a more 
limited claim, arguing that the economic costs of climate action are reasons for inaction be-
cause they contradict national and big business interests. 
Half of the group believes that the selfish pursuit of national interests is an important ob-
stacle to addressing climate change. Often this argument is associated with the idea that peo-
ple in developed countries have to change their current lifestyles and their consumption pat-
terns. One individual goes even further suggesting that national interests contradict the UN 
agenda, apparently separating his support for development and poor people from the notion of 
national interest. He also argues that alternative political forums to the UNFCCC, for in-
stance, the G20, are interest-driven and therefore not effective when it comes to addressing 
climate change. 
The CAMs of this group include a broad range of identity concepts. The most interesting 
contrast is the reference to two very distinct primary in-groups: the state and humanity. All six 
diplomats but only one NGO representative have a strong national identity and make numer-
ous references to their home country, especially when describing important impacts of climate 
change, framing their country as a victim of climate change. However, two diplomats empha-
size the notion of one humanity—the largest possible in-group of human beings—and global 
community, and even expand this in-group by locating humans in a larger planetary system 
(“Humans as part of a whole” or “Humans as part of nature”). Implicitly they argue for the 
protection of the Earth system as an integrated whole of humans and their environment. This 
in-group definition is associated with a set of norms and values that espouse generosity and 
cooperativeness: “Solidarity,” connectedness, “Equality” and “Thinking about each other as 
significant partners.” Two NGO participants and one diplomat define their relevant in-group 
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roughly as all poor people in developing countries, who suffer not only because of climate 
change, but more broadly because of global inequities created by the development path taken 
by the rich. These belief systems build on a world divided into two groups rather than 200 
countries or a single humanity. 
A key group distinction shared by all six diplomats is that between developed, developing, 
and emerging countries. Only one individual contests the value of singling out the BASIC 
group as a third category. Vulnerability is an important but contested identity dimension. Fi-
nally, two individuals mention today’s and future generations as two distinct groups that have 
the same value and rights and are connected by ethical responsibilities. Interestingly the group 
label ‘emerging economies’ is far less important for the NGO representatives. Only one be-
lieves that the existing diversity among developing countries should be reflected in the equity 
discussion, which should move beyond a binary distinction between developed and develop-
ing.  
Other important normative concepts are inclusiveness, emphasizing the importance of the 
UN as a forum where everybody has and should have a voice and nobody should be “left out” 
or “trampled on,” and equity. There are different ideas related to the concept of equity, for 
instance, “Everybody has to commit to something depending on their ability,” the necessity of 
resource flows from the developed to the developing countries, or the demand for lifestyle 
change in the developed world. Five individuals address the concept of historical responsibil-
ity. One believes that the overconsumption of resources by the developed world and their de-
sire to maintain their current lifestyles is blocking the aspirations of people in developing 
countries. Another perspective suggests “We need to leave the historical burden behind.” In-
terestingly, these two individuals both point out that a “bad” or “wrong” model of develop-
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ment has caused not only climate change but also global inequity. A solution to climate 
change therefore has to be based on a new development paradigm, what they call “the Politics 
of Wellbeing” or the idea of “Living Well”, and global wealth redistribution. 
The importance of domestic politics for international negotiations features in three CAMs. 
They point to the role of voters in pushing governments to act on climate change, and the 
more general importance of national circumstances as political constraints on multilateral ne-
gotiations. The US is singled out as the country whose domestic situation is blocking the cli-
mate negotiations. 
Regarding the special characteristics of climate change seven individuals speak about hu-
mans as part of a larger planetary system, where everything is connected and where human 
wellbeing depends on nature being well. Eight individuals recognize the pervasiveness of the 
problem when they suggest that a solution reaches down into everyday behavior of individu-
als, or that it requires changing minds of voters and consumers, especially in the developed 
world. Concepts related to problem and solution time scales are incoherent and patchy, from 
the idea that we have 20-30 years to stabilize the climate system, to the fear that tipping points 
could happen 10-20 years from now, to the concern that an agreement under the Durban Plat-
form by 2020 would be too late. 
b. Narrative 
The CAMs reveal four distinct narratives, somewhat overlapping with Group 1-HEHV: 
Addressing Historical Grievances, The Helpless Victim, A Lost Cause, and Policy-driven Sys-
tem Transformation. Six individuals share the dominant narrative—Addressing Historical 
Grievances—but with significant variations, and in slightly less confrontational terms than the 
Group 1-HEHV version.  
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Addressing Historical Grievances: This is a narrative about the global history of injus-
tice. The development path taken by the now developed countries has created two problems: a 
globally inequitable distribution of wealth and now climate change. The latter is worsening 
the already unjust situation, leading to even more suffering in the developing world. The pri-
mary challenge to be addressed is global inequity—solving climate change has to make poor 
people better off; at least it must not make them poorer. The rich countries that are historically 
responsible for causing and solving these interconnected problems are shirking their moral 
responsibility. They have to provide resources to the developing world in order to equalize 
global wealth distribution, and to enable a different, clean development path into the future. 
There are a number of important variations on this general theme, which places a strong 
constraint on climate change solutions: they need to promote greater global equity by redis-
tributing wealth. The strongest variation of this narrative is an emphasis on the developed 
world, especially the US, as the villain, who is accused of blocking the aspirations or sacrific-
ing the wellbeing of the poor (victims) in the interests of big business (another villain). Con-
sequently, a just solution involves a reduction of wealth and power in one part of the world 
and an increase in the other. A second variation starts from a similar assumption of histori-
cally created inequity, but considers climate change an opportunity to overcome these differ-
ences, and set the relationship between the developed and developing world on a new coop-
erative foundation of mutual respect and generosity. A third variation uses the idea of one 
humanity sharing one planet to overcome the North-South divide with norms of solidarity and 
helping the poor.  
The Helpless Victim: The narrative of the helpless victim is a simple story of an actor 
who is facing severe costs from climate change, has little capacity to cope with these impacts, 
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and is unable to address the problem (i.e., its mitigation potential is miniscule). All this actor 
can do is to ask the rest of the world for help, hoping that everybody will contribute to a solu-
tion to their best ability. Nobody is singled out for blame, and the only relevant norm is that 
those who can ought to help those in need. 
A Lost Cause: This is a story of the paralyzing power of economic and political struc-
tures. Given the economic costs involved in addressing climate change this problem cannot be 
solved today. The current market structures do not provide any incentives for change, and 
short political election cycles make the needed long-term investments impossible. Conse-
quently it is not in the interest of states to act on climate change, which renders the UN impo-
tent. It is up to the next generation of voters to take more risk and responsibility for dealing 
with climate change. 
Policy-driven System Transformation: Finally, there is a narrative of policy-driven 
change in response to climate change, which requires of multi-level interactions between gov-
ernments, industry and individuals with the aim to transform current economic structures in 
line with the target of 2°C average global warming. Using an opportunity framework, focus-
ing on co-benefits of climate action rather than a burden-sharing framework could facilitate 
the necessary political agreements. This is a story about the need for and path to complex 
global change—a story without villains, heroes or morality, but reason and responsibility.  
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c. Example 
Figure 3-7: CAM of Group 2 Member 	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3. Group 3 – Low Emitters With High Vulnerability (10) 
The group includes Botswana, Dominica, Grenada, Mozambique, Namibia, Samoa and 
Uganda, and three representatives from environmental NGOs. 
a. Content Analysis 
The CAMs contain a range a concepts that broadly fit the realist assumptions of rational 
decision-making based on cost-benefit assessments, national interest and global power balanc-
ing. All ten CAMs contain a number of different types of costs related to climate change. Two 
group members refer directly to the CBA framework (the costs of action today are lower than 
the costs of inaction/destruction tomorrow), integrating and comparing impact-related costs 
and policy-related costs. Most of the remaining cost concepts fall into only one of these cate-
gories.  
All ten individuals perceive present costs of climate change. Diplomats refer to observed 
changes in their countries, including water scarcity and extreme weather events, including 
floods, droughts and hurricanes, while NGO representatives refer to climate impacts outside 
their home country. Nine people emphasize a direct link between environmental damage from 
climate change and economic costs, which is closely related to poverty. The three NGO repre-
sentatives mention the impact of climate change on food security and the threat that poor peo-
ple will go hungry. All seven diplomats and one NGO representative hint at the existential 
threat posed by climate change—the risk that it can cause the death of individuals (e.g., 
through violent conflict, extreme weather or starvation), or the possible disappearance of low-
lying island states. The latter is a cause of concern even for the five individuals who are not 
directly threatened by it. Two island state representatives think about threats to their national 
identity ("Everything we are about,” "Change of social fabric," changes in and loss of cul-
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ture); which seems to be unique among the diplomats in the group of highly vulnerable coun-
tries. More generally, five diplomats and all NGO representatives recognize that climate ne-
gotiations are about economic decision making: "Economics drive decisions,” "Competitive-
ness," and the "Fear that mitigation raises the cost of doing business,” "Economic barriers 
have become too big" over time, or the fact that structural economic change will create “Win-
ners and losers.” The group offers three different economic rationales for inaction: (i) vested 
interests, simply resisting policy-driven change of their profitable situation; (ii) the impossi-
bility to impose economic hardship and sacrifice on people in a democracy, and (iii) the man-
agement of an ongoing global power shift—something the policy-makers themselves might 
want to avoid or advance regardless of vested interests in the current system. 
Regarding existing identity groups, only four diplomats and one NGO representative 
make the explicit distinction between developed and developing countries. Others use differ-
ent language, referring to traditional and more recent polluters, consider very different, non-
national actors categories (e.g., younger generations, the global rich in poor countries, the 
most vulnerable communities) or don't mention these groups at all. However, all seven diplo-
mats mention the emerging economies, either as the BASIC group, as “More Recent Pollut-
ers” or “Major Emitters,” and demand that they do more. But they also see a lack of leader-
ship and place responsibility for action on the developed countries. Five individuals empha-
size the human community or global family as an important reference point for moral obliga-
tions regardless of nationality. 
The most dominant normative theme among diplomats is the idea that all countries—not 
only the developed countries—should contribute something to the best of their abilities. The 
responsibilities of various actors have to be differentiated, but there is broad agreement that 
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the emerging economies need to do more. Two individuals explicitly point to the stark con-
trast between ethics and profits, arguing that ethics should be prioritized. They consider inac-
tion a moral failure that is inconsistent with the values of the human community: mutual sur-
vival, solidarity and protection of the weakest. Only one person in this group challenges cur-
rent consumption patterns in the developed world.  
Moral norms play a big role in the NGO CAMs. They believe addressing climate change 
is a fundamental moral necessity. Poverty alleviation and caring for the vulnerable has moral 
priority. One individual states a very general moral principle: one should alleviate suffering if 
one can. A more extreme position is taken by another person, who frames fossil-fuel con-
sumption as a crime, even an act of war. 
Four diplomats and all three NGO representatives see the relevance of domestic forces as 
constraints of the negotiation process, and all associate this problem with the US. One indi-
vidual contrasts that situation, especially the problem of vested interests, with the situation in 
small developing countries, where such resistance simply does not exist (action is in every-
one's interest) or with the EU, where environmental interests have established themselves 
since the 1970s in now legitimate green parties. Five individuals make suggestions for over-
coming this domestic obstacle: changing voter attitudes or public opinion through civil soci-
ety and the media, in other words, educate the body politic by building bottom-up political 
pressure to act/do the right thing, or by giving the political elite “access to the scientific and 
ethical domain” through direct experience and observation of climate impacts, for example 
with visits to small island states. Two believe that ”watershed moments” like extreme weather 
events could help foster the needed public support. 
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Similar to Groups 1-HEHV and 2-MEHV, concepts related to the special characteristics of 
climate change are scarcer and far less consistent across the members of Group 3-LEHV. The 
concepts used seldom reflect complexity thinking (more so among NGO representatives), but 
several individuals recognize the pervasiveness of the challenge when they mention that cli-
mate change already affects local communities, that current patterns of activities at the com-
munity level will have to change, or that the daily life of everyone will be affected. Uncer-
tainty only plays a role for two NGO representatives, who argue that it is not an obstacle, but 
rather a reason to act decisively. Four individuals do not use concepts related to time at all. 
Those who do have a strong sense of urgency based on science, and argue that either time is 
short and that global emissions have to peak in five years. Two of these individuals have iden-
tified strong connectors between the present and the future: one is worried about carbon infra-
structure lock-in with current investments; the other is concerned about her children's lives. 
One diplomat argues that the shortsightedness of “those who control the economy” is irra-
tional.  
Eight group members consider governments as key actors, but they also acknowledge the 
importance of civil society in influencing government in countries that are reluctant to act.  
While many diplomats see decision-making in the UNFCCC as paramount, others and the 
NGO representatives perceive the UN as—at least temporarily—useless. Since leaders and 
negotiators merely reflect the views of the people, imposing clear limits on the UN process, 
change needs to be sought elsewhere, primarily among domestic populations that can lead 
their governments and in the private sector. 
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b. Narrative 
Unlike in Group 2-MEHV, there is no strong clustering around one dominant narrative in 
Group 3. However, there are a number of similarities to three narratives in Group 2-MEHV: 
The Helpless Victim, A Lost Cause, and Policy-driven System Transformation. An additional 
narratives can be called Western Voters Have the Power. 
The Helpless Victim: This is a story about severe vulnerability and on the ground reali-
ties. The central insight is the fact that addressing climate change through low-carbon devel-
opment requires offering poor individuals alternative livelihoods that make economic sense. 
Since there is little domestic capacity to deal with climate problems, the victim state asks the 
most developed countries (including the US, China and India) to mitigate, to invest in cheaper 
and clean energy systems, and to support adaptation efforts in developing countries. 
A Lost Cause: This is a domestic variation of the lost-cause narrative. It acknowledges 
that climate change is a serious threat to humanity, and argues that it can only be solved if 
economic activity is significantly scaled back, revisiting the idea of human needs and adjust-
ing to a new normal. However, this is impossible in a democracy because people would reject 
any idea of sacrifice in an election. Considering the selfish and shortsighted human nature, the 
chances to change people’s minds in favor of such a solution are not good. 
Policy-driven System Transformation: This narrative is about the need to create the next 
industrial revolution or energy system transformation. It acknowledges that these structural 
changes will create winners and losers, but it is more concerned with the fate of the poor and 
vulnerable than the wealthy and industrial players. Governments play a key role, driving this 
transition through domestic legislation. Bridging the individual and global level, these indi-
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viduals are driven by strong ethical convictions and commit their own career to improving the 
lives of poor people around the world, hoping to benefit the planet and future generations. 
Western Voters Have the Power: Individuals sharing this narrative strongly feel that the 
developed countries “got us here” and therefore have a major responsibility to address the 
climate problem. At the same time they focus on climate change as a problem facing all of 
humanity, requiring a collaborative spirit and contributions from all parties, including the 
emerging economies (see Multilateral Solidarity). They recognize that climate politics are 
subject to economic considerations, which place major constraints on the ability of govern-
ments to make strong commitments in the UN negotiations. They see the key to an interna-
tional agreement in various domestic contexts: people have to lead governments. Since politi-
cal leaders only reflect the views of their population, the real work has to happen in the do-
mestic political space, especially in developed countries. Mobilizing populations, changing 
minds and attitudes with the help of civil society organizations and media is the only way to 
shift the positions of their governments towards climate action. 
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c. Example 
Figure 3-8: CAM of Group 3 Member 	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4. Group 4 – High Emitters With Low Vulnerability (16) 
This group consists of Australia, Canada (2), Germany, Japan, South Korea (2) and the 
US (3). Associated non-state actor groups are fossil fuel and other industry organizations (6). 
a. Content Analysis 
All ten diplomats in Group 4-HELV distinguish clearly between climate impact-related 
costs and the costs of climate policy. Regarding impacts, fewer people are concerned about 
domestic effects than about effects in other parts of the world (9). Three of them point to food 
shortages as a global impact. Four are worried about different kinds of existential threats: hu-
man security and the potential of war (3), the unprecedented disappearance of island states 
(4). One person expands this thought and considers the international system threatened. All 
ten diplomats have concerns about the cost implications of climate action; most of them (8) 
link this concern to the idea of global competitiveness. The loss-of-competitiveness argument 
is connected to notions like trade-offs between today and the future, the current structure of 
major economies, the energy-efficiency of current industries, stranded assets, vested interests, 
and the positive notion of new economic opportunities (e.g., "Green Economy,” "Win-Win 
Thinking," or even a "New Industrial Revolution”). Only two individuals address identity-
related costs in addition to material costs, for example, the loss of seasons and no longer shar-
ing a life-experience with future generations.  
The six private sector representatives show a different pattern regarding cost concepts. 
Generally, all six invoke impact-related cost categories that are less severe than those of other 
groups thus far, for instance, nobody mentions the possibility of lives lost or states disappear-
ing, and identity-related concepts are absent. With one exception these individuals speak 
about environmental changes exclusively elsewhere in the world, disconnected from their 
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own lives. Two individuals explicitly state that they are not concerned about climate impacts 
because humankind has great adaptive capacity and "will do what needs to be done.” Three 
individuals make reference to a "global power game" as a relevant decision framework, im-
plying three different things: the dominance of national economic interests, the relevance of 
geopolitical alliances, and the rise of China and its competition with the US for superpower 
status. Unsurprisingly all six private actor representatives employ free-market concepts and 
frameworks including price signals, consumption changes, market mechanisms as policy in-
struments of choice, cost-effectiveness, profit motives and self-interest. For four of them 
technology plays a major role in addressing climate change, for example, carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) as a bridging technology, or the role-out of low-carbon energy technologies. 
Two people view climate change as part of a larger set of problems that could be summarized 
as global resource overconsumption.  
Concepts related to benefits of various climate-related policy options are poorly devel-
oped. Only two individuals (both diplomats) in the entire group of 16 mention the possibility 
of benefits. One focuses on economic advantages, such as resource efficiency improvements. 
The other provides a detailed account why global action is in the national interest: limiting 
demands for humanitarian assistance after extreme weather events, expanding trade opportu-
nities with developing countries, and because it is a moral responsibility to help those less for-
tunate.  
 Only four diplomats but all industry representatives use the distinction between devel-
oped and developing countries; five refer to the Annex 1 vs. non-Annex 1 distinction. Only 
two diplomats mention humanity as a relevant reference group. However, three business rep-
resentatives mention possible collectives that are different from the state: a global, mental 
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connection between all people ("thinking as one"), the global community of states and society 
as a family. 
The most striking feature is the absence of any strong norms or justice-related concepts in 
six out of the ten CAMs of diplomats in this group. Four of them express a serious concern 
about fairness rather than equity, and one experiences a moral responsibility "to those less for-
tunate than us,” which is closer to the idea of charity and generosity than to the idea of princi-
pled responsibility. Three business representatives believe that each individual has a moral 
responsibility to and for other human beings, society or "the future,” countering libertarian 
notions of individualism. They see the necessity to reduce global consumption as part of these 
moral obligations. Two of them argue that the old development paradigm is part of the prob-
lem because it links progress with consumption. The idea of historical responsibility does not 
receive any support in this group; five individuals associate negative emotions with this con-
cept and consider it unhelpful or an obstacle to addressing climate change. None of the private 
actor representatives even mentions this concept. This suggests a strong disconnect between 
the idea of fairness and the concept of historical responsibility as it is currently used in the 
climate negotiations. 
Nine diplomats and all six business representatives recognize that there are important 
connections between domestic political processes and international climate negotiations. Only 
two diplomats point to the US congressional constraint. Ten individuals offer different domes-
tic factors that shape the negotiations: the lack of public support or public pressure on gov-
ernments that would ensure the electability or political survival of elected officials in favor of 
climate action, the influence of oil interests, reelection pressures in political systems with 
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three- to four-year terms, competence fights within governments and the need to beef up do-
mestic policies before committing internationally. 
Concepts regarding special problem characteristics are sparse and show only weak pat-
terns within the group. Only two diplomats and two non-state representatives describe the 
problem as uniquely complex. Seven people acknowledge elements of the problem's perva-
siveness. They mention the effects of climate change on the day-to-day lives of citizens, for 
instance, consumption patterns or "the way of life,” including patterns of driving or consum-
ing energy more generally. Eleven individuals consider the importance of uncertainties, espe-
cially uncertainties related to climate impacts, causality and attribution, but none of them be-
lieves that they preclude a cooperative solution. Four of them mention the difficulties created 
by popular disbelief associated with impact-related scientific uncertainties. Five individuals 
do not mention any time-related concepts at all; three others consider the timeframe to be un-
certain or unknown. The year 2020 has become somewhat of a focal point: three diplomats 
consider it too late for a new agreement, but do not provide alternative suggestions for action 
timelines. Three business representatives mention concepts with an unusually long time hori-
zon. One argues that there will be 100-200 more years of fossil-fuel consumption. Another 
believes that resource scarcity will lead to commodity price increases in 20-50 years and that 
one should plan as far into the future as one can think. A third describes climate change as a 
challenge for multiple generations. 
Worth mentioning here is the array of concepts used by this group when asked about the 
ultimate goal or purpose of climate change governance. The 2°C temperature target features 
in the minds of seven group members. Others suggest goals like “minimize damage and suf-
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fering caused by climate change,” “the number that prevents war,” “avoid unmanageable out-
come,” “the human species can survive, ”or “reduce the speed of climate change.” 
Unsurprisingly, governments play an important role in the CAMs of all ten diplomats in 
the group. Eight of them consider governments as the key—sometimes sole—actor in climate 
change governance. Two think about national governments as only one among many actor 
types at different governance scales from the individual to the global. Four diplomats deem-
phasize the role of the UNFCCC, suggesting that it is unimportant or that developments out-
side the UN are currently the only reason for optimism. Five diplomats point to the absence of 
and need for public support or even pressure that would enable governments to become more 
ambitious in the negotiations. 
Business actors also see governments as the most important actors, but only domestically 
and not in the UNFCCC. Governments are expected to create national legislation and to estab-
lish bilateral or transnational cooperation, most importantly for cap-and-trade systems. The 
only function of the UNFCCC should be to set international targets. Some consider NGOs 
important to create the political conditions for change at the domestic level by raising problem 
awareness and convincing politicians and electorates of the need for policy and behavior 
change. 
b. Narrative 
Group 4-HELV presents a unique set of four narratives: National Interests Trump Collec-
tive Ones, The Market, Agency Diffusion, and The Larger Picture: Sustainability; three of 
these overlap with previous ones. Further there is a variation of the Multilateral Solidarity 
narrative. 
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National Interests Trump Collective Ones:  This is the dominant narrative in Group 4-
HELV with a number of variations. Generally these five individuals take climate change very 
seriously and expect grave consequences mainly for vulnerable populations in developing 
countries. While two of them clearly identify benefits of action for their home country, all five 
focus on the cost burden of mitigation – funding the low-carbon energy system transition – in 
countries seen as major emitters. These cost burdens are linked to a decrease in the country’s 
global competitiveness, which contradicts national economic interests. Since these costs are 
perceived to be politically unacceptable, economic national interests are considered a major 
obstacle or counterproductive in the negotiations. Two possible solutions are offered to re-
solve this dilemma: a change in public opinion or bottom-up pressure on governments that 
counters existing fossil-fuel industry interests (similar to the Western Voters Have the Power 
narrative), and/or a technological breakthrough that would reduce the costs of economic 
changes. 
A variation of this narrative stresses that the current inaction at the international level is 
simply a reflection of political reality. Governments are constrained by people’s perceptions 
of climate risks, and their limited willingness to accept drastic measures translates into limited 
global progress. Based on democratic principles this has to be accepted. This overlaps with 
Western Voters Have the Power.  
The Market:  This narrative is related to the one above. But rather than focusing on na-
tional interests as obstacles in the negotiations it zooms in on GHG emissions as a product of 
economic activity and the corresponding need to change economic processes. The preferred 
pathway of change is domestic legislation that utilizes market mechanisms, such as cap-and-
trade systems, tax incentives, and public infrastructure investments, to create a carbon price 
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signal to which business will respond. The basic idea is that actors at all levels—individuals, 
firms, industries, and states—are rational and will respond to incentives that align desirable 
behavior with their immediate, economic self-interest. 
Agency Diffusion: This viewpoint deemphasizes the particular role and responsibilities of 
state governments and the UNFCCC. Instead it focuses on the complex nature of the climate 
challenge and the distributed authority and capacity to act across multiple spatial and system 
scales from the individual to the global, including the private sector, civil society and the me-
dia. The standard categories of developed and developing countries play no role at all in this 
ahistorical and amoral narrative. It is a pragmatic, forward-looking approach focusing on the 
limited possibilities within the current political structures, and it is in that sense similar to the 
narrative of Policy-driven System Transformation. 
The Larger Picture: Sustainability: This narrative sees climate change as part of a much 
larger sustainability challenge, which is in essence about the overconsumption of global re-
sources (“consuming more than one Earth,” “threatening the planet’s functioning’), driven by 
a development paradigm and social value set that links progress with consumption and indi-
vidualism. Two different solutions are put forward. One focuses on increasing the efficiency 
and productivity of resource use (“prolong resources required for life as far into the future as 
you can think”). The other is a complementary change in social values towards a more com-
munity and future-oriented set of norms that limit consumption. Individuals play a large role 
in this narrative, both as consumers and as citizens who can be mobilized to accept political 
changes or to bring about the needed changes at the ballot box. This creates a strong overlap 
with two previous narratives: the Global-Local Link and Western Voters have the Power. 
	   138	  
Multilateral Solidarity: This narrative also uses as a starting point a sincere concern about 
future climate change impacts in other parts of the world, but in addition to recognizing the 
costs of sharing the global mitigation burden these individuals emphasize that any agreement 
has to be fair. There is less clarity on how fairness or equity could be defined, but the BASIC 
countries need to player a bigger role. 
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c. Example 
Figure 3-9: CAM of Group 4 Member 	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5. Group 5 – Medium Emitters With Low Vulnerability (10) 
This group includes Argentina, Denmark, Finland (2), Singapore and Sweden (2). The as-
sociated non-state actor groups are environment and market NGOs and a local government 
organization.  
a. Content Analysis 
This group displays a number of interesting patterns regarding the rational frameworks of 
cost-effective action, but concepts related to national interests and global power balancing are 
almost absent. With regard to the costs of climate change, five individuals emphasize the suf-
fering of poor people (e.g., increasing poverty, hunger, personal catastrophes and disease) and 
six emphasize social costs (e.g., community destruction, displacement, food security) rather 
than economic damage caused by climate change. Four diplomats perceive a systemic change 
(weakening) of the natural resource base for human development, and two non-state represen-
tatives speak in more general systemic terms about the nature of climate change impacts, for 
instnace, "multiple repercussions" that are "harder to detect,” "hysteresis" and the possibility 
of moving into a new, incomprehensible state. Only two diplomats associate their home coun-
try with the notion of climate change impacts; the majority thinks of people and impacts else-
where in the world. Nobody mentions identity-related costs, and only four CAMs feature exis-
tential threats related to climate change: the possibility of (individual) deaths and the threat to 
the human species or civilizations by impacts beyond the limits of adaptation. Two diplomats 
introduce a new category of mental costs: dramatic climate impacts like the loss of island 
states could have mental effects on people everywhere, and caring about future generations 
even beyond our grandchildren—a long-term perspective—is important for the mental health 
of a society. All members of Group 5-MELV express concerns about the economic costs of 
	   141	  
climate action especially as an obstacle to an international agreement, and all favor a market-
based approach for developing solutions: bringing down the cost of technology, finding the 
most efficient way to mitigate, or creating the right incentives for market actors. However, 
three people believe that cost-benefit analysis is a reductionist tool that is not sufficient to 
prepare decisions, especially at the global level.  
As in other groups, concepts related to the benefits of action are poorly developed. Only 
two people explicitly named "Fixing the climate problem," "Green growth and jobs," and the 
savings from changed consumption patterns as benefits of action. A third cautions about the 
potentially immense costs of inaction. 
Identity and group membership concepts are fairly limited. Only two individuals use the 
classic distinction between developed and developing countries, but eight people refer to spe-
cific countries or country blocks, especially the US, China and the EU. Two individuals iden-
tify the private sector as an important actor or at least partner. 
I identified four distinct norms in the CAMs of this group. Three individuals believe that 
everyone (i.e., all countries in the UNFCCC) should take a fair share of the cost burden based 
on their respective capabilities. Five people argue that "Countries better off" or "Major emit-
ters” need to take a larger responsibility and/or move first. Third, two diplomats emphasize a 
moral obligation towards future generations, because "we extend our presence in the world" 
or we should "leave behind a reasonably habitable planet" and simply have a human responsi-
bility to care for other human beings. Finally, one person emphasizes the responsibility of all 
individuals to do what they can in their respective position of authority to act on climate 
change. 
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Six individuals think about the link between domestic and international politics; four of 
them point specifically to the case of the US. Five emphasize the challenges of garnering pub-
lic support for climate action in democracies, and the role of civil society to create acceptance 
for political change. 
Concepts regarding special characteristics of climate change show fewer patterns. Nine 
group members mention different expressions of complexity and the respective challenges of 
decision-makers and the public to fully comprehend the climate challenge. The three NGO 
representatives have a fairly advanced understanding of complexity, including concepts like 
hysteresis and tipping points. Four people speak about the ways in which climate policies (not 
climate impacts) affect "all of us," "the entire economy" (pervasiveness), and four people 
have specific concerns regarding uncertainties surrounding climate impacts, for example, "We 
don't know how much warming we can live with." Six people mention tipping points; most of 
them associate the concept with the notion of irreversibility. 
The most interesting feature of Group 5-MELV is the fact that all ten group members ex-
perience a sense of urgency and emphasize the importance of long-term thinking in develop-
ing solutions. Their perceptions of urgency, expressed in time-related concepts like "acute," 
"lack of urgency," "2030 is practically tomorrow," and "race against time," is particularly sur-
prising, given that most of these individuals live in highly developed countries, far from the 
vulnerable places of the world that already experience impacts. Equally interesting is their 
ability to think about the long-term, expressed in phrases like "impacts on generations to 
come," "the future beyond grandchildren,” "build for the future - 50-100 years."  
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Five individuals consider democracy to be an institution that presents obstacles to climate 
negotiations because of the need for public support for costly policy measures, the influence 
of vested interests and the mismatch between problem time scales and political cycles. 
Four people express completely different views on the topic of intentionality and blame. 
One suggests that the rich are imposing the costs of their development on the poor, implying 
that there are consciously acting perpetrators of injustice. At the other end of the spectrum is 
the view that there is no enemy to be blamed; rather humans are waging war with the planet. 
Between these positions are diverging opinions about the concept of historical responsibility. 
This group does not show a clear pattern regarding agency concepts and models of 
change. Group members locate agency in very different places, for instance, in the bilateral 
relationship between (the presidents of) the US and China, in "the public" that needs to pres-
sure governments, in "the private sector" and its innovative potential, and finally in govern-
ments that make collective decisions about mitigation in the UNFCCC. NGO representatives 
all emphasize the role of individuals in creating change: their mobilization through commu-
nity-specific framing, the creation of awareness and political will, and everyone taking re-
sponsibility and demonstrating leadership, regardless of their position. 
b. Narrative 
The narratives of most group members are variants of narratives identified in previous 
groups. 
National Interests Trump Collective Ones: Three individuals in Group 5-MELV use this 
narrative. One person argues that climate change can only be addressed with a bilateral 
agreement between the US and China, and that they would solve it if it was cheap. Since po-
litical will is a function of the price of clean technology, the focus has to be on reducing the 
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costs of mitigation technology with the use of market forces. The other two individuals con-
firm the relevance of the costs of burden-sharing, vested interests at the domestic level, espe-
cially in the US, and the challenges of motivating people to change and to support climate 
policies. 
The national interest narrative has a strong overlap with The Market, which is shared by a 
member of Group 5-MELV, who emphasizes that action on climate change in the industrial-
ized economies makes economic sense because of conservation-related savings. 
Policy-driven System Transformation: One person adds a bilateral dimension to this nar-
rative, suggesting that while climate change is a complex and multifaceted management chal-
lenge, a mitigation agreement between the US and China would unlock the global negotia-
tions. Another person shares the view that Western Voters Have the Power to change interna-
tional climate politics by pressuring their national governments. The beliefs of a third individ-
ual align with the Multilateral Solidarity narrative. A fourth person sees climate change as 
part of a larger sustainability challenge (The Larger Picture: Sustainability), arguing that 
humanity’s collective actions might be damaging spaceship Earth irreversibly. Private sector 
driven innovation is necessary to create a global energy transition that will leave the planet in 
a habitable state for future generations. 
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c. Example 
Figure 3-10: CAM of Group 5 Member 	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6. Group 6 – Low Emitters With Low Vulnerability 
This group includes Barbados, Cape Verde and Iceland. 
a. Content Analysis 
All members of Group 6-LELV express a profound concern about the disappearance of is-
land states as a consequence of sea-level rise. One individual described the impacts of un-
abated climate change in even more stark terms as "the end of history" and the "death of cul-
tures." Identity-related concepts play a much bigger role than in other groups—existence as 
the condition for identity, land loss, and the loss of iconic landscape elements that represent 
"what we stand for" are all expressions of a concern that is qualitatively different than antici-
pated economic losses (which all group members also mention). There is a strong focus on 
human suffering and social costs (e.g., "human costs," "the poor today will be even poorer," 
"human suffering," "killing people," "directly affects human lives"). All group members point 
to national economic interests as the key obstacles to a negotiated agreement (e.g., "cold-
hearted business interests," "entrenched economic interests," "politicians defending prosper-
ity"). In two cases this issue is connected to "powerful lobbies" in "powerful countries.”  
Three identity groups are relevant for these three diplomats apart from their national iden-
tity: humanity, the group of major emitters, and the poor and vulnerable people in the world. 
All three individuals share one fundamental norm that is in its pure formulation unrelated 
to climate change: there is a human responsibility to care for other humans if they are suffer-
ing. Failing to do so is a moral tragedy, and in the case of climate change this would be a fail-
ure of historic proportions. Our shared humanity is the foundation of solidarity. 
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All three believe that national circumstances matter in this two-level game, either because 
domestic oil lobbies prevent more ambitious negotiation positions or because national publics 
need to be mobilized to enable climate action in a state-based governance system. 
The complexity of climate change does not receive any attention, but the members of 
Group 6-LELV share a sense of urgency and a specific timeline: they all believe that global 
GHG emissions need to peak latest in 2017, and that the Durban Platform timeline (a treaty 
coming into effect in 2020) is neglecting this timeline. Two individuals include tipping points 
in their beliefs, either as reason for concern or as something that could help mobilize the pub-
lic. Tipping points are both dreaded and needed. 
For all group members, governments, especially those in the group of high emitters, play a 
central role in solving the climate problem. They have the power/capacity to act, and their re-
fusal or reluctance to do so can be explained, for example, by the role of vested interest 
groups, but is not morally justifiable. Some group members are more optimistic than others 
about the role of negotiation groups like AOSIS or the LDCs to pressure the major emitters 
into action, and all understand that domestic politics and public opinion are important to un-
lock the negotiations. 
b. Narrative 
This group offers emotionally charged versions of narratives identified in previous groups. 
Two individuals present emotionally intensified variations of the narrative Domestic In-
terests Trump Collective Ones. In one person’s view, climate change imposes severe human 
suffering and economic damage. Many countries have not yet recognized that inaction is a 
costly policy choice. A number of powerful countries have the resources and are the only ones 
who can solve this problem, but they are reluctant to do so because they have entrenched eco-
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nomic interests to maintain the status quo. The small island states are pressuring these reluc-
tant players to act in accordance with their human responsibility to alleviate human suffering. 
Another person emphasizes the moral tragedy of “discarding parts of humanity” for national 
economic interests. The rich are developing to the detriment of others; they are killing people, 
countries and cultures by not doing what is morally expected and right: to help the poor. De-
nying some countries the right of existence is not something human beings would do. 
Finally, one person shares the Western Voters have the Power narrative with participants 
in other groups: Governance is state-based and since the negotiations are constrained by nego-
tiation mandates, the solution has to be sought at the domestic level, where we have to mobi-
lize publics for a change in lifestyles, and a paradigm shift away from connecting carbon with 
prosperity.  
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c. Example 
Figure 3-11: CAM of Group 6 Member 	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7. Content and Narrative Summary 
The following two tables summarize key themes of the CAM content analysis. Table 3-4 
offers a summary of the conceptual substance of all 55 CAMs. Each participant group is pre-
sented in one column, and each row contains frequently used concepts in each participant 
group that relate to a particular theory-driven concept category like costs, two-level game, 
identity or complexity. The concept category “costs,” which is important in rationalist ap-
proaches, was divided into climate impact-related costs in the first row and climate action- or 
policy-related costs in the second row. Regarding the latter, a number of CAMs in participant 
Group 1-HEHV (column one) contained concepts that could be summarized as “economic 
costs of action for emerging economies and the US.” There is no row for concepts related to 
“benefits” because very few CAMs contained concepts that fit this category. The concept 
category “identity” (row five) lists all identity groups that were mentioned by the participants 
in the different groups. For example, the members of Group 3-LEHV frequently referred to 
the developed countries, emerging economies, the human community, the global rich, and the 
vulnerable. Unlike Group 4-HELV they did not mention particular negotiation groups like 
AOSIS or the Annex-1 countries. The fact that a concept is listed does not imply that every 
single group participant has used it. If a box is empty, like in the case of Group 6-LELV and 
the concept category “Global Power Structure,” the CAMs in that group either did not contain 
any concepts relevant for that concept category or there was no recognizable pattern among 
the concepts used. 
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Table 3-4:  CAM Content Summary 
 Group 1-HEHV Group 2-MEHV Group 3-LEHV Group 4-HELV Group 5-MELV Group 6-LELV 
Costs  
(Impacts) 
Existential threat to 
individuals elsewhere 
Identity loss today 
Human suffering at 
home today 
Economic and devel-
opment costs at home 
today and later 
Human suffering 
elsewhere	  
 
Human suffering at 
home today 
Environmental dam-
age = economic 
damage 
Extreme weather 
events at home to-
day 
Risks to humanity 
and life on Earth 
Loss of countries 
Existential threat to 
my country (later) 
and individuals (to-
day) 
Present threats to my 
identity 
Human suffering 
Extreme weather 
events 
Environmental dam-
age = economic dam-
age  
Food insecurity 
Existential threat for 
others later 
Human security and 
possibly war later 
Global food short-
age later 
Extreme weather, 
environmental 
change and eco-
nomic loss else-
where 
 
Suffering of poor 
and vulnerable peo-
ple elsewhere 
Global systemic 
changes  
Mental costs of los-
ing states 
Existential threats 
(individuals and 
civilization) 
 
Existential threat to 
other states 
Identity threat at home 
Human suffering 
Economic losses 
Costs  
(Action) 
Economic costs of 
action for emerging 
economies and the 
US 
Costs of mitigation 
for others 
Contradict national 
and big business in-
terests 
Costs of mitigation 
for others 
Economic costs of 
action at home 
Market-based ap-
proaches 
Technology 
Economic costs of 
action at home 
Market-based ap-
proaches 
 
Economic costs in 
other countries = ob-
stacles 
 
Global 
Power 
Structure 
Global Competitive-
ness 
Global power man-
agement (US concern 
about relative de-
cline) 
National interests = 
obstacles 
Power differences 
and seeking change 
vs. protecting the 
status quo 
National interests = 
obstacles 
Competitiveness 
(Mitigation raises the 
cost of doing busi-
ness) 
Global power shift 
Vested interests 
Global competitive-
ness 
Trade-offs between 
today and the future 
Global power game 
Global power struc-
ture 
 
 
Two-level 
Game 
US is holding nego-
tiations hostage 
Domestic Con-
straints, especially 
US 
Role of voters 
US is blocking ne-
gotiations 
Domestic constraints, 
especially US 
Democracies do not 
accept economic 
costs 
Vested interests 
Domestic con-
straints 
Lack of public sup-
port 
Vested interests 
Domestic constraints, 
especially US  
Lack of public sup-
port 
Democracies = ob-
stacles 
Powerful lobbies in 
powerful countries 
National publics need 
to be mobilized 
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Identity National identity 
(place-based), evol-
ving away from 
purely developing 
country (“Moral Di-
lemma”) 
Developed vs. devel-
oping vs. emerging 
countries, 
The most vulnerable 
and most affected 
elsewhere 
The West 
Community of states 
Young people/the 
future 
National/ identity 
Developed vs. de-
veloping (=victims) 
vs. emerging coun-
tries, 
Humanity/planet 
The international 
system 
The vulnerable/poor 
vs. the rich in the 
world 
Generations 
Developed countries  
Emerging economies 
Human community/ 
global family 
The global rich 
The vulnerable 
 
National identity 
Developed vs. de-
veloping countries 
(unproductive) 
Annex 1 vs. non-
Annex 1 (unproduc-
tive) 
BASIC, AOSIS 
Individual big emit-
ters 
Community of states 
US, EU, China 
Private sector 
Individuals 
 
National identity 
Major emitters 
The poor and vulner-
able 
Norms, Jus-
tice & Ideas 
Multilateralism and 
inclusiveness 
Polluter pays princi-
ple  
Pro-poor, pro-
vulnerable regime 
Climate justice 
Wrong development 
model 
Local and community 
values 
Multilateralism and 
inclusiveness, 
Equity 
Everybody should 
contribute, depend-
ing on abil-
ity/historical respon-
sibility 
Solidarity 
Connectedness 
Resource flows from 
North to South 
Wrong development 
model 
Politics of Wellbe-
ing	  
Everyone should con-
tribute/inaction is 
moral failure 
Ethics should trump 
profits 
Solidarity  
Protection of the 
weakest/ Equity fa-
voring the poor 
Alleviate suffering is 
moral necessity 
Resource flows from 
North to South 
Fairness 
Moral responsibility 
to those less fortu-
nate than us  
Individual responsi-
bility to other hu-
man beings 
Reduce global con-
sumption 
Old development 
paradigm 
Everyone should 
take a fair share of 
the cost burden 
Wealthier countries 
should do more 
Human responsibil-
ity to other humans 
Moral obligations to 
other generations 
Everybody should care 
(states) 
The rich help the poor 
Solidarity and shared 
humanity 
Human responsibility 
to other humans if 
they are suffering 
Complexity Systemic time lags  
Tipping points  
Interconnected 
planetary system 
Pervasiveness 
Pervasiveness 
Uncertainty as a rea-
son to act 
Pervasiveness 
Uncertainty 
Complexity 
Hysteresis 
Tipping points and 
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 irreversibility 
Pervasiveness 
Uncertainty 
Timeline   Urgency Uncertain 
2020 ADP 
Urgency Urgency 
2017 Emissions peak 
Agency/ 
Change 
National govern-
ments 
Multilateral coopera-
tion 
Domestic action 
National govern-
ments 
Multilateral coop-
eration 
Limitations of gov-
ernments – need 
voter support 
Non-state actor in-
volvement at the UN 
Changing mindsets 
of consumers 
National govern-
ments 
Special role of the 
emerging powers 
Limitations of gov-
ernments within the 
UN – need voter sup-
port 
Private sector action 
National govern-
ments 
Multilateralism 
Domestic action 
(legislation) 
The market 
Bilateralism  
Need public support 
Different individual 
countries 
Role of individuals in 
creating political will 
Private sector 
National governments 
Special role of high 
emitters 
Negotiation groups 
Public opinion can 
unlock the negotia-
tions 
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Table 3-5 shows the distribution of existing narratives among the 55 study participants in the 
six participant groups. The groups are shown in the original matrix where the columns indicate 
different GHG emission levels (high, medium, low) and the rows differentiate between high and 
low vulnerability (e.g., Group 1-HEHV is located in the upper-left corner and Group 6-LELV in 
the lower-right). 
The members of each group offered different narratives—condensed stories that order and 
give meaning to their various beliefs about global climate change governance—and often similar 
narratives occurred in more than one group. A narrative was only included when it was shared by 
at least two individuals in a group. Different colors are used to identify shared narratives across 
different participant groups. For example, the narrative National Interests Trump Collective Ones 
occurred in Groups 4-HELV, 5-MELV, and 6-LELV. When it was not possible to place shared 
narratives next to each other, for instance, in the case of A Lost Cause, which occurred in Groups 
2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, and 4-HELV, I used arrows to emphasize the connection. 
The table shows several interesting patterns. First, only Groups 1-HEHV and 4-HELV con-
tain narratives that are specific to the group. This might be an indication of their novelty or their 
lack of popularity beyond a small group. Five narratives are shared across three different groups, 
and three narratives across two groups. Given that these narratives cross different levels of emis-
sions and vulnerability, one could hypothesize that these group-defining factors do not deter-
mine—at least not by themselves—the believes of group members. However, it is rare that 
members of non-adjacent groups share a narrative. This only holds for A Lost Cause. 
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Table 3-5: Distribution of Narratives Across Participant Groups 
	  	  
 
8. Structural Analysis 
Observed structural patterns occur across multiple participant groups, and are much more 
limited than the content-related findings. 
Generally there is a curious disconnect between the concepts related to climate science and 
all the other areas of the CAM. As I expected a large number of CAMs make multiple and strong 
connections between science-related concepts and impact-related concepts, for example, in-
creased temperature leading to droughts or sea-level rise leading to the disappearance of island 
states. Often those links are strengthened (and might have been created) by personal experiences 
or observation of events the individual attributes to climate change. However, links to other areas 
of the CAM, for example, to the Solution cluster or the Problem Nature cluster, are rare. The 
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only consistent link between these two themes is the temperature target, which is often perceived 
as being imposed by science.  
There is one exception to this missing-links pattern: a small number of participants point to 
the science, especially to emission data, as a confirmation for the argument that today’s problems 
are the result of a ‘bad development model’ used by the West and of overconsumption of global 
resources. In other words, some individuals appropriate scientific information to bolster existing 
narratives of North-South inequity, colonialism and consequently the responsibility of the devel-
oped world to provide resources to the developing countries. 
If individuals have a concept ‘Tipping Points’ it tends to be associated with the Science clus-
ter, but not connected to Solution or policy-related concepts. 
All CAMs contain various concepts for groups, including groups they identify with—usually 
their own country or the organization they work for—but also other groups like “The Developed 
Countries” or “The Fossil Fuel Industry.”  
Most CAMs of representatives of vulnerable countries make strong connections between 
concepts related to climate change Impacts and the (national) identity cluster. 
One can attempt to identify more or less important concepts based on various measures of 
centrality. The most straightforward is degree centrality, defined as the number of links of a sin-
gle node.6 Given the research question and CAM process used Climate Change is naturally a 
concept node with high degree centrality. The concept was the anchor point for the interviews 
and I used Climate Change as a central hub for the CAM generation process. Therefore the cen-
trality of this concept is neither surprising nor meaningful. On rare occasions the belief system of 
the interview partner overwhelmed this natural pattern and forced me to place another concept in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Other measures that require quantitative analysis include closeness centrality and betweenness central-
ity. The former measures the shortest distances between pairs of nodes; the latter how often a node serves 
as a bridge along the shortest path between two nodes.  
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the center of the CAM, for example, Sustainability. The Climate Change hub in all other CAMs 
usually has a number of links to concepts that in turn are hubs for sub-themes of the interview. 
These ‘regional hubs’ in terms of the visual space of a CAM include Impacts, Problem Nature, 
Solution, and UNFCCC. Other well-connected concepts include the person’s home country name 
and the concept Me as part of the identity cluster, Mitigation and North-South Differences as part 
of the Solutions and Obstacles clusters. 
Centrality in the sense of having a large number of links is not always an indicator of the im-
portance of a concept. I detected three other reasons for centrality. First, high connectedness is 
sometimes the result of difficulties to explain a concept or one’s personal interpretation of the 
concept, which necessitates the use of many associated concepts to communicate the desired 
meaning. In other words, more contested or more difficult concepts require detailed explana-
tions, and high centrality measures for the entire CAM might indicate high levels of contestation 
in the negotiations more generally. This explanation applies to concepts like North-South Divide, 
Divergence of Views, or Development Model. A similar need to use multiple associated con-
cepts to present subtle meaning occurs when individuals use new or extraordinary concepts, or 
when a concept is in the early stages of establishing itself in the negotiation process. One exam-
ple for an extraordinary concept is Thinking about each other as significant partners. Loss and 
Damage is a case of a young concept that is still in the process of being defined for the context of 
climate change negotiations. Finally a high number of connections can indicate that a concept is 
multifaceted and complex. Examples include multiple elements of a solution, or multiple obsta-
cles, or multiple possible impacts of climate change. Often it is unclear how these elements relate 
to each other and whether they are interdependent or not. 
Other possibilities for structural analysis include an assessment of peripheral, yet important 
concepts, in other words, the absence of needed centrality. However, the number of peripheral 
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concepts was too large to draw meaningful conclusions from a qualitative analysis. The same is 
true for an analysis of the dominance or ratio of emotional valences: what characterizes belief 
systems with a majority of positive, negative, neutral, or ambivalent concepts? 
These initial observations only hint at the potential power of a structural CAM analysis, but 
computationally powerful quantitative analytic tools will be required to exploit this potential. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Cognitive Obstacles to Cooperation in Global Climate Change Negotiations 
 
CAMs can help reveal at least four different types of information about an actor’s mind: the 
content or substance of beliefs regarding a certain issue (i.e., discrete cognitive elements), the 
type and intensity of emotions associated with these beliefs, the structure of the belief system, 
(i.e., the relationships between discreet cognitive elements) and what one might call the narrative 
that provides coherence to this belief system.  
Building on the initial analysis of the cognitive content, structure and narratives summarized 
in the previous chapter, this chapter interprets this information and presents the central argu-
ments of this dissertation. Highlighting specific cognitive patterns, this chapter analyzes to what 
extent they match the key assumptions of the main theories of IR. Second, it assesses how study 
participants grapple with the special characteristics of climate change. Since not all of the find-
ings fit easily into the cognitive categories offered by IR theory or the question of unique prob-
lem characteristics, I offer some additional thoughts, for example, on the role of science for the 
thought processes of climate negotiators and on the problem of defining a goal or purpose for the 
negotiations. Jointly these insights enrich current knowledge about agency in global climate gov-
ernance. 
The sections below address the following themes: (I) rational choice-based decision-making 
including the costs and benefits of action, power balancing and structural constraints of agency, 
(II) identity, (III) norms, justice and other ideas, (IV) the use of scientific information, and (V) 
agency. The concluding section summarizes the key findings and highlights their implications 
for IR theory, in particular theoretical interactions between rational choice and constructivist ap-
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proaches and the need to expand existing theories of agency to account for time (memory and 
anticipation) and hope in political decision-making and behavior.   
 
I. RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES 
This section will assess the existence and strength of cognitive patterns that indicate rational 
choice-based decision frameworks among study participants as well as the relations between 
these rational patterns and other cognitive elements that do not fall within the narrow definition 
of rationality prevailing in IR scholarship. 
 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis 1: A Hierarchy of Cost Categories 
The interview transcripts contain a variety of cost concepts, indicating major differences and 
diversity in the way individuals think about the costs associated with climate change. Apart from 
a fundamental distinction between the costs of climate change impacts (i.e., the costs of inaction) 
and the costs of climate action, it is possible to devise a hierarchy and taxonomy of cost catego-
ries. Table 4-1 lists these categories, starting with the most threatening. The table also indicates 
different at-risk groups mentioned by study participants, contains brief descriptions of the nature 
of the cost, and mentions the participant groups that are most (but not exclusively) concerned 
about each category.  
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Table 4-1: Hierarchy of Cost Categories 
Cost Category At Risk Groups Description Associated 
Groups 
Existential Threat Humanity, Cul-
tures, States, Indi-
viduals 
Climate change could lead to the destruction of 
the entire group (i.e., wipe out humanity, destroy 
cultures, e.g., island cultures, lead to the disap-
pearance of states, or the death of individuals). 
3-LEHV, 
6-LELV, 
Youth 
NGOs 
Identity Loss Nations, Cultures, 
Communities, In-
dividuals 
Identity loss can take many forms, e.g., the loss 
of an occupation (e.g., fishermen becoming farm-
ers), the loss of homes, the loss of ritual sites and 
other forms of cultural practice, the loss of land-
scapes, territory, and associated activities and 
emotions, the loss of seasons and possible expe-
riences, the loss of species central for hunting, 
diet, experience of nature. 
3-LEHV, 
6-LELV, 
Youth 
NGOs 
Human Suffering Developing world, 
States, Regions, 
Communities, In-
dividuals 
Human suffering refers to issues like poverty, 
hunger, hardship, disease, and water scarcity. 
1-HEHV, 
5-MVLV, 
6-LELV 
Extreme Weather 
Events / Link 
between Envi-
ronment and 
Economy 
States, Regions, 
Communities, Cit-
ies, Individuals 
Extreme weather events include storms, floods, 
droughts, heat waves, and the associated human, 
environmental and economic losses, often medi-
ated by the effects on agricultural productivity 
and infrastructure. 
2-MEHV, 
3-LEHV 
Global Food 
Shortage 
All Humans, Poor 
States and Com-
munities 
This is a unique category in the sense that it is 
perceived to be a global concern, not linked to a 
particular place but systemic. However, poor 
people are expected to suffer more from it. 
4-HELV 
Economic and 
Development 
Costs 
States, Regions, 
Communities 
This category refers to the loss of GDP due to the 
effects of climate change (overlap with extreme 
weather events), and the reversal of development 
progress, e.g., migration of fish populations leav-
ing fishing communities and infrastructure 
stranded, or increasing temperatures decreasing 
agricultural yield. 
1-HEHV, 
2-MEHV, 
3-LEHV, 
6-LELV 
Economic Costs 
of Action 
States, Industries, 
Voters 
The financial costs and GDP loss associated with 
climate policies; also the loss of global competi-
tiveness. 
4-HELV, 
5-MELV 
  
The literature on risk and risk perceptions provides a very useful contribution to the rational 
choice model of decision-making, which stipulates the need to compare expected costs and bene-
fits of various action options. Risk perceptions are cognitive processes related to expected harm 
or costs. Understanding which risks negotiators perceive as serious in turn helps one understand 
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which anticipated costs of climate change these negotiators take into consideration when making 
decisions (Slovic and Weber 2002). This literature offers three specific insights related to the hi-
erarchy of costs developed in Table 4-1. These insights concern (i) the distinction between ex-
pected costs for oneself and others, (ii) the distinction between present and future costs, and (iii) 
the quality or severity of the expected costs. 
(i) First, it matters whether individuals anticipate costs for themselves or for others (Sjöberg 
1998; Sjöberg 2000; Lorenzoni et al. 2006; Leiserowitz 2006). Often the cost categories believed 
to apply to oneself and to others differ significantly, for example, island state representatives ex-
perience an existential threat to themselves but see only economic costs for developed countries. 
While all participants recognize cost categories that affect themselves and other groups, they are 
naturally more concerned about the former. The groups associated with each cost category in 
Table 4-1 tend to be those who connect the specific cost with their own group, usually their own 
country.  
The distinction between costs expected for oneself and for others already indicates the close 
connection between costs concepts and concepts related to identity—if I expect harm to come to 
a group I associate with, care about or feel protective of, my motivation to act on climate change 
will be much stronger than if I believe only other groups to be at risk. Taking this argument one 
step further, individuals who are concerned about personal costs should have a stronger motiva-
tion to contribute to costly solutions than those who are not, especially if these are concerns 
about the person’s survival and wellbeing.  
The structure of the CAMs confirms this pattern to some extent. Individuals in Groups 2-
MEHV, 3-LEHV and 6-LELV make a number of connections between climate impacts and their 
own country or other identity-related concepts. They also tend to be more concerned about and 
demand faster cooperative action than members of Group 4-HELV and 5-MELV, who have only 
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weak connections between climate impacts and their own country but generally recognize that 
climate change will strongly affect the poor and vulnerable in developing countries.  
(ii) Second, people distinguish between costs expected in the present and the future, a dis-
tinction that has implications for their sense of urgency. Individuals who have already experi-
enced climate-related damages in their home country and live in anticipation of additional costs 
every day have a stronger sense of urgency for action than others, who believe that climate im-
pacts will mainly occur in the future. Combining these distinctions between different groups at 
risk and the time of impact, costs for the person’s in-group today have a much stronger motiva-
tional potential than costs to other groups in the future. Closely related to the time dimension of 
costs is the effect of personal experience. According to work in psychology “experientially de-
rived knowledge is often more compelling and more likely to influence behavior than is abstract 
knowledge” (Epstein 1994, 711). The interview data seem to confirm this finding: individuals 
who have observed and experienced what they consider climate impacts (e.g., Groups 1-HEHV, 
2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, and 6-LELV) tend to have a much stronger sense of urgency than those who 
only have abstract or scientifically based conceptions of climate-related costs (Nisbett and Ross 
1980).  
While these distinctions—affiliation with groups at risk and time of impact—are increasingly 
being made in the literature on risk perceptions and decision-making (Spence, Poortinga, and 
Pidgeon 2012; Saleh Safi, James Smith, and Liu 2012; Bruneau, Dufour, and Saxe 2012), the 
hierarchy table suggests that a third dimension is of fundamental importance for understanding 
differences in beliefs: the quality of the costs expected. 
(iii) Table 4-1 highlights that different study participants think about different types of cli-
mate-related costs. The interview data suggest that individuals who are concerned about the three 
most severe cost categories—existential threats, identity loss, and human suffering—tend to use 
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a normative decision-making and negotiation framework that is based on fundamental questions 
about right and wrong. Further, these types of cost arouse very strong emotions, for instance, 
dread, fear, and anger, and are thought so grave that suffering these costs or allowing these im-
pacts to occur appears morally unacceptable. The question is not whether or not these costs have 
to be avoided, or which costs should be avoided, but how they will be avoided. For these indi-
viduals, the negotiations are about the right or wrong path of action, rather than the most cost-
effective or efficient one. The latter framing focuses on the distribution of costs and benefits and 
is used by a second group of participants, who care mainly about less severe economic and mate-
rial costs. Importantly, the cost categories triggering primarily normative reasoning are all related 
to climate change impacts, while the most important cost category involved in rationalist cost-
benefit arguments is related to climate action and policy. This distinction splits the negotiations 
into participants who think mainly about the negative effects of inaction (Groups 2-MEHV, 3-
LEHV, and 6-LELV), and participants who are focused on the negative effects of action (Groups 
4-HELV and 5-MELV). Group 1-HEHV is interesting because it occupies the middle ground 
between the two camps. This observation suggests that fundamentally different ways of norma-
tive thinking are associated with different cost categories.  
The distinction between individuals with a normative, rule-based decision-making frame-
work and those with cognitive patterns focused on material costs bears strong similarities to the 
distinction made in moral philosophy between deontological and consequentialist reasoning. 
However, the emotional pattern identified here—strong and intense emotions among normative 
thinkers (“hot” deontology) and cooler, more subdued consequentialist belief systems—is not 
congruent with prevailing moral theories, which consider deontology a logic and rationality-
based approach and consequentialism a framework that is driven by emotions like fear of pain. 
 	   165	  
However, the combination of cognitive content and emotion detectable in this data set sup-
ports recent and controversial work in social psychology and moral cognitive neuroscience, ac-
cording to which deontological patterns of moral reasoning are driven by emotions, and conse-
quentialist thinking—while not completely void of affect—is dominated by cognitive processes 
comparable to calculations (Haidt 2001; Greene 2008). Roeser offers yet another explanation for 
the observations made by Haidt, Greene and myself. She argues that rather than being unreliable 
“gut reactions,” ethical emotions and intuitions can be both useful sources and results of ethical 
reasoning and deliberation (Roeser 2010). Roeser opposes the dual-process theory that distin-
guishes between a fast, affective cognitive system based on emotional heuristics and intuition 
(System 1) and a slow deliberative System 2 that uses rational faculties (Kahneman 2011). In-
stead she defends an integrated view of emotion and cognition and argues that emotions are part 
of both the fast and the slow cognitive systems: “ … we cannot separate the cognitive from the 
affective aspect. They are two sides of the same coin. … In the same vein it is futile to ask 
whether the affective or the cognitive response comes first” (Roeser 2010, 180). 
The qualitative data used here are too general to provide any evidence for the direction of the 
causal arrows (if any) between cognitive content, emotions, and normative reasoning. But it 
points to a strong interaction between these three cognitive elements. On the other hand, con-
cepts related to ‘mere’ economic and material loss for the in-group are associated with weaker 
emotions and rationalist reasoning. These insights begin to illuminate how cost-relevant beliefs 
impact the rest of a person’s belief system, especially the overall motivation to act, the sense of 
urgency, and the applicable decision-making and negotiation frameworks. 
Placing this debate in a broader context of decision-making in social groups and conflict, re-
cent work in other disciplines confirms that a distinction between normative and rationalist 
thinking is useful. Berns et al. argue that conflict can emerge or escalate because individuals are 
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not willing to trade off “sacred values, such as those associated with religious or ethnic identity” 
in return for material benefits (Berns et al. 2012). A value-based logic prevails over a material-
consequentialist one. Transferring this argument to the climate change context suggests that 
small island states are unlikely to be satisfied with financial and technological support for adap-
tation (although not even that form of support is readily forthcoming) in a situation when the 
survival of their statehood and cultures is at stake. Ginges and Atran make a similar argument 
about deontological reasoning of participants in violent conflict, arguing that quantitative indica-
tors of success or perceptions of the efficacy of violence are unimportant in their decision-
making about the use of violence (Ginges and Atran 2011). However, these studies focus only on 
cognitive content, ignoring the question of emotions. 
Risk perception theory points to a number of additional factors that shape individual re-
sponses to climate change, including controllability (risks perceived to be under one’s control are 
more acceptable than those controlled by others) and the distinction between natural and man-
made risks, the former being more acceptable than the latter (Sjöberg 2000). One could conclude 
from the CAMs analyzed here that people from developing countries (Groups 2-MEHV, 3-
LEHV and 6-LELV) have a much stronger risk perception because they lack any control over 
risk sources (GHG emissions) and means of mitigation and even have limited control over means 
of adaptation, which strongly constrains their sense of agency in the face of climate change. Re-
garding the distinction between man-made and natural risks, there is a difference between 
Groups 1-HEHV, 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV and 6-LELV, who seem to frame climate change as a man-
made risk that has been created by the developed world and increasingly by the emerging 
economies, and Group 4-HELV and 5-MELV that seem to view climate change more as a natu-
ral risk or environmental management problem. 
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Based on these empirical observations I disagree with Grasso, who argues that “Moral cogni-
tive neuroscience … indicates that up, close and personal harm triggers deontological moral rea-
soning, whereas harm originating from impersonal moral violations, like those produced by cli-
mate impacts, prompts consequentialist moral reasoning. Accordingly, climate ethics should be 
based on consequentialist approaches” (Grasso 2012). While the interview data confirm the ar-
gument that different types of (expected) harm trigger different normative frameworks of think-
ing that resemble deontology and consequentialism, the data also suggest that not all  individuals 
involved in the climate negotiations—or even all people around the world—perceive climate 
change as an impersonal threat produced by nature rather than human beings. Although climate 
change is seen as a phenomenon of nature, a large number of study participants consider certain 
human beings—those in the developed world—responsible both for the creation and advance of 
the threat. The developed world and increasingly the emerging economies are seen as having 
caused the problem (historical responsibility for GHG emissions) and as refusing to address the 
problem despite the fact that they alone hold the power to do so because they control all major 
emission sources. Consequently the behavior of big emitters is morally reproachable and experi-
enced in a very “up, close and personal” way by negotiation participants from less powerful and 
more vulnerable countries.  
The arguments outlined above might invite the conclusion that individuals from wealthy 
countries simply lack the heightened threat perception, intense emotional response and urgency 
experienced by their colleagues from the developing world. Further one could conclude that this 
result is inevitable because it reflects the current science and reality of climate change—the de-
veloping countries will be hit harder and sooner than other parts of the world. However, those 
conclusions would be crude generalizations that ignore two important observations. First, indi-
viduals in developed countries also experience serious threat. In their case, threat perceptions are 
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linked to fundamental societal and individual values that define much of their identity, although 
they are not place-based: the neoliberal notions of individual freedom and choice, free markets 
and minimal government intervention, private property and natural resource extraction as a 
source of prosperity and happiness. Since climate action threatens to some extent all of these 
values in the way they are currently defined and practiced in the industrialized world, but in par-
ticular among conservatives in the United States, the climate issue is indirectly threatening West-
ern identity and elicits a strong defensive response.  
Second, there are study participants from developed countries, in particular Groups 4-HELV, 
5-MELV and various NGOs, whose cognitive patterns of concern, urgency and normative rea-
soning resemble closely those of representatives of vulnerable developing states. This phenome-
non will become clearer when concepts of identity and norms are added to the analysis (see be-
low). Finally, the general conclusion that different risk perceptions are insurmountable because 
they reflect the reality of the differing impact of climate change around the world would miss an 
important point: people’s cognitive patterns can change—based on perceptions of a changing 
environmental reality, personal experience (e.g., Hurricane Sandy at the US east coast in No-
vember 2012), or other reasons for increasing emotional intensity (e.g., framing effects). 
A final observation concerns the general absence or lack of importance of a set of cost con-
cepts that I expected to find, at least among a subset of study participants: environmental loss or 
degradation, species extinctions, and irreversible changes to ecosystems and landscapes. With 
very few exceptions, individuals are not concerned about environmental values and threats to 
non-human life on Earth. When these categories show up, they are almost always introduced in-
strumentally: certain species, ecosystems and environmental characteristics are needed for the 
survival and wellbeing of humans, for example, their ability to grow food. Not even representa-
tives from environmental NGOs showed a concern about the environment for its own sake, driv-
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ing home the anthropocentric nature of the UNFCCC negotiations. Climate change is not per-
ceived as an environmental issue; it is an inherently economic and social issue. 
 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 2: The Absence of Benefits 
In contrast to the breadth of concepts related to the costs of climate change, participants of-
fered only a sparse, vague and not very detailed set of concepts about the benefits of climate pol-
icy. Examples include “to prevent catastrophic climate impacts,” “to avoid dangerous climate 
change,” and “green jobs.” It is possible that climate negotiators implicitly define the avoidance 
of climate-related costs as benefits of climate action, but they almost never state this definition of 
benefits explicitly. This absence of concepts about benefits reflects the negotiation reality, where 
the focus is on the need for mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology support without ad-
dressing the expected benefits of any of these actions. If one assumes that decision-makers em-
ploy cost-benefit analyses (CBA) to chose a desirable path of action, this imbalance between 
costs and benefits in the minds of negotiation participants presents a serious problem, because it 
can skew the rational assessment towards the cost side of the equation.  
Some individuals are introducing the idea of co-benefits of climate action, which implies 
that acting on climate has positive effects on non-climate policy issues, including health, air 
quality and security. But the move supports the concern that the absence of perceived benefits of 
climate action is a serious problem for the negotiations. Co-benefits are supposed to fill that gap 
without offering direct benefits.   
 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis 3: the Absence of Numbers 
Presumably estimates of future costs and benefits have to be quantified for the purpose of a 
CBA in order to make different policy-options comparable with each other, for example to an-
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swer the question how much agricultural production loss does one avoid by investing $X in miti-
gation compared to the benefits of providing the same amount of money as climate finance for 
adaptation. But with the exception of occasionally mentioned average GDP losses associated 
with extreme weather events not a single study participant used numbers to estimate expected 
costs or benefits of different types of climate action, or different aspects of an international 
agreement. It is understandably difficult to quantify various expected costs, including lost lives, 
species extinctions and water shortages, or to find other measures that make these qualitatively 
different issues comparable. The interviews and CAMs confirm this simple insight, challenging 
rational choice theorists, who assume that cost-benefit calculations are at the core of all policy 
decisions.  
In addition, a small number of participants (mainly in Group 5-MELV) recognize that CBA 
has severe limitations when it comes to climate change. They argue that CBA has very specific 
areas of application, including national policy-making and implementation, but is not useful on 
its own to determine a country’s national interest or shape its negotiation position. Other consid-
erations, including reputational concerns, norms and values, play a role that CBA is not able to 
capture. 
Nevertheless I would argue that individuals attempt to make rational decisions in the sense 
that they compare and weigh the likely but highly generalized consequences of different paths of 
action to the best of their knowledge and ability. In Groups 4-HELV and 5-MELV this often re-
sults in a general concern about the unspecified loss of international competitiveness related to 
mitigation policies and the associated political costs. Individuals from developing countries tend 
to think in terms of increasing poverty, loss of agricultural yields and water shortage; usually 
without attaching numbers, regions or specific communities to these beliefs. Lacking any reliable 
numbers they resort to very rough qualitative comparisons, which suggests that the cost catego-
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ries outlined above might be an important factor in climate policy decision-making. However, 
even this generalized and numberless version of rationality seems to reach its limits when people 
consider threats to humanity or to the international community, or the circumstance that sea-level 
rise will deprive a number of island states of the territory on which their statehood rests. The dis-
appearance of states troubles people in a way that cannot be usefully expressed in numbers. 
 
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis 4: Who uses it? 
Every study participant made reference to the idea of national interests and to the relevance 
of cost concerns related to climate action in the developed world. While people seemed to intui-
tively understand and use the idea of cost-benefit analysis, one needs to distinguish between 
those who apply this framework to their own situation, in other words, try to assess costs and 
benefits for their own group, those who try to use the CBA framework to mobilize action (e.g., 
the co-benefit reframing attempts), and a third group of people who consider it a bad or unpro-
ductive way of looking at the world used by a certain set of countries. Members of this last group 
often suggest that national interests are major obstacles in the negotiations, or are immoral.  
 
5. Global Power Structures 
Members of all six participant groups use concepts that describe global power structures and 
their relevance for the negotiations. They make three distinct arguments. One concerns the eco-
nomic interests of individual states, one is about the interests of vested interest groups at the do-
mestic level, and one is about the relationship between two groups of countries: the developed 
world and the emerging economies.  
First, some members of Groups 1-HEHV, 3-LEHV, 4-HELV, and 5-MELV believe that 
states’ concerns about competitiveness (presumably at the international level) are a major driver 
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of the negotiation dynamics. They never elaborate on the concept, but it implies that climate ac-
tion imposes unequal costs on participants in international economic transactions, and that ex-
pected disadvantages for a country’s industries, sectors or firms in comparison to those in other 
countries would lead to a loss of competitiveness and consequently economic damage, including 
a reduction in GDP, maybe jobs and taxable income. Most participants believe that these ex-
pected costs are the main reason why developed and emerging countries are not willing to act 
decisively on climate change. This argument is associated with trade-offs between today and the 
future, carbon leakage, the current structure of major economies, the energy-efficiency of current 
industries, stranded assets, and the idea of keeping a level playing field for all global economic 
players, implicitly but strongly linking the climate issue to global economic governance. In a 
broader sense this is a system level argument concerning the current balance of economic power 
in the international trade system. 
Second, some participants, especially in Groups 3-LEHV, 4-HELV and 6-LELV, argue that 
vested interests—oil, coal and gas lobbies in particular countries—play an important role be-
cause they have large amounts of financial resources and access to the political system. Pre-
sumably they use their money and connections to prevent domestic climate action, indirectly 
hampering progress in the international negotiations. While the competitiveness argument out-
lined above suggests that climate policy might be desirable and possible if a level economic 
playing field can be maintained, vested interests are believed to oppose any kind of change. They 
seek to preserve the status quo in order to protect their own profitability and expected income 
flows in a business-as-usual future. 
Third, some participants believe that the world is currently undergoing a major power transi-
tion with economic power shifting from the developed world to the emerging economies. This 
presents a significant constraint for the climate negotiations because it exacerbates the competi-
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tiveness concerns of both of these groups. The developed countries, who already see their power 
wane, are not interested in speeding up this power loss by imposing costs and constraints on their 
own economies while other big emitters do not face similar constraints. The most negative inter-
pretation even suggests that the rich have no interest in fighting climate change because climate 
impacts will limit or roll back the progress made elsewhere in the world. The emerging econo-
mies are not interested in curbing emissions at a point in time when they are finally catching up 
with the developed world and rely on growth to maintain social stability at home. Based on this 
argument, climate politics is an instrument of power politics—managing systemic changes that 
are perceived as threats or opportunities by different state actors. 
 
6. The Two-Level Game 
Every participant group acknowledges the relevance of cross-scale linkages and the influence 
of domestic politics in the global climate change governance system. The interviews present 
strong evidence that the case of the US has brought this issue into focus. General arguments 
about domestic politics, for example, lack of public support, role of vested interests, political in-
stitutions and ideologies, are almost always connected to the US, where there is only weak public 
support for climate policy, Congress continues to oppose climate legislation or an international 
treaty, vested interests are strong and have significant influence in the political system, and a 
conservative ideology has lead to widespread climate denial and skepticism. The unique role of 
the US in the climate negotiations—its massive mitigation potential, its leadership legacy regard-
ing global public goods, and its identity ties to capitalism, unbounded material success and ex-
cessive consumerism—has focused every mind on the problem raised by Robert Putnam in 1988: 
the two-level game. “When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their 
constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous 
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imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game.” (Putnam 1988). The 
attention paid to the domestic processes in the US, and how they relate to the UNFCCC, is 
unique—there are no comparable thought patterns related to any other country. Nearly everyone 
is aware of the fact that US is not able to make serious international mitigation commitments be-
cause Congress would simply not ratify such an agreement—a lesson learned from the fate of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
One could argue that this is a case of regime failure without the hegemon—that the climate 
case demonstrates the necessity for the leading, regime-supporting role of the predominant, most 
powerful actor—the US in the view of most negotiators. Falkner showed that it is not always 
necessary for the hegemon to support a regime-building effort, coercing and incentivizing others 
into a new set of behaviors, and that regimes can even succeed against the will of the hegemon 
(Falkner 2006). But in the case of climate change the problem structure is such that an unwilling 
hegemon is a serious obstacle, because the global public good cannot be provided without it. At 
least that is the dominant perception among negotiators, reinforced by the Chinese position that 
the US has to act first. This situation influences every party’s concerns about regime effective-
ness and ultimately deters them from making their own commitments.     
While most people consider the US domestic situation a severe constraint for the negotia-
tions, even “holding the negotiations hostage,” some consider the two-level game insight helpful, 
identifying barriers to success that can be addressed, although not within the scope of the nego-
tiations. Some participants propose strategies to address this barrier, for example, mobilizing the 
public in the US, and working with civil society and the media to devise and spread appropriate 
messages at the grassroots level. Refocusing on the role of voters, these individuals believe that 
pressure from below can counter vested interests and create the political will for climate legisla-
tion. Recognizing that the enabling conditions for an international agreement cannot be created at 
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the level of political elites, these ideas create new solution space outside the negotiations with 
positive and negative implications for agency. 
Some participants seem go even one step further, suggesting that specific national institu-
tions—democracy and short election cycles—pose challenges to the climate negotiations because 
they reinforce and institutionalize short-term thinking and political incentives. This raises the 
intriguing question whether democracy is a regime-type that is unfit for global governance in the 
Anthropocene. 
 
7. Realism’s Eternal Wisdom? 
The observed cognitive patterns—a focus on the costs of action, major differences in the ex-
pected types of costs for different actors and their timing—interact with and seem to mirror the 
current material circumstances and scientific information about climate change. Each concept 
and belief is a reflection and interpretation of reality as the individual perceives it.  
Historically the developed world has been and continues to be the main contributor to climate 
change. The expected impacts of climate change will disproportionately disadvantage the devel-
oping world—poor and vulnerable countries with limited resources to adapt to change. These 
negative impacts are an unintended consequence of economic activity in the industrialized coun-
tries. Only the latter have the power to address the problem; they could control the emission 
sources and have the resources that could help the poor deal with the changes to come. Address-
ing the problem requires at a minimum the costly transformation of current economic structures, 
phasing out fossil fuels from all production and consumption processes. This would include a 
teardown of some of the most profitable industries on the planet, but would affect all sectors of 
the economy. Power—the capacity to address climate change—is unevenly distributed in the 
world; it is concentrated in the global North, and currently expanding to the emerging econo-
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mies. The powerful actors’ current perceptions of their material-economic interests—preserving 
economic power and protecting profit-making industries—do not favor climate action, because 
mitigation implies economic costs that are not outweighed by identifiable benefits. Consequently 
no action is taken to slow climate change, committing the developed world to increasingly cer-
tain damages and suffering. 
In short, the distribution of power and threat perceptions over the last two decades has re-
sulted in political behavior that confirms the expectations of neorealist theory. The powerful act 
in their self-interest to the detriment of the powerless. Interestingly all study participants—men 
and women alike—share an understanding of this realist explanation of the climate change nego-
tiation stalemate, but they differ in their beliefs regarding the inevitability of this outcome. Those 
differences will become clearer when analyzing notions of identity, norms, and models of change 
below (see sections II, III and VII). 
 
II. IDENTITY 
Not a single CAM can do without basic identity concepts that identify and distinguish exist-
ing actors and groups, and attach roles, characteristics, intentions, and other meanings to them. 
Identity groups are basic building blocks of belief systems—they determine the available agents 
one can associate with, seek to protect, assign blame or responsibility to, fight, fear or feel for. 
Identity concepts enable thinking about agency, group relationships and norms. They are also 
preconditions for rational choice thinking, because assessing costs and benefits is impossible 
without knowing who will incur them. Rational cognitive patterns depend on identity—the exis-
tence of me and you, us and them, in-groups and out-groups (Tajfel 1982; Risse et al. 1999; 
Kaarbo 2003; Abdelal et al. 2006). 
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1. Identity Diversity - More than the State or Nation 
IR theory’s natural starting point for thinking about identity is the state or the nation (Hall 
1999; Risse et al. 1999; Kaarbo 2003). But the interview transcripts demonstrate that the national 
identity is rarely the only category, and sometimes not even the most important one in the minds 
of negotiators. The following identity groups are the most common among study participants: 
developed and developing countries, emerging economies (BASIC), big emitters, negotiation 
alliances (e.g., AOSIS, LDCs), the vulnerable or poor in the developing world, humanity or hu-
man civilizations, the planet as a systems of humans and ecosystems, oil lobbies, civil society, 
and individuals. 
These groups can be clustered around three themes. First, there are groups that use the state 
as the basic unit of membership. This includes groups of countries (e.g., developed countries), 
process-specific groups of countries (e.g., negotiation alliances), or issue specific groups of 
countries (e.g., big emitters). Second, some groups use certain characteristics of its members—
individual human beings—to define the collective’s boundaries. These groups tend to be larger 
than a state and include the poor, the vulnerable, and humanity. Finally there are groups associ-
ated with domestic or local politics, including lobby groups, civil society organizations or indi-
viduals. 
Table 4-2: Identity Groups 
Identity Group Participant 
Group* 
National Identity / The State 1-HEHV, 2-MEHV, 4-HELV, 5-MELV 
Developed vs. Developing Countries 
Emerging Economies 1-HEHV, 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, 4-HELV 
Big Emitters 4-HELV, 5-MELV, 6-LELV 
Humanity / Planet Earth 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, 6-LELV 
The Vulnerable / The Poor 2-MEHV, 6-LELV 
Lobby Groups, Civil Society, Individuals All 
* Not all members of a group listed mention this identity group; only some do. 
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Truly extraordinary is the identification of planet Earth as an interconnected system of hu-
mans and all other life as a unit one can identify with and seek to protect. Short of thinking about 
other civilizations in the universe, this is the ultimate, all-encompassing in-group, extending the 
boundaries of what is worth protecting even beyond humanity, animal and plant life to the sys-
temic functions of the planet.  
Some of these categories present a troubling puzzle for international relations. The modern 
international system and those who study it only acknowledge states as actors with formal rights 
and obligations. States have sovereignty-based rights to represent a group of people (citizens), to 
enter agreements with each other and create international regimes (Keohane 1984; Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal 2003), to conduct diplomacy, to appoint officials of international organiza-
tions, and to be subject to rules that govern war (Held 1995, 78). While this system also ac-
knowledges the existence and maybe even influence of other actors, including non-governmental 
organizations, transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and private sector organizations 
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Strange 1996), it does not award these non-state actors any rights or 
obligations beyond those they are given by the states in which they originate. Given this back-
ground the frequent reference to non-state actors, especially by diplomats, deserves attention. 
These references are unproblematic when they merely describe current or desirable behavior by 
non-state actors, who are considered to play a certain role in the larger context of climate change 
governance. However, beliefs that attribute rights and obligations to humanity, ‘the wealthy,’ or 
‘the vulnerable’ are deeply problematic to the extent that they imply a fundamental mismatch 
between the actor categories accepted in the current international system and the actor categories 
necessary to deal with the climate problem—they pose an ontological challenge in the sense that 
they introduce entities with rights and obligations that do not (yet) exist in this form in interna-
tional politics. Nobody is able or entitled to represent humanity or the poor in the international 
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system—these entities are non-existent as far as the institutions of world politics are concerned. 
Appeals to these identity groups are bound to be ineffective, yet participants in the climate nego-
tiations (not only by study participants) put them forward, and assign these groups rights and ob-
ligations that appear to be rooted in cosmopolitan notions of mutual responsibility based on 
shared humanity.  
How can one understand these cognitive patterns? One could argue that powerless states in-
voke the protection of humanity and associated moral obligations for purely instrumental rea-
sons—moral persuasion is the only form of power they can wield given their lack of material 
power or mitigation potential. But in many cases it is equally plausible that the climate problem 
is simply incomprehensible without reference to humanity as a whole—the concept creates emo-
tional coherence in response to conceptual novelties regarding the global climate system and 
complex, uncertain, long-term consequences. Once a person discovers the interconnectedness of 
all human beings through the global climate system, it becomes easier or even imperative to be-
lieve that the broader collective interest of all ought to trump the narrow national ones of a few. 
People who share this belief are also more likely to question the adequacy of the current interna-
tional system to address climate change. Rather than ‘misunderstanding’ the basic rules of the 
system or being hopeless moral optimists, they have acquired beliefs that are incomprehensible 
with the reality of the UN process, and they begin to challenge it in order to reestablish cognitive 
coherence.  
Similar to the rationalist cognitive patterns, there is no discernible difference between men 
and women or diplomats and NGO representatives when it comes to cognitive patterns related to 
identity. 
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2. Underestimated: Place-Based Identity 
A very interesting identity dimension that receives increasing attention outside the field of 
IR (Adger et al. 2011; Fresque-Baxter and Armitage 2012) is place identity. It is defined as 
“those dimensions of the self that define an individual’s personal identity in relation to the physi-
cal environment by means of a complex pattern of conscious and unconscious ideas, beliefs, 
preferences, feelings, values, goals and behavioral tendencies” (Proshansky 1978, 155), and has 
numerous dimensions including emotional attachment, continuity, security and social connec-
tions (Fresque-Baxter and Armitage 2012). Naturally, place-related identity elements are of ma-
jor significance for individuals who perceive the physical integrity of their home countries to be 
at risk from climate change—mainly representatives of small island and low-lying developing 
states in Groups 3-LEHV and 6-LELV. For these individuals, parts of their identity are existen-
tially threatened—in a few decades particular places might have disappeared under the rising 
ocean, or unrecognizably altered due to land loss, erosion and coastal flooding. Climate change 
might destroy places that they call home, where they grew up, where they used to work or met 
their spouse. Climate change threatens to change the topography of the world in a way that alters 
their life experience both as individuals and nations, taking away physical realities that link their 
present lives to their past. The loss includes the possibility for their children and future genera-
tions to have a similar life experience, and importantly it involves a broad range of emotions as-
sociated with these places, landscapes and the experiences they made possible.  
But it is not only islanders who experience threats to and even loss of place-based identity. 
Study participants in Groups 1-HEHV (youth NGOs) and 4-HELV express concerns about the 
loss or change of seasons, for example, the absence of snow in some regions in North America in 
the 2011/12 winter, the change of local forest expressions, the loss of a way of life, and the sad-
ness and melancholy associated with losing “the world as it always was.” With one exception all 
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of these individuals are women, who also use or connect the concepts nature and beauty. These 
identity concepts are not attached to the country, but to lower system scales like a region (state or 
province), a city, a cultural community, or an ecosystem the person has a relation with or feels 
connected to.  
It is possible that the destabilization of physical-environmental parts of a person’s life leads 
to some form of psychological-emotional destabilization—the world feels less certain, less reli-
able and less safe. The mental costs of accepting these changes and adjusting to a changing envi-
ronment, especially in a time period when it is unclear when the changes will end and what the 
new normal will look like could be immense for individuals with a strong need for stability. In a 
subtle way these changes threaten what Anthony Giddens calls a person’s ontological security—
a sense of stability and continuity of the basic constituent elements of life (Giddens 1991, chap. 
2).  
Societies tend to develop a set of tools or sociological mechanisms to deal with—usually 
suppress—such disturbing information or signs of impending change (Norgaard 2011; Weintrobe 
2012). One would expect that negotiators do not have the same options of socially organized de-
nial, because their profession forces them to confront these destabilizing ideas regularly. Yet, 
most of the time disturbing information about climate change—in the form of scientific findings 
or individual accounts—is kept away from the negotiation process. The NGO community tries to 
introduce these elements into the conversation, but their side events or staged protests are sepa-
rated from the negotiations; they take place in a different building and negotiators rarely ever 
attend them. The only group of negotiators that continuously introduces disturbing information 
about climate impacts and its tragic human consequences, emphasizing the need to devise solu-
tions based on the latest science, is AOSIS (“the voice of conscience”). Small island state repre-
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sentatives seek to make other delegates “… “see” connections between their lives and politically 
relevant events in the world around them.” (Mills 1959; Norgaard 2011, 76) 
These cognitive patterns of study participants present examples of individuals, who perceive 
place-based identity threats to themselves or their in-group, related to places that they consider 
their own, individually and collectively as citizens of a state. This raises the question whether 
people could experience similar losses and emotions regarding places that are not their own, for 
example, the “loss of paradise” for world-traveling Europeans with the disappearance of small 
island states in the South Pacific, or the “loss of mystery” with the changing Arctic, and associ-
ated notions of adventure, courage, uniqueness, beauty and value.  
 
III. NORMS, JUSTICE AND OTHER IDEAS 
1. Who Cares about Norms? 
Who cares about norms, what are those, and whom do they burden with obligations? With 
the exception of Group 4-HELV and some representatives of faith and development NGOs, all 
participant groups integrate normative beliefs into their cognitive structure. Table 4-3 summa-
rizes the set of normative ideas regarding climate change governance contained in the interview 
data. Most of these are shared across multiple groups. 
Table 4-3: Norm Distribution 
Norm Participant 
Group* 
Everyone (i.e., every state) should contribute / care / take 
a fair share of the burden / based on their capabilities. 
1-HEHV, 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, 5-MELV, 
6-LELV 
Historical responsibility 2-MEHV 
Richer countries should do more. 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, 5MELV, 6-LELV 
Emerging economies should do more / More integrated 
mitigation 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV 
Polluter Pays Principle 1-HEHV 
Solidarity / Protection of the weakest / Pro-poor regime / 1-HEHV, 3-LEHV, 6-LELV 
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Equity favoring the poor / The Rich help the poor. 
Human responsibility to other human beings 4-HELV, 5-MELV, 6-LELV 
Global wealth equalization through resource flows from 
North to South (equity) 2-MEHV 
Multilateralism and Inclusiveness / Procedural Justice 1-HEHV, 2-MEHV 
Intergenerational responsibility 2-MEHV, 5MELV 
Changing lifestyle patterns in the rich world. 1-HEHV, 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, 6-LELV 
* Not all members of a group listed share this norm; only some do. 
  
Most of these norms do not contradict or exclude each other, at least not in their general for-
mulations used here, which are based on the language used by participants. Only two individuals 
in Group 2-MEHV support the concept of historical responsibility; individuals in Group 4-HELV 
considered it unproductive or associated it with negative emotions. Most participants do not even 
mention the concepts equity and historical responsibility, which seem to be a major source of 
contention in the climate negotiations. But many believe that fairness and responsibility are im-
portant concepts. Finding a productive bridge between these two levels of norms—equity and 
historical responsibility as a position in the negotiations, and a subjective preference for fairness 
and responsibility—might be a potentially big opportunity to advance the negotiations. 
The idea that every state should contribute to a solution to the best of their ability—even de-
veloping states—might not seem surprising, but signals a significant departure from the previ-
ously dominant interpretation of one of the core principles of the UNFCCC: common but differ-
entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR+RC). In the past this norm has been 
operationalized through the distinction between developed countries in Annex 1 of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the group of so-called non-Annex 1 countries. The former group is supposed to take 
on legally binding mitigation commitments and to provide resources for mitigation and adapta-
tion action in non-Annex 1 countries. The latter do not have legally binding mitigation obliga-
tions, but recently have been asked to take Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). 
Today almost all study participants consider this distinction between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 
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countries unproductive and even an obstacle to negotiation success. Returning to the idea that 
there are common rather than differentiated responsibilities, study participants support the idea 
that everybody should contribute to a solution. In some CAMs, especially in Group 3-LEHV, 
this norm is connected to the emerging economies, who are not part of Annex 1, but no longer fit 
the category developing countries due to their increasing economic success, future emission and 
mitigation potential, and global political power. 
However, the norms presented remain vague and provide no clear guidance for the distribu-
tion of responsibilities or burden-sharing arrangements among negotiation parties. They merely 
suggest every country should contribute in some form, that country’s contribution can differ, and 
that developed countries (“the better-off,” “the rich”) and in some people’s opinion the emerging 
economies should do more than they are doing now.  
Further, linking norm-related concepts to cost and identity concepts is not straightforward. 
But it is possible to draw some initial conclusions from the combination of the cost hierarchy 
(Table 4-1, p. 159), identity constructs (Table 4-2, p. 175) and the norms summarized in table 4-
3. Members of Groups 3-LEHV and 6-LELV, who perceive present threats to their existence and 
identity and often use a moral normative framework, express support for norms that invoke hu-
manity and solidarity as reference points. These norms obligate everybody—every state and 
every human being—to take responsibility for others, especially the vulnerable. Groups 2-
MEHV and 5-MELV show a similar pattern of normative thinking, and expand it to a responsi-
bility to future generations. Members of Group 1-HEHV, who are both highly vulnerable to cli-
mate impacts but also increasingly significant contributors to global GHG emissions, seem to 
demonstrate a form of compassionate pragmatism: everyone should contribute to a multilateral 
solution in favor of the poor, and preferably those who have caused the emissions should be re-
sponsible for mitigation (which, as they recognize, will include emerging economies in the fu-
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ture). The absence of a clearly identifiable cost-identity-norm pattern for Group 4-HELV is also 
interesting. It might indicate a fundamentally different cognitive pattern in which norms are not 
necessary to make sense of the problem, or it could be the result of a cognitive effort to suppress 
norm-related concepts; at least those used by their colleagues in the negotiations. 
 
2. Do Ideas Matter? 
The CAMs developed for this study offer an example for the relevance of a purely ideational 
construct for an ongoing political process: the argument that solving climate change requires a 
“new model of development” or “a new aspirational model for the poor.”  
Individuals across three different participant groups (1-HEHV, 2-MEHV and 4-HELV) for-
mulated different versions of the same argument: apart from the various technological, eco-
nomic, legal, and institutional changes discussed in the negotiations, addressing climate change 
will require a new development paradigm. The demand for a new model of development is often 
associated with a criticism of current consumption patterns in the world, and the pursuit of eco-
nomic growth as the ultimate political and social good. However, the argument does not focus on 
the behaviors, policies, practices or outcomes of development, but on the ideational construct or 
conceptual model that defines, gives meaning to and justifies what policy-makers today under-
stand as development. A model in the sense used by the study participants is an abstraction—a 
cognitive structure. While it is non-physical in itself, it is related in multiple ways to a broad 
range of physical objects, human behaviors, institutions and practices, including patterns of pro-
duction and consumption, economic growth, professions, industry standards, goods and services, 
global supply chains, or social relationships. The individuals who argue that we need a different 
model have identified some of these current physical-material realities of development as prob-
lems in the context of climate change. Seeking to permanently change these material realities and 
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patterns of behavior, for example, the kind and amount of consumption in the developed world 
or the pursuit of economic growth at the expense of other goals, they suggest that such change 
requires first of all a change of beliefs, “a change of mind,” presumably by everyone who is in-
volved in the practice of development. Since a broad set of undesirable economic and political 
behaviors today rest on a model of development that prescribes and validates these existing pat-
terns, and allows for their institutionalization, there is no use in tackling these behaviors without 
first tackling the ideational foundation that gives rise to them.  
The importance of ideas in changing material realities is a feature of Cox’s neo-Gramscian 
theory of hegemony and acquiescence in the international system, which is enabled by an align-
ment of ideational, institutional and material power (Cox 1996). In the present international sys-
tem neoliberalism provides the foundation for the institutional architecture, and justifies the dis-
tribution and accumulation of material capabilities and power in certain parts of the system. De-
manding a new development paradigm tackles the ideational foundations of the current interna-
tional system with significant implications for its institutional and material components. Bern-
stein makes a similar argument about the ideational power of neoliberalism in the context of 
global environmental governance, and suggests that this particular set of ideas and norms has 
been so successful because of its socio-evolutionary fitness in the existing social structure and 
with the actors at the time of its rise (Bernstein 2001, chap. 5). 
Regardless of the validity of this argument, designing a new development model and creating 
the conditions for its broad acceptance and application is not a task that can be accomplished by 
climate change negotiators. If these individuals have correctly identified a problem and corre-
sponding solution space outside the negotiations, this would have important implications for the 
UNFCCC process. It might imply that the negotiations are not able to succeed because not all 
pieces of the puzzle are in the possession of the negotiation parties. Those who make the new-
 	   187	  
paradigm argument do not draw this conclusion for the negotiations, nor do they elaborate on its 
implications for climate or development governance. 
 
IV.  THE USE OF SCIENCE 
Policy-making in modern societies is based on the general assumption that scientific knowl-
edge is a necessary condition for enlightened decision-making: “we presume that knowledge will 
lead to rational action” (Norgaard 2009, 12). Making a distinction between science as the pursuit 
of truth and politics as a struggle between values, many scholars, policy-makers and voters alike 
assume that there is a rational or logical link between a scientific finding, such as anthropogenic 
climate change, and the “right” policy response. Hulme calls this model of a science-policy inter-
face “technocracy” (Hulme 2009, 102–103). 
Given the nature of climate change as an environmental phenomenon rooted in physical, 
chemical and biological processes, scientific knowledge should play a major role in the way ne-
gotiation participants think about the governance challenge. Science-based concepts should de-
termine or at least influence the general problem definition, possible solution options, the overall 
goal of climate governance, and maybe even the social and technological challenges to be ex-
pected in pursuit of this goal. The IPCC acts as the key source for scientific information in the 
UNFCCC process. Its task is to aggregate and summarize all relevant scientific information for 
regime-building purposes without making policy prescriptions. The latter task is for the politi-
cally legitimized representatives of states as parties in the negotiation process. In reality this neat 
separation is nearly impossible as the section on the governance goal (see below) will demon-
strate. 
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The interview data do not confirm these expectations about the relevance and use of climate 
science. Science does not play a significant role at all in the belief systems of most study partici-
pants. Rather than being integrated in the various thought patterns concerning the nature of the 
problem, solution options and governance goal, climate science is almost cognitively sepa-
rated—there is a set of concepts that can be activated if one is asked about them, but this belief 
cluster does not necessarily interact with the thought processes that dominate the negotiation 
process. Neither scientific concepts in general nor complexity concepts in particular are used to 
define negotiation positions, solution options or the final goal of climate governance. 
The four sections below will address several science-related cognitive patterns that emerge 
from the CAMs: (i) a general disconnect between the science and the politics, (ii) issues related 
to defining a goal of climate governance, (iii) the inadequate ability of negotiation participants to 
grapple with the complex nature of climate change as a natural phenomenon, (iv) and issues re-
lated to time. These sections address mainly my second hypothesis regarding cognitive obstacles 
to multilateral cooperation. They confirm that some but not all complexity-related characteristics 
of climate change pose particular cognitive challenges for participants in the negotiation process.   
 
1. The Science-Policy Disconnect  
All participants share a similar set of ideas about climate science, which concerns the nature 
of the problem. This belief cluster usually includes the belief that climate change is real, anthro-
pogenic, caused mainly by GHG emissions and land-use change, and has a range of bad conse-
quences. This set of core concepts has become a background truth for all political thinking with-
out making reference to numbers, uncertainties, timelines or other specifics. It is taken for 
granted, does not seem to require articulation anymore, and appears to be a sufficient basis for 
debating action. This simplified version of climate change—GHG emissions have bad conse-
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quences—is a cognitive framework that provides direction, which most individuals are satisfied 
with despite not knowing how to define success for the climate regime, how to measure it, what 
would constitute useful milestones, and what relevant time constraints might exist.  
Despite the existence and constant expansion of scientific knowledge, there is only a weak 
connection between this information and the concepts that reflect the substance of the political 
debate—what to do, who should do it, when and why. There is one strong link between GHG 
emissions as a science-related concept and mitigation as a solution-related concept. Beyond that 
science-related concepts only show strong connections with impact-related concepts, for exam-
ple, sea level rise and the disappearance of island states, but no other areas of the CAMs. This 
separation between science and politics becomes even clearer when looking at the reduced ver-
sions of the CAMs (Appendix Ch4-1). In almost all core CAMs science-related concepts have 
been removed, but the maps continue to make perfect sense as long as there are climate impact-
related concepts to motivate action.  
The disconnect between the political aspects of the negotiations and the available scientific 
knowledge speaks to a problem that the global governance literature calls regime effectiveness. 
There are multiple ways to think about regime effectiveness. Oran Young identifies six of these 
(O. R. Young 1994), but here I am solely concerned with the question of problem solving: will 
the climate regime have an effect on the climate system, and slow or prevent dangerous climate 
change in line with Art. 2 UNFCCC. In contrast to the existing literature (Underdal 1992; 
Mitchell 2006; O. R. Young 2011) my observations concern the stage of regime development 
rather than a post-hoc assessment of international regime effects. While the regime is in the mak-
ing, do its creators consider scientific information that is relevant for the effectiveness of future 
climate governance instruments? In essence this is about a potential mismatch between the scien-
tific problem concepts and the political solution-concepts in the cognitive patterns of climate ne-
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gotiators. The structural disconnect between climate science and the rest of the belief systems of 
study participants impressively shows that the climate negotiations today are all about getting a 
deal—a political solution—rather than addressing climate change in the way we have come to 
understand the problem scientifically.  
 
2. The Goal of Climate Governance 
A discussion of regime effectiveness raises the question which goal the climate negotiations 
ought to pursue. What are the parties trying to accomplish through the climate negotiations? 
What is the purpose of a climate regime? While this seems to be a simple question, and a neces-
sary starting point for thinking about a governance regime, the interview data show that most 
study participants do not have a clear answer to it. Instead there seem to be three counterproduc-
tive, interlinked cognitive patterns regarding the goal of climate governance: the absence of clear 
definition and shared understanding of a goal, the political focus on the 2°C target, and recent 
pessimism regarding the attainability of the temperature target.  
Art. 2 of the UNFCCC states that the purpose of the Convention is to achieve “stabilization 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with the climate system.” In an attempt to define the term “dangerous 
climate change,” the parties agreed in the Copenhagen Accord in 2009/2010 that global average 
warming should be limited to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. In Durban in 2011 the parties ac-
knowledged that it might be desirable to pursue a temperature target of 1.5°C, but they did not 
make a commitment to do so. 
When asked about the goal of climate governance, only two individuals mentioned the Con-
vention objective of avoiding dangerous climate change. Many more referred to the 2°C degree 
target as the final goal of the negotiations; other responses included ideas like “the decarboniza-
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tion of the economy” or simply “global GHG emission reductions.” Participants seemed puzzled 
when I inquired why decarbonization or a 2°C were desirable goals and in most cases did not 
offer a rationale for these rather technical goal formulations. The 2°C target seems to have be-
come a goal in itself. The majority of study participants do not think about the goal of climate 
governance in terms of creating public or social goods, such as the prevention of harm and suf-
fering, the avoidance of economic damage, or the stability and wellbeing of societies. Instead the 
technical steps towards those higher-level goals have replaced the goals themselves. Hulme con-
firms this observation and believes that the global temperature target is “socially regressive” by 
“confusing ends with means” (Hulme in Knopf et al. 2012, 124). 
Only six individuals defined goals with strong connections to human wellbeing, but differed 
significantly in their framing and specificity: “to minimize damage and suffering,” to maintain “a 
biophysical system supportive of nine billion people in 2050,” “to prevent catastrophic impacts,” 
“to ensure that we can all survive,” and “the number that prevents war.” These goals were gener-
ally not linked directly to the 2°C target. The cognitive pattern of the majority—a focus on the 
means to an end rather than the end itself—is not trivial and speaks to the major challenges gov-
ernments face in communicating climate change policy. A global average temperature target 
does not mean the same to politicians and voters like saving lives and avoiding damage, and 
therefore does not have the same motivational power. The universal nature of the goal makes it 
hard to engage human imagination (Hulme in Knopf et al. 2012, 123). Further, the focus on what 
Hulme calls an “output variable” rather than the various anthropogenic input variables that create 
global warming adds a significant amount of ambiguity—it is uncertain how the goal can be 
reached. Maybe even more importantly, the goal is unachievable because it requires a higher 
level of understanding and control of the climate system than humankind currently has and is 
likely to achieve in the foreseeable future (Hulme in Knopf et al. 2012, 123)   
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Many study participants argue that scientists determined this temperature target as the num-
ber that would prevent dangerous climate change, and that political actors simply accepted it. In 
line with this view, the Copenhagen Accord refers to “the scientific view that the increase in 
global temperature should be below 2°C.” Scientists on the other hand emphasize that the selec-
tion of a certain target is a value judgment that has to be made by politicians (IPCC 2001). The 
literature traces the target back to EU’s political efforts since 1996 to energize and guide the ne-
gotiation process (Tol 2007; Randalls 2010). Finally, one can argue that 2°C was a number that 
appeared scientifically still feasible (in 2009), was likely to avoid massive species extinctions, 
and based on the Stern Report was not too costly economically—it offered a pragmatic compro-
mise. Regardless which argument is most accurate, they all suggest that the goal was not selected 
because the negotiation parties had come to a shared understanding of what constitutes danger-
ous climate change. Taking this argument one step further, Barrett and Dannenberg argue that 
parties knowingly set a target that is too weak to prevent catastrophe, pledge less than what is 
needed to reach their target, and most likely will do less than is necessary to fulfill their pledges 
(Barrett and Dannenberg 2012).  
Even more serious than the disconnect between climate science on the one hand and the cur-
rent goal definition on the other is the fact that in 2012 most study participants no longer be-
lieved that the 2°C goal will be achieved. Many argued that based on the science it is still techni-
cally possible and desirable to keep warming below 2°C, but that it is politically impossible to 
get there. If these individuals had previously accepted the 2°C mark as a boundary between safe 
and dangerous levels of warming, they must conclude that we are heading towards a world with 
dangerous levels of climate change. However, these individuals do not despair and do not expect 
catastrophe despite believing that the target will not be met. They even remain confident and 
hopeful that the climate problem will be solved. The parallel existence of hope and a belief in 
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failure (to prevent dangerous climate change) is curious. It suggests that these individuals do not 
associate the idea of missing the target with impending catastrophe—things will get worse, but 
they are not (yet) hopeless. This thought pattern is confirmed by concepts like “Some action is 
better than no action,” “Small wins are possible,” or “4 degrees is better than 6 degrees.” These 
belief systems do not merely distinguish between a benign ‘less-than-2°C future’ and a cata-
strophic ‘more-than-2°C future,’ but contain a spectrum of outcomes, where 2°C warming is bet-
ter than 3°C, but 5°C is also better than 8°C. In other words these individuals do not perceive of 
the temperature target as a tipping point between two qualitatively different worlds—a safe one 
and a dangerous one. Instead negotiators believe that collectively humanity might be moving to-
wards a dangerous world when surpassing the 2°C target temperature, but not a catastrophic one. 
Most of them have never considered the idea of catastrophe but they have all considered the pos-
sibility of warming beyond 2°C. In fact, it is still entirely unclear what catastrophe means as 
compared to danger, when or where catastrophe would start and how it can be averted. Given 
these uncertainties, individuals appear to look for reasons to be hopeful, despite a negative as-
sessment of the political situation and mounting scientific evidence for the severity of the prob-
lem.   
 
3. Dealing with Complexity 
Underdal to some extent captures the challenges of addressing climate change when he ar-
gues that some environmental problems are hard to solve because they are “long-term policy 
problems with time lags between policy measures . . . and effects,” they “are embedded in very 
complex systems” surrounded by uncertainties, and  “involve global collective goods” not sub-
ject to single best effort solutions (Underdal 2010). How do study participants deal with the 
characteristics of climate change that make it a complex problem, including pervasiveness, non-
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linear behavior, time lags, cross-scale interactions, cascading failures, and sometimes irreducible 
scientific uncertainties? 
Study participants in all groups use the term complexity when describing climate change, but 
not necessarily in the sense that complex systems theory defines complexity. Many have a partial 
understanding of complex systems characteristics, for example, they recognize that there are 
multiple interacting causes and effects across social scales, and that climate change is a uniquely 
pervasive problem that affects all kinds of social and economic behavior. Individuals in Groups 
2-MEHV and 3-LEHV, and to a lesser extent 1-HEHV and 6-LELV, are particularly aware of 
social-ecological system links. They see rain-fed agriculture in developing countries, fishing, and 
nature-based tourism not only as key income and GDP sources, but as the foundations for liveli-
hoods and ultimately happiness. In these groups the link between nature and economic wellbeing 
is much more visible and conscious than among representatives of developed countries. Most 
members of Groups 1-HEHV and 2-MEHV have a planetary systems view that links either all of 
humanity, or humanity and “all life on Earth.”  
Most study participants acknowledge the existence of uncertainties, but none views this fact 
as an obstacle for the negotiations or as a reason to delay climate action. Most people see uncer-
tainty as a science-related concept that concerns climate change impacts. Some worry that impact 
uncertainty is a problem for mobilizing publics for climate action. One person outlines how im-
pact uncertainty makes it difficult to create legitimate adaptation budgets and funding requests. 
Only one participant made a strong case for the precautionary principle based on scientific uncer-
tainty, arguing that our lack of understanding regarding biodiversity and the importance of cer-
tain species we might be losing is really disconcerting—we do not even know what we are losing 
and how important it is for humanity’s wellbeing.   
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Imperceptibility of climate change is not an issue for most negotiators, because many believe 
they have observed climate impacts at home. Only three individuals state explicitly that they 
have not observed any climatic changes. But some participants, especially in Groups 3-LEHV 
and 4-HELV, recognize that imperceptibility is a problem when it comes to garnering public 
support for climate action in the developed world. They argue that personally feeling or merely 
seeing the effects and destruction climate change can bring, for example, in the form of intensi-
fying and more frequent extreme weather events, can change people’s minds about the problem. 
This observation points to the cognitive challenge of dealing with abstract scientific information 
as the sole motivator for political action in large parts of the developed world, where climate im-
pacts are not yet felt or where changing weather patterns are not yet explicitly connected to cli-
mate change. In many countries climate change is still an idea or a concept, but not a reality. 
Given the fast-growing scientific interest in thresholds or climatic tipping points over the last 
four years (Lenton et al. 2008; Scheffer 2009; Scheffer et al. 2009; Lenton 2011b; Dakos et al. 
2012), it is surprising that most study participants do not yet have a good understanding of the 
concept and its potential implications for the negotiations. Many do not mention the concept at 
all or only when specifically asked about it. When people refer to tipping points at all, they usu-
ally do it in the context of science, but rarely in the context of climate impacts and never in the 
context of the governance goal or policy design. Individuals who have more detailed thoughts 
about tipping points are primarily concerned about the irreversibility of change associated with 
them. A small group of people (members of Group 6-LELV and environmental NGOs) believe 
that tipping points might be useful to mobilize public support—they are both dreaded and 
needed. Development and industry NGO representatives have the most sophisticated understand-
ing of tipping points, but even in their minds the phenomenon is linked to ecosystem change 
only, lacking clear connections to social systems. These observations contradict Nuttall, at least 
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as far the climate negotiations are concerned, who suggests “The tipping point thus becomes 
tremendously powerful in discursive, rhetorical, and metaphorical senses.” (Nuttall 2012, 97). 
Agreeing with Young, who argues that one of the cutting edge issues of global environmental 
governance is an understanding of tipping points and non-linearities (O. R. Young 2011, 19858), 
I find evidence that the current science-policy interface design of the global climate regime does 
an inadequate job of creating this understanding among climate negotiators.   
Finally, members of Group 1-HEHV and a small subset of NGO representatives (develop-
ment and environment & market) have a sophisticated understanding of complex systems dy-
namics, including tipping points, hysteresis and the need for adaptive governance, adjusting 
goals and policy measures over time. In contrast to most other participants time and urgency play 
a major part in the belief system of these individuals.  
 
4. Time 
In this section I make two arguments about time as a complexity-related topic. First, concepts 
related to time are patchy, inconsistent and often absent in the minds of climate change negotia-
tors, which is a serious concern given the importance of timelines for addressing the problem. 
Second, the group of study participants demonstrated a general lack of imagination regarding the 
long-term future, which limits the motivational power of scientific knowledge about expected 
climate impacts. The former argument builds on the interview data presented in the CAMs; the 
latter relies on parts of the interview transcripts that have not been included in the visual repre-
sentation of beliefs.  
The nature of climate change draws attention to a set of specific temporal features of climate 
change itself as well as the political process that seeks to address the problem. Thinking about 
climate change requires the ability to imagine the future and to understand how the future is 
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linked to the present. Important concepts include time scales, for instance, political decision-
making over years to decades vs. climate change over centuries to millennia, timelines or timeta-
bles for action (i.e., what should be done by when in order to achieve what), time lags and sys-
temic inertia (i.e., how long is the period between a policy measure and a measurable systemic 
change), peaking (i.e., at what point should emissions reach their maximum levels), and the con-
cept of discounting (Schelling 2000; Weitzman 2009; Gollier and Weitzman 2010; Jacobs and 
Matthews 2012). Related to these concepts of time is a major concern about political short-term 
thinking in the face of a long-term environmental challenge (Underdal 2010).  
In comparison to the concepts one expects negotiators to grapple with, the interview tran-
scripts demonstrate a dearth of detail and consistency with regard to time; no clear cross-group 
pattern can be identified. Many study participants, mainly in Groups 3-LEHV and 4-HELV, 
make no reference to time at all. Members of Group 1-HEHV have a small set of concepts about 
the future as far out as 2030 or 2050 and converge on a desire to reach a global emissions peak in 
three to seven years from today. Industry representatives associated with Group 4-HELV share 
an unusually long time horizon, including concepts like “100-200 more years of fossil fuel con-
sumption, “commodity price increases in 20-50 years,” and “planning as far out into the future as 
one can think.” All seven members of Group 5-MELV experience a sense of urgency and em-
phasize the importance of long-term thinking in developing solutions. Their perceptions of ur-
gency, expressed in time-related concepts like "acute," "lack of urgency," "2030 is practically 
tomorrow," and "race against time," is particularly surprising given that most of these individuals 
live in highly developed countries, far from the vulnerable places of the world that already expe-
rience impacts. Equally interesting is their ability to think about the long-term, for example, "im-
pacts on generations to come," "the future beyond grandchildren,” "build for the future - 50-100 
years." But even these individuals who have a real sense of urgency are not able to present a 
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clear action timeline to address climate change; they do not know what constitutes “too late” or 
“in time” for global climate governance. Their thinking comes down to the idea that sooner is 
better and later is better than never. 
After the Durban negotiations, the year 2020 has become a focal point for many study par-
ticipants, but not because of any scientific reasons but because the Durban Platform for En-
hanced Action stipulates that a new agreement should be in effect by then. The opinions on this 
timeline are mixed: some consider it progress; others believe 2020 is too late because global 
emissions should peak earlier (2017).  
These observations demonstrate further that most people do not connect timelines with gov-
ernance outcomes or the amount of damage climate change will cause to national economies or 
communities (exceptions are two members of Group 1-HEHV). Neither do they update their ne-
gotiation position with the passing of time, for example, reassessing the expected national adap-
tation costs based on new scientific data and their latest estimates of collective mitigation suc-
cess, and consequently updating their willingness to pay for multilateral cooperation. 
Beyond these general cognitive difficulties dealing with the temporal aspects of climate 
change and its governance, study participants find it particularly challenging to imagine the dis-
tant future. One interview question targeted this issue, asking study participants how they imag-
ined a worst-case scenario of a world where governance efforts had failed and continued GHG 
emissions had lead to the worst climate impacts they could imagine in the year 2080. The reac-
tion to this question showed a surprisingly consistent pattern across all participant groups. With 
very few exceptions there was a three-stage response. First, people stated that they had not 
thought about this scenario and found it challenging to come up with a response on the spot. 
Second, many participants rejected the idea of a worst-case scenario because “by then we will 
certainly have solved the problem.” When pushed to accept the hypothetical worst-case world, 
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many made a final attempt to evade the cognitive challenge, arguing that between now and 2080 
new technological solutions will emerge, which we cannot even think of today.  
Those who tried to imagine a worst-case 2080 scenario fell into two groups. Those who did 
so for the first time during the interview tended to develop ideas that were mostly linear exten-
sions of current or expected climate impacts: more floods, more droughts, more hunger and pov-
erty, more extreme weather events, and occasionally more resource conflicts. The small group of 
individuals who were not surprised by this question and presumably had considered this issue 
before, presented an image of an incredibly negative, dark and scary future world with fewer 
states, more violent conflict, resource scarcity and a lot less happiness than today. Both groups 
often referred to movies (“The Day After Tomorrow”) to help them and me visualize what they 
imagined. 
These cognitive patterns suggest that most participants in climate negotiations have either no 
reason, interest or ability to imagine the distant future, and that their dominant cognitive pattern 
is the denial of the possibility of governance failure. From an observer’s perspective this is sur-
prising given the continuous failure of the UNFCCC negotiations to produce tangible results 
over a period of two decades, and the fact that many study participants have been part of this 
process—which many describe as frustrating and slow—for several years. Given the strong 
negative emotions associated with the dystopias described by some study participants, one could 
argue that the avoidance of images of the distant future is a cognitive a self-protection mecha-
nism, and might be productive in the sense that it allows people to work on this issue without 
becoming depressed. On the other hand, the lack of imagination and the rejection of the possibil-
ity of failure means that people are never fully cognizant of what is at stake in the negotiations 
and what they are collectively putting at risk. The ease with which thoughts about potential fu-
ture damages are suppressed might significantly limit the motivation of negotiators to come to a 
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cooperative agreement today. How can you determine your own willingness to pay if you don’t 
know what your payment will gain or what costs non-payment could imply?  
Research in psychology and sociology describes these cognitive patterns as distancing—an 
active mental process that represents climate change as something that is distant from the indi-
vidual or the in-group (Norgaard 2006a). Others discuss them as a cognitive dismissal of very 
hard problems (Wagner 2012). The phenomenon described here has not yet been captured in the 
literature, which tends to focus on risk perceptions regarding present problems (Spence et al. 
2011), and has identified four interacting dimensions of distancing: social (i.e., the problem is 
perceived to concern other groups), geographical (i.e., it is a problem in far-away places), tempo-
ral (i.e., it will happen in the future), and distancing based on uncertainty (i.e., it is unclear 
whether harm will really occur) (Liberman and Trope 2008; Spence, Poortinga, and Pidgeon 
2012). Since individuals tend to distance themselves from climate change in the present, it is not 
surprising that distancing effects are even stronger regarding climate change in the long-term fu-
ture. Events that are not expected to occur in a person’s lifetime are naturally less important than 
those that might have personal relevance. However, in the context of the climate negotiations, 
this cognitive pattern is highly counterproductive. Given the major implications of action or inac-
tion of this generation for the effects of climate change on generations to come, negotiation par-
ticipants bear responsibility for the distant future. They may decide not to value it as highly as 
the present and near-term future in the their decisions, but the failure to even consider distant 
costs as costs is an impediment to good decision-making. 
Both cognitive patterns—the absence of clear timelines concerning climate change action 
and the lack of imagination regarding the long-term future—limit  the possible spectrum of feel-
ings of urgency among negotiation participants. Both strongly interact with each other in the 
sense that the absence of clear timelines and causal connections between action today and the 
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state of the world in 2080 render thoughts about the distant future unnecessary or at least un-
likely. 
 
V.  UNDERSTANDING AGENCY IN CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS 
Drawing on the themes outlined above this section explores issues related to agency. What 
can be learned from the cognitive patterns of study participants about the way agency is per-
ceived, exercised and constrained in the climate negotiations? Who is believed to have agency in 
climate governance? After a short theoretical introduction to the concept of agency in IR and 
psychology, I apply the concept of agency to the findings presented above. I argue that IR theo-
ries of agency would benefit from two conceptual expansions. First, insights from psychology 
and the interview data suggest that the inclusion of time—concepts and emotions associated with 
the past and the future—play an important role for agents’ decisions and behavior in the present. 
Second, hope could be a relevant dimension of agency that has not yet been fully explored either 
in IR or psychology.  
 
1. Defining Agency 
Agency is the freedom and ability to act based on intention or purpose. One could expand 
that definition to include certain effects or consequences of action, for example, an observable 
change in the actor’s environment, but agency lies in the potential to influence one’s environ-
ment, not merely in the act of doing so. 
IR theorists often present an simplified division of the discipline into a rationalist camp of 
scholars that emphasize the causal power of the material system structure, reducing agency to an 
actor’s rational response to structural constraints and opportunities, and a constructivist camp 
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that insists on the causal power of different identities, norms and ideas. What the structure-
agency discussion comes down to is a disagreement over the source of causal power and ulti-
mately social change in the international system: are actors structurally coerced by the given ma-
terial reality that determines their interests, or can they chose to act based on motivations that are 
independent of system structures? Wendt’s efforts to bridge this structure-agency gap with the 
help of the sociological theory of structuration (the mutual constitution of structure and agency 
(Giddens 1992) has lead him to famously argue that “Anarchy is what states make of it,” in other 
words agents have the ability to chose how they interact with the structure (and with other 
agents) and consequently change it (Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999). However, as Checkel convinc-
ingly argued, many constructivists—and I would argue that group includes Wendt—rely on the 
causal power of social structures to reconstitute actors’ interests, but ignore the theoretically im-
portant question of agency (Checkel 1998, 340–342).  
Psychologists have developed an individual-centered understanding of agency as a belief in 
individual or collective self-efficacy, the ability to anticipate and predict future events and to di-
rect one’s own behavior in a manner that influences the future in line with one’s motivations and 
goals (Bandura 1989). The emphasis on self-generated action rather than reaction, in other words 
the causal contribution to one’s own motivations and actions, is key to this perspective—agency 
begins in the mind. But agency is ultimately the result of multiple interacting factors, including 
cognition and affect, other personal factors and environmental events. Bandura presents a social 
cognitive theory of agency according to which “Agency embodies the endowments, belief sys-
tems, self-regulatory capabilities and distributed structures and functions through which personal 
influence is exercised.” He emphasizes the temporal dimensions of agency and its extension into 
the future through forethought, intentionality, self-reflectiveness about one’s capabilities, and the 
meaning and purpose of one’s life pursuits. Adopting a form of structuration theory, Bandura 
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argues that “people are producers as well as products of social systems” (Bandura 2001, 1). Im-
portantly, he points to the difference between individual and collective agency, but never elabo-
rates on the link between these two in detail.  
These two disciplinary perspectives on agency provide the analytical foundation for address-
ing the role of agency in the global climate negotiations. The IR lens emphasizes the interaction 
between an agent—often assumed to be a unitary state—and the structure in which the agent is 
located (i.e., the international system), more often than not argues that the structure determines or 
at least constrains agency in important ways. Scholars tend to assume that agents have the ability 
to interact with and change the given structure, but they do not often explore this ability empiri-
cally. The psychological lens focuses on the individual, usually a person rather than a collective 
entity, and the origins of agency in the cognitive-affective system that interacts with its structural 
environment, and ultimately seeks to influence that environment through forethought, goal set-
ting and intentional, purpose-driven behavior. 
Contrasting these two disciplinary perspectives reveals an important conceptual lacuna—how 
to bridge the gap between individual and collective agency, for example, between the statement 
of a single diplomat and the behavior of a state? Not only do IR scholars frequently attribute 
agency to groups, but so do people in their everyday language and especially diplomats in UN 
negotiations. Apart from a legal theory of representation, for example, a president who is author-
ized to represent and act on behalf of a state, collective agency has hardly been addressed in the 
literature. Even legal representation uses the fiction of the state as an entity separate from those 
who act on behalf of the state, which supposedly has a will and consequently agency. While in-
dividual agency is based on the person’s individual thought processes, collective agency does not 
have such a basis. A groups does not have a group brain. So how can one attribute agency to col-
lective entities like Germany, Exxon Mobile, Occupy Wall Street, or Greenpeace?  
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As outlined in chapter 2, the bridge between the individual and the group exists in the minds 
of individuals, both group members and outsiders, who have mental representations of the group, 
its characteristics, membership criteria, purposes and so on. These mental representations are 
shared among many individuals through communication and interaction with the social and natu-
ral world, which means that different group members and non-members have the same cognitive 
patterns concerning the group. Using these mental representations, individuals enact the group 
through their decisions and behaviors whenever these decisions relate to the group. Since the ac-
tions of groups result from the actions of individuals who think about the group, groups attain 
agency through individual cognition. At the same time individual cognition is never isolated 
from its social and physical environment. 
The notion of collective agency based on individual cognitive processes strengthens a num-
ber of insights presented earlier in this chapter, for example, the ability of individual diplomats to 
think about climate impacts in their home country or even elsewhere in the world, and to experi-
ence emotions not in response to any specific personal loss, but in response to the collective loss, 
including deaths due to extreme weather events, economic damage, or place-based identity 
threats. The cognitive explanation of collective agency will also be a useful guide for the follow-
ing sections on agency in the climate negotiations. 
 
2. Agency and National Interests 
Intentionality, purpose and motivation are key concepts of agency. IR theory conceptualizes 
motivations that presumably guide states’ actions as national interests. Rationalist theories as-
sume that national interests are determined by the material system structure that presents con-
straints and opportunities for action—states scan their environment and make action decisions 
based on a desire to maximize their own net gain, pursuing the path with the largest positive dif-
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ference between the costs and benefits of action. Constructivists argue that the externally given 
system structure does not predetermine national interests. Agents have to interpret and attribute 
meaning to the system structure, which they do from the vantage point of a certain identity, asso-
ciated norms and beliefs. Consequently normative and reputational concerns can shape national 
interests as much as the desire to maximize material gain and power. 
Integrating the arguments presented in sections II.1, II.2., and II.3 reveals that both rationalist 
arguments about costs and benefits and constructivist arguments about identity and norms pow-
erfully shape the definition of an actor’s interest: Interest = Cost & Benefits x Identity x Norms. 
It is impossible to define one’s interest without first identifying the group one belongs to and 
seeks to protect. The group affiliation determines the type and temporal proximity of a threat an 
actor perceives (potential costs and benefits of action and inaction). The threat perception in turn 
determines the ethical framework activated in one’s mind (normative or rationalist), which trig-
gers associated norms and norm interpretations. When combining these conceptual categories 
across theoretical boundaries it becomes clear why Group 3-LEHV presses for immediate action, 
Group 4-HELV is reluctant to commit, and Group 1-HEHV finds itself in a pragmatic middle 
between these different definitions of national interests. Depending on the constellation of iden-
tity group and cost concerns, different levels of cognitive disturbance lead to very different moral 
sentiments, ranging from cold, seemingly unemotional utilitarian thinking to emotionally 
charged normative thinking. 
Further, the data suggest that it is not always national interests that matter in international 
politics. Some individuals combine, switch between, or solely rely on alternative group identities 
and their respective interests, including humanity sharing one planetary resource, or vulnerable 
people deserving protection from climate impacts by other humans, who have the resources to 
help.  
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3. Agency and Time 
This cognitive approach also reveals that IR ignores an important dimension of agency, 
which psychologists have already begun to grapple with: the role of time. I argue that theories of 
agency will have to be expanded to account for the relevance of the past (memories) and the fu-
ture (anticipation) for decisions and behavior of political agents in the present. Emotions play an 
important role when theorizing about time and agency, because mental representations about the 
past and the future can be associated with different types of emotions, and their varying levels of 
intensity, which can impact their salience for decisions taken in the present.  
The data gathered for this study crystallize the importance of two types of time-related cogni-
tive elements for belief systems about climate change. One of these are memories, in particular 
memories of places that are changing due to climate change, and the emotions associated with 
those places. The other is anticipation of future climate change, in particular a lack of imagina-
tion regarding the distant future. Both of these cognitive elements can but do not have to enter a 
person’s thoughts or decision-making process, and they do so in different ways.  
Memories tend to be about things, people and places that one has seen, experienced and felt. 
They are associated with images, smells, textures, and other sensory experiences that enable the 
individual to make them vivid in their minds. In the case of climate change, memories are often 
about things and places that the world or the person might be losing—positive elements of one’s 
past that climate change threatens to remove from the current physical reality. While the memory 
of those places is certain and cannot be taken away by climate change, the potential loss of the 
real places linked to the memories affects the way one thinks about the past—it might become 
more precious. It also links to the future, because the loss of familiar places means that one can-
not pass this place and its experience on to one’s children. People lose intergenerational stability, 
which is another form of ontological insecurity.   
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In contrast to the certainty and colorful, emotional vividness that our minds can activate with 
memories of the past, thoughts about the future do not benefit from the cognitive intensity that 
accompanies experience. Instead anticipation of the future depends to a large degree on our abil-
ity to imagine and visualize things that have not yet come to pass.  
Social cognitive theory integrates the concept of time in the form of forethought and goal-
setting, which are symbolic cognitive activities. Bandura emphasizes that these symbolizing ca-
pabilities enable the human species to transcend the present and shape our life circumstances and 
even “override environmental influences” (Bandura 2006, 164). The future cannot be causal for 
behavior in the present because it has not happened yet, but its cognitive representation in the 
present can turn concepts about the future into presently motivating factors (Bandura 1989, 
1179). The capacity to extrapolate future consequences from known facts enables us to take cor-
rective action to avoid future harm, which presumably increases prospects for human survival 
(Bandura 1989, 1181).  
Not only concepts but also emotions connected with the mental representation of the future 
matter. Loewenstein and Elster state that people savor anticipated good events ahead of their oc-
currence, and dread bad ones (G. Loewenstein 1992). Dreading bad climate impacts—to the ex-
tent that they can be anticipated and emotionally experienced—should therefore motivate indi-
viduals today to make choices that prevent future harm.  
The data gathered for this study suggests that the easiest way for the mind to deal with the 
challenge of anticipation is to use the experience of the past and extend it into the future, even if 
there is knowledge that the future will be different than the past. The relative weakness of imagi-
native abilities regarding the future and the associated weakness or even absence of emotions 
might prevent humans from using their cognitive survival power sufficiently. This weakness af-
fects a person’s ability to value the future or to estimate costs expected to occur in the future 
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(Berns and Atran 2012). The unprecedented nature of climate change and the perceived temporal 
distance of severe impacts might simply outstrip current cognitive capabilities. Bandura recog-
nizes this when he states  “However, the power of anticipative control must be enhanced by de-
veloping better methods for forecasting distal consequences and stronger social mechanisms for 
bringing projected consequences to bear on current behavior to keep us off self-destructive 
courses” (Bandura 1989, 1181).  
In a nutshell these theoretical and empirical insights imply that the past might have a fairly 
strong influence on decisions today, while certain, more distant parts of the future might not even 
enter the cost-benefit calculation or the normative considerations of climate negotiators. In addi-
tion to grappling with agents’ relationship to structure, agency theory within IR should include a 
cognitive dimension that can link time (the past and the future), place and emotion to decisions 
and behavior in the present.  
 
4. Agency and Hope 
I made a number of observations during the interview and CAM process that relate to the 
concept of hope. One is the fact that most people are fairly pessimistic regarding the effective-
ness and speed of the UNFCCC process and the chances of achieving the 2°C target, but at the 
same time remain surprisingly optimistic about humanity’s collective ability to solve the climate 
problem. A second observation concerns the apparently fast recovery from moments of hope-
lessness that some study participants experienced at COP 15 in Copenhagen or COP 17 in Dur-
ban. A third is about the general focus on the US despite the minimal contributions the US has 
made to the climate regime over the last 15 years.  
“Hope is … the perceived capability to derive pathways to desired goals, and motivate one-
self via agency thinking to those pathways” (Snyder 2002, 249). Using insights about goal pur-
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suit, psychologists have established a strong theoretical link between hope and agency. McGeer 
argues that hope is “an essential and distinctive feature” and even a “unifying and grounding 
force of human agency” (McGeer 2004, 100). As Snyder’s definition indicates, hope is a motiva-
tional state that combines future-oriented goal setting—“the goal is the cognitive component that 
anchors hope theory” (Snyder 2002, 250)—with the identification of pathways (actions) towards 
that goal. Problems are seen as barriers to people’s goals—they decrease hope and consequently 
weaken perceptions of agency. Not many political scientists have explored this topic, but those 
who do tend to address questions of collective agency and social mobilization. Courville and 
Piper suggest that hope can have empowering effects and that NGOs can use hope for political 
mobilization towards social change (Courville and Piper 2004). Conflict researchers have ex-
plored the interaction between hope and fear, finding that memory-based fear tends to override 
anticipation-based hope in conflict-ridden societies (Bar-Tal 2001). 
But even with this theoretical guidance it remains unclear how hope, agency and goal-setting 
interact with each other. Mutual causal arrows between all three elements are possible. First, 
hope can affect agency, both positively and negatively (i.e., increasing hope increases one’s 
sense of agency while losing hope results in a loss of agency.) Second, agency can affect hope: a 
strengthened sense of agency can increase hope, and a weakening of agency thinking reduces 
one’s sense of hope.7 Third, both agency and hope interact with goals: the type of goal deter-
mines the available pathways towards it, while one’s own skills and abilities determine what 
kinds of actions one is able to take, making certain goals more or less achievable. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  There	  might	  be	  occasions	  when	  agency	  and	  hope	  are	  disconnected.	  Frankl’s	  account	  of	  his	  concen-­‐tration	  camp	  experience	  in	  Man’s	  Search	  for	  Meaning	  (1959)	  offers	  an	  example	  for	  this	  phenome-­‐non.	  As	  an	  Auschwitz	  and	  Dachau	  inmate	  he	  had	  absolutely	  no	  control	  over	  his	  own	  life,	  or	  even	  daily	  activities;	  yet,	  despite	  this	  lack	  of	  agency	  he	  maintained	  a	  sense	  of	  hope	  and	  found	  meaning	  in	  existence.	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Figure 4-1: The Relationship between Agency, Hope, and Goal 
 
The hope-agency and hope-goal relationships are mutual, meaning that they affect each other 
depending on their current state and strength. The causal relationship between agency and goal is 
unidirectional—a sense of agency influences the selection and pursuit of a certain goal. The re-
verse relationship is not causal but constitutive in the sense that the form and sources of agency 
depend on the goal chosen. Due to the fundamentally different nature of causal and constitutive 
relationships I do not include the arrow in Figure 4-1.  
The links between agency, hope and goals are asymmetrical in the sense that different factors 
can influence each corner of the triangle. Without being comprehensive, I argue that agency-
related beliefs can be influenced by scientific knowledge, perceptions of resources and power, 
causal beliefs, available technologies and uncertainty. Concepts related to efficacy are of central 
importance. In a collective action dilemma like the climate negotiations the individual’s assess-
ment of collective efficacy (Bandura 2006, 165–166)—the joint ability of all participants in the 
UNFCCC process to achieve desired outcomes —is at least as important as the person’s assess-
ment of his or her individual efficacy or the efficacy of the delegation representing a country or 
NGO. Parties to the negotiations constantly have to assess how likely other parties are to support 
a cooperative solution and how much they are likely to contribute, because the effectiveness of 
one’s own contributions to climate governance depends on what others do.  
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The mental state of hope or hopelessness might depend on one’s beliefs about human nature, 
one’s personal life experience or spirituality. Goal thinking is heavily shaped by values, imagina-
tion and in the case of climate change also scientific knowledge.  
The CAM analysis provides some clues regarding the sources of agency and hope that study 
participants currently perceive. As already mentioned, many participants no longer believe that 
the 2°C target is achievable. When asked what makes them hopeful, individuals pointed to a va-
riety of factors inside and outside the negotiation history, including past successes in creating an 
institutional architecture (e.g., the Green Climate Fund), recent developments and the potential 
for change in the private sector (i.e., others’ agency without personal involvement or control), 
observing community activities based on a shared desire to create a better future (i.e., collective 
agency at the local level with personal involvement), and the believe that a better future is possi-
ble, even if not likely today. Participants also identified a set of hope- and agency-diminishing 
obstacles to a negotiated agreement. The most prominent among them is the position of the US, 
which study participants believe to be constrained by vested interests and lacking public support 
for climate action at the domestic level. 
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Figure 4-2: The Relationship between Agency, Hope, and Goal for the 2°C Target 
	   	  	  
The figure crystallizes two important phenomena in the beliefs of negotiation participants. 
The first is the fact that the American position has a negative influence on others’ perceptions of 
collective agency because it weakens collective efficacy beliefs. The general awareness of both 
the importance of the US for global mitigation and its current domestic political handcuffs (com-
bined with other country’s reluctance to “go first”) significantly reduces available action options 
and consequently imagined pathways towards the goal—the 2°C target. This leads to pessimism 
regarding the temperature goal. The goal itself is beset by a number of cognitive challenges out-
lined above, including the absence of a clear understanding whether and how the 2°C target can 
be reached. The negative interaction between agency- and goal-related thought patterns results in 
hopelessness. 
Second, in the face of this intractable problem—nobody in the UNFCCC process has a sense 
of agency with regard to domestic US politics—individuals maintain a sense of hope by shifting 
their definition of what they are trying to achieve. Instead of pursuing the temperature target or 
seeking to avoid dangerous climate change, negotiators begin to focus on goals that they can 
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reach with the tools under their diplomatic control: a political agreement. While negotiators do 
not see a clear path towards keeping warming under 2°C, they do know how to use the existing 
political processes and instruments of diplomacy to arrive at a negotiated agreement. The cogni-
tive search for agency and the associated positive experience of hope explain the mental separa-
tion between the political feasibility of a multilateral agreement and the scientifically prescribed 
necessities of action (targets, ambition, timelines). The side effect of the hope-agency interaction 
is a purely political definition of success that ignores regime effectiveness, but facilitates an un-
reasonable sense of optimism about the UNFCCC process. Anderson and Bowls suggest that sci-
entists contribute to such “unsubstantiated hope” and “neglect for serious constraints for achiev-
ing goals” (Anderson and Bows 2012).  
Figure 4-3: The relationship between Agency, Hope, and Goals for a Political Agreement 
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VI. SUMMARY 
No single theory of IR can explain the way negotiation participants cognitively deal with and 
ultimately make decisions on climate change and multilateral cooperation. Even the combination 
of all major IR theories does not fully capture the relevant thought processes driving political 
behavior within the UNFCCC. But this cognitive analysis has demonstrated that multiple IR 
theories contribute important parts of the puzzle, and that their combination rather than their 
separation creates a much fuller, and more in-depth understanding of the global climate change 
negotiations. The concepts assumed by rational choice approaches and constructivism strongly 
interact with each other and create beliefs and ultimately negotiation behavior that one cannot 
fully comprehend using only one of these theoretical lenses. 
The most impressive example of this theoretical interaction is the cognitive relationship be-
tween cost categories, different identity groups and norms to create different types of national 
interests. Emotions triggered by threats to an in-group play a fundamental role in determining a 
negotiator’s stance, especially the differentiation between normative and consequentialist deci-
sion frameworks. Emotions triggered by perceptions of power and agency could also play a role. 
The data contained some indications less powerful groups experience anger and blame big his-
torical emitters for the harm they experience due to climate change. Blame depends on the belief 
that these big emitters are able to prevent climate-related harm, in other words, that they have 
latitude for action that they deliberately do not use. 
The cognitive exploration of costs and identity has also brought into focus the importance of 
place as an identity dimension that is often neglected in IR. The nexus between place identity 
and the expected loss or change of places as a consequence of climate change again demonstrates 
the importance of emotions in political decisions about cooperation. Individuals who experience 
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significant threats to their place-based identity both in the developed and developing world favor 
multilateral cooperation with intensity and urgency that is not matched in the belief systems of 
people who lack a similar risk perception. 
Norms and ideas play a major role in the belief systems of all study participants except 
Group 4-HELV. The norms contained in the interview transcripts present a much broader spec-
trum and are significantly less contentious than the current normative debate in the UNFCCC 
negotiations. Instead of equity and static definitions of historical responsibility, the dominant 
norms focus on broadening the group of parties who should contribute to a solution (e.g., includ-
ing all major emitters, the emerging economies, or all countries), and emphasize notions of inter-
national solidarity, and a human responsibility to help other human beings in need. 
The data also provide some fresh input into the debates around the importance of domestic 
politics for international affairs, and the question whether an engaged hegemon is necessary in 
environmental regime building. 
With few exceptions the role of science is weaker than expected in the belief systems of 
study participants. The link between climate science and the goal of climate negotiations is par-
ticularly difficult. Most negotiators perceive the 2°C temperature target as a goal imposed by sci-
ence. This temperature target has largely replaced public good definitions of the goal or purpose 
of the climate regime. At the same time many individuals across all participant groups are aban-
doning this target, which has a number of implications for the political process. For example, it 
remains unclear how negotiators define and understand dangerous climate change, catastrophe, 
success and failure of climate governance. Given this lack of clarity, they resort to a default defi-
nition of success in diplomacy—a political compromise or agreement—rather than use environ-
mental effectiveness as a measure of success. 
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The cognitive patterns of study participants demonstrate only a weak and unsatisfying en-
gagement with a number of characteristics of climate change. Many participants do not under-
stand some features of complexity, for example, emergence, systemic lags, non-linearity, thresh-
old behavior, or cascading failures. Consequently they rarely address the implications of these 
problem characteristics for governance. Surprisingly there is very little knowledge about the im-
portance of tipping points. People tend to associate the concept of tipping points with climate 
science, but hardly ever connect it to the governance goal or governance mechanisms. Concepts 
of time are inconsistent, and most participants lack imagination regarding the distant future. Both 
of these cognitive features interact and inhibit the consideration of the full future implications of 
present decisions about climate governance. Lacking a cognitive link between present (in-) ac-
tion and future consequences, decision-makers have a limited sense of responsibility for the fu-
ture. Most of them are not aware of the extension of this generation’s causal powers into the dis-
tant future, and do not experience a sense of responsibility that corresponds with this new an-
thropogenic power. In a way, they are lacking the ethical frameworks for such long-term, inter-
generational problems. 
However, the group of study participants do not perceive these cognitive shortcomings as 
such. Instead they are generally confident that the problem can be solved with the existing 
knowledge and governance tools, that uncertainty is no impediment, complexity is not over-
whelming or paralyzing, and that the imperceptibility of climate change is only a problem at the 
domestic level where publics need to be mobilized. 
Some of these insights provide important insights into the role of agency in climate govern-
ance. Perceptions of a single actor—the United States—severely constrain perceptions of collec-
tive agency of the international community. The combined assessment of the US as powerful—a 
mitigation-related belief grounded in a scientific understanding of climate change—and as very 
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unlikely to cooperate reduces people’s sense of multilateral agency. People base their assess-
ments of the likelihood to cooperate on perceptions of domestic political constraints in the US: 
vested interests, an unsupportive public, and maybe even democracy more generally. They also 
link these assessments to beliefs about the US’ strategic interests in the international system. Ob-
serving an ongoing power transition, they believe that the US seeks to protect the status quo of 
economic power distribution in the world, trying to prevent emerging powers from gaining com-
petitive advantage through climate policy. Such pessimism about the UNFCCC process often 
results in a turn to processes outside the UN, which offer more reasons for optimism: other mul-
tilateral activities with fewer participants, civil society activities, the private sector, technological 
developments, including a price drop for renewable energy technologies, or community-based 
initiatives. Nobody can or does assess the activities in terms of their effectiveness.  
Further, when negotiation participants identify parts of the solution space, which the negotia-
tion process is not able to address, this recognition can constrain collective beliefs about agency. 
This applies, for example, to the idea that solving climate change requires a new development 
paradigm, or a change of mind of domestic voters.  
Time is another important aspect of agency-related beliefs that shape decision-making in the 
climate negotiations. Given the cognitive ease to evoke memories of the past and re-experience 
associated emotions, and at the same time the cognitive difficulty to imagine the long-term future 
and prematurely experience emotions associated with that future, memory plays a much stronger 
role in political decision-making than anticipation. Because of the special temporal properties of 
climate change this different impact of the past and the future on present decision-making poses 
significant challenges to global governance.   
Finally, a closer look at agency and hope has revealed interesting cognitive patterns regard-
ing the definition of a goal of the climate change negotiations and related measures of success. If 
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a goal appears unachievable, as the 2°C target does at the moment, people experience a decrease 
in their sense of agency and lose hope. Since hopelessness is a negative mental state that people 
seek to avoid, they turn to alternative goals that appear more achievable. In the case of climate 
change, the negotiators separate and maybe even replace the temperature goal with the diplo-
matic goal of reaching a political agreement. The latter gives negotiation participants a stronger 
sense of agency and recurring small boosts like the Copenhagen Accord, the Durban Platform or 
the Doha Gateway. This has negative implications for regime effectiveness, but also for the pub-
lic legitimacy of the UN process. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Six Belief Systems on Climate Change and Multilateral Cooperation  
 
This chapter presents the method, results, and limitations of the Q analysis I conducted for 
this study. In contrast to the CAM-based inquiry, I do not separate the report of empirical results 
and their interpretation into two chapters. Q offers a systematic approach to revealing shared 
viewpoints or belief systems without the need for preexisting assumptions about participant 
groups that were necessary to facilitate the CAM analysis. Q method complements cognitive-
affective mapping by identifying existing points of view that are shared by individuals across all 
participant groups. But rather than focusing on individual concepts, their emotional valences, and 
connections, Q takes a macro perspective and reveals entire belief systems—sets of coherently 
linked beliefs that are held by groups of individuals. Its purpose is to identify these perspectives 
and the differences between the various points of view regarding a certain topic. 
After introducing the method in section I, section II offers some general observations about 
patterns in the data set that are independent of the factor analysis at the heart of Q method. I pre-
sent six different belief systems (‘factors’ in Q language) I identified with the Q analysis in sec-
tion III. Where the results provide such opportunities, I establish links to the CAM analysis in 
addition to the standard factor interpretation. Continuing the analytic patterns of the CAM chap-
ter, I emphasize the relevance of three cognitive meta-elements in each factor: structural con-
straint and agency, identity and justice. Section IV turns to some qualitative data gathered from 
study participants after the Q sort, using their responses to four basic questions to establish what 
I call thought communities. The section explores the relationships between these thought com-
munities, the six participant groups, and the six factors I identified with the Q analysis. 
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I. Q METHOD 
Q method (Brown 1980) is a well-established research technique created by William Ste-
phenson in 1935 (Stephenson 1935) for the systematic study of subjectivity. A Q study enables 
the researcher to identify and explore the given viewpoints on a specific topic within a certain 
population, by analyzing patterns (underlying ‘factors’) in the opinions of participants. These 
opinions are elicited in a special type of survey that requires participants to rank-order a given set 
of statements about the topic. The statistical analysis of these rankings reveals so-called factors 
that are shared by several individuals (clusters of shared subjectivity). 
The method has been applied in multiple fields, including psychology (Stainton Rogers in 
Harre, Smith, and Langenhove 1995, chap. 12; Watts and Stenner 2005), political science (S. R. 
Brown 1980; Jeffares and Skelcher 2011), health (Stenner, Cooper, and Skevington 2003), and 
policy studies (Ockwell 2008). Lately it has become increasingly popular in environmental stud-
ies, which place emphasis on stakeholder engagement (Webler et al. 2003; Rutherford et al. 
2009; Curry, Barry, and McClenaghan 2013), narratives, and discourse analysis (Barry and 
Proops 1999; Dryzek 2005; Cairns 2012). The technique uncovers a high degree of qualitative 
detail about individual and collective thinking, and allows the researcher to gain a holistic under-
standing of existing belief systems—a substantive gestalt of a point of view rather than a struc-
tural one. At the same time it is driven by statistics (inverted factor analysis), offering a meth-
odological bridge between qualitative and quantitative approaches. The quantitative basis of the 
analysis differentiates the method from other more textual approaches to exploring beliefs, but 
also differs from other quantitative techniques such as opinion polls and surveys. 
A Q study seeks to elicit different viewpoints regarding a specific subject matter; here multi-
lateral cooperation on climate change. A key strength of Q is that it does not require that any 
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shared perspectives are known or even hypothesized in advance; rather these belief systems 
emerge from the data. Although the researcher does not know the number of existing viewpoints 
at the outset, Q method assumes that, regardless of the issue domain, the number of possible 
viewpoints is finite, generally smaller than seven (Barry and Proops 1999, 339), and normally 
about five (S. R. Brown 1980, 62). But Q studies with only two or three factors are common. 
In a Q study participants attribute their own, personal meaning to a fixed set of statements 
(stimulus items) they rank on a pre-arranged grid that approximates a normal distribution, with 
few statements towards the extreme ends of the scale and most items in the center columns 
(Watts and Stenner 2012, 15–17). This sorting exercise reveals participants’ individual beliefs 
and belief structure through their interaction with the statements (operant subjectivity). By corre-
lating individuals (rather than objective traits) in an inverted factor analysis (Watts and Stenner 
2012, 7–14), the correlation of Q sorts provides information about similarities and differences in 
the structured beliefs of groups of people. The emergent groups of participants sharing a view-
point can differ from the groups I predefined for the purpose of participant selection, and also 
from the existing negotiation alliances in the UNFCCC process. This might provide useful in-
sights regarding the possibilities of creating different political dynamics around climate change 
at the global level based on agreement at a deep level of subjective beliefs rather than a higher 
positional level of national or alliance interests. 
More broadly Q method permits a conception of subjectivity that is complex and multifac-
eted in the sense that individuals may not only hold one clearly bounded perspective, but share 
elements of a number of different factors (Harré and Gillett 1994, 25; Hajer 1996). Binary cate-
gories (e.g., male vs. female, or developed vs. developing) are often not able to capture this com-
plexity, but Q method provides opportunities to explore these multi-dimensional perspectives. 
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Critiques of Q studies often attack the inability of the method to produce certain insights, 
which it does not seek or claim to produce in the first place, such as the observation of change in 
beliefs over time with a single Q sort or the lack of the results’ representativeness of the larger 
population. The limited aim of a Q study is to identify existing points of view based on individu-
als’ internal frame of reference, and the difference between these existing viewpoints. It does not 
and cannot make any claims about the characteristics of the population at large (e.g., all partici-
pants in global climate negotiations), such as the share of the population associated with different 
factors. Therefore a Q study does not claim to be representative, in the sense that all possible 
viewpoints have been identified, or that the results are indicative of the importance and distribu-
tion of viewpoints within the relevant community (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993, 51). It is always 
possible that one or several viewpoints are missing, because participants who hold this view did 
not participate in the study. But generally the method has proven to quickly unearth the most 
relevant perspectives on any given issue. Understanding those additional characteristics of the 
factors is not the aim of Q method and can only be explored with additional methods, for exam-
ple, representative surveys that build on the factors identified with an earlier Q study. 
Conventional Q method only assesses beliefs without paying specific attention to the associ-
ated emotions. Since the technique is flexible in this respect, I adjusted the set-up to include an 
emotional dimension in the analysis, simply by adding statements about emotional states associ-
ated with concepts and beliefs, and placing special emphasis of affect in the factor interpretation 
stage. 
 
1. General Process 
A Q study proceeds in five steps. First, the researcher selects the topic of exploration and the 
relevant population—the communities whose viewpoints are of interest and require exploration. 
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Second, using a variety of sources, the researcher identifies the full range of opinions on the 
topic that are relevant to the selected population (R. Brown 1986, 56). From the universe of pos-
sible statements, often called the concourse, the researcher selects a limited number of represen-
tative statements that capture the largest possible opinion space, and maximize the ability of all 
study participants to express their views (Q set). This is a deliberate effort to create boundaries 
around the study topic. Third, facilitated either manually (printed statement cards) or by an on-
line platform, study participants are asked to respond to the Q set by rank-ordering the statements 
on a pre-determined scale based the intensity of their own agreement or disagreement with these 
items. Fourth, statistical analysis of these Q sorts enables the extraction of ‘factors’—patterns in 
the data based on the similarity of statement rankings that identify different points of view. The 
initial factor extraction is complemented by factor-rotation—the maximization of differences be-
tween factors that help explore various hypotheses, for example, singling out individuals who 
have a special role within the investigated community. The Q sorts of individuals who have 
strong factor loadings are used to calculate the factor scores—a standardized Q sort representing 
a specific factor. Finally, the resulting factors require interpretation. The systematic analysis of 
the content of these different points of view, their most important differences, and the individuals 
associated with a certain viewpoint can create a deep, holistic understanding of the subject matter 
explored. 
 
 
2. Application 
I designed a pilot study to test and improve the Q study design, in particular the quality and 
number of statements in the final Q set. For the pilot study 44 participants from ten countries 
completed an online Q sort containing 73 statements (Appendix Ch5-1). None of the participants 
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are involved in the global climate negotiations. Appendix Ch5-2 contains a summary of results 
from the pilot study.  
a. Concourse, Q Set & Grid 
Creating a concourse—a set of statements that reflect all possible opinions on the subject 
matter within the relevant community—usually relies on multiple sources, including interviews 
with members of the community, news articles, books, and academic literature. Since access to 
the relevant community for an exploratory interview was not possible in the available time win-
dow for designing the study, I relied on a range of text sources, including the coverage of the 
climate change issue in the print media (US, Canadian and German newspapers), online sources 
(UNFCCC website, blogs, NGO websites), journal articles, and discussions with colleagues re-
searching climate change politics. I generated an initial list of statements with a number of items 
in eight different themes: science/causes, problem nature, actors, policy goals and options, eco-
nomics and development, identity, ethics and justice, and special characteristics of climate 
change. These were honed down to 73 statements for the pilot study (Q set).  
Using the results of the pilot study I identified a number of statements that yielded very little 
additional insight, for instance, because all participants ranked them similarly (no differentia-
tion), because they captured important views of a domestic rather than global discourse, or be-
cause no participant considered them important. These were removed from final the Q set. I 
changed and added some statements based on the written responses of pilot study participants. 
Appendix Ch5-3 contains the final Q set (65 statements).  
Based on the number of statements I chose the following grid structure with a score range 
from -5 to +5. 
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Figure 5-1: Forced-choice Frequency Distribution for Q Sort 
 
b. P Set  
Two main goals drive the selection of participants from the community of interest: capturing 
a minimum diversity of existing viewpoints, and including viewpoints that matter in relation to 
topic of investigation (Watts and Stenner 2012, 70–71). Strategic rather than random sampling is 
desirable, using initial hypothesis and existing knowledge about the issue while taking into ac-
count practical constraints specific to the sampled population.  
Participant selection for this project emphasized diversity over importance of viewpoints, and 
was described in more detail in the introductory chapter of this thesis. I invited all 55 individuals 
who participated in the interviews for the CAM analysis to take part in the Q study. The resulting 
number of participants in the Q study is 28. This is not an unusual P set size in published Q stud-
ies, but might still seem small given the complexity of the issue and the corresponding diversity 
of viewpoints. However, the specific circumstances of participant selection placed two com-
pounding constraints on the P set. First, the accessibility of participants in global climate negotia-
tions is limited due to their involvement in an ongoing political process (reluctance) that involves 
a heavy international travel and meeting schedule (time constraints). More importantly, since the 
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pool of invitees was limited (55) and had severe time constraints the number of participants 
(50%) is satisfactory.  
More generally, the question how many study participants are necessary and desirable de-
serves some explanation. The logic of large-n sampling in quantitative studies with a claim to 
universality and representativeness does not apply to Q methodology. Instead the aim of a Q 
study is to involve a sufficient number of participants to “establish the existence of a factor for 
purposes of comparing one factor with another.” (S. R. Brown 1980, 192). Generally the P set 
should be smaller than the Q set (here, less than 65), but good Q studies have been carried out 
with as few as twelve participants (Niemeyer 2004). Given the complexity of the subject matter, 
I worked with the assumption that there might be a relatively high number of viewpoints (5-7), 
possibly closely related to the six groups defined for participant selection (see section IV below). 
Since it would be desirable to have at least two individuals with similar perspectives and conse-
quently similar Q sorts, 10-14 participants might have been mathematically sufficient, but every 
additional participant increased the probability of including a broad range of viewpoints and of 
having at least two participants share a viewpoint.  
There are two reasons why some uncertainty regarding the quality of the statistical analysis 
remains. First, a participant’s viewpoint could not be known before selection, especially given 
the possible difference between the negotiation positions they present in public and their private 
beliefs. Second, participants self-selected into the Q study. For example, it is possible that half of 
the P set shares the same viewpoint, increasing the chances that some viewpoints captured in the 
CAMs are not represented at all, or that a single Q sort becomes a factor. However, these con-
cerns are limited because the final P set is a fairly good representation of the larger set of study 
participants, containing fifteen diplomats, with at least one individual from five out of the six 
 	   227	  
participant groups (Group 1-HEHV is missing), and thirteen NGO participants from seven out of 
eight different NGO types (sub-national governments are missing). 
In order to reveal researcher bias I participated in the Q study, which enabled the comparison 
of my own view with those of the research participants.  
c. Sorting  
Given the geographic dispersion of study participants and the difficulties of recruiting indi-
viduals for more than one in-person meeting, Q sorting was conducted online, using FlashQ pro-
gramming and hosting services of http://www.qsortonline.com/. Q researchers often prefer face-
to-face sorting, but that was practically not possible. Online sorting has the advantage that the 
researcher does not interfere at all with the sorting process, and that the participant can chose a 
time and place that is most convenient for the exercise, rather than a scheduled meeting time. 
One can argue that these conditions create a more accurate and unbiased sort than one generated 
while interacting with the researcher. Previous Q studies provide evidence that online or remote 
sorting does not affect the quality of the results compared to face-to-face sorting sessions with 
possible instructions and help by the researcher (Van Tubergen and Olins 1979). 
The Q survey asked participants to provide basic demographic information, and to comment 
on the statements they ranked under +5 or -5. The web survey also inquired whether they had 
‘missed’ particular statements to express their point of view, and to point out which statements 
had been particularly difficult to place in the grid (e.g., because of conflicting interpretations). 
Appendix Ch5-4 contains the instructions for the sorting exercise and the list of additional ques-
tions. 
d. Factor Extraction & Rotation 
The most common software to conduct by-person factor analysis is PQMethod, provided by 
Peter Schmolck as freeware (http://www.lrz.de/~schmolck/qmethod/). Other software packages 
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are available for purchase. I used the recently developed program AdvanceQ, provided free of 
charge by Simon Niemeyer and David Moten (Moten and Niemeyer 2008). 
I developed the factor solution in four steps: (1) extraction of six factors, (2) factor rotation, 
(3) identification of sorts with significant loadings on a factor, and (4) calculation of factor 
scores using these significant loadings. Steps two and three were iteratively linked—the pattern 
of significant loadings informed rotation as described in more detail below. 
(1) Factor Extraction: Two methods are available for this analytic step: Centroid factor ex-
traction is the standard in Q method research, and principle component analysis (PCA) is a simi-
lar mathematical procedure that generally yields the same results. Since both methods generated 
similar factors for this data set I worked with the Centroid method to avoid the controversy over 
the comparability of PCA. 
Multiple criteria can guide the decision how many factors to extract. The standard approach 
is to extract only those factors that have an Eigenvalue (sum of all squared loadings of a factor) 
higher than 1.0 and/or at least two significant factor loadings (Watts and Stenner 2005, 105). The 
factor solution I present below fulfills both of these criteria, but also sought to emphasize sim-
plicity, in other words, minimizing the number of factors without losing a significant amount of 
information. I tested eight-, seven-, six- and five-factor solutions. Even when extracting eight 
factors, some solutions would meet the Eigenvalue and significant loadings criteria. However, 
the similarities between some of these eight factors were too great to offer interesting insights; 
presenting minor variants of the same factor. The six-factor solution offered the best compromise 
in terms of maximum differentiation and minimum redundancy.  
Other variables that can influence the selection of a factor solution but did not play a role 
here include the total variance explained (here this value was consistently around 60% for a 
broad range of tested solutions), and the number of persons not loading on any factor. In this data 
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set there is one outlier who consistently loaded weakly on one factor, and depending on the solu-
tion would drop below the significance threshold. Finally, factor stability was not an issue be-
cause similar individuals tend to cluster across several solutions. 
(2) Factor Rotation: Factor rotation can be performed either manually, guided by theoretical 
assumptions and conceptual knowledge about the data, or using purely mathematical criteria, for 
example, with a Varimax rotation that maximizes the variance explained and single-factor load-
ings. While the automated statistical solution is easier, it is not necessarily better in terms of re-
vealing relevant patterns in the data (Watts and Stenner 2005, 99). Therefore by-hand rotation is 
often preferred in Q studies. Watts and Stenner recommend the combination of both approaches.  
I followed this advice and performed a Varimax rotation followed by a number of hand rota-
tions to create a ‘cleaner’ solution with fewer highly confounded sorts. While confounded sorts 
could not be removed, the overall clarity of the developed solution was maximized by efforts to 
increase the number of sorts loading on only one factor and to minimize the number of sorts with 
more than two significant factor loadings.  
The goal of hand-rotations was to align clusters of sorts with the axes of the two-dimensional 
factor diagrams rather than allowing them to cover the space between the axes, which leads to 
multiple loadings (1/2  +13°, 2/6  +42°). In addition, small adjustments were made to mini-
mize the number of sorts with three significant factor loadings. These rotations maximized a 
sort’s loading on one factor and minimized its loading on another until it would drop under the 
significance threshold of that second or third factor (4/6  -3°, 2/8  -2°, 8/9  +4°).  
(3) Identifying Significant Loadings: Factor loadings are correlation coefficients indicating 
the degree to which a sort is associated with (i.e., correlates with) a factor. The significance 
threshold at a 99% confidence level is calculated with formula = 2.58 * (SE), where the standard 
error (SE) is calculated using the number of statements in the Q set: SE = 1/ SQRT (65).  Using 
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these calculations the significance level for this study is 0.32. Given the high number of con-
founded sorts I raised the significance level to 0.36. 
 Table 5-1 presents the resulting factor loadings, Eigenvalues, variance explained, and com-
munality (percentage of a Q sort associated with the other sorts, h2). The loadings of Q sorts as-
sociated with a factor a shaded; blue indicates the sorts with three significant factor loadings that 
have been excluded from the calculation of factor scores. 
Table 5-1: Rotated Factor Loadings 
 
Factor Loadings Participant ID 
A B C D E F 
h2 
1 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.18 0.42 0.36 0.51 
2 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.59 0.48 0.20 0.78 
3 0.33 0.59 0.09 0.25 0.37 0.09 0.67 
4 0.31 0.43 0.01 0.25 0.27 0.47 0.64 
5 0.01 0.27 0.09 0.47 0.29 0.48 0.61 
6 0.52 0.28 0.45 -0.01 0.50 0.21 0.84 
7 0.33 0.08 0.05 -0.26 0.00 -0.09 0.19 
8 0.11 0.50 0.22 0.05 0.56 0.19 0.67 
9 0.17 0.17 0.59 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.50 
10 0.54 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.51 0.08 0.76 
11 0.33 0.27 0.62 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.72 
12 0.51 0.41 0.19 0.45 0.30 -0.02 0.75 
13 0.28 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.22 0.22 0.55 
14 0.14 0.55 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.03 0.74 
15 0.25 0.36 0.13 0.26 0.38 0.26 0.49 
16 0.70 0.25 0.23 0.41 0.12 -0.04 0.79 
17 0.28 0.43 0.61 0.26 0.09 -0.04 0.72 
18 0.43 0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.39 
19 0.41 0.04 0.32 -0.15 0.11 0.20 0.35 
20 0.37 0.15 0.41 0.45 0.20 0.32 0.67 
21 0.32 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.18 0.27 0.48 
22 0.40 0.43 0.31 0.07 0.11 0.44 0.64 
23 0.13 0.17 0.33 0.48 0.58 0.01 0.73 
24 0.14 0.73 0.11 -0.01 0.08 0.10 0.58 
25 0.52 0.10 0.42 0.52 0.24 0.07 0.79 
26 0.41 0.23 0.24 0.43 0.15 0.31 0.59 
27 0.28 0.10 0.66 0.05 0.25 -0.11 0.61 
28 0.29 0.43 0.31 0.55 0.20 0.26 0.77 
29 0.17 0.43 0.31 0.19 0.08 0.24 0.42 
Eigenvalue: 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.8 1.7   
Variance: 12.2 11.9 11.9 10.8 9.5 5.7   
Total Variance Explained (%):       62.0   	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The process of factor extraction and rotation reveals that the data set contains a large number 
of confounded sorts, which is unusual compared to other Q studies. The result is consistent 
across several solutions, including PCA and Centroid factor extraction, a five-, six-, seven-, or 
eight-factor solution, and multiple rotation options. The solution developed through multiple ro-
tations contains seven sorts that load on a single factor only. The majority of sorts (15) have two 
significant factor loadings; six sorts show significant correlations with three different factors. 
In the Q method literature the treatment of confounded sorts is almost non-existent. The 
standard approach relies solely on pure sorts that load only on one factor, excluding all con-
founded sorts because they “muddle the waters” since they offer no clear factor association 
(Stephenson 1953, 107–109; S. Brown and Robyn 2004, 114–117; Akhtar-Danesh, Baumann, 
and Cordingley 2008). Although a detailed discussion in the published literature is lacking, past 
email communication over the Q Method list serve run by Stephen Brown has provided some 
arguments for the inclusion of confounded sorts, and at least greater theoretical attention to this 
issue. One can argue that the existence of confounded sorts merely reflects the reality of human 
thinking—people often hold or share parts of different points of view, and each point of view can 
get activated by different circumstances. Depending on the Q set, different beliefs get activated 
in the course of the sorting exercise and become part of the data. Other examples for confound-
ing sorts could be conflict mediators, who can associate with two or more parties, or ideological 
moderates who share parts of a conservative and a liberal perspective.  
This data set suggests that relying on pure sorts only would provide a severely limited picture 
of the existing points of view, removing more data from the analysis than including in it. Con-
founded sorts are a dominant feature of the data, which could have several reasons. First, it might 
reflect the fact that this study deals with a particularly complex subject matter where multiple 
overlapping beliefs are possible and occur with a greater likelihood. Second, confounded sorts 
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might indicate that the subject matter is not yet settled and that strong and clearly distinguishable 
camps have not yet formed. It could be a sign of immaturity or a time period of changing per-
spectives. Finally, it is possible that rather than representing a comprehensive point of view, a 
factor concerns one of several sub-issues. In that case multiple factors could be part of a person’s 
view and several factors might be needed to understand someone’s larger belief system. These 
sub-issues might be combinable in several ways, leading to different patterns of confounded 
sorts.   
Whatever the underlying reason for the large number of confounded sorts might be, they 
might offer bridges between possible belief systems and current negotiation positions—avenues 
along which cognitive change could be fostered. For example, if sort 1 loads on Factor A and B, 
and person 2 loads on Factor A only, person 2 might find it comparatively easy to take on the 
beliefs of Factor B. 
(4) Calculation of Factor Scores: A factor score (also called factor array) is created by cal-
culating the weighted average score for each statement from all sorts that load significantly on 
the factor. Due to the nature of this specific data set, I further constrained the calculation of fac-
tor arrays by excluding all sorts with more than two significant loadings. This removal from the 
factor score calculation left their impact on factor extraction unaffected.  
This exclusion affected six sorts (including my own), which had each three significant factor 
loadings. In terms of participant groups this concerns two NGO representatives (Environment & 
Market, Business), two diplomats in Group 4-HELV, and one in Group 2-MEHV.  
This exclusion at the last stage of the mathematical analysis has implications for interpreting 
the resulting factor scores. In addition to missing the perspectives of a number of individuals 
who took part in the CAM analysis but not in the Q sort (e.g., BASIC, AOSIS, ALBA and most 
LDC diplomats), this limits the breadth of views represented in the resulting factor solution. Ta-
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ble 5-2 shows the distribution of Q study participants across the six participant groups, divided 
into diplomats (black dots) and NGO representatives (red dots). Table 5-3 removes the five indi-
viduals whose sorts did not contribute to the final factor scores.  
Table 5-2: Q Study Participants and Participant Groups 
 
Table 5-3: Q Study Participants Who Contributed to Factor Scores 
	  
The tables demonstrate that the factors identified with the Q analysis are mainly expressions 
of perspectives in participant Groups 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, 4-HELV, 5-MELV, and among youth 
NGO representatives.   
e. Interpretation  
I present a detailed interpretation of the factors below (III). The process of factor interpreta-
tion followed Watts and Stenner’s approach, which allows for a comparison across factors while 
creating a holistic intra-factor logic and narrative. The key categories for factor comparison are: 
(1) items ranked +5, (2) items ranked higher or equally high in factor array X than any other fac-
tor array, (3) items ranked lower or equally low in factor array X than any other factor array, and 
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(4) items ranked -5. Items in the middle of the distribution deserve special attention because they 
can have different meanings. Usually Q methodological studies assume that items ranked 0 have 
no meaning for the factor, ibecause the participant placing this item did neither agree nor dis-
agree with the statement in question and is therefore indifferent regarding its content. However, 
different interpretations of the 0 ranking are possible. Some participants may have felt deeply 
conflicted regarding a particular statement, because they had two different interpretations of it, 
each eliciting a different level of (dis)agreement (i.e., a case of too much rather than no mean-
ing). Further, it is possible that participants agreed with a high number of items and found them-
selves forced by the grid to place some of these items in the center or even to left of the 0 col-
umn. Participants’ written comments at the end of the Q sort as well as feedback via email sug-
gests that at least one participant experienced such difficulties.  
 
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
1. General Data Patterns 
a. Statements With Broad Agreement Among Study Participants 
Both the raw data and the factor scores contain a set of statements that elicited very similar 
rankings among a large number of Q study participants, which implies that there is broad agree-
ment regarding the relevance (valence and weight) of these statements among a diverse set of 
negotiators. The raw data contain ten statements that received consistently high rankings (+4/+5 
or -4/-5) by more than a third (minimum 10) of all Q study participants. 
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Table 5-4: Statements with a High Number of Similar and Extreme Scores 
Number of Scores  
Statement +5 +4 -5 -4 Total (%) 
Min/ 
Max 
Score 
 1.  Human-released greenhouse gases are causing sig-
nificant climate change. 7 10   17 (58%) 0 
 2.  I don’t trust what scientists say about climate 
change.   8 9 17 (58%) 0 
 4.  I do not believe that we will see significant effects of 
climate change in my lifetime.   4 10 14 (48%) 2 
 6.  Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing 
countries.   7 6 13 (45%) 0 
15. The climate problem should be left to the markets.    5 6 11 (38%) 4 
18. Politicians need much stronger voter support and 
pressure from political movements to create mean-
ingful climate policies. 
4 6   10 (34%) -4 
21. Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve 
this problem on their own—climate change is a mul-
tilevel problem and requires action at all of these 
different levels. 
4 9   13 (45%) -1 
22. A key element in solving the climate problem is the 
need for fundamental value change within our socie-
ties. 
9 4   13 (45%) -5 
47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not 
important to me.   6 9 15 (52%) -1 
58. It is already too late to do anything about climate 
change.   5 9 14 (48%) 2 
 
Three statements stand out, with more than 50% of Q study participants ranking them simi-
larly high or low. Statements no. 1 and 2 concern the very foundation of the negotiations: the re-
ality of climate change, its anthropogenic causes, and the trust in science as the most important 
source of knowledge about the problem. The only surprising aspect of the scores for these two 
statements is not their similarity or broad agreement with them (nobody assigned them a negative 
score), but the fact that even after more than 20 years of negotiations these statements are con-
sidered to be some the most important among 65 statements regarding climate change govern-
ance. Instead of having become normal and ranking somewhere in the middle of the positive 
range of scores, participants felt the need to state strong support for the simple basics. One ex-
planation for this pattern might be the cognitive ease to identify these fundamental beliefs and 
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facts as important among the complex set of arguments one can make about climate change, and 
the general difficulty to attribute higher and lower importance to these arguments. Another ex-
planation might be sought in the context of persisting doubts about the reality of the problem and 
the trustworthiness of scientists within a number of countries today, most prominently the US. 
Although these questions are no longer contested among negotiation participants, stating one’s 
convictions still seems to be important and necessary.  
The consistently extreme negative scores for statement no. 47 are an expression of concern 
for the future and an important acknowledgement of the relevance of thinking about the future 
when discussing climate change in the present. However, it is a very general statement that does 
not specify how or why this concern about the future matters or should be acted upon. The 
statement cannot be fully understood in isolation, but needs to be interpreted in relation to other 
statement scores in the context of a person’s entire ranking. One clue might already be offered by 
the broad disagreement with statement no. 4. If people expect to experience climate change im-
pacts in their own lifetime and have an interest in avoiding those, that would explain why prob-
lems that arise decades from now are important to them. 
Statements 15, 18, 21, and 22 concern the possible policy and governance approaches to cli-
mate change. They acknowledge that climate change is a multilevel problem that cannot be 
solved with a multilateral treaty alone, and that the national and maybe even sub-national levels 
are extremely important. Value change, voter support and grassroots pressure on politicians are 
possible mechanisms of change that can influence a negotiated outcome only indirectly. Further 
the call for value change (22) but rejection of laissez-faire free-market policies (15) could indi-
cate broad support for a value set that is not driven by neoliberal ideas that prioritize growth 
driven by self-interested producers and consumers. 
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Statements with very similar rankings but not at the extreme end of the score spectrum in-
clude the following: 
	  	  8.	  Climate	  change	  will	  result	  in	  violence	  and	  human	  deaths.	  (8x	  +1	  and	  10x	  +2)	  
16.	  It	  is	  best	  to	  leave	  the	  development	  of	  climate	  solutions	  to	  regions,	  cities,	  and	  local	  
communities	   -­	   they	   have	   been	  much	  more	   successful	   than	  UNFCCC	   negotiations.	  
(10x	  -­1	  and	  6x	  0)	  
17.	  Individual	  contributions	  don’t	  make	  a	  difference	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  climate	  change.	  
(10x	  -­1	  and	  7x	  -­2)	  
26.	  Limiting	  average	  global	  warming	  to	  2°C	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  prevent	  major	  dam-­
age.	  (10x	  -­1	  and	  8x	  0)	  
46.	  Elected	  officials	  have	  a	  political	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  con-­
stituency	  -­	  the	  present	  rather	  than	  future	  generations.	  (11x	  -­2	  and	  7x	  -­1)	  
59.	  There	  are	  moments	  when	   I	   lose	  all	   hope	   that	   the	  UNFCCC	  process	   can	   solve	   this	  
problem.	  (6x	  0	  and	  11x	  +1)	  
The process of factor extraction reduces the number of comparable scores to six, making the 
range of scores for a statement (e.g., -3 to -5) a more interesting measure than the number of fac-
tors with the same score. After factor extraction major agreements remain across the six factors, 
but especially statements with a big score range disappear from this list (e.g., statements 15, 18 
and 22). A number of new areas of agreement emerge.  
16.	  It	  is	  best	  to	  leave	  the	  development	  of	  climate	  solutions	  to	  regions,	  cities,	  and	  local	  
communities	  -­	  they	  have	  been	  much	  more	  successful	  than	  UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  (-­
1/-­2)	  
33.	  Economic	  growth	  and	  jobs	  must	  take	  priority	  over	  climate	  concerns.	  (-­2/-­3)	  
47.	  Problems	  that	  might	  arise	  decades	  from	  now	  are	  not	  important	  to	  me.	  (-­4/-­5)	  
60.	  Climate	  change	  scares	  me	  because	  I	  don’t	  know	  what’s	  going	  to	  happen.	  (0/-­1)	  
64.	  I	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  imagining	  the	  consequences	  of	  climate	  change	  for	  my	  commu-­
nity	  and	  my	  country.	  (0/-­1)	  
Eighteen additional statements show large similarities too, but with a score range of two 
rather than one (1, 4, 6, 8, 17, 20, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 40, 46, 54, 58, 59, 62, 63). 
For the Q study these high agreement statements, especially those with extreme scores, pose 
a challenge, because they make it difficult to differentiate the factors. The extreme scores are 
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crucial to identify key differences between the factors, and the amount of similarities in these 
high rankings limits the available information for interpretation. Consequently factor interpreta-
tion has to become much more detailed, drawing on differences in lower score ranges and even 
towards the center of the score distribution. On the other hand, these agreements bode well for 
the negotiations themselves. Although one cannot extrapolate from the Q study to the larger 
population of negotiation participants, the finding suggests that there are significant areas of 
agreement that various parties rely on. It is particularly important to recognize these similarities 
between participant Group 4-HELV and other groups, moderating the concern about the differ-
ences between them identified in the CAM analysis.  
b. Statements With Large Disagreement 
Statements with a large range or spread of scores (maximum = ten) point to major disagree-
ments among study participants. They are important to understand the key sources of contention 
between different belief systems. Three statements have received scores at both ends of the spec-
trum (-5 and +5).  
12.	  Only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  countries	  with	  significant	  GHG	  emissions	  are	  important	  for	  
climate	  negotiations.	  
22.	   A	   key	   element	   in	   solving	   the	   climate	   problem	   is	   the	   need	   for	   fundamental	   value	  
change	  within	  our	  societies.	  	  
24.	  God	  has	  made	  us	  stewards	  of	  the	  Earth,	  giving	  us	  the	  ability	  and	  responsibility	  to	  
keep	  the	  planet	  healthy.	  
Statement 22 was also among the statements with a high level of agreement among partici-
pants, which suggests that there is a majority supporting that statement and the opposing belief is 
an exception. The topic of religion (24) is not very important in the negotiations and conse-
quently the disagreement regarding this statement is not very consequential. One participant 
commented that the statement was the most difficult to place: “I placed the "God has made us 
stewards" question into "neither/conflicted" because I don't strongly identify with the concept of 
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God on a personal level, but worded differently I would agree with this general statement of re-
sponsibility in a spiritual context.” Of real importance is the opinion split regarding statement 
12—the number of countries that are important for the climate negotiations and the reason for 
their raised significance. The bar charts below visualize the distribution of scores for these three 
statements among all participants, showing very different patterns of agreement and disagree-
ment.  
Figure 5-2: Patterns of Distribution of Agreement with Statements 12, 22, and 24 
    
 
Other Statements with a large spread of scores (nine) before factorization and therefore large 
sources for disagreement are 
	  3.	  	   Anti-­climate	  change	  policies	  threaten	  progress	  and	  modernity.	  	  
14.	  	  The	  power	  disparities	  between	  countries	  in	  climate	  negotiations	  make	  me	  very	  up-­
set.	  
15.	  	  The	  climate	  problem	  should	  be	  left	  to	  the	  markets.	  	  
18.	  	  Politicians	   need	  much	   stronger	   voter	   support	   and	   pressure	   from	   political	  move-­
ments	  to	  create	  meaningful	  climate	  policies.	  
32.	  	  Taxes—whether	   globally	   or	   domestically—and	   other	   policies	   that	   constrain	   pri-­
vate	  property	  rights	  are	  simply	  not	  politically	  acceptable	  in	  our	  system.	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38.	  	  Economic	  growth	  is	  the	  best	  solution	  to	  climate	  change.	  
41.	  	  I	  am	  ashamed	  that	  my	  country	  is	  not	  doing	  more	  about	  climate	  change.	  
48.	  	  All	  states	  have	  a	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  global	  climate	  solution.	  	  
50.	  	  Future	  generations	  are	   likely	   to	  be	   richer	  and	  better	  off	   than	  we	  are,	  and	  better	  
able	  to	  deal	  with	  climate	  change.	  	  
61.	  	  Climate	  change	  is	  not	  the	  only	  issue	  we	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  and	  other	  issues	  are	  often	  
more	  urgent.	  
62.	  	  The	   focus	  on	  winning	  the	  next	  election	   is	   the	  biggest	  obstacle	   to	   finding	   interna-­
tional	  agreement.	  	  
The main themes include the role of the state vs. markets and economic growth in addressing 
climate change, private property constraints as (domestic) policy instruments, and voter support 
and elections as obstacles to an international agreement. How these statements matter and what 
types of belief system they support will become clearer in the process of factor interpretation.  
It is noteworthy that I list statements 15 and 18 as having both high levels of agreement and 
disagreement. This indicates that the big group of participants, who assigns these statements 
similar scores, disagrees significantly with the rest of the study participants. The charts below aid 
the understanding of this situation.  
 Figure 5-3: Patterns of Distribution of Agreement with Statements 15 and 18 
	  	   	  
 
Scores for statement 15 are much more evenly distributed, with a large majority in disagree-
ment with the idea that climate change should be left to the markets, but also a significant group 
of individuals, who support the argument. In contrast, all but one individual agree with or are 
indifferent towards statement 18. A single person creates the large score spread and thereby the 
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impression that there is major disagreement among study participants regarding the need for 
stronger voter support for climate change policies. 
After factorization the maximum range of scores is reduced to seven, and can be observed for 
three statements:  
	  7.	  	   Climate	   change	  was	   caused	  by	   rich,	   industrialized	   countries,	   but	   its	   impacts	  will	  
hurt	  poor	  countries	  most—this	  asymmetry	  is	  unfair.	  	  	  
41.	  	  I	  am	  ashamed	  that	  my	  country	  is	  not	  doing	  more	  about	  climate	  change.	  
45.	   	  My	  government	  is	  a	  very	  constructive	  player	  in	  international	  affairs.	  
Interestingly at this stage beliefs about fairness and national identity—expressed in terms of 
shame and assessments of constructive attitudes of governments—are the main sources of differ-
ences in opinion. Additional statements with a large range of scores (6) include the following: 
	  3.	   	  Anti-­climate	  change	  policies	  threaten	  progress	  and	  modernity.	  	  
12.	  	  Only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  countries	  with	  significant	  GHG	  emissions	  are	  important	  for	  
climate	  negotiations.	  
14.	  	  The	  power	  disparities	  between	  countries	  in	  climate	  negotiations	  make	  me	  very	  up-­
set.	  
15.	  	  The	  climate	  problem	  should	  be	  left	  to	  the	  markets.	  	  
24.	  	  God	  has	  made	  us	  stewards	  of	  the	  Earth,	  giving	  us	  the	  ability	  and	  responsibility	  to	  
keep	  the	  planet	  healthy.	  
38.	  	  Economic	  growth	  is	  the	  best	  solution	  to	  climate	  change.	  
52.	  	  The	  rich	  countries	  have	  caused	  the	  problem;	  consequently	  they	  have	  the	  obligation	  
to	  fix	  it.	  
c. Other Statements With Surprising Scores 
Independent of the six factors, the scores for a number of statements offer interesting insights 
about general attitudes of the Q study participants.  
8.	   Climate	  change	  will	  result	  in	  violence	  and	  human	  deaths.	  	  
The highest factor score for this statement is +3, and the average +1.8. Despite the reports of 
thousands of people dying due to extreme weather events, and the link between extreme weather 
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events and climate change, the idea that climate change can pose risks to human lives does not 
(yet) play a major role in the beliefs of many Q study participants. 
10.	  States	  are	  the	  most	  important	  players	  in	  global	  climate	  politics.	  	  
Surprisingly, in a group of individuals tasked with multilateral negotiations the highest factor 
score for this statement is +2; the average factor score a mere 0.5. Twelve individuals assigned 
this statement a negative score. The highest score (+4) was given by only two individuals; one of 
them is an NGO representative. Although more than half of the Q study participants represent 
state governments, who seek to address climate change through cooperative agreements among 
states, there is only weak support for the idea that states are the most important actors in climate 
politics.  
16.	  It	  is	  best	  to	  leave	  the	  development	  of	  climate	  solutions	  to	  regions,	  cities,	  and	  local	  
communities	  -­	  they	  have	  been	  much	  more	  successful	  than	  UNFCCC	  negotiations.	  
Participants not only expressed doubts about the role of states, but also dismissed the ability 
of sub-national authorities to address climate change. This statement received only negative fac-
tor scores (-1/-2), but as one participant explained this might not mean that sub-national levels of 
governance are not important, but rather a problematic framing of the statement: “Whether we 
should 'leave' climate change to the municipal governments and others, or if we should concen-
trate 'all resources' on domestic action.  Domestic, municipal, city level action is where the real 
meat of climate change is and where most of the action is, but I can't agree with 'leave it' or ap-
plying 'all resources' to them, because the larger context is important for setting the tone and mo-
tivation.” 
19.	  The	  vested	  interests	  blocking	  solutions	  are	  too	  powerful	  to	  allow	  for	  any	  meaning-­
ful	  action	  on	  climate	  change.	  	  
With an average factor score of +1 and maximum factor score of +2 this statement received 
less support than I had expected. The weak support might indicate that study participants do not 
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attribute major importance to the blocking force of vested interests, or that despite the power of 
vested interests people believe that their resistance can be overcome, in other words, that they are 
not “too powerful.” 
26.	  	  Limiting	  average	  global	  warming	  to	  2°C	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  prevent	  major	  dam-­
age.	  	  
The factor scores for this statement range from -1 to -3, and the highest raw score is +1, as-
signed by only one individual. Eight individuals scored this statement 0. This result suggests that 
there is little confidence that the current temperature goal will be able to achieve the objective of 
the Convention, raising doubts about the utility of and general support for the goal that goes be-
yond political declarations. At the same time the scores give very little weight to the following 
statement: 
27.	  We	  lack	  a	  clearly	  defined	  goal	  for	  global	  climate	  policy.	  
The highest factor score is +1; the average is -0.2. One could conclude that participants do 
not consider the temperature goal as sufficiently ambitious, but perceive it as sufficiently clear to 
guide policy-making efforts. 
28.	  Since	  the	  climate	  is	  going	  to	  change	  we	  should	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  adaptation.	  
There is surprisingly little support for this statement in the data despite growing concerns 
about adaptation in the media and in academia, and the continuous demands of negotiators from 
developing countries to allocate more resources to this issue. Only four individuals ranked the 
statement +5 or +4. The highest factor score is +3; the average factor score is +0.8. 
31.	  Geo-­engineering	  can	  solve	  the	  global	  warming	  problem	  much	  more	  cost-­effectively	  
than	  mitigation.	  	  
There was a fairly strong rejection of the idea that geo-engineering might offer a more af-
fordable solution to climate change than mitigation. The factor scores range from -1 to -3 (aver-
age = -2.3). This is a surprising result given that the geo-engineering literature often emphasizes 
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that its lower price tag makes this technological pathway so appealing in comparison to eco-
nomically painful mitigation policies. The argument that geo-engineering might buy more time 
for mitigation and adaptation elicited generally more agreement. 
33.	  Economic	  growth	  and	  jobs	  must	  take	  priority	  over	  climate	  concerns.	  	  
In opposition to popular perceptions of the negotiation rationale of diplomats from developed 
countries, this statement received negative scores from 90% of Q study participants, which are 
predominantly from participant groups 4-HELV and 5-MELV. The factor scores are all negative 
(-2/-3). Only two individuals—NGO representatives associated with Group 4-HELV—assigned 
positive scores (+1 and +2). Similarly there was fairly strong disagreement among study partici-
pants with idea that economic growth offers a solution to climate change. 
38.	  Economic	  growth	  is	  the	  best	  solution	  to	  climate	  change.	  
The factor scores range from +1 to -5 with an average of -2.3. 
45.	  	  My	  government	  is	  a	  very	  constructive	  player	  in	  international	  affairs.	  	  
The scores for this statement reflect the highly contentious character of UNFCCC negotia-
tions and the rather negative self-assessment of individuals who represent governments. The 
highest factor score is +2. Four factor scores are negative, ranging from -1 to -5.  
52.	  The	  rich	  countries	  have	  caused	  the	  problem;	  consequently	  they	  have	  the	  obligation	  
to	  fix	  it.	  
This statement is an expression of the currently dominant interpretation of one of the Con-
vention’s most important principles, which has been the source of major disagreements in the 
climate negotiations: common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). This interpretation re-
ceives mixed support among study participants. The statement has a large score range (-3 to +5) 
and an average score of +0.24. The majority of scores (24) range between -2 and +2, and only 
five individuals strongly support this statement with a score between +3 and +5. 
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55.	   I	   believe	   that	  we	  will	   find	  a	   cooperative	   solution	   to	   climate	   change.	  Other	   issues	  
have	  taken	  many	  years	  of	  negotiation,	  too.	  
Only one factor score shows significant agreement with this statement of optimism (+3); all 
others score it either 0 or +1. Generally, participants in the UNFCCC negotiations seem to have 
only modest confidence in their joint ability to find a multilateral solution. 
56.	  Climate	  change	  is	  a	  very	  depressing	  issue.	  
Five factors score this statement 0, suggesting that what is often described as threatening in-
formation does not affect study participants in the same way it affects citizens, or that many 
study participants are unsure how to respond to this statement. More generally, emotional state-
ments invoking fear, disappointment, or worry tend to have rankings in the middle of the distri-
bution. On the other hand statements no. 57 and 58, which touch upon a sense of being over-
whelmed and fatalism, triggered strong disagreement.  
57.	  Climate	  change	   is	   simply	   too	  complex	  and	  overwhelming.	   It	   is	   impossible	   to	   fully	  
understand,	  let	  alone	  solve,	  the	  problem.	  
58.	  It	  is	  already	  too	  late	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  climate	  change.	  
The factor score range of statement 57 is -1 to -4; that of statement 58 is -3 to -5. Their re-
spective average raw scores are -1.8 and -2.9.  
64.	  I	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  imagining	  the	  consequences	  of	  climate	  change	  for	  my	  commu-­
nity	  and	  my	  country.	  
This statement has a very narrow factor score range close to 0 (-1/0).  Although the interview 
data offer evidence that study participants had difficulties imagining worst-case scenarios of the 
distant future (the year 2080), they generally do not believe that they lack imaginative capabili-
ties regarding their home country. 
65.	   Sometimes	   gradual	   processes	   such	   as	   GHG	   emissions	   result	   in	   sudden,	   dramatic	  
changes	   in	   the	   environment.	  The	   existence	  of	   such	   climatic	   tipping	  points	  makes	  
action	  even	  more	  urgent	  than	  previously	  thought.	  Avoiding	  tipping	  points	  should	  
become	  a	  key	  climate	  policy	  goal.	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Although the possibility of climatic tipping points has received growing attention in the sci-
entific community, the issue is not (yet) of high importance in the beliefs of study participants. 
Factor B stands out, scoring this statement +5. All other factor scores range from +1 to +2. The 
average raw score is +1.9. 
 
III.  SIX FACTORS 
Appendix Ch5-5 contains a table with all statements and factor scores. 
 
1. Factor A – The International Community  
Table 5-5: Extreme Factor Scores for Factor A 
Score Statement 
9. An effective climate solution requires the cooperation of all governments around the world. 
+5 22. A key element in solving the climate problem is the need for fundamental value change 
within our societies. 
21. Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve this problem on their own—climate 
change is a multilevel problem and requires action at all of these different levels. 
29. Adaptation and mitigation are complementary and equally important policies.  
42. The BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) should show greater leadership 
in international climate negotiations. 
+4 
48. All states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a global climate solution.  
6. Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing countries. -5 38. Economic growth is the best solution to climate change. 
4. I do not believe that we will see significant effects of climate change in my lifetime. 
12. Only a small number of countries with significant GHG emissions are important for climate 
negotiations. 
13. All our efforts and resources to combat climate change should be concentrated domestically, 
rather than internationally. 
-4 
47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
 
Four themes dominate this point of view: the importance of cooperation among all states 
within the UN, a focus on adaptation, economic growth as a problem rather than a solution, and 
the character of climate change as a moral problem.  
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States are the central actors in this belief system. One of the most important elements of cli-
mate governance is the cooperation of all governments, strongly opposing the idea that a small 
group of states could solve the problem. The score of statement 12 (-4) confirms the importance 
of engaging all governments for these individuals. This is the only factor that singles out the role 
of the BASIC group, emphasizing that the circle of state actors who demonstrate leadership must 
grow. One participant commented, “BASIC countries need to commit more to taking action, not 
just leadership.” Individuals with this view strongly reject the argument that climate change con-
cerns only the developing countries (-5) and that more effort and resources should be allocated 
domestically rather than internationally (-4). They clearly favor a multilateral approach.  
This factor emphasizes that all states have a moral responsibility to act on climate change, lo-
cating the reason for cooperation in realm of morality and justice rather than that of economic 
costs and benefits. The subject of rights and obligations are states and not individuals. Accord-
ingly statement 49 (ethical responsibility of the current generation of voters and politicians) re-
ceives a lower score than in any other factor score (+2). However, individuals who hold this 
state-centered view disagree with the notion that the causal and impact asymmetry between the 
rich and the poor is unjust (statement 52, -2). This focus on cooperation among all states indi-
cates a strong preference for the UNFCCC as a governance venue and a belief in the primacy of 
the multilateral level in a multilevel governance system (21).  
Emphasizing the equal importance of adaptation and mitigation, individuals with this point of 
view are concerned about arresting the causes of climate change and dealing with its conse-
quences at the same time. The emphasis on adaptation might signal a strong concern about the 
impacts of climate change in vulnerable developing countries. Individuals who share this belief 
find the social impacts of climate change such as suffering from food and water scarcity most 
worrying (+3). At the same time they expect climate impacts in their own lifetime and care 
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strongly about events that will occur decades from now (+4). This set of beliefs is accompanied 
by solid support for climate finance (+3). Combining these convictions, there is a strong sense 
that climate change will affect our lives in ways that require adaptation, and that it is the moral 
responsibility of states to prevent future climate-related suffering with investments in both miti-
gation and adaptation. The comparatively low disagreement with statement 31 (-1) suggests that 
for this group geo-engineering might be a serious policy option.  
Another interesting element of this factor is its strong disagreement with statement 38 (-5), 
which suggests that these individuals consider economic growth part of the problem rather than 
the solution. Emphasizing the need for value change within our societies (statement 22, +5) they 
might argue that a departure from our current growth-based development models is needed and 
will require a fundamental change in beliefs about the good life, progress, modernity and happi-
ness, which moves away from consumption and materialism. Along the same lines this factor 
assigns a low score (-3) to statement 15 (The climate problem should be left to the markets.) and 
an equally low score—lowest among all factors—to the idea that the main costs of climate policy 
will include the loss of GDP and jobs (statement 36). They consider progress on climate change 
governance more important than economic growth. 
Finally, it is worth noting that statements 1 and 2 received more moderate scores in this fac-
tor than in any other (+3 and -2). This might indicate a normalization of these beliefs—they mat-
ter but they have become normal in a sense that does not require any emphasis any longer. 
Emotions do not play a strong role in this belief system. Excitement about a cleaner eco-
nomic future (+3) and disappointment with a lack of environmental concern (+2) are the strong-
est expressions of emotion. Another interesting observation concerns the higher-than-average 
scores for statements 57 (Climate change is simply too complex and overwhelming. It is impos-
sible to fully understand, let alone solve, the problem. -1) and 58 (It is already too late to do any-
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thing about climate change. -3). This might indicate that this factor has a greater tolerance for 
admitting the inadequacy and possibly failure of climate governance efforts, although it still sig-
nals disagreement with these statements. In line with such a willingness to accept failures and 
shortcomings, individuals who share this belief system disagree more than others with statement 
26 (-3), indicating their dissatisfaction with the current temperature goal (2°C). 
Study participants, whose sorts load significantly on factor A, include diplomats in Groups 2-
MEHV, 4-HELV and 5-MELV, and members of various non-state actor groups, including a 
youth NGO and the fossil fuel industry. With the exception of two individuals all of them live in 
the developed world. More generally the themes of this belief system—centrality of state agency, 
the primacy of the multilateral governance level, equal weight on mitigation and adaptation, con-
cern about the future and moral obligations of all states—resemble those identified in the CAMs 
of Group 2-MEHV. Skeptical of today’s model of development, they advocate changing the cur-
rent way of life and consumption patterns. They also easily identify with identity-groups larger 
than their own state—humanity or the community of states, which corresponds to the belief that 
all states have a moral obligation to act, and not just a select few with a special responsibility 
based on historical emissions or any other measure. The beliefs about state agency in a multilevel 
governance system also reflect parts of the cognitive patterns identified in the CAMs of Group 4-
HELV.   
The CAM of the person with the highest factor loading (0.7) is included below. The individ-
ual is a member if Group 2-MEHV. 
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Figure 5-4: CAM of Participant with Highest Loading on Factor A 	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A number of key concepts—both negative and positive—provide a quick understanding of 
the key themes of this person’s belief system. The most negative concepts are associated with the 
expectation of future climate change impacts (upper right), including food and water scarcity. 
These concerns are based on past and present experiences of extreme weather events in the per-
son’s home country, which have caused major economic damage but more importantly human 
suffering and displacement (upper left). The second area of strong negative emotions concerns 
the North-South divide and its counterproductive effect on the UN negotiations (left). The person 
believes that a solution to climate change (center) has at least three key elements. First, there has 
to be a change in mindsets (lower center), accepting that humankind is embedded in a larger 
planetary system of life and needs that support system for its own wellbeing. Second, a change of 
mind is also necessary to break up the rigid ways of thinking in international politics. North-
South differences have to be replaced by thinking about each other as significant partners and 
treating each other with respect and compassion. Finally a politics of wellbeing should replace 
the current politics of growth, and an important part of this is greater global equality. 
 These core ideas are reflected in a version of the narrative Addressing Historical Griev-
ances, which emphasizes the idea of one humanity sharing one planet, and advocates bridging 
the North-South divide with norms of solidarity and helping the poor (see chapter 3 p. 119). 
While this is a popular narrative in participant Group 2-MEHV, it is not present in the belief sys-
tems of Groups 4 and 5. 
 
2. Factor B – A Minilateral Club  
Table 5-6: Extreme Factor Scores for Factor B 
Score Statement 
1. Human-released greenhouse gases are causing significant climate change. +5 65. Sometimes gradual processes such as GHG emissions result in sudden, dramatic changes in 
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 the environment. The existence of such climatic tipping points makes action even more urgent 
than previously thought. Avoiding tipping points should become a key climate policy goal. 
21. Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve this problem on their own—climate 
change is a multilevel problem and requires action at all of these different levels. 
25. The prospect of a cleaner, eco-friendly economy is exciting. 
34. Ideally climate policies would reduce GHG emissions while stimulating economic growth. +4 
49. The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical responsibility to future 
generations. 
2. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change.  -5 47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
4. I do not believe that we will see significant effects of climate change in my lifetime. 
6. Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing countries. 
24. God has made us stewards of the Earth, giving us the ability and responsibility to keep the 
planet healthy. 
-4 
58. It is already too late to do anything about climate change. 
 
Factor B attributes hardly any importance to states at all—among the statements with the 
highest and lowest scores only one concerns state governments as agents of climate governance. 
Instead the most important themes include a strong grounding of the belief system in facts and 
science, a concern about the future and the possibility of climatic tipping points, and a struggle to 
balance the need to address the climate problem and the need for economic growth.  
Ranking statement 1 (+5) and statement 2 (-5) demonstrates that this point of view considers 
scientific knowledge and factual statements foundational and more important than value-based 
statements. This strong trust in data finds expression in three additional ways. One is the concern 
about climatic tipping points, which is currently purely based on scientific theories and publica-
tions, but not on observation or experience. Assigning statement 65 score +5 is the most unusual 
feature of this factor; all other factors rank this statement +1 or +2. In addition to signaling trust 
in scientific knowledge, this score indicates a concern about the future and a desire for long-term 
stability and predictability. 
The second way in which the factor’s preference for facts over values shows is the strong 
disagreement with statement 24 (God has made us stewards of the Earth, giving us the ability 
and responsibility to keep the planet healthy.). Rather than ignoring this statement as not useful 
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or not important (e.g., assigning score 0), it is decisively rejected, which signals strong discom-
fort with giving religion or spirituality a role in the climate debate. 
Third, this factor ranks the need for value change (statement 22) lower than any other factor 
(0), rendering values irrelevant for addressing climate change. At the same time there are slightly 
positive scores for statement 62 (The focus on winning the next election is the biggest obstacle to 
finding international agreement. +1) and the need for greater voter support for climate policies 
(+2). Presumably voters do not have to change their values, but simply need to to understand the 
problem better in order to make better election choices. 
 Like Factor A this factor emphasizes that climate change is a multilevel governance problem 
that cannot be solved by states, markets or civil society alone. People with this perspective do not 
believe that states are the most important players in global climate politics (statement 10, -1), or 
that sub-national state actors have the ability to address the problem (-1). Instead of cooperation 
among all states only a small group of states is sufficient to address climate change at the multi-
lateral level (statement 9, 0; statement 12, +2), presumably to provide a global framework for 
mitigation. Rather than pursuing negotiations in the UNFCCC, Factor B prefers a club approach. 
Factor B also agrees more than others with the argument that efforts to fight climate change 
should be concentrated at the domestic level rather than internationally (-1). Depending on the 
person’s nationality this could be an argument for more ambitious domestic mitigation policy or 
for the need to push adaptation at home. On the other hand it could be interpreted as a lack of 
support for climate finance, technology transfer and other international support measures for the 
vulnerable and poor. Finally this factor disagrees with the argument that elected officials have to 
protect the interests of the present rather than future generations (-3). This score suggests that 
elected officials are important agents, who have a major ethical responsibility to future genera-
tions (statement 49, +4). To summarize, this is a UN skeptic belief system that advocates a club 
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approach at the international level and places the key burden of responsibility for climate gov-
ernance on elected officials in a national political context.  
For Factor B the key challenge of climate governance is the reconciliation between mitiga-
tion and growth—ideally climate policies would reduce GHG emissions while stimulating eco-
nomic growth (+4). However, they strongly disagree with argument that economic growth and 
jobs must take priority over climate concerns (-3). Since statement 33 has a score of -2, growth is 
not considered to be a solution to climate change or an end in itself, but more like a necessity. In 
contrast to Factor A, individuals who hold this view do not call for a new development model, 
but believe in the need for development. They are excited about the prospect of a cleaner econ-
omy, but they do not trust the problem-solving power of the markets (statement 15, -2). Their 
policy goal is a balance between the climate and the economy, and they are likely to support 
green growth and sustainability concepts. While states are not the most important actors in cli-
mate politics, they do seem to have a role in creating the regulatory frameworks that pursue such 
a balance between emission reductions and economic growth.  
Most of the statements with extremely negative factor scores and the statement about tipping 
points deal with the future. People who hold this view strongly care about problems that occur 
decades from now, and they expect to experience impacts of climate change in the course of their 
lives. Despite this perceived relevance and maybe proximity of negative effects of climate 
change they strongly reject the idea that it might already be too late to do something about the 
problem. This indicates that they have a sense of agency, or at least believe that actors today are 
able to prevent future harm, including the occurrence of tipping points. At the same they are 
fairly pessimistic about the conditions of major change. Statement 20 (Nothing will happen be-
fore a climate crisis hits.) has a higher score in Factor B than in any other factor (+1). 
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With the exception of statement 25 (excitement) emotional statements are not very important 
for Factor B. There is more fear for their children’s future than in other factors (+2), but no un-
certainty, disagreement with the idea of being overwhelmed (-3), and no concern about having to 
explain the failure to address climate change to one’s grandchildren (-1), in other words, no per-
sonal shame, guilt or responsibility that one has not lived up to. 
Study participants with significant loadings on Factor B include members of Groups 2-
MEHV, 4-HELV, 5-MELV, 6-LELV, and a youth NGO representative. Members of Groups 4 
and 5 are in the majority. The factor shares a number of cognitive patterns with those identified 
among industry NGOs associated with Group 4-HELV: the extraordinary concern for tipping 
points combined with fairly long time-horizons, an important role for governments domestically 
rather than internationally, a preference for market-based approaches but not laissez-faire poli-
cies (e.g., establishing a carbon price signal through carbon markets), and the need for greater 
voter support for officials in favor of climate action. The view that the UNFCCC is less impor-
tant than the numerous developments outside of it, ranging from small club and bilateral diplo-
macy to sub-national and NGO initiatives, is prominent among the diplomats in Group 4-HELV. 
There is also a notable concern about tipping points among the members of Group 5-MELV, 
both among the diplomats and the environment & market NGO representatives.    
Below I include the CAMs of the two individuals with the highest loading sorts on Factor B. 
The first is a diplomat in Group 4-HELV; the second is a youth NGO representative.  
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Figure 5-5: CAMs of Participants with Highest Loadings on Factor B 	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Given the major differences between the CAMs, this comparison highlights the power of Q 
to identify shared beliefs (underlying factors) that can help to bridge different policy positions. 
The first CAM shows a detailed engagement with legitimate sources of knowledge (upper 
right) and emphasizes why and how future climate change impacts matter for this person: they 
could lead to war, which is fundamentally opposed to what the individual believes to be in the 
national interest—a peaceful world, prosperity, and robust (energy) systems. The left side of the 
CAM reveals a number of reasons why the UN process is perceived as ineffective and unneces-
sary (e.g., obstructive participants with no abilities or willingness to contribute to the solution, 
the need to act domestically). The bottom area of the CAM contains concepts about wealth crea-
tion and the constraints it places on the speed of social change (i.e., the non-acceptability of 
wealth elimination or stranded assets). 
The second CAM contains numerous references to the future, which is an almost natural fo-
cus for a youth representative in the climate negotiations. Again, knowledge sources matter for 
this person and go far beyond abstract scientific information (upper right). Although the UN is 
viewed favorably, there is a strong awareness of the importance of domestic policy processes, 
placing the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of elected decision-makers, and expressing 
concern about campaign finance and vested interests. Further the person emphasizes the role of 
individuals and communities in creating the necessary changes. 
Neither CAM contains the concept tipping point because the interviews had not highlighted 
the concept as important. But when the Q sort forced these individuals to rank-order statement 65 
they assigned it score +4 and +5 respectively. 
The narrative summarizing the themes of the second CAM (The Global-Local Link) captures 
nearly all important elements of Factor B, but integrates the need for value change. Both climate 
change impacts and the solution to climate change have a global and a local dimension. The 
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problem severely affects the global poor, but there are also local losses in the developed world. 
The global solution needs to combine scientific effectiveness (i.e., staying within the 2°C target) 
and global equity (i.e., allowing developing countries to grow). There are strong links between 
this global goal and the domestic and even local dynamics. First, domestic politics and elector-
ates can present major obstacles to the global process because their values and positions shape 
governments’ negotiation positions. Second, value change at the individual and community level 
can make important contributions to solving the climate problem. Third, the young generation 
can give voice to the future in the UN process. 
 
3. Factor C – The Market 
Table 5-7: Extreme Factor Scores for Factor C 
Score Statement 
1. Human-released greenhouse gases are causing significant climate change. +5 48. All states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a global climate solution. 
9. An effective climate solution requires the cooperation of all governments around the world.  
18. Politicians need much stronger voter support and pressure from political movements to create 
meaningful climate policies. 
21. Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve this problem on their own—climate 
change is a multilevel problem and requires action at all of these different levels. 
+4 
25. The prospect of a cleaner, eco-friendly economy is exciting. 
2. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change.  
-5 39. Investment in climate policies is a poor use of our resources; it makes more sense to do some-
thing about poverty, health care and education in the developing world. 
6. Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing countries. 
13. All our efforts and resources to combat climate change should be concentrated domestically, 
rather than internationally. 
47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
-4 
58. It is already too late to do anything about climate change. 	  
There are some significant similarities between the extreme scores of Factors B and C 
(statements 1, 2, 6, 21, 25, 47, 58). But in combination with other statements they provide the 
foundations for a distinct perspective that emphasizes state cooperation within the UN, links be-
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tween international and domestic politics, a strong concern with economic growth, and a per-
sonal element that links one’s identity with the issue.  
Factor C’s high scores for statements 1 (+5) and 2 (-5) signal a desire to ground one’s beliefs 
in facts and science, similar to Factor B. However, this factor assigns the highest score also to a 
strong value statement about the moral responsibility of all states to contribute to a solution (48).  
Factor C also emphasizes the multilevel nature of the climate change problem (21). The UN 
negotiations are an essential part of the solution (9), but they are tightly connected to domestic 
political processes. The focus on the next domestic election is an obstacle to finding an interna-
tional agreement. In order to overcome national political constraints, politicians need much 
stronger voter support and pressure from below (18). Statement 19 concerning the blocking 
power of vested interests receives the lowest score among all factors (-2). This disagreement 
could mean that either vested interests are not considered to have much blocking power, or that 
this power could be overcome with voter support and grassroots pressure. 
A third theme is a strong preference for investments in climate policies rather than conven-
tional development aid (39), and for doing so at the international rather than domestic level (13). 
Combined with the rejection of statement 6 (Climate change is mainly an issue for the develop-
ing countries.) this forms a strong argument for global cooperation and a belief that climate 
change cannot be addressed without some form of global governance. However, this is not a call 
for international support schemes for poor countries, but the recognition that effective mitigation 
requires global cooperation. 
Factor C shows significantly less concern than others about the social consequences of cli-
mate change (statement 5, 0) and about issues related to the North-South divide. The possibility 
of death and violence as a consequence of climate change (statement 8) receives the lowest of all 
factor scores (+1); so do unfairness concerns (statement 7, +1). There is slight disagreement with 
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statement no. 28, which argues for a stronger focus on adaptation (-1), and this is the only factor 
that does not signal strong support for climate funding (0).  
Individuals loading on Factor C believe in the market as a source for solutions more than 
others (statement 15, +1). They are excited about a cleaner economy (statement 25, +4), and they 
agree more than any other factor (+1) with statement 38 (Economic growth is the best solution to 
climate change). Other scores confirm that they use economic frameworks of analysis when 
thinking about climate change: they support cost-benefit-analysis (statement 35, +2), and they 
score statement 36 (The main costs of climate change policies include loss of GDP and jobs.) 
higher than the other factors (0). But at the same time they believe that “the main costs of future 
climate change can simply not be calculated: the loss of human life, food insecurity, or species 
extinctions don’t have price tags.” (+2). The relationship between these scores suggests that 
these individuals’ belief systems are rooted in economic frameworks, but that other values occa-
sionally override or challenge this default mode. 
People loading on this factor seem to view climate change as an issue in which they are per-
sonally—not only professionally—invested. They dedicate their career to solving climate change 
(+3), and they express greater optimism than others in the possibility of finding a solution 
through negotiations (statement 55, +3). They have a strong sense of agency, rejecting the feel-
ing of helplessness (statement 53, -3). They are also the only ones who signal some concern 
about having “to explain our failure to fix the climate problem” to their grandchildren (+1), con-
necting agency and future accountability for failure.  
This personal angle seems to be linked to a strong national identity. These individuals per-
ceive their own government as constructive players in the negotiations (+1), and they strongly 
disagree with statement 41 (I am ashamed that my country is not doing more about climate 
change. -3). They signal more disagreement than others with the idea that the rich countries have 
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caused climate change and therefore have an obligation to fix it, which strengthens statement 48: 
All states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a global climate solution. (+5). The moral 
obligation to act does not seem to be based on any form of causality or historical responsibility, 
but simply on the global nature of the climate problem. It is possible that this statement was 
ranked so highly because of its emphasis on all states, rather than on moral obligations. This 
could reflect a desire to move oneself out of the spotlight of responsibility. 
Factor C has unusually strong negative responses to statements that refer to emotions. Apart 
from the rejection of shame, these individuals emphasize that they are not upset about the power 
disparities between the rich and poor (-2), and also have the lowest factor score (0) for statement 
44 (disappointment about lack of environmental concern). The rejection of helplessness (see 
above, -3) is coupled with an ambivalent score about the loss of hope (0). 
Members of Group 4-HELV, Group 5-MELV and one individual in Group 2-MEHV share 
this point of view. All except one are diplomats. The patterns identified through factor interpreta-
tion match those identified through CAM analysis of members of Group 4-HELV: a focus on the 
costs of action rather than the social costs of climate impacts, a concern with domestic political 
constraints affecting multilateral negotiations, a preference for global cooperation combined with 
confidence in market forces to contribute to a solution (e.g., CDM), and the absence or lack of 
importance of norms of justice.  
The person with the highest loading on Factor C is a diplomat in Group 4-HELV.   
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Figure 5-6: CAM of Participant with Highest Loading on Factor C 
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Concerns about climate change impacts are severe—more so than the factor suggests—but 
they are not connected to the person’s home country because “people in my country can deal 
with the consequences.” The overwhelmingly positive upper left side of the CAM demonstrates 
that this person perceives global cooperation in the UNFCCC as positive and desirable. Avoiding 
climate change (center) is in the global interest—the reason why all states have an obligation to 
contribute to a solution. This can only be achieved through mitigation with the help of market 
mechanisms—creating a price for carbon and its “externalities.” This CAM contains an interest-
ing line of argument why international cooperation on climate change is in the national interest 
of the country the person represents (upper left): fostering trade relations with (poorer) neigh-
bors, limiting costly demands for humanitarian assistance and finally a moral responsibility to 
those “less fortunate than us.”   
The CAM combines two narratives: National Interests trump International Ones and The 
Market. While expecting grave consequences, mainly for vulnerable populations in developing 
countries, the focus is on the cost burden of mitigation (i.e., funding the low-carbon energy sys-
tem transition) in countries seen as major emitters. The preferred pathway of change is domestic 
legislation that utilizes market mechanisms, for example, cap-and-trade systems, tax incentives, 
and public infrastructure investment to create a carbon price signal. The basic idea is that actors 
at all levels—individuals, firms, industries, and states—will rationally respond to incentives that 
align desirable behavior (emission reduction) with their immediate, economic self-interest. 
 
4. Factor D – Individuals 
Table 5-8: Extreme Factor Scores for Factor D 
Score Statement 
+5 18. Politicians need much stronger voter support and pressure from political movements to create meaningful climate policies. 
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 22. A key element in solving the climate problem is the need for fundamental value change 
within our societies. 
1. Human-released greenhouse gases are causing significant climate change. 
7. Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries, but its impacts will hurt poor 
countries most—this asymmetry is unfair. 
21. Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve this problem on their own—climate 
change is a multilevel problem and requires action at all of these different levels. 
+4 
49. The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical responsibility to future 
generations.  
6. Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing countries.  -5 15. The climate problem should be left to the markets. 
2. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change. 
47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
50. Future generations are likely to be richer and better off than we are, and better able to deal 
with climate change. 
-4 
58. It is already too late to do anything about climate change. 	  
Instead of being concerned with states or market forces, Factor D places heavy emphasis on 
individuals and their political roles and power to create change. A second theme evolves around 
fairness and ethical responsibilities among human beings (rather than states). This ethical theme 
relates to a number of issues, including a responsibility to future generations, the decisive rejec-
tion of geo-engineering, and a location of responsibility to address climate change in the devel-
oped world. Third, this point of view is skeptical of growth, market forces, and neoliberal policy 
frameworks. 
The two highest scores for statements 18 and 22 express the belief that the key for addressing 
climate change lies in the values and attitudes of individuals, who have the power—as voters or 
grassroots organizers—to change the politics of climate change and to influence their govern-
ment’s negotiation position. In line with this focus on individual agency, this factor disagrees 
with statement 17 according to which individual contributions do not make a difference (-3). 
Value change at the individual level is the first step towards meaningful climate action at the 
community, national and international level (see statement 21 for the multilevel nature of the 
problem), but it is still unclear what values should be discarded and which new ones adopted. 
The unusually high score (+3) for statement 23 (Based on our shared humanity, our desire for 
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happiness and security, we can find a solution to the climate problem.) suggests that these might 
be collective human values like happiness and security rather than individual ones like independ-
ence and property. Consequently this factor strongly rejects the power of the markets (statement 
15), which cater to and are driven by individual interests in profit and consumption. 
Concerns about unfairness in the relationship between the rich and the poor are very promi-
nent in Factor D. In addition to the perceived unfairness of the asymmetry of climate impacts 
(statement 7), individuals loading on this factor are upset about power disparities among coun-
tries in the UNFCCC negotiations (statement 14, +2). This point of view strongly rejects the idea 
that climate change is a problem for the developing countries only (-5). Leaving the developing 
countries—in essence, the victims—alone with this problem would be immoral. One could con-
clude that individuals with this point of view believe that developed countries have an ethical 
obligation to address climate change. However, the high scores for statements 7 and 49 elevate 
ethical themes of responsibility among human beings, but not necessarily among states. There is 
neither agreement nor disagreement with the argument that states are the most important players 
in global climate politics (0). States matter somehow, but it is individual human beings who ex-
perience and are subject to moral duties. In line with this argument the score for statement 48 
regarding the moral responsibility of all states to contribute to a solution is positive (+2) but 
lower than in any other factor. And there is only modest agreement with statement 52 (The rich 
countries have caused the problem; consequently they have the obligation to fix it., +1). 
This ethical framework of thinking about climate change has a number of extensions. The 
most obvious one is a concern about future generations, who are expected to be worse off than 
the present generation due to climate change. The belief that the present generation plays a role 
in diminishing the potential for happiness of future generations adds to a sense of personal re-
sponsibility today. This is expressed in at least three ways: disagreement with the idea that prob-
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lems that might arise decades from now are not important (-4), fear for one’s children’s future 
(+2), and concern about having to explain our failure to address climate change to one’s grand-
children (+1). (The scores for statements 54 and 63 are higher than in other factors).  
Another extension is a fairly strong rejection of neoliberal ideas that prioritize economic 
growth (statement 33, -3; statement 38, -3), utilize market forces to address the problem (state-
ment 15, -5) and frame the issue in terms of a cost-benefit analysis (statement 35, -2). Instead 
Factor D identifies vested interests as a problem (statement 19, +2). 
It is possible that this factor’s ethical framework and distancing from neoliberal ideas is also 
linked to its rejection of geo-engineering, either as a cost-effective solution to the mitigation 
challenge (-3) or even as a tool to buy more time for mitigation and adaptation (-2). There might 
be an underlying mistrust of technological quick fixes that merely seek to avoid dealing with our 
generations’ ethical responsibilities. Geo-engineered solutions might allow the world to continue 
on its current economic development path without the value change that this factor has identified 
as most important for addressing climate change. 
  There are five emotional statements that receive fairly high factor scores (+2 or +3). These 
include excitement about a cleaner economic future (25), disappointment about a lack of envi-
ronmental concern in state and market institutions (44), distress over major environmental 
change (40), fear for one’s children’s future (54) and upset about power imbalances in the UN 
(14). With the exception of fear for one’s children’s future, all of these are emotional responses 
to collective states of affair or societal conditions. 
The ten Q study participants whose sorts load significantly on Factor D represent all six par-
ticipant groups. They include diplomats from Groups 2-MEHV, 3-LEHV, 4-HELV, and 6-LELV 
and NGO representatives from Groups 1-HEHV, 2-MEHV and 5-MELV. Given this diversity of 
individuals sharing a viewpoint, it is difficult to identify a participant group whose CAM patterns 
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offer a strong match with the cognitive patterns of Factor D. Rather the factor presents a combi-
nation of beliefs that exist across different participant groups.  
The view that individuals matter as voters in a two-level game shows up consistently across 
all six participant groups, among diplomats and NGO members alike. People who believe in the 
power of voters also tend to emphasize the power of civil society organizations to change voter 
attitudes, to create the broad public awareness through framing and mobilization that allows gov-
ernments to take costly climate action and more ambitious negotiation positions in the UN. This 
focus on individuals and civil society is particularly strong among Group 2-MEHV, representa-
tives of Environment & Market NGOs (Group 5-MELV), and diplomats in Group 6-LELV. The 
diplomats in Group 2 identify additional ways in which individuals can make a difference: deci-
sions by political leaders and lifestyle changes by consumers. Youth NGO members add another 
angle to individual responsibility, emphasizing the importance of local and community activities 
through which people can take care of each other and take responsibility for the environment. 
The beliefs of Youth NGO members support two additional features of Factor D: they have a 
desire to speak on behalf of future generations and are concerned about the implications of cli-
mate change for those future generations. They also identify with young people around the 
world, especially with members of the climate youth movement, emphasizing shared elements of 
human identity that go far beyond the state. 
The idea of shared human values and a human community has a strong influence on the be-
liefs of Group 2-MEHV, Group 3-LEHV, and Group 6-LELV. They emphasize values like mu-
tual survival, solidarity, and protection of the weakest and argue that ethics should take priority 
over profits. In their view inaction (regarding climate change) is a moral failure inconsistent with 
the values of the human community.  
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The person with the highest loading on Factor D is a youth NGO representative, who had 
also the second highest loading sort on Factor B (see above). 
Figure 5-7: CAM of Participant with Highest Loading on Factor D 	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The CAM reflects most of the key themes identified for Factor D. Individuals clearly matter, 
both through community-based action at home (lower-right) and through civil society action 
(upper-left). Future generations need to be given voice through the youth movement, because 
decisions today will shape the future. Given the major social impacts of climate change the pre-
sent generation has a responsibility to address the problem in order to minimize its impact on 
land and people (present and future). The market and economic growth play no role in this per-
son’s envisioned solution to climate change.  The CAM’s narrative—The Global-Local Link—
emphasizes the multilevel nature of climate change and the importance of individual choices and 
values within this setup.  
 
5. Factor E – The Developed World 
Table 5-9: Extreme Factor Scores for Factor E 
Score Statement 
1. Human-released greenhouse gases are causing significant climate change. 
+5 7. Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries, but its impacts will hurt poor 
countries most—this asymmetry is unfair. 
18. Politicians need much stronger voter support and pressure from political movements to create 
meaningful climate policies. 
21. Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve this problem on their own—climate 
change is a multilevel problem and requires action at all of these different levels. 
49. The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical responsibility to future 
generations. 
+4 
52. The rich countries have caused the problem; consequently they have the obligation to fix it. 
6. Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing countries. -5 58. It is already too late to do anything about climate change. 
2. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change. 
15. The climate problem should be left to the markets. 
7. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. -4 
57. Climate change is simply too complex and overwhelming. It is impossible to fully under-
stand, let alone solve, the problem. 
 
The extreme scores of Factor E show major overlap with those of Factor D. The similarities 
include a heavy emphasis on unfairness, which is even more pronounced in Factor E, a belief in 
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the power of voters and political movements to influence global climate politics indirectly by 
creating political pressure on politicians at the domestic level, the ethical responsibility of the 
current generation of politicians, who must not leave the developing countries to grapple with 
this alone, and a lack of confidence in the power of the market to solve the climate problem. 
However, there are a number of significant differences that differentiate these two factors. 
First, the argument that the rich countries have an obligation to fix the problem because they 
have caused it in combination with an emphasis of unfairness suggest that this perspective is 
about climate justice as many developing country diplomats and members of the climate justice 
movement define it. Confirming this assumption, the participant with the highest loading on this 
factor stated that she had assigned score +5 to statements 7 and 52 because “Climate change is a 
climate justice issue.” This perspective also explains this factor’s strong disagreement with 
statement 6 (-5). She commented “Developed countries have the biggest share of responsibility 
in dealing with the problem.” This view is strongly grounded in a distinction between developed 
and developing countries and allocates responsibility in the developed world. States play an im-
portant role, either as perpetrators or victims of injustice.   
The high score for the ethical argument in statement 49 is likely intended to emphasize the 
responsibility of politicians rather than individual voters. This assumption is bolstered by the 
comparatively low score (+1) for the statement about needed value change within our societies 
(22), which was one of the most important ideas in Factor D. Factor E deemphasized the role of 
individuals and civil society as compared to state governments. 
Third, Factor E strongly disagrees with the suggestion that climate change might be too com-
plex to understand or solve (statement 57, -5). This score implies a conviction that somebody or 
some group of actors is capable of solving the climate problem with the knowledge and tech-
nologies existing today. The forcefulness of the response to statement 57 indicates a concern that 
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the rich could use this argument as an excuse for not acting and for shirking their moral obliga-
tions.  
Fourth, Factor E emphasizes the importance of adaptation and support for the developing 
countries (statement 28, +3), which is not a strong feature of Factor D. There is also significant 
support for the argument that economic growth is desirable (statement 34, +3). Given the general 
views on the differences between the global North and South, the argument in favor of growth 
might be intended to apply to the developing world only. These individuals reject the idea that 
growth is be a solution to climate change (statement 38, -3). Further, they strongly disagree with 
the notion that taxes or other property constraints are not politically acceptable. As one partici-
pant commented on statement 32: “The enforcement of property rights is one of the main obsta-
cles to blocked progress on the climate issue - they prevent the transfer of what would be ex-
tremely useful and effective technologies, finance, and intellect. … Since the purpose of politics 
is to serve society, it should be irrelevant whether this responsibility is politically popular or 
not.”  
Participants who load on this factor include members of Youth NGOs, and Groups 2-MEHV, 
4-HELV, and 5-MELV. The strongest match between CAM patterns and the beliefs of Factor E 
exist for Group 2-MEHV, especially faith & development NGOs: a clear distinction between de-
veloped and developing countries, and a justice framework to explain their relationship, histori-
cal responsibility as the foundation for the obligation of the developed world to address the cli-
mate problem, support for adaptation measures and resource flows from North to South, and a 
focus on state actors rather than civil society, markets or individuals.  
The CAM of the highest loading individual is included below.  
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Figure 5-8: CAM of Participant with Highest Loading on Factor E 
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The main themes are easily identified: a strong concern for poor people and the injustice 
done to them through climate change (upper-middle) and the need to lift them out of poverty; the 
notion of difference between the rich and the poor as the deeper reason of injustice (lower-right); 
the concept of historical responsibility and the anger about the lack of political will to address 
climate change among the big emitters (upper right); and adaptation, technology transfer and 
climate finance as core elements of a climate governance regime (lower-middle). 
The narrative capturing the core ideas of this CAM is Addressing Historical Grievances, 
which is based on the fundamental differences between the developed and developing countries, 
and the overriding priority to overcome these differences (i.e., to make poor people better off), 
even if that places constraints on the solution to climate change. 
 
6. Factor F – The Irresponsible West 
Table 5-10: Extreme Factor Scores for Factor F 
Score Statement 
22. A key element in solving the climate problem is the need for fundamental value change 
within our societies. +5 49.	  The	  current	  generation	  (of	  politicians	  and	  voters)	  has	  a	  major	  ethical	  responsibility	  to	  future	  generations.	  
14. The power disparities between countries in climate negotiations make me very upset.  18.	  Politicians	  need	  much	  stronger	  voter	  support	  and	  pressure	  from	  political	  movements	  to	  create	  meaningful	  climate	  policies.	  25.	  The	  prospect	  of	  a	  cleaner,	  eco-­‐friendly	  economy	  is	  exciting.	  +4 
41. I am ashamed that my country is not doing more about climate change. 
45. My government is a very constructive player in international affairs. -5 47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
2. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change. 
4. I do not believe that we will see significant effects of climate change in my lifetime. 
15. The climate problem should be left to the markets.  -4 
50. Future generations are likely to be richer and better off than we are, and better able to deal 
with climate change. 
 
Five themes characterize this final factor. The most important theme is the need for value 
change within our—presumably Western—societies as an ethical responsibility of the current 
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generation to future ones. The future is an important part of this perspective. It is expected to be 
worse than the present due to climate impacts in one’s own lifetime. The third theme concerns 
the importance of national identity and associated feelings of disappointment and shame about 
one’s government’s poor climate action record. The weaker themes include being upset about 
existing power disparities in the negotiations, which hints at underlying equity concerns and a 
focus on the North-South divide, and skepticism about the market’s power to address climate 
change.  
Value change is at the center of this belief system. When acted upon in elections or in civil 
society organizations, value change can influence national politics and eventually international 
negotiations. Participants’ comments and CAMs elucidate why value change is so central for ad-
dressing climate change and what type of value change people envision. One person explained 
why statement 22 deserved score +5: “I think a new political wave … world wide presents a po-
tential to solve the climate problem, and I think that an enhanced understanding of human con-
nectedness as well as ecosystem and earth system sciences play an important role in creating a 
foundation for principled climate politics. When I think about the need for value change, or "a 
new story" to define climate politics, I am also thinking about the need to expand collective con-
sciousness (or identify) beyond individual, family, and national borders.” The same individual 
justified the highest score for statement 18: “I do not see it possible to realize significant progress 
on climate change without a strong mobilization for change and action from local, provincial and 
national governments. It is necessary for many complementary efforts to unfold at the same time 
- ranging from market measures, innovation and enhanced communication of science - but if 
state policies are chosen with the goal of ensuring an elected party’s political survival, then it is 
incumbent on the electorate to demand strong climate policy.“  
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The CAMs of individuals with high loadings on Factor F contain concerns about a growing 
consumption-orientation of the world, the need to rethink the old development paradigm of the 
West, including “what we eat, what we produce, and where our ambitions lie,” the need for more 
community focus, sustainable lifestyles and emotional health rather than “North-American con-
sumerism and entertainment focus,”  and a “social conscience shift” in the next generation of 
voters, which requires “special people” to take risks and leadership. Addressing climate change 
requires personal change of individuals in Western societies: on the one hand they need to reori-
ent their personal and community lives, on the other they have to exercise their democratic rights 
and push their societies in a new direction with their votes and political mobilization for climate 
action. Shared humanity (statement 23, 0) does not play a role in this reorientation. 
Interestingly, Factor F shows only weak disagreement with the argument that individual con-
tributions do not make a difference in climate policy. This suggests that individual choices have 
a limited reach if they are not complemented by actions at other levels of the system. The ex-
treme factor scores do not indicate a strong role for the state or the markets, but a particular set of 
governments—those of Western, industrialized countries—seems to be at the center of view’s 
call for action. Opposing the idea that climate change is an issue for the developing countries (-
3), believing that all states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a solution (+3), and giving 
the highest of all factor scores to the argument that states are the most important players in global 
climate politics (+2), individuals with this perspective focus on the big emitters in the Global 
North and their responsibility to deal with mitigation. Apart from unfairness concerns (statement 
7, +3) issues related to the North-South divide do not have high factor scores. This group is am-
bivalent about the UN as a forum to create the necessary changes; they have the highest factor 
score for statement 59: There are moments when I lose all hope that the UNFCCC process can 
solve this problem. (+2). 
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Like Factor E this factor emphasizes the importance of the future and is pessimistic about the 
trajectory of humanity. Future generations are not expected to be better off, and climate impacts 
are expected to occur over the coming decades (i.e., one’s lifetime). Individuals who load on this 
factor show the strongest agreement among all participants with the idea that climate change will 
result in violence and deaths (+3). They also show fairly strong agreement with statement 5 (The 
social consequences of climate change are most worrying: …,” +2), and disagree with the argu-
ment that climate change is just one among many important problems today (statement 61, -2). 
While not trusting the market to deal with climate change, individuals with this view are not 
opposed to the use of market-based mechanisms or to the mobilization of private resources for 
climate action. One participant commented: “I think climate markets play an important role in 
solving the climate problem, … I also believe in the potential for market-based measures to gen-
erate revenue to support public goods, such as mitigation and adaptation measures in developing 
countries, while also removing incentives to pollute. However, I think the scope of the climate 
problem is so huge that it's solution will not be ushered by market logic, especially when the 
growth imperative that drives state interests is also closely coupled with carbon emissions.” 
This is an exceptionally emotional factor. Emotional statements received higher scores than 
in any other factor (e.g., 14 [upset], 25 [excited] and 41 [ashamed] were ranked +4). Particularly 
noteworthy is the high score for shame, which has a large score spread (-3 to 4) and an average 
raw score of 0. This appears to be the only factor that is able to embrace shame as a negative 
self-referential emotion, facilitated by national identity as the link between oneself and the 
shameful behavior of the state. These individuals feel ashamed on behalf of their governments, 
who have disappointed certain expectations or norms of behavior that the person experiencing 
shame approves of. Other emotions with fairly high scores (+2) are hopelessness, depression, and 
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disappointment. The perception of climate change as depressing is an exception among the Q 
study participants; all other factor scores rank this statement 0.  
This perspective is shared exclusively by NGO representatives, including individuals in the 
youth, faith, environment and business communities. No single participant group offers a good 
match in terms of the cognitive patterns identified in the CAMs and the factor interpretation. 
This is a perspective that the CAM analysis was not able to identify in its entirety.  
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Figure 5-9: CAM of Participant with Highest Loading on Factor F 	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The lower-right area of the CAM speaks to the issue of value change and a stronger commu-
nity orientation instead of consumerism. The importance of the state and national identity are 
indicated on the left, expressing frustration with current government policies and a belief in the 
power of civil society activism to shape political outcomes (upper-left). Mitigation plays a much 
stronger role than adaptation or equity issues related to the North-South divide. Nevertheless, 
equity and fairness are important themes, as are environmental effectiveness and ambivalence 
about the role of the UNFCCC.  
The narrative for this CAM is the same as for Factor D—The Global-Local Link—despite the 
differences that divide these viewpoints. Another strongly related narrative is Western Voters 
have the Power, which focuses on the potential of voters in Western democracies to bring about 
policy change through their political activism and support for climate action. 
 
My personal Q sort loads on Factors A (0.51), B (0.41) and D (0.45). 
 
The two tables below summarize the central cognitive themes of all six factors with an em-
phasis on beliefs about agency, structure, identity, justice, and the special characteristics of cli-
mate change, and the emotional patterns. 
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Table 5-11: Summary of Cognitive Themes 
Factor A B C D E F 
 The International 
Community 
A Minilateral 
Club 
The Market Individuals The Developed 
World 
The Irresponsible 
West 
Agency 
States in the 
UNFCCC (espe-
cially BASIC)  
Small group of 
states, elected offi-
cials 
UNFCCC, states, 
voters 
Individuals States Western States, 
voter-consumers 
Structure 
 Two-level game, 
domestic politics/ 
elections 
Two-level game, 
domestic politics/ 
elections 
Domestic politics, 
elections, vested 
interests 
Two-level game  
Identity Community of states 
National Individual, national Humanity Developed vs. de-
veloping countries 
National 
Justice 
Climate change is a 
moral issue, states 
are the subject of 
norms  
  Fairness and ethics, 
individuals are the 
subject of norms, 
rich vs. poor 
Fairness and ethics, 
North-South equity 
and wealth distribu-
tion 
North-South equity 
Ideas & 
Values 
New development 
paradigm, growth 
and consumption 
are the problem, 
value change 
Facts and science Growth and market 
forces 
Value change, 
shared humanity, 
community-focus 
Poverty eradication  Value change, sus-
tainable lifestyles, 
voting 
Emotions 
Excitement, disap-
pointment 
Excitement, distress Rejection of shame, 
fear for kids’ future 
Excitement, disap-
pointment 
Rejection of over-
whelming complex-
ity 
Upset, shame, de-
pression 
Special 
Charac- 
teristics 
 Tipping points   Rejection of over-
whelming complex-
ity 
 
Other 
Equal focus on ad-
aptation and mitiga-
tion; geo-
engineering re-
mains an option 
Balancing mitiga-
tion and growth 
Global cooperation 
on mitigation 
Rejection of geo-
engineering and 
neo-liberalism 
Emphasis on adap-
tation, mistrust of 
market mechanisms 
Focus on future 
generations 
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Table 5-12: Summary Table Emotional Patterns 
FACTOR SCORE EMOTION 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
(14) Upset    C  B A DE  F  
(25) Excited        E AD BCF  
(40) Distressed       AF CD BE   
(41) Shame   C A   DE B  F  
(44) Disappointed      C BE AF D   
(53) Helpless   C B ADE  F     
(54) Fear (kids’ future)      AEF C BD    
(56) Depressed      ABCDE  F    
(57) Overwhelmed  E BCF  AD       
(59) Hopeless      CDE AB F    
(60) Scared (Unknown)     ABCE DF      
(63) Guilt     BF AE CD     	  	  	  
There is broad agreement among the six factors regarding a large number of emotions, al-
though most of the negative emotions received lower scores than I expected (e.g., fear driven by 
uncertainty about future impacts). Unsurprisingly excitement as the only positive emotion re-
ceived the most positive scores (+2 - +4). Particularly noteworthy is the near-consensus on 
statement 56 (Climate change is a depressing issue.), which received score 0 (neither agree nor 
disagree) in all factors except F. Being overwhelmed by the complexity of climate change is the 
only feeling with negative scores in all factors, although the strength of rejection differed (-4 to -
1). 
The factors disagree regarding the statements on being upset, ashamed, and feeling helpless. 
For each of these emotions the scores of Factors C and F are at opposite ends of the score spec-
trum, indicating that these two factors have symmetrical emotional patterns. 
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Factors A and D seem to have very similar emotional patterns. Factors D and E and Factors 
A and B show a weaker pattern of similarity.  
 
IV. THOUGHT COMMUNITIES 
All participants responded to four Yes/No questions to reveal simple and fundamental beliefs 
about climate change and cooperation. These questions were: 
Do	  you	  think	  climate	  change	  is	  an	  important	  problem,	  i.e.,	  among	  the	  top	  five	  issues	  
global	  leaders	  should	  worry	  about?	  
Are	  you	  optimistic	  that	  climate	  change	  will	  be	  addressed	  effectively	  with	  cooperative	  
international	  policies,	  i.e.,	  is	  it	  a	  tractable	  problem?	  
Does	  your	  home	  country	  have	  comparatively	  high	  GHG	  emissions?	  	  
Do	   you	   expect	   your	   home	   country	   will	   be	   strongly,	   negatively	   affected	   by	   climate	  
change?	  
Based on their responses participants can be grouped into six different belief types or thought 
communities. The following table lists both the number of individuals who fall into each thought 
community, and which participant groups they belong to. 
Table 5-13: Thought Communities 
Response Pattern Thought Community No. of Par-
ticipants 
Participant Groups 
YYYY Reasonable Optimists 7 4-HELV (6), 5-MELV (1) 
YYYN Moral Optimists 6 1-HEHV (1), 4-HELV (1), 5-MELV (3), 6-LELV (1)  
YYNY Optimists without a Choice 6 
2-MEHV (4), 3-LEHV (1), 5-MELV 
(1) 
YNYY / YNYN Powerful Pessimists 8 1-HEHV (2), 2-MEHV (1), 3-LEHV (1), 4-HELV (3), 5-MELV (1) 
YNNY / YNNN Powerless Pessimists 1 4-HELV (1) 
NYYY / NNYY / 
NYYN Negligent Deniers 0 
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The largest thought community are Powerful Pessimists—individuals from countries with 
high levels of emissions that have the capability to address the mitigation challenge and to pro-
vide the resources to help vulnerable countries deal with impacts of climate change. With one 
exception all of these pessimists represent non-state actor groups.  
Overall the optimists far outweigh the pessimists (68%), with the majority of optimistic dip-
lomats in participant Group 4-HELV. There is a natural match between Reasonable Optimists 
and participant Group 4-HELV, because members of Groups 1 and 4 are nationals of countries 
with the highest national GHG emission levels and therefore the ability to act on climate change 
if there is a political decision to do so. The match between Moral Optimists and Groups 4-
HELV, 5-MELV, and to some extent Group 6-LELV was also expected. Countries with low vul-
nerability but significant emission levels, who are willing to contribute to a cooperative solution 
have reasons to be optimistic, but are expected to act out of concern for others rather than them-
selves. Members of participant Groups 2-MEHV and 3-LEHV tend to be Optimists without a 
Choice—due to their lower levels of emissions they cannot make any significant contributions to 
global emission reduction efforts, but their high exposure to climate change impacts is indicative 
of a strong desire to find a cooperative global solution. With the exception of a self-identified 
Powerless Pessimist in Group 4-HELV, and the large number of Powerful Pessimists in the 
NGO community, these response patterns confirm my prior expectations about variables that in-
fluence the thought patterns of negotiation participants (national emission levels and vulnerabil-
ity), and how they do so. They also confirm that the perceptions of participants largely match the 
measures for emissions and vulnerability I used to establish the six participant groups. The 
thought communities also match the existing negotiation alliances in the UNFCCC:  the Reason-
able Optimists are all members of the Umbrella Group, the Moral Optimists are all representa-
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tives of EU member states, and the Powerless Optimists are members of the G77 and China, the 
LDCs and AILAC.  
Figure 5-10: Thought Communities and Participant Groups 
	  
It is more difficult to establish a clear pattern between thought communities and factors. Ta-
ble 5-14 shows how many individuals from each thought community load on each factor (e.g., 
the sorts of two Reasonable Optimists load significantly on Factor A). As the table indicates in-
dividuals within the same thought community (and negotiation alliance) tend to have very differ-
ent viewpoints. There are only weak patterns of association between the Reasonable Optimists 
and Factor C (The Market), Moral Optimists and Factor B, Optimists without a Choice and Fac-
tor D, and Powerful Pessimists and Factor E. 
Table 5-14: Thought Communities and Q Factors 
 Reasonable 
Optimists 
(7) 
Moral Op-
timists (6) 
Optimists 
without a 
Choice (6) 
Powerful 
Pessimists 
(8) 
Powerless 
Pessimists 
(1) 
A 2 2 2 3 1 
B 3 4 2 2  
C 5 3 1   
D 2 1 4 3  
E 1 1 3 4  
F  1  3  	  
Different members of the Umbrella Group and of the G77 and China load on factors A to E, 
and different EU representative load of factors A to D. Factor F can be found exclusively among 
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NGO representatives. This indicates that the existing negotiation alliances contain individuals 
with very different points of view, and not in all cases easily compatible ones. Negotiation alli-
ances therefore reflect the current material reality (i.e., levels of emissions and vulnerability), but 
not the ideational reality of existing beliefs about climate change and multilateral cooperation. 
It is important to note that most people’s sorts load on two or even three factors, and there-
fore appear multiple times in the table above. For example, the study participant with ID 6 is a 
Reasonable Optimist and loads significantly on Factors A, C, and E. Consequently ID 6 is in-
cluded in the count in three different rows in the Reasonable Optimists column. 
This raises the question whether there are significant patterns of factor association—if people 
hold two of the viewpoints identified in the factor analysis, which combinations are possible or 
even common? Given the small number of participants, the patterns identified here are only 
weak indicators of all possible combinations and can say even less about the popularity and 
strength of these combinations in the larger community of climate negotiators. Nevertheless, 
these are interesting avenues to pursue in future research. Eight factor combinations occurred at 
least twice, and below I list the four that occurred three times. 
• The International Community & The Market (AC) in Groups 2-MEHV and 4-HELV, 
• The International Community & Individuals (AD) in Groups 2-MEHV and 4-HELV, 
• A Minilateral Club & The Developed World (BE) in Groups 2-MEHV and 5-MELV, 
• A Minilateral Club & Individuals (BD) in Groups 5-MELV and 6-LELV. 
 
V. SUMMARY 
Although working with the same participants and the same topic, the Q study has offered a 
very different angle on existing cognitive patterns from the CAM analysis. The method imposes 
a number of limits and boundaries that enable greater comparability across different individuals’ 
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viewpoints and facilitates a more rigorous comparison. The circumstance that all individuals 
have to respond to the same set of statements and thus work with limited conceptual resources 
clearly limits how well participants can express their beliefs. For example, based on the set of 
statements used, the Q analysis was not able to identify the rich diversity of beliefs regarding the 
different cost categories linked to climate change revealed by CAMs, or the different identity 
groups participants associated with it. But this exploratory weakness is balanced by the ability of 
Q to identify shared viewpoints among participating individuals regardless of their membership 
in one of the six participant groups, a specific negotiation alliance, or any other formal categori-
zation. A CAM analysis has to rely on artificially created categories like participant groups and 
is not able to uncover these ‘natural’ groups of individuals who think and feel alike. Given these 
different strengths and weaknesses both methods complement each other well. 
The Q analysis identified six distinct belief systems that capture a large percentage but far 
from all the variance in the beliefs of the 28 participants. The data set resulted in an exception-
ally high number of confounded sorts, which suggests that most individuals hold parts of more 
than one belief system. This is an indicator of the large complexity of climate change as a global 
governance issue, but also offers bridges between different viewpoints. The six factors reflect 
mainly the views of individuals in participant groups 2-MEHV, 4-HELV, 5-MELV, and youth 
NGO representatives. Important perspectives are not included (e.g., AOSIS, ALBA, LDCs) be-
cause of the constraints of the P set. 
Some of the factors match the CAM-based cognitive patterns of certain participant groups 
strongly, for example, Factor A and Group 2-MEHV, Factor B and NGOs associated with Group 
4-HELV, or Factor C and diplomats in Group 4-HELV. For other factors such a clear match does 
not exist. The big advantage of Q is the emergence of natural groups with a shared point of view 
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that tend to contain individuals from multiple participant groups. The most impressive example 
is Factor D, which is shared by individuals from all six participant groups and is therefore inde-
pendent of national GHG emission levels or vulnerability. 
Regardless of the factors, all study participants share a number of beliefs concerning the real-
ity of climate change and the trustworthiness of scientists, a concern about the future, an expecta-
tion that climate change impacts will occur in their lifetime and a strong conviction that it is not 
yet too late to address the problem. There is also a shared belief in the multilevel nature of cli-
mate change governance, and the need for greater voter support/grassroots pressure, possibly 
combined with or driven by societal value change, to create the conditions for political action on 
climate change. 
Study participants are strongly divided over a small number of arguments. The question 
whether all states or just a small number of big emitters are necessary for an effective interna-
tional agreement pits Factors A and C against Factor B. The need for broad value change within 
our societies is contested between Factors A and D on the one side and Factors B and C on the 
other. The ability of market forces to address climate change pits Factors C and F against all oth-
ers. An issue that is contested among all six factors concerns a moral obligations framework for 
dealing with climate change rather than a national interests framework. Factors A, E and F favor 
the former; Factors B, C and D the latter. This reflects the CAM-based finding that some nego-
tiators use a mainly normative decision-making framework, while others apply a rationalist or 
utilitarian framework to make sense of the problem.  
Each of the six factors has a unique cognitive structure, focusing on different actor types, the 
sources of these actors’ respective obligations to act on climate change, the shape their action 
should take, and the structural constraints they have to contend with, the prospects for success 
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and the emotions associated with these beliefs. At the center of each belief system is an actor 
type that grounds, facilitates, and constrains all other beliefs. Without clearly defined actors, it is 
impossible to think about a problem in terms of threats or opportunities, about obligations or 
possible actions. 
For example, a focus on the international community as a collective actor (The International 
Community) is associated with a cluster of concepts about the identity of this group, for example, 
concepts about the benefits and disadvantages associated with the growth-oriented model of de-
velopment that is currently shared by most states, and with an ethical framework that places 
states at the center. The factor develops solutions for climate change from the perspective of the 
international community of states, bearing in mind the specific capabilities and constraints of this 
particular actor group, for example, its ability to create multilateral agreements and its current 
struggle to overcome North-South differences. At the other end of the possible actor spectrum is 
the individual, which is the focus of Factor D (Individuals). Again, identity concepts and ethical 
norms focus on the individual as the defining feature of the belief system. Rather than thinking 
about the community of states this cosmopolitan belief system creates a community of individual 
human beings around the world. From this starting point, action options and solutions to climate 
change depend on the ability of individuals (alone or collectively) to influence the political proc-
ess as voters, consumers or community organizers. 
The Market stands out as a belief system that does not include ethical obligations for any-
body to address climate change. Although it is a state-centric perspective, there are very few 
concepts regarding the actor’s identity and character—the state as an idea has become so normal-
ized that it does not even require any description. Further, the belief system strongly responds to 
emotional statements, denying that they (should) play a role in thinking about climate change 
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cooperation. The Market therefore stands out as a non-moral and anti-emotional factor that 
shares very little with the other five belief systems identified here. At the opposite end of the 
identity and emotional spectrum (see below) is the belief system The Irresponsible West. It em-
braces negative emotions, even those relating to the person’s own national identity, and responds 
to the climate change based on these negative emotions. 
Some factors (B, C, E and F) have a more difficult time defining the relevant actor groups 
than others (A and D). For example, A Minilateral Club advocate a club approach to multilateral 
cooperation, referring to some, yet unspecified countries, but not all of them. The Market uses 
vague notions of market power and market mechanisms without being able to point to specific 
actors and specific actions that would address the climate challenge. The picture becomes clearer 
once the role of the state as a regulator and creator of economic frameworks like cap-and-trade 
systems is added. Similarly, The Developed World has to refer to “the developed countries” or 
the North-South divide, and The Irresponsible West to “the Western countries” to present their 
point of view. Understanding these perspectives and their actor definitions requires a lot of sys-
temic knowledge and historical-ideational context, for example, the global history of develop-
ment that allowed concepts like the Global South or Western countries to emerge. This might be 
a weakness when seeking support for these belief systems among populations who lack such 
contextual knowledge. Logical coherence is harder to achieve for people who acquire one of 
these belief systems. 
There is broad agreement among the six factors regarding a large number of emotions. 
Noteworthy is in particular the near-consensus on statement 56 (Climate change is a depressing 
issue.), which received score 0 (neither agree nor disagree) in all factors except F. Being over-
whelmed by the complexity of climate change was the only feeling that received negative scores 
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from all factors. There are differences regarding being upset, ashamed, and feeling helpless. For 
each of these emotions the scores of Factors C and F are at opposite ends of the spectrum, indi-
cating that these two factors have symmetrically opposed emotional patterns and are unlikely to 
offer opportunities for agreement. The other factors do not have such emotional obstacles to rec-
onciliation. F (The Irresponsible West) is an emotional outlier does not find acceptance among 
diplomats, possibly because it embraces negative self-referential emotions like shame. 
Feeling in control, in other words, not being overwhelmed by the scale or complexity of cli-
mate change and the daunting challenge of designing a functioning governance regime, appears 
to be an important emotional need in five out of six belief systems I identified in this study. A 
sense of control is linked to agency and is an important ingredient for defining obligations and 
tasks of various actors, including oneself or the group one represents. While the majority of indi-
viduals maintain a sense of control by simply rejecting a number of concepts and emotions, it is 
questionable whether control-maintenance is a productive cognitive mechanism. To the extent 
that control over climate change or the future of humanity is a fiction, maintaining a false belief 
in control can severely limit the governance options actors consider or the action they eventually 
take to address the problem. However, none of the six belief systems has been able to use this 
emotion as a motivator for action and it is unclear how individuals engaged in the global political 
process should deal with this problem. 
Apart from identifying potential synergies and links between factors, it is also important to 
note fundamental differences between factors D, E and F. All of them contain a strong justice-
related element, and one could easily group them under a thematic climate justice umbrella. But 
they present distinct points of view with varying levels of integration potential with other factors. 
Individuals is a cosmopolitan view of individual responsibilities and a shared humanity—it takes 
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each person to task and demands action from those who hold the belief. The Developed World is 
the opposite—it refers to groups of states as the most important subjects of rights and obliga-
tions, seeing individual negotiators merely as representatives of groups. Study participants who 
hold this belief tend to identify with the developing world and frame their position as demands of 
the developed countries (i.e., an out-group). Finally The Irresponsible West is about Western re-
sponsibility, an indirect form of self-referential obligations—not the individual, but the person’s 
government is responsible to act and called to action. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
Starting with a curiosity about the role of the mind in perpetuating and potentially dissolving 
the current stalemate in global climate negotiations, this dissertation raised the question what 
cognitive elements and processes inhibit effective multilateral cooperation on climate change. 
Deploying two methods new to IR, I explored the cognitive drivers of climate politics by engag-
ing a subset of carefully selected UNFCCC negotiation participants. The project makes several 
theoretical and empirical contributions to scholarly debates about global climate change politics 
and about the relationship between major IR theories; it expands the available methodological 
toolbox of IR; and it offers initial guidance to policy-makers, climate scientists and knowledge 
brokers regarding the communication strategies needed to help create the conditions for effective 
multilateral cooperation. 
 
I. THE ROLE OF COGNITION IN GLOBAL CLIMATE POLITICS 
This research project has generated three connected sets of theoretical and empirical insights 
that advance IR scholarship. They concern (i) the nature of cognition and the contribution of a 
cognitive approach to the study of international politics, (ii) the characteristics of belief systems 
of political actors engaged in global climate change negotiations, and (iii) the cognitive chal-
lenges of these actors dealing with special characteristics of climate change. These insights 
jointly provide a deep understanding of agency and beliefs about agency within the UNFCCC 
process. 
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1. The Nature of Cognition 
A cognitive approach to IR emphasizes three aspects of political life that other theoretical 
perspectives usually ignore: (i) the need to understand how the brain creates meaning, purpose 
and motivation for political behavior, that is the ideational source of agency, (ii) the relationship 
between individual and collective beliefs and agency, and (iii) the role of emotion in political 
thought and action.  
Belief systems are cognitive structures that enable and constrain thought and decision-
making. People develop these emotionally coherent networks of mental representations in the 
course of their lives in interaction with other individuals (i.e., the social environment) and the 
physical-material environment. Meaning making is a relational process that uses language to link 
physical realities with mental representations and multiple mental representations with each 
other and to synchronize these connections across multiple individuals (group members). The 
same mechanism applies to socially constructed entities, including concepts like democracy, 
border, or identity, but for the absence of a physical entity. Instead the meaning making process 
relies on symbols, behaviors enacting social facts, conceptual definitions, and other abstract rep-
resentations.  
A central issue for understanding cognition in political processes is the person-group prob-
lem. Since collective thoughts are no real entities – 
there is no biological foundation for them in a 
‘group brain’ – collective cognition is best 
understood as a multilevel mechanism that links 
neural and cognitive processes at the individual 
level with social processes like communication at the 
Elements of a Cognitive Approach: 
 
1. Mental representations linking indi-
vidual mind to physical or social re-
ality 
 
2. Person-group relationship (collec-
tive cognition) 
 
3. The role of emotions 
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group level. Individuals think of themselves as members of groups; they have mental representa-
tions of the group, and thoughts and feelings as group members or even on behalf of the group as 
an entity. Many of these mental representations are not only inputs for, but also the result of so-
cial communication processes. Cognition is a recursive interaction process between individual 
systems of representation and social networks of cognitive systems. 
Finally, a cognitive lens forces the researcher to acknowledge the role of emotion in political 
decision-making, broadening the set of interacting variables to be explored and challenging the 
methodological toolbox of IR scholars. 
 
2. The Nature of Political Belief Systems  
Linking cognitive theory to IR, I have explored the mental representations in the belief sys-
tems of UNFCCC negotiation participants regarding climate change and multilateral coopera-
tion. Taking a step back from the paradigmatic battle between realists and constructivists in IR 
scholarship, I have offered evidence that both strands of theory make important contributions to 
the analysis of global climate politics; indeed both are necessary but perhaps jointly insufficient 
to explain observable political dynamics. 
Using the cognitive assumptions of realist and constructivist scholars as an analytic frame-
work to approach the data gathered for this project, I was able to identify three types of mental 
representations that exist in the belief systems of study participants: concepts regarding structural 
constraints of agency, group identity, and norms of justice. Two of these concept types occur in 
all belief systems: concepts about the opportunity/risk structure as assumed by rational choice 
scholars, in particular the type and hierarchy of expected costs, and concepts about identity 
groups as expected by constructivists.  
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The presence of different normative frameworks is a key feature that distinguishes two major 
types of belief systems. Emotionally driven differences in risk perceptions combined with dis-
tinct conceptions of a person’s in-group determine whether a belief system is based on rule-based 
norms of justice (deontology) or on consequentialist considerations. Individuals who expect cer-
tain types of costs or damages above a severity threshold of human suffering for their in-group 
tend to apply a Kantean or deontologial framework of reasoning that is often associated with 
strong emotions. Individuals who are mainly concerned about costs below that threshold, mainly 
economic and material losses, tend to apply a considerably less emotional consequentialist 
framework of reasoning. The quality of the expected cost for one’s identity group is the decisive 
factor in differentiating belief systems, splitting the negotiation participants in two major groups: 
those concerned about the costs associated with climate change impacts and those concerned 
about the costs of climate policy and action. These two groups do not easily match the familiar 
categories of developed and developing country representatives. Many negotiators from the de-
veloped world share concerns about climate change impacts that trigger normative beliefs about 
cooperation—it is simply morally right to act collectively on climate change. 
Most negotiators associate themselves with multiple identity groups. The state or the organi-
zation one represents is central and often the most important collective identity. However, addi-
tional groups can complement and even compete with a national or organizational identity. Some 
belief systems focus on individuals, others on groups of states, and some even on Planet Earth as 
an all-encompassing identity group that contains humanity and all planetary systems of life. The 
importance of group identities cannot be overemphasized: they determine which expected costs 
or structural threats an individual focuses on and consequently shape the entire belief system, 
including the willingness to commit one’s group to cooperation in a multilateral forum. The 
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larger or more inclusive the group, the more likely are expectations of major climate change im-
pacts. Consequently the likelihood of favoring multilateral cooperation and immediate action in-
creases with the growing inclusiveness of the in-group. National definitions of collective interest 
contrast with concepts about humanity sharing responsibility for one planetary resource.  
Some identity groups referred to by negotiation participants, such as the poor or humanity, 
are not encompassed by the current rules of the international system, which do not accord them 
rights and responsibilities. While one might simply dismiss this observation as irrelevant, I sug-
gest that it reveals an important incongruity between the existing understandings of climate 
change as a global governance challenge and the available multilateral tools for addressing the 
problem. Some negotiation participants believe, and I concur, that solving climate change re-
quires appealing to collective identities that are commensurate with the scientific problem defini-
tion, and consequently involving different groups and categories that are currently not acknowl-
edged in international politics. 
The data also pointed to the importance of place identity for understanding beliefs and nego-
tiation positions. Place identities in their great varieties can shape threat perceptions, for instance 
if physical changes are experienced or expected to occur in locations linked to a collective iden-
tity. Emotions play a significant role in this 
context because they are associated with 
specific places and anticipating or 
experiencing the loss of these places causes 
dread, anxiety, fear, and sadness. Further, 
place identity changes the relevance and 
emotional implications of climate-related 
Three Key Features of Political Belief 
Systems: 
 
1. Structural constraints of agency—
threat perceptions—and associated 
emotions 
 
2. Collective identities, especially place 
identity, and associated emotions 
 
3. Norms of justice (in some, but not oth-
ers), and associated emotions 
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extreme weather events. They become tangible, visible traumas to places groups care about—
ruining sacred locales—in a way that most of the current policy discourse surrounding extreme 
events does not recognize. Connecting physical-material structures like territory or land with 
ideational structures like identity or culture, the concept of place identity not only adds explana-
tory value but also offers opportunities to bridge realism and constructivism.  
To the extent that participants’ belief systems contained concepts about applicable norms of 
justice in global climate governance they are far less contentious than current negotiation posi-
tions and political dynamics. The concepts of equity and historical responsibility are not as 
prominent in the interview data as they are in the negotiation process; very few study participants 
considered these norms important and appropriate. More important were notions of fairness, car-
ing for the poor, and the idea that everybody should take responsibility to a degree they are able 
to. This difference between private beliefs and negotiation positions might signal a normative 
trend away from the contentious politics observable at the moment or indicate that the equity de-
bate is a cover for other interests or concerns. Norms are important, but formal negotiation posi-
tions and interventions do not reflect parties’ substantive concerns and normative beliefs very 
well. 
These observations speak directly to existing theories in IR scholarship and are to a large ex-
tent enabled by those theories. However, this research project generated a number of additional 
insights that do not fit the existing theoretical categories and boxes as easily.  
 
3. Special Problem Characteristics of Climate Change 
Special problem characteristics of climate change affect the belief systems of negotiation par-
ticipants in multiple ways, but the central insight of this research is that some characteristics and 
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their governance implications are not sufficiently understood by many negotiators. Major cogni-
tive challenges exist with respect to tipping points and the long time scales of climate change and 
climate policy.  
Based on my empirical findings, I reject the initial hypothesis that the loss of hope in re-
sponse to the pervasiveness of climate change is a significant cognitive process driving the nego-
tiation dynamics. Pervasiveness and the associated uncertainties are acknowledged by most study 
participants, but often in very general terms that do not reflect a full understanding of these prob-
lem characteristics and their implications for climate governance. A specific subset of individu-
als, especially negotiators from small-island states, occasionally and only temporarily loses hope 
in the UNFCCC process, but not because of the complexities of climate change. They despair 
because high-emitting countries decline to act on climate change despite the devastating conse-
quences it will have on small and highly vulnerable countries. They lose hope in humanity, 
which is distinct from losing hope in the future. More generally, hope prevails among climate 
negotiators although there are very few rational reasons to be hopeful about the ability of the in-
ternational community to deal with the problem effectively. The maintenance of unsubstantiated 
hope allows the political process to continue, but is unproductive in the sense that it legitimizes 
that process and thus impedes development of alternative processes.  
Myopia poses significant cognitive challenges for the negotiation process. However, the cog-
nitive mechanisms associated with myopia apply only to some negotiators, and involve more 
complicated processes than discounting the future in a rational sense. The uncertainties surround-
ing climate change and climate policies are not considered an obstacle for action; most individu-
als are able to develop positions based on their general working knowledge of climate change. 
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While such a disregard for the specifics might be a problem when it comes to designing policy 
instruments, it is not an obstacle to cooperation in the first place.  
I hypothesized that the limited observability of climate change would inhibit cooperation be-
cause the lack of experience of climate change impacts limits cognitive access to possible 
sources of motivation for collective action. This does not appear to be a problem for most nego-
tiators from the developing and emerging world. Most of them believe they have observed cli-
mate change already, either directly or indirectly through reports of the citizens they represent. In 
the developed countries a similar trend is emerging in the aftermath of hurricane Sandy, 
droughts, floods and wildfires in the US, Europe and Australia. However, negotiators from these 
countries rarely have a personal experience related to climate change and do not expect to be 
personally affected in their lifetime.  
Limited observability of impacts does affect decision-making in the UNFCCC in conjunction 
with long time scales and system-response lags. Jointly these factors impair three crucial govern-
ance tasks: (i) imagining the long-term future and implications of governance failure, in other 
words the ability to link (in)action today to possible future outcomes, (ii) developing action time-
lines, and (iii) setting and acting on goals and targets.  
(i) The majority of study participants were not able to imagine a non-linear, qualitatively dif-
ferent future in which some of the more extreme possibilities of change materialize. Most par-
ticipants had never encountered this cognitive task before. Their lack of imagination is not sur-
prising—it is a novel challenge for the human brain—but it has an important constraining effect 
on present decision-making on climate change. If decision-makers do not actively consider the 
full spectrum of possible futures, either because they lack the cognitive ability to imagine such a 
distant hypothetical world or because they are not extending the cognitive effort, and if they are 
 	   301	  
not aware of the causal influence they collectively have over different imagined futures, they are 
not making fully informed decisions. 
(ii) Generally study participants were unable to identify clear timelines for actions or climate 
impacts, or to link particular actions with particular outcomes on a timescale. Only a subset of 
negotiators from highly vulnerable countries was focused on timelines prescribed by the scien-
tific community, including a peak year for global emissions and target years for certain levels of 
global emission reductions (e.g., 80% by 2050). For others, time is not an important variable in 
the negotiations or in designing governance instruments. 
(iii) Not being able to observe or think effectively about the full long-term consequences of 
climate change also impacts people’s thinking about regime goals and targets. This study identi-
fied three linked, counterproductive cognitive patterns: the absence of a clear definition and 
shared understanding of the goal(s) of climate governance, a focus on the 2°C target (i.e., the 
temperature target that is now perceived to be the goal of the climate regime), and the cognitive 
replacement of the 2°C target with the diplomatic goal of reaching a multilateral agreement at 
some point in the future. The main reasons for privately abandoning the temperature target in-
clude major uncertainties surrounding the science and policy effects, in other words not knowing 
how to practically reach the target, which diminish hope and undermine belief in agency. The 
move from a scientifically determined target to a diplomatic one strengthens hope and belief in 
agency because negotiators have a stronger sense of control over processes that lie within their 
personal and collective skill set. In essence, there is a disconnect between individuals’ assess-
ments of what is politically feasible and what is necessary for environmental regime effective-
ness. This mental compartmentalization is linked to feelings of hope and beliefs about agency. 
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Usually a discussion about the goal of climate change governance starts with a reference to 
Art 3 UNFCCC and the notion of preventing ‘dangerous’ climate change, and then moves on to 
the temperature target as a specification of the term dangerous. Much of the scholarly work con-
ceptualizes the 2°C target as a threshold, separating a non-dangerous world from a dangerous 
one. This study has demonstrated that negotiators do not conceptualize the temperature target as 
a threshold with the associated need to avoid “going over the cliff” at all cost. Rather than ex-
pecting catastrophe beyond 2°C warming, negotiation participants tend to think about global av-
erage temperature increase in a linear fashion in the sense that 3°C would be a little worse than 
2°C, and a 4°C world would be better than a 6°C world. This linear conceptualization of climate 
change is consistent with their personal experience so far and is linked to their limited ability to 
imagine a starkly different long-term future. It is also the result of using temperature as an ag-
gregate measure of multiple complex change processes. But it clearly limits actors’ motivation to 
seek an immediate cooperative solution.  
Of even greater concern than goal selection is the general lack of attention to the possibility 
of climate tipping points among negotiation 
participants. Rather than dismissing the current 
importance of tipping points for the governance 
process (e.g., because of its weak scientific basis), 
many negotiators are not familiar with the concept 
at all and do not incorporate tipping points into 
their negotiation positions or beliefs about climate 
governance. For example, nobody suggested that 
preventing tipping points might be a useful governance objective or that tipping points could be 
Cognitive Challenges Dealing with 
Special Problem Characteristics: 
 
1. Unreasonable hope 
 
2. Problems defining productive goals 
and targets (perceived lack of 
agency) 
 
3. Lack of imagination regarding the 
long-term future  
 
4. Lack of attention to tipping points 	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disruptive for pursuing the goals of the Convention. Despite the quickly growing use of the con-
cept in various scholarly communities, climatic tipping points are not getting much attention in 
the diplomatic and NGO community. 
 
4. Other Cognitive Challenges 
The analysis of belief systems further reveals that the US plays a special role in the climate 
negotiations, emphasizing a particularly strong link between domestic and multilateral politics. 
There is an unusually high level of awareness of how the domestic challenges in the US impede 
the introduction of effective climate policies, which places strong constraints on collective be-
liefs about agency at the international level. Under the current conditions the US is not able to 
make a legitimate mitigation promise, which is widely perceived as a condition for an effective 
international treaty. This unique two-level game setting raises interesting questions for regime 
theory and seems to counter the argument that regime creation without the hegemon’s participa-
tion is possible in the case of climate change. 
These agency-constraining beliefs regarding US domestic conditions point to two additional 
problems for global climate governance. First, a number of study participants identified solutions 
to the climate problem outside the scope and reach of the UNFCCC. Such beliefs are unproblem-
atic to the extent that these solution elements are complementary to the work of the UNFCCC. 
But some of these proposals—for example, the adoption of a new development model not cen-
tered on growth, the mobilization of domestic constituencies including value and preference 
change, or changing minds of political elites not involved in climate negotiations—could be con-
ditions or independent enablers of an effective multilateral treaty. Since the diplomatic commu-
nity cannot create these conditions, they severely constrain the community’s collective agency in 
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the sense that progress in the negotiations depends on developments outside of negotiators’ con-
trol, possibly even outside the control of national governments. 
Second, framing US domestic politics as a serious constraint for multilateral treaty making 
raises the broader question about the relationship between democracy as a form of government 
and global governance as a means to address global problems. The climate case highlights that 
democratic opposition to engagement with certain problems can stall global-scale progress, af-
fecting the fate of human beings far beyond the borders of the obstinate democratic country. The 
national political system in its current form and functions is linked to the (perceived) collective 
inability (i.e., lack of agency) of actors at the global scale to address climate change. Democracy 
becomes an obstacle to global governance. This obstructive role is likely to grow more important 
in the Anthropocene with an increasing number of truly global challenges requiring multilateral 
cooperative solutions.  
 
5. Six Belief Systems 
Stepping back from specific cognitive elements and themes identified with the use of CAMs, 
the Q analysis offered a glimpse at some of the existing belief systems within the community of 
climate negotiators, piecing various cognitive elements together into a coherent whole. Due to 
the limited set of Q study participants, the six belief systems I identified here do not represent the 
full spectrum of existing views on climate change and multilateral cooperation. But they offer a 
first in-depth view into the complex cognitive dynamics driving the global climate negotiations. 
Almost all study participants share a number of fundamental beliefs, such as those regarding 
the importance and reality of climate change, trust in science, and the collective ability of the in-
ternational community to solve the problem. Opinions diverge sharply on a small number of is-
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sues, including the question whether all or just a few countries should be at the negotiation table, 
the distribution of governance tasks between governments and the market, and ultimately the im-
portance and desirability of economic growth. 
The key element distinguishing belief systems is actor type: each belief system focuses on a 
different type or category of actor, a difference that impacts their respective problem definitions, 
proposed solutions, and political strategies. I briefly summarize the six factors below. 
The International Community focus on the collective agency of all states in the UNFCCC, 
and consider states to be bound by ethical norms rather than national interests. They pay little 
attention to domestic processes or other factors that might constrain global efforts and negotia-
tion positions. The key challenge is overcoming the North-South divide in order to create a co-
operative multilateral solution. The International Community consider growth a problem rather 
than a solution to the climate challenge. 
A Minilateral Club strongly prefer a multilateral club approach to global climate govern-
ance, engaging the major emitters only and avoiding the cumbersome and ineffective UN proc-
ess. Grounding their views in facts and scientific knowledge their long-term perspective gives 
rise to strong concerns about future climate change impacts, including the possibility of tipping 
points. Agency and responsibility to avoid climate-related harm lies with elected officials in do-
mestic political contexts, where most of the policy work needs to be done.  
The Market is a belief system that links the need for multilateral cooperation among all 
states on mitigation with the use of market-based instruments to bring about the needed social-
economic changes, for instance with a carbon price signal. Climate change governance is a two-
level game, and stronger voter support is needed to overcome vested systemic interests. Climate 
action is a necessity and collective action problem, not a moral issue. 
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A fourth belief system emphasizes the power of Individuals to create change, ranging from 
individual value change affecting consumption patterns, to local and community engagement and 
the exercise of democratic rights to vote and to mobilize other people for change. This view dis-
likes neoliberal policy frameworks. It is grounded in a strong human identity—shared with peo-
ple around the world rather than fellow-citizens only—and a moral framework of obligations 
binding the rich and the poor as well as the present and future generations.  
The Developed World assigns the responsibility for fixing the climate problem to the devel-
oped world for two reasons: historical emissions and present resource wealth, the latter being the 
base for adaptive capacity. Adaptation and support for the developing countries are key compo-
nents of a just climate solution, which has to prioritize the needs of the vulnerable developing 
countries. Scientific information is important to motivate a North-South narrative about past ex-
ploitation and present moral obligations to alleviate suffering. 
The final belief system, The Irresponsible West, focuses on the responsibility of the devel-
oped world too. At its center is the need for value change in Western societies as an ethical re-
sponsibility of the present generation to future ones. Taking themselves and their own societies 
and governments to task, these individuals advocate more sustainable, more socially connected, 
and less consumption-oriented lifestyles. They also express great disappointment and shame 
about the continuous failure of our societies to address climate change. 
All belief systems have a surprisingly similar emotional profile, except The Market and The 
Irresponsible West, which have opposing responses to negative self-referential emotions like 
shame. The former strongly denies the importance of these emotions, the latter embraces them. 
These two factors stand out in other ways, too. The Market is the only belief system that does not 
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include norms of justice, and The Irresponsible West is a belief system that seems to occur ex-
clusively among NGO representatives.  
The comparison of Individuals, The Developed World, and The Irresponsible West reveals 
some fundamental differences that have so far not been noted in the literature. All three belief 
systems contain a strong justice-related element and could easily be grouped under a thematic 
climate justice umbrella. But they actually present distinct points of view with varying levels of 
integration potential with other factors. Individuals is a cosmopolitan view of individual respon-
sibilities and a shared humanity—it takes each person to task and demands action from those 
who hold the belief. The Developed World is the opposite—it refers to groups of states as the 
most important subjects of rights and obligations, seeing individual negotiators merely as repre-
sentatives of groups. Study participants who hold this belief tend to identify with the developing 
world, for example individuals with dual nationality crossing the North-South divide and em-
ployees of development NGOs, and thereby frame their position as demands of the developed 
countries (i.e., an out-group). Finally The Irresponsible West is about Western responsibility, an 
indirect form of self-referential obligation—not the individual, but the person’s government is 
responsible to act and called to action. 
Interestingly most study participants share parts of two or three of these belief systems. This 
pattern indicates that there is large potential for bridging these connected views, possibly inte-
grating currently different beliefs, and building broader or different—hopefully more productive 
- negotiation alliances. The possibility to create belief change does not imply an argument for 
belief convergence. Given the complexity of the issue and diversity of views about climate 
change governance, belief convergence would be not only an unreasonable goal but an unneces-
sary one. It appears more promising to seek ‘clumsy solutions’ to this wicked problem, which 
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would allow different actors to pursue similar governance goals for very different reasons 
(Verweij et al. 2006).  
Finally it is worth noting that most belief systems are shared by people from very different 
countries, regions and negotiation alliances, suggesting that their viewpoints are at least to some 
degree independent of material variables like national emission levels (i.e., cost of mitigation) 
and vulnerability. The fact that the distribution of beliefs does not match the existing divisions 
between negotiation alliances is also encouraging for the future of the negotiations. 
 
6. Summary 
These three different sets of insights—the elements of a cognitive approach, the cognitive 
features of political belief systems, and the cognitive responses to the special characteristics of 
climate change—interact with each other and jointly shape actors’ perceptions of collective 
agency in the global climate change negotiations. These findings and their interactions are sum-
marized in Figure 6-1 below. The general nature of cognition (blue box) affects the content of 
belief systems concerning multilateral cooperation and beliefs concerning the special characteris-
tics of climate change. For example, the emotional nature of a person’s climate-related risk per-
ceptions affects her beliefs concerning appropriate governance goals, which is linked to her as-
sessment of the possibilities and likelihood of the international community (i.e., identity group) 
to achieve these goals, and consequently her sense of hope and agency. The effect on beliefs 
about agency is mainly negative—it either limits or distorts these beliefs in a manner that makes 
a cooperative and effective agreement less likely. 
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Figure 6-1: Three Types of Interactive Insights 
 
	  	  
 	  
 
II. METHODS FOR A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS 
Both methods used in this study—cognitive-affective mapping and Q method—have demon-
strated individual and synergistic strengths for a cognitive approach to the study of global cli-
mate politics, and international relations more generally. 
Interview-based CAMs offer great detail regarding the substantive and structural elements 
contained in a person’s belief system. Providing deep insights and a visual aid that complement 
purely text-based analysis, CAMs can improve qualitative work, especially exploratory studies 
like this one, where categories and causal mechanisms are unknown at the outset. Like every 
method CAMs are suited for a particular type of studies and have clear limitations, including 
limited comparability across multiple CAMs, and weak structural analytic capacity without com-
putational support tools.  
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Q method offered a systematic way to explore collective subjectivity—existing belief sys-
tems that are shared by several study participants and likely to be shared by larger groups of ne-
gotiation participants. Q’s benefits include more rigor and comparability of viewpoints in com-
parison to CAM. Revealing shared perspectives is a particularly useful empirical approach for a 
subject matter as complex and unsettled as multilateral cooperation on climate change at this 
point in history. Although the set of beliefs identified in this study is incomplete, it offers a use-
ful starting point for in-depth analyses of the current room for agreement and points of conten-
tion within the UNFCCC process. The adjustments to the research design aimed at capturing 
emotional elements of existing belief systems created additional and unique insights. Further ex-
pansions, for example, the inclusion of a policy-preference dimension (Niemeyer 2011; Hobson 
and Niemeyer 2011), might be desirable but not always feasible because in the global negotiation 
context policy choices are not clear cut and mutually exclusive.  
The combination of CAM and Q method offers bridges between the micro and macro scales 
of subjectivity. 
 
III. POLICY RELEVANCE—DEEPENING UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING 
THE SCIENCE-POLICY INTERFACE 
The qualitative findings of this study offer policy-relevant insights in four distinct spheres: 
multilateral negotiations, national development of negotiation strategies and positions, develop-
ment of political strategies by non-state actors engaged in the UNFCCC process, and planning 
and communication efforts of the climate science community.  
This study has identified a range of similarities and differences between the cognitive proc-
esses of participants in global climate change negotiations, revealing private beliefs that feed the 
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negotiation process but often remain invisible. Providing insights into the motivating beliefs and 
values driving different actors, this study can help negotiators gain a better understanding of the 
negotiation dynamics of which they are a part. A deeper understanding might aid a growing rec-
ognition of differences in specific negotiation positions and their resistance to change due to their 
embeddedness in larger belief systems. Further, acknowledging that the source of contention 
might sometimes be rooted in the different make-up of individuals’ brains and their different 
cognitive-affective experience of reality may help improve communication and trust among ne-
gotiators.  
Important issues that divide negotiations parties but are rarely openly discussed include the 
possibility of a multilateral club approach to complement or replace the UNFCCC and the impor-
tance of the multilateral paralysis caused by domestic politics in the United States. The data have 
also revealed that the equity discussion based on the concept of historical responsibility is 
thought to play a larger role in the minds of negotiators than this research seems to indicate. Un-
doubtedly norms and equity are important issues in the negotiations and finding agreement on 
the meaning of equity in a climate change context is central for moving the process forward. 
However, the equity debate could be far less contentious if it moved away from the narrow idea 
of historical responsibility applying to developed countries to a broader notion of responsibility 
for all countries, which is based on “respective capabilities” and a concern for the poor. The cog-
nitive seeds of change exist because many negotiation parties hold beliefs that permit a more 
productive equity discussion than the current arguments regarding common but differentiated 
responsibilities. However, it is unclear whether countries like China or India would be willing to 
move in that direction. 
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The beliefs of negotiation participants have also identified a solution space outside the multi-
lateral negotiations, pointing to inherent limitations of the diplomatic process. These solution 
elements include a major change in the current development paradigm, grassroots mobilization 
in the United States, and bringing about value change among voters in the developed world. 
None of these changes can be facilitated with diplomatic tools within the UNFCCC, but some of 
these might indeed be necessary or at least enabling conditions for an effective multilateral 
agreement on climate change. These solution elements and their possible links to the negotiations 
require open discussions, but currently there is no dedicated space or institutional mandate for 
such a debate.  
Taking this cognitive status-quo as a point-of-departure, national policy-makers and non-
state actor groups can adjust their own political and negotiation strategies (i) to tailor their mes-
sages, offers and demands to different audiences in the negotiation process, (ii) to make a con-
scious effort to speak to existing concerns and values of other negotiation parties, and (iii) possi-
bly even to seek change of existing beliefs with a focus on creating collective identities with 
normative attachments to climate change that favor action. Such change efforts can be internal to 
a group or target another group. They can take place at the multilateral scale or at other system 
scales all the way down to local communities or individuals.  
Finally, this study has provided clues regarding current communication failures at the climate 
science-policy interface that might help the scientific community rethink its approach to science 
communication. The lack of attention to the issue of tipping points and the difficulties negotia-
tors have imagining a qualitatively different future place constraints on current regime-creation 
efforts because they limit the presence of cost-related concepts. These cognitive challenges raise 
two questions: Why is existing information not being heard or used, and what type of informa-
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tion or communication is needed to help policy-makers grapple with the special problem charac-
teristics of climate change? New ways to think about science communication might be needed, 
including a role for art, visual representations, and stories that engage not only cognitive but also 
emotional and experiential faculties of decision-makers. 
More generally the science-policy disconnect revealed through the analysis of beliefs of ne-
gotiators indicates that it might be useful, even necessary, to rethink the current interaction rules 
and modes of communication between the IPCC and the diplomatic community in the UNFCCC. 
If current forms of presenting scientific information are insufficient to create beliefs that reflect 
relevant scientific knowledge, other avenues of communication should be considered.  
 
IV. RESEARCH OUTLOOK—AN EXPANDING FIELD OF COGNITIVE IR? 
This explorative study has begun to map the cognitive landscape of global climate change 
negotiations, offering a partial snapshot of existing belief systems and their effects on political 
dynamics in the UNFCCC. It is a theoretical and empirical starting point for further work at the 
intersection between cognitive and political science.  
Further work is needed to investigate additional belief systems that have not been captured 
by this project. A complementary Q study involving negotiators from the emerging powers in the 
BASIC coalition, AOSIS representatives, ALBA, the LDCs and the Like-minded group would 
be necessary to create a more complete cognitive map of the global climate governance debate. 
Further theoretical work is needed to understand the fundamental rules that determine the struc-
ture and functioning of these belief systems, most importantly the centrality of actor types and 
identity concepts and their relationship to the nature of the governance problem. 
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Going beyond the scope of this research project, future work should explore the nature of 
cognitive change and the processes that can create different kinds of cognitive change in the par-
ticular context of global climate change governance. Linking cognitive change to political behav-
ior and multilateral cooperation in particular might be one of the most important areas of re-
search at the intersection of science and global public policy-making. 
This dissertation identified a number of issues that could be relevant for bringing about cog-
nitive change in the minds of climate change negotiators. These issues include the formation and 
diffusion of beliefs about climate tipping points and cognitive challenges concerning the scien-
tifically informed imagination of the distant future. Future research should investigate what 
forms of information and communication are needed to help negotiators but also decision-makers 
and voters more generally deal with these issues proactively and productively. These questions 
are a concern not only for science communicators, but also for climate scientists, who make im-
portant choices about the concepts they use to investigate certain phenomena and to present their 
findings. 
This study has identified a number of ways to advance current theories of agency in the field 
of international relations. Building on insights from psychology, sociology and cognitive science 
a political definition of agency should be able to address the person-group problem and be sensi-
tive to the importance of time. Further, my exploration of the role of hope has demonstrated that 
emotions can play an important role in strengthening or weakening beliefs about agency linked 
to particular goals and motives, thus creating significant biases not just in the individual mind but 
in collective processes of selecting governance goals and targets. Awareness of these biases is a 
first important step towards countering them. That in turn requires greater openness towards 
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studying emotions and greater methodological creativity to get some empirical traction on these 
issues.  
Future research could also explore to what extent the cognitive patterns of climate negotia-
tors and their impacts on political behavior are relevant for national decision-makers or members 
of the public. Not all cognitive challenges identified in this dissertation might be relevant for 
public engagement with climate change. But if they are, further work would be required to iden-
tify and address the cognitive mechanisms that currently contribute to phenomena like denial, 
skepticism, distancing and disengagement. 
Finally, and maybe most importantly for the field of IR, I believe there is value in further ex-
ploring a cognitive approach as bridging tool between realism, institutionalism, and constructiv-
ism. Focusing on cognitive processes can create insights about the types of reasoning, motiva-
tions, values and emotions that underlie and drive political processes, about their boundary con-
ditions, and about the role of person-group interactions in inter-subjective meaning making. In-
teraction rules between structural and ideational theories are likely to be issue specific and identi-
fying them requires further work. 
 
The aspiration of this research project was to identify at least one cognitive obstacle to an ef-
fective agreement on global climate change. Finding more than one obstacle, I have argued that 
the global climate negotiations are stifled by a battle of belief systems that differ fundamentally 
in their conceptual, especially normative, and emotional make-up. Further, many negotiation par-
ticipants have major difficulties dealing with the special characteristics of climate change, which 
reduces their willingness to cooperate and their sense of urgency. The difficulty of integrating 
scientific knowledge into political positions weakens beliefs about agency and negatively affects 
the definition of governance goals and targets.  
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It is possible at this stage of the evolutionary process that human beings lack the cognitive 
ability to address these novel characteristics of climate change. Given our lack of experience and 
therefore lack of previous opportunities for learning about the nature of this problem, our mind 
lacks the appropriate tools—conceptual frameworks and emotional responses—to generate be-
liefs that can produce proactive, collective solutions. Existing philosophical or moral frameworks 
are insufficiently developed to address the question of responsibility for humanity rather than 
individuals, nations or states. The two strongest candidates, utilitarianism and cosmopolitanism, 
do not address issues of intergenerational justice or the value of planetary systems that enable 
human life and wellbeing. More generally, Discussions of intergenerational justice at a global 
scale are still in their infancy (Gardiner 2011) and remain abstract and ungrounded in experience. 
Economic frameworks have been developed to understand market dynamics over several years, 
but not decades or centuries. State institutions take a similarly short-term perspective with four- 
or five-year election cycles. Collective identities have grown from tribes and clans to nations and 
states, but humanity as the ultimate in-group seems far out of reach and perhaps even impossible. 
With few exceptions, negotiators’ faculties of imagination and empathy do not reach far enough 
beyond state borders or far enough into the future to facilitate timely collective action that could 
slow climate change. 
Recognizing these cognitive constraints of global climate change governance is the first step 
towards overcoming them. Understanding the sources of current differences in negotiation posi-
tions based on belief systems could improve mutual understanding among climate negotiators, 
increasing much needed trust and mutual respect in the negotiation process. The lack of attention 
to tipping points calls for changes in the science-policy interface, including different means of 
communicating scientific concepts and engaging negotiators in discussions about their implica-
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tions for climate governance. The general inability to imagine the distant future calls for innova-
tive ways to represent, visualize and explore different possible futures both conceptually and 
emotionally, helping negotiators to understand the ways in which their collective actions make 
some of these possible futures more or less likely.  
If the mind is an obstacle to cooperation, changing minds becomes a political necessity.   
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APPENDIX CH3-1  
 
Limitations of Cognitive-Affective Mapping 
 
 
Cognitive-affective mapping is a tool that focuses on one specific aspect of human cognition: 
the relevance of emotions attached to key values that individuals hold with respect to a certain 
issue. To that end CAMs are highly simplified representations of the relationships of important 
values and emotions that are not supposed to resemble a neurological structure or process, or 
any other biological reality. Cognitive-affective maps (CAMs) do not provide a full picture of 
the mind, or even of the part of the mind that is relevant for the topic under discussion. Other 
tools and models are more appropriate for more comprehensive representations (and 
simulations) of the multiple interacting facets of cognition. Given this very specific purpose of 
CAMs, the tool has a number of important limitations that constrain what can be represented 
in a CAM and how. The process of generating a CAM based on interview transcripts often 
runs into these limitations without being able to resolve them fully (e.g., too general 
information, focus on causality rather than emotion and values, …). Below I summarize the 
most relevant limitations and indicate the standard protocol I used when faced with these 
problems in the course of this project. 	  	  
1. Different Relationships Between Two Nodes 
CAM links can represent very different relationships between two nodes (mental 
representations), e.g., constitution, causation, correlation, association, (inter) dependence and 
any form of influence on each other (e.g., to support, increase, strengthen, weaken, limit, 
decrease, accelerate, damage, …). The viewer of a CAM who is not the researcher or the 
research subject sometimes does not have enough information to distinguish the type of link 
selected, and although much might be inferred from the conceptual context, it is possible that 
the viewer has to insert his or her own assumptions regarding the meaning of the link, rather 
than simply 'seeing' conceptual structures. This problem can be addressed by expanding the 
CAM, adding concepts that differentiate and clarify the relationship.  
At least three general types of links are possible, using the representational tools offered by 
cognitive-affective mapping. The first and most important one is emotional association: if I 
like one concept, but I do not like the other, I dislike the link between them, which is 
emotionally incoherent. This is the default way of representing links. 
Example: Somebody states that climate change is a threat to humanity.  
[Climate Change]_______[Threat] ---------(Humanity) 
Since climate change and threat are both negative concepts, their link is emotionally coherent, 
but the relationship between threat (negative) and humanity (positive) is incoherent. 
The second and third types of relationship between two concepts are causal or definitional. 
There is positive causality (one concept causes or constitutes the other) and negative causality 
(one concept damages the other). Adding the emotional valences of the nodes creates four 
different options: (1) two nodes with the same emotional valence have a positive causal 
	   337	  
relationship (solid line), (2) two positive nodes have a negative causal relationship (dotted 
line), (3) a positive and a negative node have a positive causal relationship (solid line), (4) a 
positive and a negative node have a negative causal relationship (dotted line). Option 1 cannot 
be visually distinguished from the depiction of emotional coherence and is unproblematic 
because it matches the emotional information. Option 4 is visually the same like emotional 
incoherence and is also unproblematic because cognitive and emotional information are 
aligned.  
Example for Option 2: 
I would like to have a successful career, but also lots of time with my family. 
(Successful Career) ------ (Family Time) 
Example for Option 3:  
Natural disasters will increase public attention to climate change, which is necessary to change 
current policies. 
[Natural Disasters] ________ (Public Attention)   
In this case the causal effect of natural disasters on public attention is desirable and outweighs 
the emotional incoherence. Alternatively one can depict the concept Natural Disaster as 
ambivalent. 
The CAMs in this study prioritize emotional associations between nodes over causal ones. 
However, in circumstances when the available interview data prioritized causal connections, I 
chose to represent causality when it was necessary to create a comprehensible CAM.  
 
a. Directionality 
CAM networks are undirected, which is one of the major differences to other conceptual 
mapping approaches. Combined with the problem described above (multiple possible 
relationships) this can create significant problems for creating and reading CAMs. Depending 
on the type of relationship between nodes there could be unidirectionality (e.g., causation), 
there could be mutual constitution (no problem) or there could be different types of links 
between the same two nodes (e.g., a constitutional relationship in one direction; a negative 
influence in the other).  
The problem of unidirectionality (e.g., Mary loves John.) cannot be resolved given the 
symmetric links of CAMs. The concept loves would be connected to both John and Mary, 
leaving the viewer of the CAM unclear whether Mary loves John or John loves Mary. If the 
conceptual context does not provide the needed clarification, the researcher needs to provide 
the necessary interpretation. 
Based on these concerns it might be useful to distinguish between the character of the local 
relationship between two nodes, and the character of a larger set of CAM elements as 
coherent/incoherent. Coherence is an appropriate 'global' descriptor for a macro-level state that 
emerges from the connections between multiple nodes (a cluster of nodes or the entire CAM), 
but not necessarily the most appropriate term for the relationship between two nodes.  
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2. Multiple Representation Options for the Same Thought Structure 
Theoretically there are multiple ways of representing the same cognitive structure, which 
introduces an element of researcher-driven randomness. 
Example: 
I like peace and dislike war; peace and war are incoherent with each other). 
(Peace) -------- [War]    
I don't like the absence of peace and I don't like war; both concepts are coherent with each 
other. 
[No Peace] ______ [War]  
Most conceptual relationships can be represented in at least two different ways, using 
inversion or opposites. Since CAMs do not claim to represent a real mental structure or rules 
of language processing, this feature of CAMs is not problematic as long the meaning and 
content of the individual’s thoughts are successfully visualized. The standard protocol in this 
study was to closely adhere to the language used by the research participant, respecting their 
choice of concepts. 
 
a. The Use of Opposites 
The last point raises the question to what extent it is useful to include opposite concepts in a 
CAM. One could argue that opposites are superfluous information, if one assumes that people 
are logically consistent. This issue is particularly relevant for representing decision-making 
when the choices are 'Do A' and 'Don't Do A'. The concepts related to each of these decision 
options might differ although they are merely opposites, e.g., doing A makes me happy and 
allows me to meet three old friends, while not doing A does not make me unhappy and allows 
me to hear an interesting talk. Therefore it can be useful to include them both when analyzing 
a decision-making process.  
This study did not map decision-making processes and did not face any problems with 
opposite concepts. 
 
 
3. Representing Temporal, Conditional and Normative Beliefs 
The key strength of CAMs is their ability to represent the relationships of values, which are 
related to each other in a time-independent, factual manner – the world as it is (the present 
state of affairs) from the perspective of the person or group whose views is/are subject of the 
CAM. It is also strongly suited to displaying a person’s worldview or ideology – the system of 
connected concepts and ideas that tend to be stable over long periods of time and that are 
independent of the specifics of a situation or policy problem. This descriptive focus on present 
relationships of values has significant difficulties representing the passing of time (e.g., 
concepts associated with the past or future and their temporal connection), conditional 
statements (if-then), indirect beliefs (beliefs attributed to others) or normative beliefs (e.g., ‘the 
rich ought to take responsibility for the poor’). Further, a single CAM is not able to display 
changes in a person’s or group’s views over time. 
Creating separate CAMs, e.g., the is-world vs. the ought-world, the world in 1997 vs. the 
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world in 2012, my world vs. my mother’s world, could solve some of these issues. 
In this study I have compressed all these issues into a single CAM for each study participant, 
and have indicated temporal differences with separate nodes for years, or a node for ‘past’ and 
‘today’. Other problems, esp. normative statements require verbal interpretation. 
 
 
4. Negation 
CAMs are not able to represent negation or negative definitions (i.e., what something is not). 
A CAM would ‘represent’ the belief that concept X (e.g., climate change) is not concept Y 
(e.g., a threat to humanity) simply by the absence of a link between these two concepts. 
 
 
5. Lack of Data 
While CAMs seek to depict the emotional intensity of nodes and the strength of links, 
interview data does not provide reliable data for these visualizations.  
 
The default procedure for this study was to assign a weight of 1 or -1 for each concept or link, 
and only add emotional strength when additional indicators in the interview transcript were 
available (e.g., adjectives like horrible, terrifying, scary). 	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APPENDIX Ch3-2 
 
Interview Questions 
 
 
 
1. What was your role during the UNFCCC negotiations at COP 17 in Durban / COP 3 in 
Kyoto?  
 
PART 1 – The Nature of the Climate Change Problem  
 
2. How would you summarize the most important and well-established scientific facts about 
climate change? 
3. Which future climate change impacts are you most concerned about? When do you expect 
“serious” climate impacts to occur? What would that look like? 
4. Do you think we are already seeing climate change effects today? 
5. Do you think about climate change mainly as a threat to your country’s 
citizens/organization’s members or others? 
6. Do you think about climate change mainly as a threat to people today or future generations? 
7. Thinking about climate change as a political rather than scientific issue, how would you 
describe the nature of the problem? 
8. Do you believe it is possible to address climate change effectively? And what does it mean 
to “solve the climate problem”? Who has the ability to address the problem? How? 
9. What is the goal of the negotiations? Is the 2°C target a good goal?  
 
PART 2 – Negotiation Positions and Durban Negotiations  
 
10. When preparing for the negotiations, how do you define your organization’s (national) 
interest? Did your negotiation preparation contain some form of a cost-benefit analysis? 
11. What are the main obstacles to finding an effective international agreement on climate 
change? 
12. Do you think that Copenhagen/Durban was a success or failure?  
13. Was Copenhagen/Durban an emotional experience for you? What are the most important 
emotional situations you remember? How did you feel?  
 
PART 3 – Special Characteristics of Climate Change 
 
14. Are you concerned about climatic tipping points? Does the possibility of tipping points 
influence how you think about the negotiations? 
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PART 4 – Imagining the Future 
 
15. Please imagine that all efforts to create an effective multilateral agreement on climate 
change fail. What would the world look like in a worst-case climate change scenario in the 
year 2080?  	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APPENDIX Ch3-3 
 
CAM Feedback Request – Email Template 
 
 
Dear [Name], 
 
Following up on our interview on [Month/Day/2012] I am sending you a first draft of your 
cognitive-affective map (CAM) with a few initial comments and questions (below). I also 
include some simple rules for reading a CAM. I hope you find some time to look at it and send 
me some feedback. Any corrections or additions you might suggest are very welcome, and I 
would generate an updated version based on your comments (e.g., are any important concepts 
missing?).  
 
As I mentioned there is a second part to this study. I include the link to the online Q 
sort: http://qsortonline.com/qsort/MMilkoreit2/. I hope you will find the time to complete it - it 
complements the cognitive mapping and will enlighten shared viewpoints among participants 
on climate change and cooperation.  
 
The sorting exercise will take about 45 minutes. You will NOT be able to save your work and 
return at a later time, so please make sure you have sufficient time available to go through the 
whole thing once you get started. Please note that there is no "Go Back" button in the 
program. PLEASE, DO NOT HIT THE GO BACK BUTTON ON YOUR 
BROWSER throughout the entire exercise! FlashQ will completely refresh and take you back 
to the first page; you would lose all previous work. 
 
THANK YOU for taking the time! 
------------------------------------ 
 
Here is a short guide for reading your CAM: 
 
- Positive concepts (concepts you feel positively about or that you like or things you would 
like to see more of) are shown as green ovals. 
- Negative concepts (those you feel negatively about or dislike) are red hexagons. (There is not 
further distinction regarding the type of good or bad feelings associated with a concept, but 
there are different levels of emotional intensity, indicated by thicker or thinner lines of the 
ovals or hexagons). 
- Neutral (non-emotional) concepts are yellow rectangles. 
- Ambivalent concepts are purple, overlaying a circle and a hexagon (this means that in some 
contexts this is a positive concept for you, in others it's negative). 
- Solid line means two concepts are mutually supportive (often linked by causality or logic). 
- Dotted line means two concepts are in conflict or incompatible with each other, or that you 
do not like their connection. 
 
One thing to think about is whether I used the appropriate emotional valences for the 
concepts, esp. ambivalent ones. For example, I am wondering whether I correctly identified 
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the ambivalent concepts in your map (e.g., [Concept X]). Please indicate where I got it wrong. 
Maybe you can also tell me, which of the concepts are most important to you (i.e., should have 
thicker edges than others). At the moment I think that [Concept Y] is among the most 
important concepts for you. 
 
There are significant limitations to this exercise and I am sure you will notice them. First of 
all, space limitations make it very difficult to connect all concepts appropriately, and the CAM 
gets very complex very fast given the complexity of the subject matter. I had to simplify a lot, 
which means that some things we talked about do not show up in the map. This is a pure 
judgment call. If you consider some missing concepts very important for making sense of the 
problem, please let me know and I will insert them. 
 
A few initial observations (none of this is new for you, but this is a good way to check 
whether I understood you well): 
 
- … 
- … 
 
I look forward to your comments! And please let me know if you have any questions. 
 
Best wishes, 
Manjana 
 
Manjana Milkoreit 
PhD Candidate in Global Governance 
Balsillie School of International Affairs 
University of Waterloo 
67 Erb Street West 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1 
 
+1-519-722-9559 
manjana@mac.com 
http://www.balsillieschool.ca/people/manjana-milkoreit 	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APPENDIX Ch3-4	  
 
Cognitive-Affective Maps of 55 Study Participants (Anonymized) 
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APPENDIX Ch3-5 	  
Cognitive-Affective Maps – Coding Scheme 
 
Approach Theme Concept Categories Sub-categories
Rational Choice Rational Choice Costs
Institutionalism Benefits
Power-balancing
National Interest
Competitiveness
Institutional effects (trust, …)
Incentive Structure
Social Constructivism Identity Group Membership
In- vs. out-group/ in-group preference
Group Purpose
Group Norms (non-justice)
Place-based identity
Norms & Justice Group Norms (justice)
Equity
North-South Divide
Fairness
Other
Domestic Politics Two-level game Domestic Actors
Domestic Processes
Diplomatic Mandates
Complexity Systemic Thinking Non-linearity & Feedbacks
Multiple scales
Cascading effects
Other
Mechanistic Thinking Incrementalism
Linearity
Pervasiveness Societal Change
Everybody's Responsibility
Uncertainty Scientific
General
Measuring Success
Myopia Time Scales Peaking
ADP Agreement
Delay / Inertia
Future Generations
Other
Institutionalized Short-
termism
Democratic Elections
Other
Imperceptibility Abstract Knowledge
Personal Experience
3rd Party Experience
Tipping Points Irreversibility
Catastrophe
Multiple Stresses
Lack of Intentionality Blame Historical Responsibility
Agency Actor types
Paths of Influence
Model of Change
Hope Sources
Strength
Loss of Hope
Emotions Positive
Negative
Other
Goal
PART 1: IR Theory
PART 2: Special 
Characteristics
Other
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APPENDIX Ch3-6 
 
National CO2 Emissions from Energy Production in 2010  
– Cut-offs Between High, Medium and Low 
(Data Source: US Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/) 
 
 
Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the 
Consumption of Energy (Million Metric Tons) 
  
  
  
Country 2010 Rank Group Group Rank Total 
China 8,320.96 1 High 1   
United States 5,610.11 2 High 2   
India 1,695.62 3 High 3   
Russia 1,633.80 4 High 4   
Japan 1,164.47 5 High 5   
Germany 793.66 6 High 6   
Korea, South 578.97 7 High 7   
Iran 560.33 8 High 8   
Canada 548.75 9 High 9   
United Kingdom 532.44 10 High 10   
Saudi Arabia 478.41 11 High 11   
South Africa 465.10 12 High 12   
Brazil 453.87 13 High 13   
Mexico 445.28 14 High 14   
Italy 416.37 15 High 15   
Australia 405.34 16 High 16   
France 395.20 17 High 17   
Indonesia 389.43 18 High 18   
Spain 316.43 19 High 19   
Taiwan 305.38 20 High 20   
Poland 303.70 21 High 21   
Thailand 278.49 22 High 22   
Ukraine 275.51 23 High 23   
Turkey 263.54 24 High 24   
Netherlands 263.44 25 High 25 25 
United Arab Emirates 199.37 26 Medium 1   
Egypt 196.55 27 Medium 2   
Kazakhstan 184.47 28 Medium 3   
Malaysia 181.93 29 Medium 4   
Singapore 172.19 30 Medium 5   
Argentina 169.83 31 Medium 6   
Venezuela 158.44 32 Medium 7   
Pakistan 151.65 33 Medium 8   
Belgium 127.19 34 Medium 9   
Iraq 118.31 35 Medium 10   
Uzbekistan 114.27 36 Medium 11   
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Vietnam 112.80 37 Medium 12   
Algeria 110.90 38 Medium 13   
Greece 92.99 39 Medium 14   
Czech Republic 90.83 40 Medium 15   
Philippines 85.63 41 Medium 16   
Hong Kong 83.78 42 Medium 17   
Kuwait 81.33 43 Medium 18   
Nigeria 80.51 44 Medium 19   
Romania 78.43 45 Medium 20   
Colombia 72.31 46 Medium 21   
Israel 70.32 47 Medium 22   
Austria 69.46 48 Medium 23   
Chile 68.76 49 Medium 24   
Belarus 68.24 50 Medium 25   
Qatar 64.68 51 Medium 26   
Korea, North 63.69 52 Medium 27   
Syria 63.10 53 Medium 28   
Sweden 62.74 54 Medium 29   
Turkmenistan 62.05 55 Medium 30   
Libya 60.60 56 Medium 31   
Bangladesh 56.74 57 Medium 32   
Oman 55.20 58 Medium 33   
Finland 54.40 59 Medium 34   
Portugal 51.43 60 Medium 35   
Hungary 50.39 61 Medium 36   
Trinidad and Tobago 49.93 62 Medium 37   
Serbia 49.92 63 Medium 38   
Denmark 45.96 64 Medium 39   
Switzerland 45.55 65 Medium 40   
Bulgaria 42.17 66 Medium 41   
Peru 41.88 67 Medium 42   
Norway 41.80 68 Medium 43   
Ireland 40.48 69 Medium 44   
New Zealand 39.58 70 Medium 45   
Morocco 35.66 71 Medium 46   
Azerbaijan 35.12 72 Medium 47   
Slovakia 34.54 73 Medium 48   
Cuba 34.46 74 Medium 49   
Puerto Rico 30.86 75 Medium 50   
Bahrain 30.69 76 Medium 51   
Yemen 26.50 77 Medium 52   
Ecuador 24.43 78 Medium 53   
Angola 24.20 79 Medium 54   
Croatia 23.43 80 Medium 55   
Estonia 20.56 81 Medium 56   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 20.14 82 Medium 57   
Dominican Republic 19.60 83 Medium 58   
Jordan 19.07 84 Medium 59   
Tunisia 18.72 85 Medium 60   
Slovenia 17.42 86 Medium 61   
Lithuania 15.98 87 Medium 62   
Panama 15.46 88 Medium 63   
Lebanon 15.24 89 Medium 64   
Sri Lanka 14.09 90 Medium 65   
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Sudan and South Sudan 13.79 91 Medium 66   
Bolivia 13.29 92 Medium 67   
Guatemala 12.97 93 Medium 68   
Burma (Myanmar) 12.80 94 Medium 69   
Kenya 12.25 95 Medium 70   
Virgin Islands,  U.S. 11.95 96 Medium 71   
Armenia 11.56 97 Medium 72   
Luxembourg 10.80 98 Medium 73   
Ghana 10.58 99 Medium 74 74 
Mongolia 9.44 100 Low 1   
Cyprus 9.26 101 Low 2   
Jamaica 9.22 102 Low 3   
Latvia 9.07 103 Low 4   
Netherlands Antilles 8.82 104 Low 5   
Zimbabwe 8.49 105 Low 6   
Honduras 8.29 106 Low 7   
Brunei 8.27 107 Low 8   
Macedonia 8.23 108 Low 9   
Tanzania 7.57 109 Low 10   
Moldova 7.38 110 Low 11   
Cameroon 7.36 111 Low 12   
Uruguay 7.27 112 Low 13   
Ethiopia 6.74 113 Low 14   
Senegal 6.68 114 Low 15   
Tajikistan 6.68 115 Low 16   
Congo (Brazzaville) 6.52 116 Low 17   
El Salvador 6.48 117 Low 18   
Costa Rica 6.41 118 Low 19   
Cote dIvoire (IvoryCoast) 5.94 119 Low 20   
Bahamas, The 5.57 120 Low 21   
Papua New Guinea 5.31 121 Low 22   
Georgia 5.30 122 Low 23   
Equatorial Guinea 5.00 123 Low 24   
Albania 4.89 124 Low 25   
Nicaragua 4.82 125 Low 26   
Gabon 4.59 126 Low 27   
Mauritius 4.55 127 Low 28   
Paraguay 4.39 128 Low 29   
Kyrgyzstan 4.13 129 Low 30   
Gibraltar 3.91 130 Low 31   
Botswana 3.84 131 Low 32   
Namibia 3.81 132 Low 33   
Benin 3.65 133 Low 34   
Cambodia 3.59 134 Low 35   
Madagascar 3.38 135 Low 36   
Palestine 3.38 136 Low 37   
Nepal 3.36 137 Low 38   
Iceland 3.36 138 Low 39   
Togo 3.17 139 Low 40   
Malta 3.11 140 Low 41   
New Caledonia 3.03 141 Low 42   
Reunion 2.96 142 Low 43   
Mauritania 2.89 143 Low 44   
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Congo (Kinshasa) 2.80 144 Low 45   
Martinique 2.77 145 Low 46   
Mozambique 2.73 146 Low 47   
Macau 2.54 147 Low 48   
Fiji 2.50 148 Low 49   
Zambia 2.42 149 Low 50   
Djibouti 2.35 150 Low 51   
Suriname 2.34 151 Low 52   
Guadeloupe 2.10 152 Low 53   
Uganda 2.01 153 Low 54   
Montenegro 1.94 154 Low 55   
Niger 1.80 155 Low 56   
Barbados 1.57 156 Low 57   
Guyana 1.52 157 Low 58   
Haiti 1.46 158 Low 59   
Guam 1.45 159 Low 60   
Burkina Faso 1.44 160 Low 61   
Guinea 1.39 161 Low 62   
Malawi 1.36 162 Low 63   
Sierra Leone 1.33 163 Low 64   
Wake Island 1.29 164 Low 65   
Seychelles 1.25 165 Low 66   
Aruba 1.24 166 Low 67   
French Polynesia 1.22 167 Low 68   
Laos 1.19 168 Low 69   
French Guiana 1.12 169 Low 70   
Swaziland 1.11 170 Low 71   
Belize 0.98 171 Low 72   
Maldives 0.92 172 Low 73   
Somalia 0.90 173 Low 74   
Mali 0.89 174 Low 75   
Rwanda 0.87 175 Low 76   
Bermuda 0.81 176 Low 77   
Eritrea 0.80 177 Low 78   
Afghanistan 0.79 178 Low 79   
Faroe Islands 0.74 179 Low 80   
Liberia 0.74 180 Low 81   
Antigua and Barbuda 0.72 181 Low 82   
American Samoa 0.69 182 Low 83   
Greenland 0.56 183 Low 84   
Burundi 0.53 184 Low 85   
Guinea-Bissau 0.46 185 Low 86   
Saint Lucia 0.43 186 Low 87   
Grenada 0.43 187 Low 88   
Timor-Leste (East Timor) 0.40 188 Low 89   
Solomon Islands 0.36 189 Low 90   
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 0.33 190 Low 91   
Western Sahara 0.31 191 Low 92   
Antarctica 0.31 192 Low 93   
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.30 193 Low 94   
Cook Islands 0.30 194 Low 95   
U.S. Pacific Islands 0.29 195 Low 96   
Gambia, The 0.29 196 Low 97   
Chad 0.29 197 Low 98   
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Lesotho 0.28 198 Low 99   
Bhutan 0.28 199 Low 100   
Cayman Islands 0.27 200 Low 101   
Cape Verde 0.27 201 Low 102   
Central African Republic 0.23 202 Low 103   
Nauru 0.22 203 Low 104   
Tonga 0.16 204 Low 105   
Saint Pierre and Miquelon 0.15 205 Low 106   
Sao Tome and Principe 0.15 206 Low 107   
Comoros 0.15 207 Low 108   
Virgin Islands, British 0.15 208 Low 109   
Samoa 0.15 209 Low 110   
Montserrat 0.15 210 Low 111   
Vanuatu 0.15 211 Low 112   
Dominica 0.14 212 Low 113   
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) 0.05 213 Low 114   
Kiribati 0.04 214 Low 115   
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.04 215 Low 116   
Saint Helena 0.02 216 Low 117   
Niue 0.01 217 Low 118 118 
Asia & Oceania 14,161.44         
Middle East 1,785.93       
Central & South America 1,257.74       
Africa 1,145.16       
World 31,780.36         	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APPENDIX Ch3-7 
 
National Vulnerability Ranking in 2010 
(Data Source: GAIN Index, Global Adaptation Institute, http://index.gain.org/) 
 
 
GAIN Index
Country Rankings
Rank countries by GAIN Index, Vulnerability and Readiness.
Table values show latest scores for 2010
Rank Country Income group Score
1 Denmark Upper 85.4
2 Switzerland Upper 83.6
3 Ireland Upper 82.2
4 Australia Upper 82.0
5 New Zealand Upper 81.7
6 Finland Upper 81.7
7 Norway Upper 81.4
8 United States Upper 80.0
9 Germany Upper 80.0
10 United Kingdom Upper 80.0
11 Sweden Upper 79.7
12 Czech Republic Upper 79.7
13 Austria Upper 79.5
14 Netherlands Upper 79.2
15 Iceland Upper 78.7
16 France Upper 78.7
17 Luxembourg Upper 78.5
18 Poland Upper middle 78.2
19 Canada Upper 78.2
20 Chile Upper middle 77.7
21 Slovenia Upper 77.3
22 Uruguay Upper middle 77.3
23 Spain Upper 77.2
24 Slovakia Upper 76.6
GAIN Index rankings | GAIN Index http://index.gain.org/
1 of 7 10/12/12 10:09 AM
	   406	  
 
Rank Country Income group Score
25 Japan Upper 75.5
26 Hungary Upper 75.4
27 Lithuania Upper middle 75.3
28 Estonia Upper 75.2
29 Belgium Upper 75.0
30 Portugal Upper 74.7
31 Italy Upper 74.6
32 Latvia Upper middle 74.4
33 Greece Upper 74.0
34 Cyprus Upper 73.7
35 Croatia Upper middle 73.7
36 Bulgaria Upper middle 73.3
37 Malta Upper 72.5
38 Romania Upper middle 72.3
39 Israel Upper 71.9
40 Republic of Korea Upper 71.9
41 Macedonia Lower middle 71.7
42 Mauritius Upper middle 70.9
43 Argentina Upper middle 70.3
44 Armenia Lower middle 69.7
45 Malaysia Upper middle 69.2
46 Oman Upper 68.9
47 Qatar Upper 68.8
48 Bosnia & Herzegovina Lower middle 68.8
49 United Arab Emirates Upper 68.6
50 Thailand Lower middle 68.3
51 Serbia Upper 68.1
52 Jordan Lower middle 67.5
53 Kuwait Upper 67.4
54 Panama Upper middle 67.2
55 Kazakhstan Upper middle 67.2
GAIN Index rankings | GAIN Index http://index.gain.org/
2 of 7 10/12/12 10:09 AM
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Rank Country Income group Score
56 Turkey Upper middle 66.9
57 Belarus Upper middle 66.9
58 Georgia Lower middle 66.9
59 Bahamas Upper 66.7
60 Mexico Upper middle 66.5
61 Saint Lucia Upper middle 66.4
62 Costa Rica Upper middle 66.3
63 Brazil Upper middle 65.9
64 Cape Verde Lower middle 65.9
65 Bahrain Upper 65.9
66 El Salvador Lower middle 65.6
67 Colombia Lower middle 65.4
68 Ukraine Lower middle 64.9
69 Kyrgyzstan Low 64.8
70 Egypt Lower middle 64.8
71 Albania Lower middle 64.7
72 Trinidad & Tobago Upper 64.7
73 Lebanon Upper middle 64.4
74 Peru Lower middle 64.3
75 Dominican Republic Lower middle 64.3
76 Saudi Arabia Upper 64.1
77 Tunisia Lower middle 63.8
78 Azerbaijan Lower middle 63.5
79 Jamaica Upper middle 63.5
80 Moldova Lower middle 63.5
81 Ecuador Lower middle 63.4
82 Russian Federation Upper middle 63.0
83 Paraguay Lower middle 63.0
84 Belize Upper middle 62.6
85 Indonesia Lower middle 62.6
86 Philippines Lower middle 61.9
GAIN Index rankings | GAIN Index http://index.gain.org/
3 of 7 10/12/12 10:09 AM
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Rank Country Income group Score
87 Mongolia Lower middle 61.8
88 Suriname Upper middle 61.6
89 Venezuela Upper middle 61.2
90 South Africa Upper middle 61.2
91 Algeria Lower middle 60.9
92 Honduras Lower middle 60.5
93 Dominica Upper middle 60.5
94 Iran Lower middle 60.4
95 Botswana Upper middle 60.4
96 China Lower middle 60.3
97 Nicaragua Lower middle 60.3
98 Viet Nam Low 60.2
99 Samoa Lower middle 60.2
100 Guatemala Lower middle 60.1
101 Fiji Upper middle 59.5
102 Libya Upper middle 58.9
103 Syria Lower middle 58.7
104 Bolivia Lower middle 58.3
105 Tonga Lower middle 58.0
106 Vanuatu Lower middle 58.0
107 Morocco Lower middle 57.5
108 Uzbekistan Low 57.4
109 Namibia Lower middle 57.2
110 Cuba Upper middle 56.7
111 Bhutan Lower middle 56.3
112 Gabon Upper middle 56.2
113 Ghana Low 55.8
114 Tajikistan Low 55.1
115 Guyana Lower middle 54.7
116 Gambia Low 53.7
117 India Lower middle 53.6
GAIN Index rankings | GAIN Index http://index.gain.org/
4 of 7 10/12/12 10:09 AM
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Rank Country Income group Score
118 Swaziland Lower middle 52.3
119 Pakistan Low 52.0
120 Sao Tome & Principe Low 51.5
121 Benin Low 51.5
122 Senegal Low 50.8
123 Djibouti Lower middle 50.4
124 Cambodia Low 50.1
125 Laos Low 50.1
126 Tanzania Low 50.0
127 Madagascar Low 49.6
128 Rwanda Low 49.4
129 Bangladesh Low 49.4
130 Burkina Faso Low 49.4
131 Côte d'Ivoire Low 49.3
132 Uganda Low 49.1
133 Zambia Low 48.9
134 Cameroon Lower middle 48.6
135 Malawi Low 48.5
136 Nepal Low 48.4
137 Mali Low 48.2
138 Kenya Low 48.1
139 Lesotho Lower middle 47.9
140 Nigeria Low 47.7
141 Comoros Low 47.6
142 Papua New Guinea Low 47.6
143 Equatorial Guinea Upper 47.3
144 Mozambique Low 47.3
145 Congo Lower middle 47.3
146 Mauritania Low 46.6
147 Yemen Low 45.7
148 Guinea-Bissau Low 45.4
GAIN Index rankings | GAIN Index http://index.gain.org/
5 of 7 10/12/12 10:09 AM
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Rank Country Income group Score
149 Guinea Low 44.9
150 Togo Low 44.5
151 Niger Low 44.0
152 Liberia Low 43.6
153 Sierra Leone Low 43.4
154 Myanmar Low 43.0
155 Angola Lower middle 42.7
156 Eritrea Low 41.8
157 Ethiopia Low 40.4
158 Chad Low 38.4
159 Burundi Low 38.2
160 Zimbabwe Low 38.0
161 Central African Republic Low 37.6
 Tuvalu Low -
 Solomon Islands Low -
 Singapore Upper -
 Seychelles Upper middle -
 Sudan Lower middle -
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea Low -
 Palau Upper middle -
 Nauru Low -
 Montenegro Upper -
 Turkmenistan Lower middle -
 Timor-Leste Low -
 Marshall Islands Lower middle -
 Maldives Lower middle -
 Monaco Upper -
 Sri Lanka Lower middle -
 San Marino Upper -
 Liechtenstein Upper -
 Saint Kitts and Nevis Upper middle -
GAIN Index rankings | GAIN Index http://index.gain.org/
6 of 7 10/12/12 10:09 AM
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Global Adaptation Institute
1747 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 1125 - Washington, DC 20006
Global Adaptation Institute
Rank Country Income group Score
 Kiribati Lower middle -
 Iraq Lower middle -
 Haiti Low -
 Grenada Upper middle -
 St Vincent & Grenadines Upper middle -
 Federated States of Micronesia Lower middle -
 Democratic Republic of the Congo Low -
 Somalia Low -
 Brunei Darussalam Upper -
 Barbados Upper -
 Antigua and Barbuda Upper -
 Andorra Upper -
 Afghanistan Low -
GAIN Index
The GAIN Index, a project of the Global Adaption Institute (GAIN), summarizes a country's Vulnerability
to climate change and other global challenges on the one hand and its Readiness to improve resilience
on the other hand. It aims to help businesses and the public sector better prioritize investments for a
more efficient response to the immediate global challenges ahead.
World wide ranking by GAIN Index, higher scores are better.
GAIN Index rankings | GAIN Index http://index.gain.org/
7 of 7 10/12/12 10:09 AM
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APPENDIX Ch3-8 	  
Participants’ Membership in Current UNFCCC Negotiation Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Totals refer to the total number of study participants in this negotiation group (e.g., only five 
countries of the Umbrella Group are represented, but eight individuals from these five 
countries participated in the study.) 
 
 
 
Umbrella 
Group EU
G77 & 
China
AOSIS/ 
SIDS BASIC LDCs ALBA EIG CRN
1 Argentina ✓ ✓ 5
2 Australia ✓ 4
3 Bangladesh ✓ ✓ ✓ 2
4 Barbados ✓ ✓ 6
5 Bolivia ✓ 2
6 Botswana ✓ 3
7 Brazil ✓ ✓ 1
8 Canada (2) ✓ 4
9 Cape Verde ✓ ✓ 6
10 Colombia ✓ 2
11 Denmark ✓ 5
12 Dominica ✓ ✓ ✓ 3
13 Finland (2) ✓ 5
14 Germany ✓ 4
15 Grenada ✓ ✓ 3
16 Guatemala ✓ ✓ 2
17 Iceland ✓ 6
18 Indonesia ✓ ✓ 1
19 Japan ✓ 4
20 Mozambique ✓ ✓ 3
21 Namibia ✓ 3
22 Pakistan ✓ ✓ 2
23 Philippines ✓ 2
24 Samoa ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 3
25 Singapore ✓ 5
26 South Africa ✓ ✓ 1
27 South Korea (2) ✓ 4
28 Sweden (2) ✓ 5
29 Uganda ✓ ✓ ✓ 3
30 US (3) ✓ 4
Total 8 5 18 6 2 4 1 2 8
Participant 
Group
Negotiation Group
State
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Core Cognitive-Affective Maps 
 
 
GROUP 1-HEHV & Youth NGOs 
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GROUP 2-MEHV & Faith and Development NGOs 
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GROUP 3-LEHV & Environment NGOs 
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GROUP 4-HELV & Business and Technology NGOs & Fossil Fuel Industry 
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GROUP 5-MELV & Environment & Market NGOs 
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GROUP 6-LELV & Sub-national Government 
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APPENDIX Ch5-1 
 
Q Method PILOT PROJECT – List of Statements (Q Set) 
(Statements marked blue have been removed for the main study.) 
 
 
1. Climate scientists don’t agree about the scientific case for global warming. 
2. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change.  
3. Climate scientists are cooking the books to get more research funding. 
4. We just don’t know enough about climate change to design good, effective climate policies.  
5. I do not believe that we will see significant effects of climate change in my lifetime. 
6. Hearing about climate science usually leaves me worried about the future and feeling 
rather helpless. 
7. Climate change can cause many environmental changes, such as Arctic sea ice melting 
and species loss, but humans do not need to be too concerned about this. 
8. The social consequences of climate change are most worrying: Whole countries and 
cultures will disappear, many people will suffer from food and water scarcity, or will be 
forced to migrate. 
9. Climate change is an issue for the developing countries. 
10. Climate change is mainly a global energy problem. 
11. The prospect of a cleaner, eco-friendly economy is exciting! 
12. Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries, but its impacts will hurt poor 
countries most; and that is not fair.   
13. Green anti-climate change policies, and environmentalism more generally, threaten 
progress and modernity.  
14. The prospect of climate change makes me fear for my children’s future. 
15. An effective climate solution requires the cooperation of all governments around the 
world.  
16. States are the most important players in global climate politics.  
17. Even if a new global treaty is signed with ambitious GHG emission reduction targets, most 
states will simply not be able to implement these targets domestically.  
18. Only the 15-20 countries with significant GHG emissions are important for climate 
negotiations. 
19. Our most important concern regarding climate change is domestic action – all our efforts 
and resources should be concentrated here, rather than internationally. 
20. Unilateral action is pointless. 
21. The power disparities between countries in climate negotiations, like between the US and 
Tuvalu, make me very upset. 
22. The climate problem should be left to the markets.  
23. Practical climate initiatives by regions, cities, and local communities have been more 
successful than international negotiations in the UNFCCC. It is best to leave the 
development of climate solutions to these communities.  
24. I would like to do something about climate change, but individual contributions don’t 
make a difference. 
25. Politicians need much stronger voter support and pressure from political movements to 
create meaningful climate policies. 
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26. If the climate is changing it is God’s will to change it, and humans cannot do anything 
about that. 
27. The vested interests blocking solutions are too powerful to allow for any meaningful action 
on climate change.  
28. Nothing will happen before a climate crisis hits. 
29. Limiting average global warming to 2°C will be sufficient to prevent major damage. 
30. We lack a clearly defined goal for global climate policy. 
31. Mitigation must be viewed as an investment, in which costs incurred now will enable us to 
avoid the risks of very severe consequences in the future.  
32. An effective deal is impossible without the US, and China coming on board.   
33. We can easily adapt to climate change, and therefore should not be worried about 
mitigation. 
34. Adaptation and mitigation are complementary and equally important policies.  
35. Given the political gridlock on mitigation, we might have to resort to geo-engineering to 
buy more time for mitigation and adaptation. 
36. Geo-engineering can solve the global warming problem much more cost-effectively than 
mitigation and therefore should receive public funding.  
37. Climate change will not be a problem because technological solutions will become 
available to fix it. 
38. Economic growth and jobs must take priority over climate concerns.  
39. Ideally climate policies would reduce GHG emissions while stimulating economic growth, 
e.g., in new clean technology sectors. 
40. Climate change policy should be based on cost-benefit analysis.  
41. The main costs of climate change policies include loss of GDP and jobs, and increased 
costs for social services, such as unemployment benefits. 
42. The main costs of future climate change can simply not be calculated: the loss of human 
life, the social costs of major migration and food insecurity, the loss of major ecosystems 
and species extinction don’t have price tags. 
43. Elected officials have a political responsibility to protect the interests of their constituency 
- they have to focus on the issues of the present rather than future generations.  
44. I don’t know of any benefits of effective climate change policies. 
45. We should leave it to those countries that will be most affected to solve the climate 
problem. 
46. Economic growth is the best solution to climate change. 
47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
48. Investment in climate policies is a poor use of our resources; it makes more sense to do 
something about poverty, health care and education in the developing world. 
49. My country should aspire to become a leader in clean technology and innovation.  
50. I am proud that our wealth and happiness has been generated with the help of oil and gas.  
51. The prospect of major environmental change, such as the melting of glaciers or species 
extinction, is very distressing. 
52. I am ashamed that my country is not doing more about climate change. 
53. The BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) are aspiring global powers, 
and should show greater leadership in international climate negotiations. 
54. I dedicate my career to solving the climate problem. 
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55. The idea that our government might restrict individual freedom and private property for 
something as uncertain and unreal as climate change is very upsetting. 
56. Based on our shared humanity, our desire for happiness and security, we can find a 
solution to the climate problem. 
57. It’s painful to see how little governments and markets care about the environment and the 
health of the planet. 
58. All states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a global climate solution. 
Governments owe it to the people suffering the consequences of climate disruption. 
59. The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical responsibility to 
future generations.  
60. Future generations are likely to be richer and better off than we are. Since they will be 
better able to deal with climate change impacts, we do not need to worry about them.  
61. I like the idea that climate funding from rich countries will help people in developing 
countries to adapt to climate change.  
62. The rich countries have caused the problem; consequently they have the obligation to fix it. 
1. Statement 63 – I believe that we will find a cooperative solution to climate change. Other 
issues have taken many years of negotiation, too. 
63. Climate change is a very depressing issue. 
64. Climate change is simply too complex and overwhelming. It is impossible to fully 
understand, let alone solve, the problem. 
65. It is already too late to do anything about climate change. 
66. Climate change scares me because I don’t know what’s going to happen. 
67. Climate change is not the only issue we have to deal with. Currently other issues, including 
sovereign debt and unemployment, are more important than climate change. 
68. The focus on winning the next election is the biggest obstacle to finding international 
agreement.  
69. I sometimes wonder how to explain our failure to fix the climate problem to my 
grandchildren. It makes me feel ashamed. 
70. The threat of losing your job is more tangible and real than the threat of climate change. 
71. I have a hard time imagining or picturing the consequences of climate change for my 
community and my country. 
72. Sometimes gradual processes such as GHG emissions result in sudden, dramatic changes 
in the environment. The existence of such tipping points makes action even more urgent 
than previously thought. Avoiding tipping points should become a key climate policy goal. 
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APPENDIX Ch5-2 
 
Q Method PILOT PROJECT – Summary of Results 
 
 
Q Method Pilot Results 
The Role of Cognition in 
Global Climate Politics 
Manjana Milkoreit 
February 8, 2012 
Agenda 
1.  Pilot Participants – Demographics 
2.  Pilot Participants – General Attitudes 
3.  Q Analysis – Main Results  
a)  4 Perspectives/Narratives 
b)  Factors & Thought Communities 
4.  Adjustments to the Study Design 
a)  Instructions 
b)  Statements 
1. Pilot Participants - Demographics 
•  44 Participants from 10 countries 
•  29 Men and 12 women (70/30%) 
▫  3 participants without demographic 
information 
•  Age range 22-61 
•  Professions: 
▫  24 Academics (grad students, 
researchers, professors), 
▫  5 Consultants/Analysts, 
▫  3 Lawyers/judges, 
▫  9 others (incl. CEO, Director in 
Foundation, Project Manager, …) 
•  Political Spectrum: 
▫  28 Left/liberal, “progressive” and 
center-left, 
▫  1 Center, 
▫  2 Right/conservative. 
1a. Thought Communities 
1.  Important? 
2.  Tractable? 
3.  High national emissions? 
4.  High national vulnerability? 
•  YYYY – (Reasonable) Optimists 
•  YYYN – Moral optimists 
•  YYNY – Optimists without a choice 
•  YNYY/YNYN – Powerful Pessimists (divide?) 
•  YNNY/YNNN - Powerless Pessimists 
•  NNYY/NYYY/NYYN – Negligent Deniers 
1b. Pilot Participants – Thought Communities 
 (Reasonable) 
Optimists 
(YYYY) 
Moral Optimists 
(YYYN) 
Optimists 
without a choice 
(YYNY) 
Powerful 
Pessimists 
(YNYY/ YNYN) 
Powerless 
Pessimists 
(YNNY/YNNN) 
Negligent 
Deniers (N/YN / 
NNYY) 
Canada Germany South Africa Canada US 
Canada Germany Canada 
Canada Germany Canada 
Canada Germany Canada 
Canada Germany Canada 
Germany Germany Canada 
Germany Germany Germany 
Germany Germany Germany 
Sweden Canada Germany 
US Canada Germany 
Norway Germany 
Belgium Germany 
UK US 
US 
Ireland 
Australia 
10 13 1 16 0 1 
2. Pilot Participants – General Attitudes 
•  Generally strong disagreement (-5) with the statement on God’s will, 
•  Everyone is excited about a “greener future” and aspire to national leadership 
in clean technology, 
•  No participants would trust the markets (or economic growth) to solve the 
problem (highest score +1, Ø score -3), 
•  Nobody thought that sub-national actors could solve the problem (highest 
score +2, average score -1),  
•  Feelings of helplessness are limited (Ø score +1), 
•  Less than 1/3 fear for their children’s future (Ø score +1; 14 score +3 or 
more), 
•  Few find it very depressing (Ø score +1) or too complex (Ø score -1), 
•  Few felt strongly about power disparities in international negotiations (Ø 
score +1), 
•  Less than half believe that the rich countries have a special responsibility 
(scores +3 or more), 
•  Few considered vested interests to be important (Ø score +1), 
•  Few though 2°C was a “sufficient” goal (Ø score -1), 
•  More than half are worried about tipping points (26 scored +3 or more). 
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3. Q Analysis: 4 Main Viewpoints 
Factor Arrays 
 
No.  Statement                                                    No.        1      2      3      4 
  
  1  Climate scientists don't agree about the scientific case for   1       -2     -4      0      1 
  2  I don't trust what scientists say about climate change.        2       -4     -4     -2     -1 
  3  Climate scientists are cooking the books to get more researc   3       -4     -5     -3      1 
  4  We just don't know enough about climate change to design goo   4       -1     -2     -1     -2 
  5  I do not believe that we will see significant effects of cli   5       -2     -3     -2     -4 
  6  Hearing about climate science usually leaves me worried abou   6        1      0      0      2 
  7  Climate change can cause many environmental changes, such as   7       -3     -5     -3     -5 
  8  The social consequences of climate change are most worrying:   8        4      4      5      2 
  9  Climate change is an issue for the developing countries.       9        0      1     -5      0 
 10  Climate change is mainly a global energy problem.             10        1      1      0      0 
 11  The prospect of a cleaner eco-friendly economy is exciting!   11        5      4      4      3 
 12  Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries,  12        1      4      3      2 
 13  Green anti-climate change policies, and environmentalism mor  13       -4     -4     -4     -3 
 14  The prospect of climate change makes me fear for my children  14        2      2      1      4 
 15  An effective climate solution requires the cooperation of al  15        4      2      4      3 
 16  States are the most important players in global climate poli  16        1      2      4      0 
 17  Even if a new global treaty is signed with ambitious GHG emi  17        0      0      0      0 
 18  Only the 15-20 countries with significant GHG emissions are   18       -2      0     -1      0 
 19  Our most important concern regarding climate change is domes  19       -1     -1     -1     -1 
 20  Unilateral action is pointless.                               20        0     -1      3     -2 
 21  The power disparities between countries in climate negotiati  21        1      0      2      1 
 22  The climate problem should be left to the markets.            22       -5     -3     -4     -4 
  
 !
3a. Factor 1 
1.  +5 Statements 
▫  My country should aspire to become a leader in clean technology and innovation. 
▫  The prospect of a cleaner eco-friendly economy is exciting! 
▫  The main costs of future climate change can simply not be calculated: the loss of human lives, … 
2.  -5 Statements 
▫  The climate problem should be left to the markets.  
▫  We should leave it to those countries that will be most affected to solve the climate problem. 
▫  If the climate is changing it is God's will to change it, and humans can do nothing about it.  
3.  Statements ranked higher than other factors 
▫  An effective climate solution requires the cooperation of all governments.  (+4 ) 
▫  I am ashamed that my country is not doing more about climate change. (+3 ) 
▫  The focus on winning the next election is the biggest obstacle to finding int. agreement. (+3 ) 
4.  Statements ranked lower than other factors 
▫  I don't trust what scientists say about climate change.  (-4 ) 
▫  Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries, but its impacts will be … ( +1 ) 
▫  Only the 15-20 countries with significant GHG emissions are important for climate 
negotiations. ( -2 ) 
▫  I believe that we will find a cooperative solution to climate change. Other issues have taken 
many years of negotiation too. ( -1 ) 
3a. Factor 1: Educated Confusion (7) 
While these individuals place greatest emphasis on a positive vision of 
cleaner future, they are also most pessimistic about the chances of 
finding international agreement on climate change. The strongest theme 
is the emphasis on the shared responsibility by “all governments”, and the 
rejection of a special role for any of the other actors mentioned (individuals, 
markets, US & China, BASIC, 15-20 big emitters, rich countries, sub-national 
actors, vested interests).  
There is a significant concern with political short-termism as a key obstacle 
to action. However, they do not consider the state to be the most important 
actor, which leaves me (them?) puzzled who can and should address this 
problem (location of agency?). At the same time they feel ashamed that their 
country is not doing more. 
This group strongly trusts climate scientists, but they find it hard to envision 
the future and fear it more than the other groups. They are least content with 
the 2C policy goal, and are most opposed to geo-engineering. 
Demographics: Majority is Canadian, almost all group members are 
academics (graduate student, post-doc, professor); all self-identified liberals, 
most in the age range between 20 and 40. 
3b. Factor 2 
1.  +5 Statements 
•  My country should aspire to become a leader in clean technology and 
innovation. 
•  All states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a global climate solution.  
•  The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical 
responsibility to future generations. 
2.  -5 Statements 
•  Climate scientists are cooking the books to get more research funding. 
•  If the climate is changing it is God's will to change it,  .. 
•  Climate change can cause many environmental changes, …, but humans don’t 
need to worry about that. 
3.  Statements ranked higher than other factors 
•  Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries, but the impacts … 
and that’s not fair. (+4)  
•  Climate change policy should be based on cost-benefit analysis. (+2)  
•  Adaptation and mitigation are complementary and equally important. (+3)  
4.  Statements ranked lower than other factors 
•  Climate scientists don't agree about the scientific case for climate change. (-4)  
•  I don't know of any benefits of effective climate change policies. (-4)  
•  Hearing about climate science usually leaves me worried about the future … (0)  
3b. Factor 2: Fairness Champions (29) 
This group places strong emphasis on moral obligations (of states, 
politicians and voters), including to future generations, and fairness (e.g., 
unfair distribution of causes and consequences).  However, they are not 
upset about existing power disparities (0).  
They strongly disagree with claims about scientific fraud or disagreement and 
a role for God. They are the strongest supporters of CBA, and consider 
economic growth desirable. 
They do not identify who should be responsible for addressing climate change. 
The statement on “all governments” gets the lowest score across all factors, 
but BASIC countries should do more (+3). Politicians need stronger 
voter support, but vested interests are not singled out as problem.   
This group is concerned about the environment (e.g., distress over 
environmental change). At the same time they show the lowest level of 
worry about the future and helplessness (0). Fear does not seem to play a 
role; neither do they feel that the problem is complex and overwhelming. 
Demographics: biggest factor, 1/3 is German and 1/3 Canadian, almost 2/3 
are academics (graduate student, post-doc, professor),. 
3c. Factor 3 
1.  +5 Statements 
▫  The social consequences of climate change are most worrying: the disappearance of 
entire states and cultures, … 
▫  Politicians need much stronger voter support and pressure from political 
movements … 
▫  The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical responsibility 
to future generations.  
2.  -5 Statements 
▫  Climate change is an issue for the developing countries.  
▫  Economic growth and jobs must take priority over climate concerns. 
▫  We should leave it to those countries that will be most affected to solve the climate 
problem.   
3.  Statements ranked higher than other factors 
▫  States are the most important players in global climate politics. 
▫  Nothing will happen before a climate crisis hits.  
▫  Given the political gridlock on mitigation, we might have to resort to geo-
engineering.  
4.  Statements ranked lower than other factors 
▫  The prospect of climate change makes me fear for my children’s future. 
▫  Elected officials have a political responsibility to … focus on the issues of the present 
rather than future generations. 
▫  Climate change is a very depressing issue  
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3c. Factor 3: Liberal Optimists (2) 
This group considers the (community of all) state(s) to be responsible for 
solving the climate problem. They think the BASIC countries should show 
greater leadership, and have little confidence that sub-national actors 
can contribute significantly to a solution. 
Group members are not concerned about the environment, but very worried 
about the social impacts of climate change. They show the greatest but 
still moderate (+2) concern about power disparities in the international 
system. They strongly disagree with a prioritization of growth and 
jobs over climate change and do not want to leave it to the markets.  
They place more emphasis than others on the fact that nothing might happen 
until a climate crisis hits. They identify “winning the next election” as a 
major obstacle to international agreement and  strongly disagree with the 
statement that elected officials have no obligations to future generations. 
Worried about the political gridlock they are the only group showing 
moderate support for the need to resort to geo-engineering (+2). 
However, they remain optimists: they neither fear the future nor find the 
issue depressing, and strongly disagree with the notion that it might already 
be too late to solve the problem. They also show least concern about tipping 
points and are fairly confident (+2) that the international community will 
find a solution.  
3d. Factor 4  
1.  +5 Statements 
▫  Ideally climate policies would reduce GHG emissions while stimulating economic 
growth, e.g., in new clean technology sectors. 
▫  The main costs of future climate change can simply not be calculated, e.g., … 
▫  The prospect of major environmental change, such as … is very distressing.    
2.  -5 Statements 
▫  Climate change can cause many environmental changes, such as … but humans 
don’t need to worry about that. 
▫  Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
▫  If the climate is changing it is God's will to change it, and … 
3.  Statements ranked higher than other factors 
▫  Climate scientists don't agree about the scientific case for cc. (+1) 
▫  Hearing about climate science usually leaves me worried about the future and 
feeling rather helpless. (+2) 
▫  The prospect of climate change makes me fear for my children’s future.  (+4) 
4.  Statements ranked lower than other factors 
▫  The social consequences of climate change are most worrying: .. (+2) 
▫  Climate change will not be a problem because technological solutions will … (-4) 
▫  The rich countries have caused the problem; consequently they have the 
obligation to fix it (-1).  
3d. Factor 4: Emotional Outlook (6) 
These individuals take a longer-term view and see a strong link between 
environmental change and social disruption. The need to address the question 
of growth when trying to reduce GHG is very dominant in their view. This 
group’s concern about the social effects of climate change exists despite a 
comparatively low level of trust in scientists and scientific consensus. They 
are concerned about the lack of a clearly defined policy goal and consider the 2C 
target as insufficient to prevent major harm.  
This group experiences strong negative emotions: thinking about major 
environmental change is very distressing and climate change is a very 
depressing issue. They are most worried about the future and experience more 
fear for themselves and their children’s future than other factors. These feelings 
might be rooted in their lack of confidence in scientific information. 
This group does not identify a specific set of actors as responsible for solving the 
problem, but they don’t believe that (individual) states can solve it. Placing the 
statement about states as most important players (and sub-state actors) at 0 
could indicate ambivalence: states are considered important but cannot 
solve the problem alone. In that sense they see a role for individuals, and 
probably private actors. They strongly support the idea that the BASIC countries 
should do more, and reject the suggestion that the rich countries have a special 
responsibility to address climate change because they caused the problem.  
4. Adjustments to the Study Design 
1.  Change Instructions 
▫  Add a suggestion to work with a sheet of paper and take notes regarding the importance of 
statements 
2.  Delete Statements (15) 
▫  Climate scientists are cooking the books to get more research funding. 
▫  We just don’t know enough about climate change to design good, effective climate policies.  
▫  Climate change can cause many environmental changes, such as Arctic sea ice melting and 
species loss, but humans do not need to be too concerned about this.  
▫  If the climate is changing it is God’s will to change it, and humans cannot do anything about 
that.  
▫  Climate change is mainly a global energy problem.  
▫  An effective deal is impossible without the US, and China coming on board.  
▫  Unilateral action is pointless. 
▫  We should leave it to those countries that will be most affected to solve the climate problem.  
▫  My country should aspire to become a leader in clean technology and innovation.   
▫  I don’t know of any benefits of effective climate change policies. 
▫  The idea that our government might restrict individual freedom and private property for 
something as uncertain and unreal as climate change is very upsetting. 
▫  The threat of losing your job is more tangible and real than the threat of climate change. 
▫  I am proud that our wealth and happiness has been generated with the help of oil and gas.  
▫  Mitigation must be viewed as an investment, in which costs incurred now will enable us to avoid 
the risks of very severe consequences in the future.  
▫  Climate change will not be a problem because technological solutions will become available to 
fix it. 
4. Adjustments to the Study Design 
3.  Add Statements (5) 
▫  Nature of the problem: “Climate change will result in violence and human 
deaths.”  
▫  Multilevel interactions: “Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve 
this problem on their own – climate change requires coordinated action at all of 
these different levels of action.”  
▫  Agency: “A key element in solving the climate problem is the need for 
fundamental value change within our societies.  
▫  Policy Options: “Taxes – whether globally or domestically – and other policies 
that constrain private property rights are simply not politically acceptable in 
our system.”  
▫  Hope: “There are moments when I lose all hope that the we can solve this 
problem.” 
4.  Change Statements (2) 
▫  Climate Scientists don’t agree about the scientific case for global warming.  
There is no agreement among scientists about the causes and consequences of 
climate change. 
▫  We can easily adapt to climate change, and therefore should not be worried 
about mitigation.  Since the climate is going to change, we should be more 
concerned about adaptation. 
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APPENDIX Ch5-3 
 
Q Method – List of Statements (Q Set) 
 
Causes of Climate Change 
1. Human-released greenhouse gases are causing significant climate change. 
2. I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change.  
3. Anti-climate change policies threaten progress and modernity.  
 
Consequences of Climate Change 
4. I do not believe that we will see significant effects of climate change in my lifetime. 
5. The social consequences of climate change are most worrying: Whole countries and 
cultures will disappear; many people will suffer from food and water scarcity, or will be 
forced to migrate. 
6. Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing countries. 
7. Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries, but its impacts will hurt poor 
countries most – this asymmetry is unfair.   
8. Climate change will result in violence and human deaths. 
 
Actors and Agency 
9. An effective climate solution requires the cooperation of all governments around the 
world.  
10. States are the most important players in global climate politics.  
11. Even if a new international treaty is signed with ambitious mitigation targets, many states 
will simply not be able to implement these targets domestically.  
12. Only a small number of countries with significant GHG emissions are important for 
climate negotiations. 
13. All our efforts and resources to combat climate change should be concentrated 
domestically, rather than internationally. 
14. The power disparities between countries in climate negotiations make me very upset. 
15. The climate problem should be left to the markets.  
16. It is best to leave the development of climate solutions to regions, cities, and local 
communities - they have been much more successful than UNFCCC negotiations. 
17. Individual contributions don’t make a difference when it comes to climate change.  
18. Politicians need much stronger voter support and pressure from political movements to 
create meaningful climate policies. 
19. The vested interests blocking solutions are too powerful to allow for any meaningful action 
on climate change.  
20. Nothing will happen before a climate crisis hits. 
21. Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve this problem on their own – climate 
change is a multilevel problem and requires action at all of these different levels. 
22. A key element in solving the climate problem is the need for fundamental value change 
within our societies.  
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23. Based on our shared humanity, our desire for happiness and security, we can find a 
solution to the climate problem. 
24. God has made us stewards of the Earth, giving us the ability and responsibility to keep the 
planet healthy. 
 
Policy Goals and Options 
25. The prospect of a cleaner, eco-friendly economy is exciting. 
26. Limiting average global warming to 2°C will be sufficient to prevent major damage. 
27. We lack a clearly defined goal for global climate policy. 
28. Since the climate is going to change we should be more concerned with adaptation. 
29. Adaptation and mitigation are complementary and equally important policies.  
30. Given the political gridlock on mitigation, we might have to resort to geo-engineering to 
buy more time for mitigation and adaptation. 
31. Geo-engineering can solve the global warming problem much more cost-effectively than 
mitigation.  
32. Taxes – whether globally or domestically – and other policies that constrain private 
property rights are simply not politically acceptable in our system. 
 
Climate Economics and Development 
33. Economic growth and jobs must take priority over climate concerns.  
34. Ideally climate policies would reduce GHG emissions while stimulating economic growth. 
35. Climate change policy should be based on cost-benefit analysis.  
36. The main costs of climate change policies include loss of GDP and jobs. 
37. The main costs of future climate change can simply not be calculated: the loss of human 
life, food insecurity, or species extinctions don’t have price tags. 
38. Economic growth is the best solution to climate change. 
39. Investment in climate policies is a poor use of our resources; it makes more sense to do 
something about poverty, health care and education in the developing world. 
 
Identity 
40. The prospect of major environmental change, such as the melting of glaciers or species 
extinction, is very distressing. 
41. I am ashamed that my country is not doing more about climate change. 
42. The BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) should show greater 
leadership in international climate negotiations. 
43. I dedicate my career to solving the climate problem. 
44. It is disappointing to see how little governments and markets care about the environment 
and the health of the planet. 
45. My government is a very constructive player in international affairs. 
 
Ethics and Justice 
46. Elected officials have a political responsibility to protect the interests of their constituency 
- the present rather than future generations.  
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47. Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. 
48. All states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a global climate solution.  
49. The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical responsibility to 
future generations.  
50. Future generations are likely to be richer and better off than we are, and better able to deal 
with climate change.  
51. I fully support climate funding – financial flows from the rich to the poor to help them 
cope with climate change. 
52. The rich countries have caused the problem; consequently they have the obligation to fix it. 
 
Special Characteristics (Hope, Uncertainty, Myopia, Imperceptibility, Tipping Points) 
53. Contemplating climate change usually leaves me feeling rather helpless. 
54. Climate change makes me fear for my children’s future. 
55. I believe that we will find a cooperative solution to climate change. Other issues have 
taken many years of negotiation, too. 
56. Climate change is a very depressing issue. 
57. Climate change is simply too complex and overwhelming. It is impossible to fully 
understand, let alone solve, the problem. 
58. It is already too late to do anything about climate change. 
59. There are moments when I lose all hope that the UNFCCC process can solve this problem. 
60. Climate change scares me because I don’t know what’s going to happen. 
61. Climate change is not the only issue we have to deal with and other issues are often more 
urgent. 
62. The focus on winning the next election is the biggest obstacle to finding international 
agreement.  
63. I sometimes wonder how to explain our failure to fix the climate problem to my 
grandchildren.  
64. I have a hard time imagining the consequences of climate change for my community and 
my country. 
65. Sometimes gradual processes such as GHG emissions result in sudden, dramatic changes 
in the environment. The existence of such climatic tipping points makes action even more 
urgent than previously thought. Avoiding tipping points should become a key climate 
policy goal. 
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APPENDIX Ch5-4 
 
Q Method – Instructions and Questions 
 
 
I. INSTRUCTIONS 
 
STEP 1 – Reading and Pre-Sorting Statements 
 
In a moment you will be shown a set of opinion statements (on climate change and 
international cooperation) on 65 'cards'. These statements have been drawn from a broad set of 
sources and reflect various perspectives on the climate issue. The statements show up in a 
random order, but they fall in roughly eight different categories: (1) climate science, (2) nature 
of the problem, (3) actors & agency, (4) policy goals and options, (5) economics & 
development, (6) identity, (7) ethics and justice, (8) special characteristics. Later you will be 
asked to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements on a scale from -5 to +5.  
Please read the statements on the cards carefully and split them up into three piles: a pile for 
statements you tend to disagree with (on the left), a pile for statements you tend to agree with 
(on the right), and a pile for the rest (in the middle). The middle pile should contain statements 
that are not very meaningful to you or that you feel conflicted about (you cannot decide 
whether you agree or disagree with them). 
Do not worry about the number of statements in each pile. The distribution is not relevant. For 
example, you could place 10 statements in the “agree” pile, 12 in the “uncertain” pile and the 
rest in the “disagree” pile. 
You can either drag the cards into one of the three piles or press 1, 2, 3 on your keyboard. 
Changes can be made later. 
You might find it useful to work with a sheet of paper and note down the values (between -5 
and +5) you might later assign to these statements. You could also note your thoughts on 
statements you find hard to place. At the end of the survey you will be asked about those. 
Please note the following abbreviations and definitions: 
GHG – Greenhouse gas emissions, 
Mitigation – Measures to slow down and prevent climate change, mainly GHG emissions 
reductions and energy efficiency improvements, 
Adaptation – Measures to adjust to climatic changes, e.g., building defenses against sea-level 
rise, growing different (e.g., more drought-resistant) crops, migrating, 
Geo-engineering – Planned (engineered) large-scale interventions to change the climate (e.g., 
cloud-whitening, air capture and storage of carbon dioxide, blocking (some) incoming sunlight 
by spraying small particles (aerosols) into the stratosphere. 
IMPORTANT: If you want to read this instruction or the abbreviations and definitions a 
second time, press the help-button at the bottom right corner.  
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STEP 2 – Ranking the Statements 
 
Next you will be shown a grid (-5 to +5) and the statements in the pre-sorted piles at the 
bottom of the page. The goal is to place all the cards in the grid above based on your level of 
(dis)agreement with them. What matters most is the final composition of the grid, not how you 
got there. Below I suggest one way to approach this ranking. If you choose another approach, 
please make sure that you spend some time in the end to move statements to their best place 
based on your beliefs (Step 3). 
Please read the statements in your "Agree"-pile again. Select the TWO statements that you 
AGREE WITH MOST and place them on right side of the score sheet below the "+5". It does 
not matter which of these you place at the top or at the bottom. Next, from the remaining pile 
select the four statements that you AGREE WITH MOST and place them in the four spots 
below the "+4". Proceed until all statements you agree with have been placed on the grid. 
Next, focus on the cards in the "Disagree"-pile. Please read through the cards again and - just 
like before - select the two statements that you DISAGREE WITH MOST and place them on 
the left side of the score sheet below the "-5". Proceed until all statements you disagree with 
have been placed on the grid. 
Finally, look at the remaining cards in the “Neither/Conflicted” pile. Please read through these 
statements once again and place the cards in the remaining spots on the score sheet. 
Please note that it is possible that you end up placing some statements that you agree with in 
the “0” column, or even in the “disagree with” area of the grid, or vice versa. This is not a 
problem, since the purpose of the grid is to establish the relative agreement with and 
importance of these statements. Please email me (manjana@mac.com) if you experience 
serious problems with this issue.  
IMPORTANT: If you want to read this instruction a second time, press the help-button at the 
bottom right corner.   
 
STEP 3 – Check and Adjust Your Ranking 
 
You have now placed all cards onto the grid. Please look over your grid once more for a final 
check and shift cards if you want to. You can drag statements out of their current location back 
into one of the three piles, and then relocate from there or swap cards directly. 
 
STEP 4 – Help us Interpret Your Ranking 
 
Please explain why you have placed your selected statements under “+5” (most agree with) 
and “-5” (most disagree with). 
  
STEP 5 – Some Final Questions 
 
Almost done! The final step consists of a number of questions about yourself and about your 
ranking. This part might be the most valuable for understanding your ranking and how your 
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point of view compares with other. Therefore any brief comment would be greatly 
appreciated! 
Questions 1-4 and 6-11 are required to finish the Q Sort; all other questions are voluntary. 
 
II.  QUESTIONS (POST-SORTING) 
 
General Questions  
1. Name 
2. Nationality 
3. Current Occupation 
4. Country of Residence 
5. Age 
 
Participant Group  
1. Do you think climate change is an important problem, i.e., among the top five issues global 
leaders should worry about? 
2. Is an international agreement necessary to address climate change? 
3. Are you optimistic that climate change will be addressed effectively with cooperative 
international policies, i.e., is it a tractable problem? 
4. Does your home country have comparatively high GHG emissions?  
5. Do you expect your home country will be strongly, negatively affected by climate change? 
6. Do you expect that you will be personally, negatively affected by climate change? 
 
Interpretation Questions 
1. Why did you place statements X and Y as most agree with? 
2. Why did you place statements A and B under most disagree with? 
3. Was there a statement missing that you needed to represent your views on climate change 
and international cooperation? 
4. Which statement did you struggle most with, i.e., which one was hardest to place? 
5. Is there a statement in the “0” column that is important to you, but that you feel conflicted 
about, i.e., you were not sure whether to place it in agree with/disagree with? Why? 
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APPENDIX Ch5-5 
 
Q Method - Factor Scores 
 	  
Statement Factor Scores 
    A B C D E F 
1 Human-released greenhouse gases are causing significant climate change. 3 5 5 4 5 3 
2 I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change.  -2 -5 -5 -4 -4 -4 
3 Anti-climate change policies threaten progress and modernity.  -3 -1 0 -1 -1 3 
4 I do not believe that we will see significant effects of climate change in my lifetime. -4 -4 -3 -2 -3 -4 
5 The social consequences of climate change are most worrying: Whole countries and cultures will disappear; many 
people will suffer from food and water scarcity, or will be forced to migrate. 
3 2 0 3 3 2 
6 Climate change is mainly an issue for the developing countries. -5 -4 -4 -5 -5 -3 
7 Climate change was caused by rich, industrialized countries, but its impacts will hurt poor countries most – this 
asymmetry is unfair. 
1 3 1 4 5 3 
8 Climate change will result in violence and human deaths. 1 3 1 1 2 3 
9 An effective climate solution requires the cooperation of all governments around the world.  5 0 4 3 3 1 
10 States are the most important players in global climate politics.  0 -1 1 0 1 2 
11 Even if a new international treaty is signed with ambitious mitigation targets, many states will simply not be able to 
implement these targets domestically. 
2 0 -1 0 -1 0 
12 Only a small number of countries with significant GHG emissions are important for climate negotiations. -4 2 -3 -3 -1 -1 
13 All our efforts and resources to combat climate change should be concentrated domestically, rather than 
internationally. 
-4 -1 -4 -2 -2 -2 
14 The power disparities between countries in climate negotiations make me very upset. 1 0 -2 2 2 4 
15 The climate problem should be left to the markets. -3 -2 1 -5 -4 -4 
16 It is best to leave the development of climate solutions to regions, cities, and local communities - they have been much 
more successful than UNFCCC negotiations. 
-1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 
17 Individual contributions don’t make a difference when it comes to climate change. -1 -2 -2 -3 -2 -1 
18 Politicians need much stronger voter support and pressure from political movements to create meaningful climate 
policies. 
3 2 4 5 4 4 
19 The vested interests blocking solutions are too powerful to allow for any meaningful action on climate change. 2 1 -2 2 2 1 
20 Nothing will happen before a climate crisis hits. 0 1 -1 -1 -1 0 
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21 Neither states nor markets nor civil society can solve this problem on their own – climate change is a multilevel 
problem and requires action at all of these different levels. 
4 4 4 4 4 1 
22 A key element in solving the climate problem is the need for fundamental value change within our societies.  5 0 3 5 1 5 
23 Based on our shared humanity, our desire for happiness and security, we can find a solution to the climate problem. 1 1 2 3 2 0 
24 God has made us stewards of the Earth, giving us the ability and responsibility to keep the planet healthy. 2 -4 -2 0 1 1 
25 The prospect of a cleaner, eco-friendly economy is exciting. 3 4 4 3 2 4 
26 Limiting average global warming to 2°C will be sufficient to prevent major damage. -3 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 
27 We lack a clearly defined goal for global climate policy. 0 0 0 1 -1 -1 
28 Since the climate is going to change we should be more concerned with adaptation. 3 1 -1 -1 3 0 
29 Adaptation and mitigation are complementary and equally important policies.  4 3 2 1 2 1 
30 Given the political gridlock on mitigation, we might have to resort to geo-engineering to buy more time for mitigation 
and adaptation. 
-2 0 0 -2 0 0 
31 Geo-engineering can solve the global warming problem much more cost-effectively than mitigation. -1 -3 -2 -3 -2 -3 
32 Taxes – whether globally or domestically – and other policies that constrain private property rights are simply not 
politically acceptable in our system. 
0 -1 -3 -2 -3 -3 
33 Economic growth and jobs must take priority over climate concerns.  -2 -3 -2 -3 -2 -2 
34 Ideally climate policies would reduce GHG emissions while stimulating economic growth. 2 4 3 1 3 1 
35 Climate change policy should be based on cost-benefit analysis.  -3 0 2 -2 -1 1 
36 The main costs of climate change policies include loss of GDP and jobs. -3 -1 0 -1 -2 -2 
37 The main costs of future climate change can simply not be calculated: the loss of human life, food insecurity, or 
species extinctions don’t have price tags. 
1 2 2 2 1 -2 
38 Economic growth is the best solution to climate change. -5 -2 1 -3 -3 -2 
39 Investment in climate policies is a poor use of our resources; it makes more sense to do some-thing about poverty, 
health care and education in the developing world. 
-2 -3 -5 -2 -3 -2 
40 The prospect of major environmental change, such as the melting of glaciers or species extinction, is very distressing. 1 3 2 2 3 1 
41 I am ashamed that my country is not doing more about climate change. -2 2 -3 1 1 4 
42 The BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) should show greater leadership in international climate 
negotiations. 
4 1 3 1 1 -1 
43 I dedicate my career to solving the climate problem. -1 2 3 0 0 0 
44 It is disappointing to see how little governments and markets care about the environment and the health of the planet. 2 1 0 3 1 2 
45 My government is a very constructive player in international affairs. 0 -3 2 -1 -3 -5 
46 Elected officials have a political responsibility to protect the interests of their constituency - the present rather than 
future generations.  
-1 -3 -1 -3 -2 -3 
47 Problems that might arise decades from now are not important to me. -4 -5 -4 -4 -4 -5 
48 All states have a moral responsibility to contribute to a global climate solution.  4 3 5 2 3 3 
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49 The current generation (of politicians and voters) has a major ethical responsibility to future generations.  2 4 3 4 4 5 
50 Future generations are likely to be richer and better off than we are, and better able to deal with climate change.  -2 -2 -1 -4 -3 -4 
51 I fully support climate funding – financial flows from the rich to the poor to help them cope with climate change. 3 3 0 3 2 3 
52 The rich countries have caused the problem; consequently they have the obligation to fix it. -2 0 -1 1 4 2 
53 Contemplating climate change usually leaves me feeling rather helpless. -1 -2 -3 -1 -1 1 
54 Climate change makes me fear for my children’s future. 0 2 1 2 0 0 
55 I believe that we will find a cooperative solution to climate change. Other issues have taken many years of negotiation, 
too. 
1 1 3 1 1 0 
56 Climate change is a very depressing issue. 0 0 0 0 0 2 
57 Climate change is simply too complex and overwhelming. It is impossible to fully understand, let alone solve, the 
problem. 
-1 -3 -3 -1 -4 -3 
58 It is already too late to do anything about climate change. -3 -4 -4 -4 -5 -3 
59 There are moments when I lose all hope that the UNFCCC process can solve this problem. 1 1 0 0 0 2 
60 Climate change scares me because I don’t know what’s going to happen. -1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 
61 Climate change is not the only issue we have to deal with and other issues are often more urgent. 1 -2 1 0 0 -2 
62 The focus on winning the next election is the biggest obstacle to finding international agreement.  -1 1 1 -1 0 -1 
63 I sometimes wonder how to explain our failure to fix the climate problem to my grandchildren.  0 -1 1 1 0 -1 
64 I have a hard time imagining the consequences of climate change for my community and my country. 0 -1 -1 0 0 -1 
65 Sometimes gradual processes such as GHG emissions result in sudden, dramatic changes in the environment. The 
existence of such climatic tipping points makes action even more urgent than previously thought. Avoiding tipping 
points should become a key climate policy goal. 
2 5 2 2 1 2 
	  
 
